Opposition Victory Research Articles

When you come at the king: Opposition coalitions and nearly stunning elections

AbstractOpposition coalitions under electoral authoritarianism have been associated with greater likelihood of opposition victory and democratization. I argue, however, that coalitions also entail significant downside risks with implications for longer term prospects for democracy. Where coalitions produce strong electoral outcomes but fail to force turnovers, regimes are left with both the incentive and capacity to repress and reconsolidate power. I show cross‐nationally that opposition coalitions are associated with stronger opposition performance overall, but that when oppositions fail to take power, exceptionally strong performance is associated with greater autocratization in the subsequent years, including increased repression and poorer electoral quality in future contests. Probing the case of Cambodia, I demonstrate how the very features that make opposition coalitions a useful tool in strengthening performance also invite new threats from regimes. I argue that this makes coalition formation a particularly risky proposition.

Paradox of optimism: opposition coordination against autocratic incumbents in Turkey’s 2019 and 2023 elections

ABSTRACT In the 2019 local and 2023 general elections, Turkey’s opposition parties joined forces in pursuit of a common objective: to oust autocratic incumbents and democratize the political system. While they achieved noteworthy successes in 2019, replicating these gains in the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections proved elusive. This study reveals that coordinating opposition efforts becomes more challenging during general elections, particularly when a charismatic presidential candidate, capable of fostering synergy among opposition factions and voters, is absent. Additionally, when opposition parties span the ideological spectrum, crafting a unified campaign around a shared manifesto becomes more intricate. The resulting atmosphere of uncertainty is exacerbated further in the absence of decisive leadership. Most importantly, the research highlights a paradox: as optimism for electoral victory grows, parties become more inclined to form alliances but less willing to nominate a strong leader, due to concerns about power-sharing overshadowing electoral success. This paradox diminishes the chances of opposition victory.

Can Latin American Voters see the Future?

The present study examined whether Argentinian citizens could predict election results at the sub-national level. We targeted Argentinian Twitter users in seven provinces with polls using Twitter Ads. Argentinian Twitter users constitute a high-ability subgroup that possesses several characteristics that enhance citizen forecasting competence. The polls asked citizens to predict what party would win the first round of the upcoming presidential election in their province. We present a preliminary citizen forecast of the first round of the 2023 Argentinian presidential election. The forecast demonstrates three preliminary findings. First, citizens expect a competitive election in their respective provinces. Second, citizens in almost all the provinces expect an opposition victory. Finally, a high degree of uncertainty surrounds these predictions, with no party obtaining a greater than 50 percent probability of winning in any of the provinces.

Patterns of Competitiveness in Russian Gubernatorial Elections

AbstractCompetitiveness in electoral authoritarian regimes is compromised by management of the electoral arena through various kinds of manipulation. This study links two dimensions of competitiveness, namely fairness and contestation. We analyze the regional heterogeneity of both dimensions for Russian gubernatorial elections held between 2012 and 2019. To assess competitiveness, we use crowd-sourced electoral observation reports and data from the Central Election Commission. Our analysis reveals significant regional variation in both dimensions. Nevertheless, opposition victories are rare and only occur in exceptional cases. Low levels of electoral malpractices seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for close election results. Windows of opportunity for the opposition arise only if the regime misperceives the closeness of the race and if the opposition nominates prominent candidates. Overall, these findings shed light on the complex factors influencing the competitiveness of elections in electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia.

Tanzania under Magufuli: the personalization of a party-based regime

ABSTRACT Contemporary research has shown that authoritarian regimes are not static. At the same time, gradual changes are often difficult to detect and the literature has not yet developed convincing tools to identify autocracy-to-autocracy transitions outside the visible ruptures of coups, power transfers, and opposition victories. Building on fieldwork in Tanzania, we show that patterns of rule shifted significantly under Magufuli. Once the model case of a party-based system in Africa, we argue that Tanzania should be reclassified as a party-personalist regime for the time of his presidency. The basis for his success lies in the increasing factional tensions within the CCM which gave him the power to act as the arbiter and to manipulate party institutions and nominations to his favour. Beyond providing a thick description of a single case, we address the theoretical and empirical challenges of correctly classifying authoritarian regimes.

