Option Awards Research Articles

Independent legal directors’ attitudes toward bank CEO stock option awards

Independent legal directors’ attitudes toward bank CEO stock option awards

WHY DO PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES INCREASE? STATE MEDICAID EXPANSION, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

We exploit a quasi-random shock, i.e., Medicaid expansion, to the demand on prescription drugs and examine its impact on drug prices conditional on manufacturing firms’ financial characteristics. We use this shock to study the role of executive compensation, board independence and corporate governance, in setting drug prices. We find suggestive evidence that drug prices increased in expansion states. We also find that stock option awards are associated with lower drug prices. This provides evidence for Ross (2004)’s magnification effect that stock options may reduce the risk-taking of a CEO. Corporate governance appears to have a more complicated relationship with drug prices. This study addresses an underrepresented area in finance and provides a blueprint for researchers in finance to utilize a unique data set to answer research questions in finance and economics.

Exploring the dark side of integrity: impact of CEO integrity on firms’ innovativeness, risk-taking and proactiveness

PurposeThis study aims to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) integrity on organizations’ strategic orientation. The authors propose that CEOs who have high degrees of integrity tend to negatively influence each of the three core dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) – innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking. They also argue that this impact of CEO integrity is likely to be stronger for overconfident CEOs and the CEOs with high power. Furthermore, this negative relationship is expected to attenuate when the firm has high customer orientation and when the CEO is compensated with high equity-pay ratio.Design/methodology/approachSeemingly unrelated regression analysis was conducted on panel of 741 firm-year observations of 213 firms across 2014–2017. CEO integrity and each of the three dimensions of EO were measured using content analysis of CEOs’ letters to shareholders. CEO power was measured using CEO stock ownership and CEO duality. CEO overconfidence was measured by using options-based measure. Customer orientation was measured by using content analyses on annual reports. CEO equity-pay based ratio was measured as sum of value of stock and option awards divided by CEO’s total compensation. This study considered alternative measures and performed treatments for potential endogeneity, sample selection bias and outliers.FindingsThe research findings conclude that organizations with CEOs who have high integrity tend to have lower levels of all sub-dimensions of EO – innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking. Further, the results indicate that the negative effect that CEO integrity has, affects one of its dimensions – proactiveness, such that the relation is strengthened when the CEO has high power and is highly overconfident. This negative effect weakens when the CEO is compensated with high equity-pay ratio. The results also indicate that the negative effect of integrity and innovativeness and risk-taking weakens when the firm has high customer orientation.Research limitations/implicationsThe research contributes to upper echelon theory literature by adding to the discussion of how business executives’ psychological traits map onto firm behavior. This research also finds common ground between literature on innovation and upper echelons, contributing to awareness about the drivers of firms’ EO.Practical implicationsThis research addresses the question of firm relation to EO by highlighting that firms’ EO is also shaped by the psychological traits of their CEOs and the interaction of these traits with CEOs’ cognitive biases. Thus, board members of firms led by CEOs with high integrity can limit CEO’s risk-averse behavior by focusing on their training and by creating incentive systems. It is also advantageous for CEOs to understand that integrity is a double-edged sword, thus leveraging the strengths of their integrity, while simultaneously using tools such as training to diminish its negative aspects.Originality/valueThis paper fulfils a twofold identified need to: study the antecedents of each of the three dimensions of EO, not limited to corporate governance; and unearth the counterproductive behaviors associated with bright traits that make up their dark side

Board gender diversity and the timing of CEO stock option awards

ResumoObjetivoEste estudo busca explorar o papel da diversidade de gênero no conselho de administração para mitigar o destino do CEO. Os CEOs têm “sorte” de receber opções de compra de ações nos dias em que o preço das ações é mais baixo no mês de concessão, o que é um momento oportunista.Desenho/MetodologiaFoi utilizada uma análise de regressão logística, bem como uma análise de variáveis instrumentais (IV). A amostra é composta por 3.249 observações de empresas de 2010 a 2015.ConclusõesNossos resultados mostram que as diretoras inibem significativamente o momento oportunista de outorga de opções. Descobrimos que a diversidade de gênero, medida pela porcentagem de mulheres no conselho de administração, a porcentagem de conselheiros independentes e a porcentagem de diretoras no comitê de remuneração, provavelmente reduz as chances de CEOs receberem subsídios da sorte em tempo hábil. Nossos resultados são consistentes com pesquisas anteriores que documentam os benefícios da diversidade de gênero no conselho.Implicações práticasOs resultados da pesquisa são relevantes para os formuladores de políticas e reguladores, pois permitem que avaliem a importância da diversidade nos conselhos na gestão de gerentes, especialmente no que se refere ao desenho de políticas. Além disso, esses achados têm implicações para os países ibero-americanos, uma vez que lançam luz sobre a importância de empreender medidas e reformas para promover a eficácia dos conselhos por meio da introdução da diversidade de gênero.Originalidadeembora a evidência científica prévia tenha examinado o efeito da diversidade de gênero do conselho no desempenho da empresa, nosso estudo é o primeiro a investigar o efeito das diretoras no momento oportunista de concessões de opções, usando uma estrutura empírica rigorosa que explica explicitamente a endogeneidade.

