European Order Research Articles

Mapping new colour lines – border studies within a workfare state

ABSTRACT This article argues that the invention of the European Union (EU) common market and the lifting of national border controls produced a mobility-control vacuum within the EU and its member states. Building on ethnographic research in the German city of Munich and symptomatic policy-paper analysis (2013–2021), it traces the emergence of a new policy field that targets ‘poverty migration’ and ‘benefit fraud’ in this vacuum. This internal border work builds on transformations of the German social system from an ethos of welfare to active labour-market policy. With the classical toolbox of national migration regimes no longer working for intra-EU movers, their mobility rights and right to residence have been increasingly restricted by making economic self-reliance a conditionality of stay and excluding those not engaged in wage labour or self-employment from welfare services. Social policy is used as a tool for controlling mobility, which we refer to as ‘workfare-state borders.' This is because it reinforces the radicalization of the workfare state by either pushing the racialized and migrantized poor into precarious wage labor or depriving them of social protection. This internal border work reconnects meritocratic logics with classical articulations of racism, thus contributing to the finely tuned reinvention of a racial order in Europe.

Ukraine’s Fate and Europe’s Future: A View from Sweden

By starting the war with Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has trampled the cooperative and democratic security order in Europe agreed upon in 1990, seeking to replace it with the tyranny of empire. If Russian aggression is not repelled in Ukraine, Moscow will be in a strong position to threaten and coerce the rest of Europe. The West needs to prepare for a long war. Sweden applied for NATO membership out of a sense of moral outrage, but also felt compelled to follow the realist instincts of its close geographical and historical neighbour Finland, which sensed imminent danger. In Europe as in Sweden, idealism and practical compulsion have converged. The West must decisively turn back Russia’s assault on Europe’s peaceful order by helping Ukrainians preserve their nation substantially intact.

France in Political Turmoil: An Inquiry into the Uncertainty of the Liberal Order in Europe

France in Political Turmoil: An Inquiry into the Uncertainty of the Liberal Order in Europe

One year since Russia invaded Ukraine

On February 24th 2022, the conflict in Ukraine became a war with global impact. The Russian army’s rapid entry into eastern Ukraine also hastened the breakdown of what remained of the post-Cold War order in Europe. Security architecture paradigms have changed dramatically at both global and European levels. US–China strategic competition, global resource markets and even Ukraine's institutional construction have all been shaken by the war. As the conflict continues to escalate on the ground, this CIDOB Nota Internacional analyses its impact in the geopolitical, economic, technological and migration fields. With no path to resolution in sight, the threat of a long war or a frozen conflict is the worst-case scenario for both Ukraine and Europe.

What policy functions are reflected in the distribution of financial support for parents by child age and birth order? An analysis of 28 European countries

AbstractMotivated by the growing prominence of fertility incentivisation and long‐term child development in European family policymaking, this paper examines the distribution of financial support for parents over the course of childhood and between birth orders in Europe. We use the term ‘older‐oriented age bias’ to refer to support that is more generous for older children and the term ‘younger‐oriented age bias’ for more generous support for younger children. Similarly, we refer to distribution patterns tilted towards later birth orders as ‘later‐oriented parity bias’ and to those that favour earlier birth orders as ‘earlier‐oriented parity bias’. Based on a list of four classical policy functions of financial support for parents (child cost compensation, fertility incentivisation, child poverty reduction, and child development), we formulate six (sets of) hypotheses for the age and parity distribution of financial support for parents. To assess these distribution patterns, we examine monthly financial support (allowance‐ and tax‐based) for the first four birth orders at child ages 2, 9, and 17 in low‐income and middle‐income households across 28 European countries as of January 2021. We find that European welfare states typically provide more generous support for younger children, while the support distribution in terms of birth orders depends on pre‐support household income. We also find considerable cross‐country heterogeneity, with fertility incentivisation and (especially) child development being reflected by more countries than child cost compensation and poverty reduction. Our analysis sheds light on previously underexplored trends and implications in the design of financial support for parents in Europe.