Securitization, fear politics, and the formation of an opposition alliance in competitive authoritarian regimes

ABSTRACT This article examines how opposition parties with diverse ideologies can form alliances in competitive authoritarian regimes despite the securitization strategy used by authoritarian incumbents. Using Turkey as a case study, the article demonstrates that an authoritarian leader may associate terrorism with opposition parties and may disseminate this fear to manipulate moderate voters and prevent coalition formation between niche parties. By analysing public speeches of political actors in Turkey, the study argues that if opposition parties recognize the vulnerabilities of the regime and believe that forming an alliance would gain support from the masses and encourage cross-party voting, then the securitization strategy would not deter them from forming a pre-electoral alliance. However, the failure of the securitization strategy to prevent opposition parties from forming an alliance does not guarantee opposition victory in elections. The securitization strategy employed by the authoritarian regime can still be utilized to effectively empower the authoritarian leader, enabling them to win elections by capitalizing on fear and depicting the opposition alliance as a security threat and a potential source of instability if they were to come into power.

Threat perceptions, loyalties and attitudes towards peace: The effects of civilian victimization among Syrian refugees in Turkey

For refugees who have fled civil conflict, do experiences of victimization by one armed group push them to support the opposing armed groups? Or, does victimization cause refugees to revoke their support for all armed groups, whatever side they are on, and call instead for peace? This paper studies the effect of civilian victimization on threat perceptions, loyalties, and attitudes toward peace in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey, many of whom faced regime-caused violence prior to their departure. Our research strategy leverages variation in home destruction caused by barrel bombs to examine the effect of violence on refugees’ views. We find that refugees who lose their home to barrel bombs withdraw support from armed actors and are more supportive of ending the war and finding peace. Suggestive evidence shows that while victims do not disengage from issues in Syria, they do show less optimism about an opposition victory.

A Rumbling from Below? Opposition Party Rebranding, Regional Elections, and Transforming the Regime in Russia

In this paper we examine whether opposition parties, particularly the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), can promote transition in the electoral authoritarian regime in Russia. We use the example of the National Action Party’s (PAN) evolution as an “official opposition” party in Mexico and discuss how its campaign strategy and party identity evolved. Using a framework derived from the political marketing literature on party branding and rebranding, we argue that the PAN successfully rebranded itself via the electoral opportunities afforded by structure of Mexican federalism, which ultimately led to the democratic transition in 1999. We then address the possibility of a similar evolution occurring in Russia, by examining how the CPRF altered its national campaign message between 2015–2018. Finally, we speculate whether local opposition victories will spark the kind of transition in Russia that occurred in other electoral authoritarian regimes, such as Mexico.

Transition from Democracy to Autocratic Rule

It is difficult to talk about real democracy in our history of the democratic system except for the first periods of the Democratic Party (DP) between 1950 and 1954. A few years after the 1960 Constitution was implemented and the first periods of Turgut Özal (Motherland Party -ANAP) between 1984 and 1989, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period after 2002 until 2010. Turkey has been controlled by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002. After some reforms initially, the AKP government showed growing contempt for political rights and civil liberties. Following an attempted coup in 2016, the country’s authoritarian nature was established entirely, prompting a harsh crackdown on perceived leadership opponents. In 2017, constitutional amendments concentrated power in the hands of the President. As a result of the negativities experienced and the changes in the system, according to the 2021 Freedom House report, Turkey’s new category is “not freedom.” While President exerts tremendous power in Turkish politics, hopefully, opposition victories in the 2019 municipal elections demonstrated that presidential authority was not unlimited. There were several steps in Turkey’s transition from democracy to autocratic rule. These stages should be well understood and analyzed in the countries where democracies declined, and necessary precautions should be taken.