Stock Buybacks as an Executive Compensation Problem

This Article is the first academic study to systematically analyze the overall sensitivity of executive compensation to stock buybacks. Specifically, my analysis of executive compensation arrangements of CEOs included in the S&P 500 Index reveals that buybacks can enhance a record high portion of incentive compensation, corresponding, on average, to one-third of total CEO pay. I further show that, despite the focus of financial economists on the ability of buybacks to mechanically improve per share performance measures that determine executives’ annual bonuses, repurchases can, in addition and to a much greater extent, boost performance measures that decide executives’ long-term incentive awards. I argue, first, that because a buyback can increase pay even when it would destroy firm value, executives are motivated to conduct buybacks excessively. Second, I explain that this potential motivates executives to game their incentive compensation arrangements and turn them from pay for performance into pay for manipulation. Third, I find that the impacts of buybacks on executive pay are camouflaged in firms’ public filings. These distorted incentives and the lack of transparency are likely to lead firms to underinvest in productive capabilities, disguise poor financial performance, and contribute to the creation of a market bubble that increases the likelihood of another financial crisis. Borrowing from dividend protection, which safeguards executive stock and option awards from the automatic decline in the stock price that dividends trigger, I suggest applying buyback protection, which would shield executive pay from the mechanical performance improvement that stock buybacks stimulate. Because I do not expect a mandatory rule requiring firms to adopt buyback protection to be effective I propose a novel regulatory reform to make the impact of stock buybacks on executive pay transparent. Transparency can be expected to push boards, shareholders, and proxy advisors to pressure firms to adopt buyback protection.

CEO compensation and firm performance in the insurance industry

PurposeWe investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and a firm's financial performance in the insurance industry to determine CEO pay policies that are more effective in promoting specific financial corporate goals.Design/methodology/approachConsidering different components of executive pay, we investigate the latter’s relationship with the corporate performance of the insurance industry using the generalized method of moments (GMM) model developed for dynamic panel estimation. Our data encompasses the periods before and after the 2008 financial crisis.FindingsWe observe that after the crisis the insurance industry experienced a major change in executives’ compensation packages. While CEOs’ compensation was primarily based on bonuses pre-crisis, the average size of the bonus was reduced to one-third of the level, stock awards and nonequity incentives were doubled and option awards increased almost 70 percent in the post-crisis period. It is also evident that the work experience of CEOs and the firm's financial performance play a significant role in determining CEO compensation. As the CEO becomes more experienced, stock awards and option awards replace cash bonus.Originality/valueThe paper finds supporting evidence for the agency-related problem in the insurance industry and the convergence of interest hypothesis, suggesting that a firm's market valuation rises as its managers own an increasingly large portion of the firm. To align the interest of owners with that of management, managers should be converted into owners via stock ownership. The paper addresses a topical issue regarding pay and performance and the effect of the financial crisis in the insurance industry.

Executive Compensation: The Trend Toward One Size Fits All

This paper reports the prevalence of a one-size-fits-all trend in the structure of executive compensation plans. The way firms distribute total compensation across different pay components -salary, bonus, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentives, pensions, and perquisites- has become more similar since 2006. In particular, 25% of the variation across firms disappeared in the last thirteen years. Using close votes surrounding Say-on-Pay implementation, I find that shareholders' influence on management decisions causes part of this convergence. This finding is robust in both difference-in-difference and RDD estimations. Additional evidence suggests that proxy advisors play a role by pushing towards standardization. Finally, I find evidence suggesting that standardization leads to a sub-optimal design of contracts. The more similar a firm's compensation structure becomes to the others, the lower its market value. Additionally, I find a negative impact on delta and vega and a positive impact on total compensation and financial misstatements.