Zmierzch bogów. Przyczynek do poglądów i postaw arystokracji wobec upadku systemu dynastycznego w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej pod koniec I wojny światowej

Twilight of the gods: The contribution to the views and attitudes of aristocracy towards the fall of the dynastic system in Central Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War The Great War 1914–1918, irretrievably destroyed the political order in Europe, which had been maintained unchanged after 1871 with the conviction of the long duration extended into the Belle Époque. It left many traces – among others – in the memoirs and contemporary reports revealing on a micro-historical scale, some of the opinions and attitudes of the aristocracy, which become invisible on the macro-historical scale and are represented by considerable numbers of sources, which allows a reconstruction of important political and military decisions. This article is a contribution presenting – on the basis of a few examples – the end of the political influence of aristocracy in Central and Eastern Europe that coincided with the departure of monarchs from its political scene.

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants, and Monastics in Motion ed. by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly (review)

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants, and Monastics in Motion ed. by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly (review)

British and Irish religious orders in Europe, 1560–1800: conventuals, mendicants and monastics in motion. Edited by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly. Pp 276. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. 2022. £75.

British and Irish religious orders in Europe, 1560–1800: conventuals, mendicants and monastics in motion. Edited by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly. Pp 276. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. 2022. £75. - Volume 47 Issue 171

Stability and Order in Europe Revisited: Lessons since 1945

This paper revisits the question of the international structure and political stability in Europe before and after 1945. It is argued that there were relations between the international political system and political stability in Europe during the two periods: the period from 1900 to 1945 and from 1945 to 1989. Instructive lessons from global political history and Mearsheimer's Neorealism have shown the instability of multipolarity in the present decline of the US order. This is because the international political structure strongly influenced the degree of stability in Europe. The different global political structure affected the different levels of stability before and after 1945. The bipolar structure strongly influenced and determined Europe's power configuration and stability after 1945. The instability of Europe before 1945 was strongly related to the multipolarity structure; there were many great powers, and the existence of multiple polarities with seven great powers posed difficulty in managing them. Thus, striking a balance between them was nearly impossible and was a lesson for today's reading of international politics.

Spór o przynależność państwową Małopolski Wschodniej (1919–1923)

After the end of World War I, the struggle for post-war order in Europe began. The collapse of the superpowers: Germany, Austro-Hungary and Tsarist Russia, allowed the creation of many countries in Central Europe. Every nation wanted to have its own state. This led to the emergence of political and military conflicts over disputed territories. One of such territories was Eastern Lesser Poland, which, after fighting with the Bolsheviks and Ukrainians, was occupied by the nascent Poland. The Ukrainians put forward their claims to this territory and their own state. Own interests, including the protection of the occupied Transcarpathian Ruthenia, were pursued by the newly established Czechoslovakia. The Western powers in the League of Nations supported various solutions. The dispute lasted until the beginning of 1923 and was one of the last chords in the construction of the Versailles order in Europe.

:British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion.

:<i>British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion.</i>

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion. Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly, eds. Catholicisms, c.1450–c.1800. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2022. $99.

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion. Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly, eds. Catholicisms, c.1450–c.1800. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2022. $99.

Германская социал-демократия в неопределенной реальности

The article analyzes new aspects of the evolution of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) against the backdrop of the situation in Europe and in the world, confirming the forecasts made in the author’s previous publications. The party remains an important political force in Europe and globally, influences the development of European social-democratic thought, actively participates in reforming the European Union. The German Social Democrats uphold the principles of liberal democracies, entering into disputes with Budapest and Warsaw in view of their heightened sense of national exclusiveness. The updated conceptual guidelines of the party testify to further tightening of the SPD’s course in the Russian direction. The party does not give an answer to the fundamental questions: how the outlines of a new world order in Europe can be built without the participation of Russia, especially against it; to what extent the turn of the SPD’s top meets the interests of ordinary party members and citizens of the country. The approach of the German Social Democrats may exacerbate the already tense situation. The SPD has forgotten Willy Brandt’s warnings about the inadmissibility of exporting the FRG’s and other Western countries’ model, of imposing certain rules. The military-political choice made by O. Scholz and L. Klingbeil, their definition of February 24, 2022 as drawing a line under the moral and historical responsibility of Berlin for the atrocities of the Nazis, depreciating the important role of Moscow in the defeat of fascism and the reunification of Germany, have become the milestone ideological imperatives of modern Germany. These and other factors will go down in the history of Moscow–Berlin relations as a major mistake of the German Social Democracy. Moscow should not negotiate with those leaders of the SPD who will certainly bring the content of conversations to the attention of Washington, Brussels, Kyiv, Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga. The German ruling class without the sovereignty of its country does not inspire confidence. The trend of expanding hostilities in Ukraine with the use of new types of weapons, a possible direct intervention of NATO countries in the conflict continues. Moscow should clearly analyze the reasons for the rise and fall of the RF–FRG relations, Russia’s miscalculations, and sketch out various scenarios. Despite everything, in Germany, especially in the new federal states, in a part of the SPD, German business and civil society, hopes for normalizing relations with Russia have not been lost completely. Their cautious statements about the common roots of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany belonging to the European civilization cannot but inspire restrained optimism in terms of preserving the experience of dialogue between the two countries.