Eroding Support from Below: Performance in Local Government and Opposition Party Growth in South Africa

AbstractHow does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.

Elections as Vehicles for Change? Explaining different outcomes of democratic performance and government alternation in Africa1

Does having more regular elections improve democratic performance in Africa? And have elections transformed the patterns of alternation in government? To answer these questions, two analyses are conducted drawing on an original dataset of 179 elections in 27 African countries, from the founding multiparty elections until 2019. The first tests the effects of alternation in government on democratic performance and shows that while alternation in government in the founding elections improves democratic performance, opposition victories in subsequent elections do not produce democratic gains. The second examines why alternation in government is more frequent in certain countries than in others; and reveals that the odds of turnover are increased by alternation in government in the founding elections, the level of political competition and the quality of elections. These findings contribute to literature linking elections, democracy and turnover in Africa.

Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies

AbstractIn electoral autocracies, opposition coalition formation offers the best hope of getting to democracy. Yet forming electoral coalitions also entails convincing opposition voters to ignore compromises and engage in the cross‐party voting necessary for opposition victory. To what extent are voters committed to defeating the autocratic incumbent even if it would result in dislikable outcomes? A survey experiment in Malaysia finds that opposition voters overwhelmingly express pretreatment support for the opposition coalition. But when exposed to a treatment vignette about which member party might lead the next government, many voters retract their support. Specifically, voters’ support for the coalition declines when their least preferred member is expected to control the government and when they can vote for a closer ideological alternative outside of the coalition. Although voters are committed to opposition unity and democratic transition, that commitment is sensitive to the anticipated consequences of an opposition victory.

Mobilizing Opposition Voters Under Electoral Authoritarianism: A Field Experiment in Russia

Under electoral authoritarianism, the opposition's victory at the polls often precipitates regime change. Yet, opposition parties persistently find it difficult to mobilize their supporters. In this study, we examine the effectiveness of information campaigns administered as part of a cluster randomized experiment by an opposition candidate in Russia's 2016 parliamentary election. In a Moscow electoral district, the campaign distributed 240,000 fliers to 75\% of the district's households. The treatments primed the closeness of the election in that district and, separately, sought to shame opposition supporters into voting. Outcomes were measured at precinct level. We find that the information campaigns failed to increase turnout or support for the candidate and her party. This finding casts doubt on the ability of opposition campaigns to mobilize voters via these widely used informational interventions in electoral autocracies.

MALAYSIA’S 14TH GENERAL ELECTIONS: DRIVERS AND AGENTS OF CHANGE

The results of Malaysia’s 14th General Elections held in May this year were unexpected and transformative. Against conventional wisdom, the newly-reconfigured opposition grouping Pakatan Harapan decisively defeated the incumbent Barisan Nasional. Despite a long-running financial scandal dogging the incumbents, an opposition victory had been all but discarded due to the advantages of incumbency, a deep fissure amongst opposition ranks, and a favourable economic outlook. Notwithstanding this, deeply-rooted political dynamics and influential actors came together, reconfiguring the country’s political landscape in the process. In order to understand the elections and their implications, this article sets out the country’s institutional context and then identifies key drivers and agents of change. From there, it assesses the conduct of the elections, analyses their results, and explores implications for the future.

Democratic Ruptures and Electoral Outcomes in Africa: Ghana's 2016 Election

Repetitive elections are important benchmarks for assessing the maturity of Africa's electoral democracies. Yet the processes through which elections entrench a democratic culture remain understudied. We introduce an important mechanism called a democratic rupture: an infraction in the democratisation process during competitive elections that has the potential to cause a constitutional crisis. It provides a new avenue of citizen participation outside of voting, and political space for opposition party realignment and to strengthen its support. Drawing from the case of Ghana, we show how the 2012 presidential election petition challenge served as a democratic rupture by contributing to the opposition's victory in 2016, enabling its political development. First, it exposed flaws in the electoral system and led to demands for electoral reforms. Second, it led to citizens being better educated on the electoral process. Third, it taught political parties that vigilance at the polling stations can help win elections. The article provides a critical analysis of the factors that shape democratic development, especially in cases where opposition parties defeat incumbent politicians.