Corporate Payout Policy and CEO Compensation Structure

This paper examines how corporate payout policy is affected by CEO compensation structure using data from more than 1,600 firms during 1992-2006. Specifically, it studies the effects of CEO compensation structure, firm characteristics, and dividend payout policies on dividend type and relative dividend size.It finds CEO salary is positively associated with cash dividends, share repurchases, and relative dividend size whereas CEO salary (compared to bonus) as a percentage of total compensation has negative effects on cash dividends and share repurchases. It also discovers CEO stock awards as a percentage of total compensation are positively associated with share repurchases and CEO option awards are negatively related to cash dividends.In addition, this paper shows larger firms and firms with more free cash flow distribute more cash dividends and share repurchases. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage ratio and more investment opportunities prefer to save earnings for future re-investment projects. Finally, it show dividend payout policy (either cash dividends or share repurchases) increases relative dividend size. The results of this study suggest that CEO compensation components affect CEOs’ dividend payout decisions: when CEOs’ stock award increases, they prefer to use share repurchases; when CEOs’ option award increases, they prefer not to use cash dividends.

Stock Option Grants And Cost Behavior

This study examines the relation between cost asymmetry and stock option grants. I posit that managers’ incentives to decrease the strike price of subsequent option awards may affect manager’s resource adjustment decisions. Using U.S. firm data, I find that the degree of SG&A (selling, general, and administrative) cost asymmetry is positively related to the value of subsequent option grants awarded to the CEOs, suggesting that managers who expect large stock-option grants deliberately delay reduction of committed costs to decrease the share price prior to the option award date. Manipulating the timing of stock option grants do not fully explain the results because the positive relation that this paper documents still holds with only fixed-date option awards sample.

What and How the Firm Features Determine CEO Equity-Based Compensation?

The goal of this paper is to check the variables with the highest probability that determine whether firms grants their CEO equity share or stock option awards or not using stepwise logistic regression. Also, how these variables will affect the magnitude of CEO stock option or equity share awards is also included as a significant problem in the next stage of this research paper. The model averaging method is introduced to make the model selection and gives a more precise prediction on the level of stock option or equity share awards to CEO.

Can Benford's Law explain CEO pay?

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueThis study applies the statistical properties of Benford's Law to CEO pay. Benford's “Law” states that in an unbiased dataset, the first digit values are usually unequally allocated when considering the logical expectations of equal distribution. In this study we question whether the striking empirical properties of Benford's Law could be used to analyze the negotiating power and preferences of CEOs. We argue that performance‐based or market‐determined compensations should follow Benford's Law, demonstrating no direct negotiation by the CEOs. Conversely, deviation from Benford's Law could reveal CEO negotiating power or even preference.Research Findings/InsightsOur analysis shows that market‐determined “Option Fair Value” (the dollar value of stock options when exercised) conforms closely to Benford's Law, as opposed to “Salary”, which is fully negotiated. “Bonus”, “Option Award”, and “Total Compensation” are generally also largely consistent with Benford's Law, but with some exceptions. We interpret these exceptions as negotiation by the CEOs. Surprisingly, we found that CEOs prefer to be paid in round figure values, especially “5”. We use Benford's Law to study the negotiating powers of CEOs vs. that of other executives. Finally, we compare the negotiating tactics of CEOs before and after SOX and analyze the impact of firm size on their compensation.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study introduces Benford's Law and its applications within the corporate governance literature.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThis method could be used by academics, industry and regulators to uncover compensation patterns within large business departments and/or organizations or even entire industry segments.

Jumping into the Spotlight: Accelerated Growth towards 100 Million in Revenue

We document a significant increase in firms’ revenue growth rate as they approach $100 million annual revenue. We identify substantial capital markets and other visibility benefits to firms achieving this goal, including discontinuous increases in analyst and media coverage and in transient and growth-focused institutional investment. We find no evidence of decreased investment efficiency or overall profitability. We find that firm CEOs benefit through higher bonuses, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and stock and stock option awards in the year after reaching the goal. We find that firms make acquisitions, expand their labor forces, and increase leasing of assets to reach $100 million revenue. Collectively, our results suggest that achieving $100 million revenue is a critical event in the trajectory of firm growth that enhances firms’ capital market receptions and information environments and sharpens CEOs’ incentives. These results constitute rare systematic firm-level evidence of upward-striving, and they suggest conditions under which setting challenging goals enables firms to achieve positive performance effects.

Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards will grow with firm equity returns, which were very high on average during the tech boom. Further, other forms of CEO compensation did not adjust to offset the dramatic growth in the value of option pay. Number-rigidity in options can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. We present evidence that number-rigidity arose from a lack of sophistication about option valuation that is akin to money illusion. We show that regulatory changes requiring transparent expensing of the grant-date value of options led to a decline in number-rigidity and helps explain why executive pay increased less with equity returns during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.

Financial Reporting Quality, Executive Stock Options and Business Ethics

AbstractThis paper tests the improvement of financial reporting quality when firms award stock options to their executives. The originality of this study is that we introduce the moderating effect of business ethics in the model. The sample is made up of 116 Canadian high-technology firms with available data for the fiscal year ending in 2012. We define the quality of financial reporting as the value relevance of accounting information as developed by Ohlson. Our results show that executive stock option award alone does not improve the quality of financial reporting. Rather, the quality improves when a firm awards stock options to its executives and investors perceive that the level of business ethics in that firm is high.

Stock Price Informativeness and the Mix of Long-Term and Short-Term Pay: Causal Evidence

How do changes to stock price informativeness affect the mix of long-term and short-term pay? We answer this question using two exogenous shocks to price informativeness: the reduction in analyst coverage due to closure of brokerage houses and mutual-fund flow driven price pressure. Using the pay duration measure to quantify the extent of long-term pay, we find that firms increase the duration of top executive pay following a decrease in price informativeness. While we document a 10% increase in pay duration following brokerage house closures, the increase in duration following mutual-fund flow driven price pressure is more modest at 2.5%. The increase in pay duration occurs both from a decrease in the cash component of pay and through an increase in the vesting period of stock and option awards. Our evidence is consistent with board of directors reacting to changes in price informativeness in designing executive pay.

Evidence of Downward Real Earnings Management from Corporate Events

​Prior studies of real-activity earnings management (REM) focus on earnings-inflating abnormal activities. We seek to establish the existence of downward REM by investigating several corporate events in which managers have incentives to temporarily deflate market valuations. Specifically, we focus on, and find downward REM before, share repurchases, management buyouts (MBOs), and CEO option awards. Large-sample evidence of downward REM is also found in our general analysis of earnings smoothing. Downward REM becomes much smaller or nonexistent when there is a lack of managerial incentives in those events, such as non-carry-through repurchases, incomplete MBOs, and unexpected option awards. Following the research design of Zang (2012), we find that various REM and AEM cost factors consistently influence the magnitude of downward REM and AEM around the three corporate events.

Evidence for the Existence of Downward Real-Activity Earnings Management

Prior studies of real-activity earnings management (REM) focus on earnings-inflating abnormal activities. We seek to establish the existence of downward REM by investigating several corporate events in which managers have incentives to temporarily deflate market valuations. Specifically, we focus on, and find downward REM before, share repurchases, management buyouts (MBOs), and CEO option awards. Large-sample evidence of downward REM is also found in our general analysis of earnings smoothing. Downward REM becomes much smaller or nonexistent when there is a lack of managerial incentives in those events, such as non-carry-through repurchases, incomplete MBOs, and unexpected option awards. Following the research design of Zang, we find that various REM and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) cost factors consistently influence the magnitude of downward REM and AEM around the three corporate events.

Growth Through Rigidity: An Explanation of the Rise of CEO Pay

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a long-standing puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards will grow with firm equity returns, which were very high on average during the tech boom. Further, other forms of CEO compensation did not adjust to offset the dramatic growth in the value of option pay. Number-rigidity in options can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. We present evidence that number-rigidity arose from a lack of sophistication about option valuation that is akin to money illusion. We show that regulatory changes requiring transparent expensing of the grant-date value of options led to a decline in number-rigidity and helps explain why executive pay increased less with equity returns during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.

Growth Through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards will grow with firm equity returns, which were very high on average during the tech boom. Further, other forms of CEO compensation did not adjust to offset the dramatic growth in the value of option pay. Number-rigidity in options can also explain the increased dispersion in pay, the difference in growth between the US and other countries, and the increased correlation between pay and firm-specific equity returns. We present evidence that number-rigidity arose from a lack of sophistication about option valuation that is akin to money illusion. We show that regulatory changes requiring transparent expensing of the grant-date value of options led to a decline in number-rigidity and helps explain why executive pay increased less with equity returns during the housing boom in the mid-2000s.

Are company founders underpaid?

This article examines the relation between founder status and CEO compensation in publicly listed US firms. The results suggest that CEO/founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers. In contrast, CEOs who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers. Different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards. The findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three CEO types when examining the determinants of executive compensation.