Сompetence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine: comparative legal analysis

Reflections on «possible constitutions of Europe» can have two directions. On the one hand, one can wonder about the legal form of the European Union: the fact that it is no longer a confederation of states, but not yet a federal state, requires a legal classification, for which a new concept of Verfassungsverbund was created in Germany, that is, a constitutional union. On the other hand, the question arises as to which national constitutions, or which parts of these constitutions, or which individual norms of these constitutions are best used to build a constitutional order in Europe. Solving this issue is not only a classic mission of comparative jurisprudence, but also of the current law of the European Community, since Article 6 of the Treaty onthe European Union declares certain principles of the Western constitutional state «common to all member states» and orders to consider fundamental rights «arising from common constitutional traditions of member countries, as general principles of Community law». Within the framework of the second way of formulating the question, the following description refers to the experience gained during the use of elements of the German Constitution to build other European constitutions. In this article, we will conduct a comparative legal analysis of the powers of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The possibility of legal review guarantees the supremacy of the constitution by sanctioning theviolation of the law of the constitution by repealing the law. According to the experience accumulated so far, an autonomous and independent constitutional court with the possibility of a constitutional appeal is a good way to protect human rights. Constitutional courts have a part of each existing state monopoly, namely the power of parliament to make laws and the power of the supreme court to interpret and apply laws passed by parliament.

«Позлащенных всадников дружество»: ранние сведения об Ордене Подвязки в России

The article presents an analysis of early information received in Russia in the 16th-17th centuries about one of the oldest and most honorable knight orders in Europe – the English Order of the Garter. Besides the reports from Muscovite ambassadors to London, one more detailed Russian account of this order has survived. Written by the English antiquarian W. Camden, this text was included in the fourth volume of the most famous geographical atlas of the world – Willem Blaeu’s Atlas Novus. This volume was translated very accurately into Church Slavonic by Isaiah, the Ukrainian-born scribe of the Moscow Chudov Monastery, in the 1650s-1661 at the behest of Patriarch Nikon. In addition to a detailed description of the appearance of the Knights of the Garter and a description of the brotherhood’s symbol itself, the translation recites legends about the founding of the order. The key point is that the translator interprets the term order to mean a social group rather than an award. This information appears to be very important in the general context of the Russian order system development, since knowledge of the English Order of the Garter and its statutes became one of the starting points for Peter I when planning the introduction of the first Russian order, the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called.

Label V. Content: The Problem of Non-Recognition of Civil Confiscation Orders in Europe

Abstract The paper discusses the problem of non-recognition of civil confiscation orders in Europe. Despite the breakthrough in international cooperation in the freezing and confiscation of crime proceeds in the criminal law domain, the formal approach in some European states destroys the potential of one of the most advanced instruments against crime proceeds—civil confiscation orders. The study offers a comparative analysis of the concepts of the confiscation of crime proceeds within and outside the frameworks of criminal proceedings. The analysis serves as the basis for the discussion of whether there is reasonable ground for the formal distinction between these concepts. The author concludes that the formal elimination of the civil confiscation orders has no substantial background. The analysis of both extended powers of confiscation in the criminal law domain in Europe and the Lithuanian Law on Civil Confiscation in the light of principles of proportionality and fair proceedings shows that civil confiscation regimes outside the framework of criminal proceedings may provide adequate safeguards to those provided in the confiscation regimes within criminal proceedings. The paper contributes to the discussion that is relevant to any European state that considers enacting or amending the civil confiscation legal framework or the legal regulation on recognising and executing crime proceeds confiscation orders. The paper elaborates on the approach that could enhance cooperation among European states in the prevention of organised crime.

