Option For Owners Research Articles

Surgical Excision of Intramuscular Sarcomas: Description of Three Cases in Dogs.

Compartmental excision consists of the complete resection of an anatomic district in which specific structures act as a barrier to local tumour invasion. It is a well-established procedure in human medicine, while only a few reports are available in veterinary medicine. The aim of this study was to describe complete muscle resection in 3 dogs affected by different intramuscular sarcomas. The clinical outcome was also reported. Medical records were searched, including preoperative diagnostic findings, compartmental excision, histologic diagnosis, and outcome. Three dogs fit the inclusion criteria, which had a sarcoma confined to a single muscular belly (semitendinosus, biceps, and splenius capitis muscles). Complete excision of the affected muscle was performed in all cases. One dog showed moderate lameness in the immediate postoperative period, resulting from the dorsal lifting of the scapula due to serratus ventralis tenotomy performed to remove the caudal insertion of the splenius capitis muscle. All the dogs recovered fully within one month, experiencing good clinical function. Histopathology showed complete tumour removal with no neoplastic fascial disruption in all cases. Compartmental excision provides effective local tumour control, representing an alternative to limb amputation or more radical excision if adjuvant radiotherapy is not an option for owners.

Expansion planning for transmission network under demand uncertainty: A real options framework

ABSTRACTIn recent years, there has been much expectation that transmission expansion planning should address ever increasing demands for transmission services under significant and complex economic and regulatory uncertainties. In this article, toward meeting the aforementioned expectation, we develop and analyze a real options framework that provides the valuation of a transmission owner's option to expand in his or her network. What distinguishes our framework from the extant literature is that the evolution of the demand follows a geometric Brownian motion process, it explicitly accounts for the physical flow of the electric power economically manifested as the locational marginal prices, and it shows how the values of the expansion options can be determined in the transmission network. Furthermore, our framework shows how to value an option to expedite or delay can be determined given that a specific expansion is planned. An extensive numerical example is presented to illustrate the key features of our framework.

Assessing the effectiveness of the Birdsbesafe® anti-predation collar cover in reducing predation on wildlife by pet cats in Western Australia

Many pet cats hunt and, irrespective of whether or not this threatens wildlife populations, distressed owners may wish to curtail hunting while allowing their pets to roam. Therefore we evaluated the effectiveness of three patterned designs (simple descriptions being rainbow, red and yellow) of the anti-predation collar cover, the Birdsbesafe® (BBS), in reducing prey captures by 114 pet cats over 2 years in a suburban Australian context. The BBS offers a colourful indicator of a cat's presence and should therefore alert prey with good colour vision (birds and herpetofauna), but not most mammals with limited colour vision. We also interviewed the 82 owners of cats in the study about their experience using the BBS and their assessment of the behavioural responses of their cats. In the first year of the study, which focused on the effectiveness of different BBS colours, captures of prey with good colour vision were reduced by 54% (95% CL 43–64%) when cats were wearing a BBS of any colour, with the rainbow and red BBS more effective than the yellow when birds were prey. Captures of mammals were not reduced significantly. The second year assessed the rainbow BBS alone, and those data combined with rainbow data in the first year found a significant reduction of 47% (95% CL 43–57%) in capture of prey with good colour vision, with no effect of differences across years. We found no evidence that cats maintained a lower predation rate once the BBS was removed. Seventy-nine per cent of owners reported that their cats had no problems with the BBS and another 17% reported that their cats adjusted within 2 days. Fourteen owners reported that their cats spent more time at home and ate more while wearing the BBS. Two owners reported their cats stayed away from home more while wearing it. Sixty-four per cent of owners using the red collar, 48% using rainbow and 46% using yellow believed that it worked. Overall, 77% of owners planned to continue using the BBS after the study had finished. The BBS is an option for owners wishing to reduce captures of birds and herpetofauna by free-ranging cats, especially where mammalian prey are introduced pests. To date, the BBS is the only predation deterrent that reduces significantly the number of herpetofauna brought home. It is unsuitable where endangered mammalian prey or large invertebrates are vulnerable to predation by pet cats.

Investment Timing, Agency and Information

This paper provides a model of optimal investment timing in a decentralized firm under conditions of agency and asymmetric information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's and an owner's option. The terms of the manager's are determined by an optimal contracting model, and provide an incentive for the manager to both extend effort and truthfully reveal his private information. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of standard real options models. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, in that the model leads to the manager having an even greater option to wait than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work.

Investment timing, agency, and information

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.

On the Pricing of Corporate Value under Information Asymmetry

This paper examines the corporate value of a decentralized firm in the presence of principal-agent conflicts due to information asymmetries. When owners delegate the management to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentive for managers to truthfully reveal private information. Using a contingent claims approach, we demonstrate that an underlying option value of the firm can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The value of a decentralized firm is lower than that of an owner-managed firm. In particular, the implied manager's decisions in a decentralized firm differ significantly from those in an owner-managed firm.

Incentives and Investment Timing: Real Options in a Principal-Agent Setting

In the standard real options approach to investment, the owner of the decides when to exercise the investment option. However, in many real-world settings, investment decisions are delegated to managers. This article provides a model of optimal contracting in a continuous-time principal-agent setting in which there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that the underlying can be decomposed into two components: A manager's and an owner's option. The specification of the manager's is determined by a compensation contract, and must provide an incentive for the manager to both extend effort and to exercise as close to the value-maximizing stopping time as possible. The residual payout goes to the owner. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, there will be greater inertia in investment, in that the model leads to the manager having an even greater option to wait than the owner. The interplay between the twin forces of hidden information and hidden action leads to markedly different investment outcomes than when only one of the two forces is at work.

Evaluation of a High‐Dose Chemotherapy Protocol with No Maintenance Therapy for Dogs with Lymphoma

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the efficacy and toxicity of an intensified dose protocol with no maintenance phase for the treatment of canine lymphoma. Forty‐nine dogs all weighing more than 15 kg were entered. Dogs were staged and treated with a modified version of the University of Wisconsin (UW)‐Madison protocol for lymphoma. Modifications included increased dosages of cyclophosphamide (250 mg/m2compared to 200 mg/m2) and doxorubicin (37.5 mg/m2compared to 30 mg/m2), with no crossover to chlorambucil or methotrexate. After 25 weeks on protocol (17 treatments), therapy was discontinued and dogs were monitored for relapse on a monthly basis. Disease‐free interval (DFI) and overall survival were compared to 55 historical controls treated with the UW‐Madison protocol. The 2 groups were comparable with respect to age, sex, breed, stage, presence of hypercalcemia, and CD3 status; a trend toward more substage b dogs was present in the high‐dose group (P= .076). When comparing response rate, DFI, death due to disease, and death due to treatment‐related toxicity, more dogs were dead due to toxicity (P< .001; odds ratio = 8.8) in the high‐dose group. Overall survival between the high‐dose and control groups did not differ significantly (P= .55) at 270 and 318 days, respectively. The intensified dose protocol is an option for owners who are willing to risk higher toxicity for a shorter protocol with no statistical difference in survival from the UW‐Madison protocol.

96/01963 Phase-out of CFCs and HCFCs - options for owners and operators of air-conditioning systems

96/01963 Phase-out of CFCs and HCFCs - options for owners and operators of air-conditioning systems