The existence of Putin's Russia is a Threat to International Law and Order (on the example of aggressive actions in Ukraine)

The article analyzes the causes, preconditions, geopolitical and geohistorical goals of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The reaction of the West to the Russian geostrategy of revenge has been clarified. It has been proven that the hybrid war which has been going on since February 2014 has created a deep crisis in the global security system. The Russian Federation, having violated the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and large-scale agreements, annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring war and again called into question the international order in Europe on February 24, 2022, when the Russian leader announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called its goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began shelling the cities of Ukraine and its military and civilian infrastructure. The recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics by Russian President Vladimir Putin preceded this madness on February 21, 2022. However, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine and its human resources is one of the key tasks in the development of the project of Russian imperialism. The current process of formation and development of Putin's Russia has always been accompanied by war with Ukraine. Russia aimed to destroy our young state. The history of relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is a chronicle of wars, the liberation struggles of Ukrainians, and a consistent policy of Russification and assimilation of our people.

Belarus, Russia, Ukraine: Three Lessons for a Post-war Order

Belarus’s recent arc offers three wider lessons for winding down the present international crisis over the Russia–Ukraine war and for planning the post-war order. Firstly, highly personalistic rule is prone to error. The flagrancy of Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s electoral rigging ignited popular indignation, and the extreme brutality of the ensuing crackdown fanned popular outrage. Secondly, and paradoxically, autocracy is strong. Lukashenka’s tight control over all institutions of the state enabled him to prevent elites from defecting or losing the will to resist. Thirdly, ambiguities and compromises are unstable, and must sooner or later give way to clarifying choices. The post-war order must embed decisive outcomes, not unsustainable compromises. The West’s challenge is to enmesh a stable Ukraine in a wider peace that, for the third time in a century, builds a durable security order in Europe.

Theoretical foundations of Russian imperialism as a danger to the constitutional order of Ukraine and world order

Purpose. The article analyzes the causes, preconditions, geopolitical and geohistorical goals of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The reaction of the West to the Russian geostrategy of revenge has been clarified. It has been proven that the hybrid war which has been going on since February 2014 has created a deep crisis in the global security system. The Russian Federation, having violated the norms and principles of international law, bilateral and large-scale agreements, annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. Methodology.The methodological basis of the article is a set of philosophical and scientific principles, approaches, and special scientific methods of understanding international legal phenomena and geopolitical processes taking place in the world. The use of these methods provided an opportunity to solve the tasks and the main task is to prove that Russia threatens international law. On this basis, a fundamental conclusion was drawn that Putin's Russia must disintegrate as an empire in order to restore world law and order. Results: Russia attacked Ukraine without declaring war and again called into question the international order in Europe on February 24, 2022, when the Russian leader announced the launch of a "special military operation" against Ukraine. He called its goal the "demilitarization" of the country. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began shelling the cities of Ukraine and its military and civilian infrastructure. The recognition of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics by Russian President Vladimir Putin preceded this madness on February 21, 2022. However, the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation has deep historical roots. The absorption of Ukraine and its human resources is one of the key tasks in the development of the project of Russian imperialism. The current process of formation and development of Putin's Russia has always been accompanied by war with Ukraine. Russia aimed to destroy our young state. The history of relations between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples is a chronicle of wars, the liberation struggles of Ukrainians, and a consistent policy of Russification and assimilation of our people.

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion. Edited by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly. Catholicisms, c. 1450–c. 1800 1. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Durham University IMEMS Press, 2022. xii + 276 pp. $99.00 hardcover.

British and Irish Religious Orders in Europe, 1560–1800: Conventuals, Mendicants and Monastics in Motion. Edited by Cormac Begadon and James E. Kelly. Catholicisms, c. 1450–c. 1800 1. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Durham University IMEMS Press, 2022. xii + 276 pp. $99.00 hardcover. - Volume 91 Issue 2