Contested labour and political leadership: three mineworkers’ unions after the opposition victory in Zambia

ABSTRACTScholars of Zambian labour thought the once-powerful movement in terminal decline, but followed up neither the effects of the multi-union environment nor the opposition victory of a leftist political party in 2011. The author’s case study of three mineworkers’ unions (Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia, National Union of Miners and Allied Workers and United Mineworkers Union of Zambia) shows how the Patriotic Front party reawakened labour militancy only to suppress it within five months. The union competition increased welfare and financial accountability, but even insurgent unions surrendered to the dominant ideology of ‘industrial peace’, yielding the strike weapon to corporate hegemony. The article concludes that the unions have little bargaining power, but that the constant grassroots contestation of labour and political leaders renders Zambian labour highly vibrant.

The Prospects for a Color Revolution in Russia

From 1998 to 2005, six elections took place in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia that led to the defeat of authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors, the empowerment of opposition forces, and, thereafter, the introduction of democratic reforms. Because Putin's regime closely resembles those regimes that were successfully challenged by these dramatic changes in politics, Russia is a logical candidate for such a “color revolution,” as these electoral turnovers have been termed. Moreover, the color revolutions have demonstrated an ability to spread among countries, including several that border Russia. However, the case for a color revolution in Russia is mixed. On the one hand, the many costs of personalized rule make Putin's Russia vulnerable. On the other hand, Putin has been extraordinarily effective at home and abroad in preempting the possibility of an opposition victory in Russian presidential and parliamentary elections.

Ghana: The Ebbing Power of Incumbency

Despite pre-election fears, the victory of the opposition NPP over the ruling NDC in Ghana’s December 2016 elections became the prologue to a peaceful transfer of power, an outcome which suggests that the advantage of incumbency in African elections may be on the wane. Recent transfers of power in Africa have been driven by deteriorating economic conditions, opposition learning, more effective and dynamic electoral processes, and increasingly assertive voters. When leaders follow the democratic rules of the game, as in Ghana’s and Nigeria’s most recent elections, incumbents are likely to lose their seats. When they do not, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, the result is instead greater repression, as presidents seek to insulate themselves from the rising risk of defeat. The factors that account for recent opposition victories thus also help to explain an upsurge in attacks on civil liberties across much of the continent.

“No” and No

This article sheds light on the process of the unprecedented “No” campaign of 1988 in Chile, whereby Augusto Pinochet was ousted by a simple yes/no referendum, thus ending his more than fifteen years in power. Pablo Larraín's 2012 film No takes this historical event as the basis for its fiction and dramatizes the feat of the creative team, with film star Gael García Bernal as the lead. While the film has enjoyed international success, it has also been criticized for its one-dimensional portrayal. The film serves as a surface-level introduction to the campaign, but its focus on publicity agents leaves many key figures out of the picture. With a brief film synopsis set against information about the much more complex historical reality, the article's intention is to show a more complete picture of the opposition's victory, indicating what is omitted from Larraín's film while highlighting conflicts in the drama that ring true to history.

“We the people:” On Popular Participation and the Making of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya

Kenya’s 2010 constitutional project was predicated on the need to tackle almost fifty years of presidential authoritarianism entrenched through fundamental amendments to the 1963 independence Constitution. Attempts to whittle down presidential power were met with brutal force orchestrated by successive administrations of the ruling party, KANU. The 2002 opposition victory did not yield a constitution as the coalition partners took opposing views on key aspects of the draft constitution. Without a constitution, the country went into the 2007 election. Widespread violence and deaths ensued after that election which triggered the process of the making of the 2010 Constitution. The philosophical underpinning of the constitution-making process was that the people of Kenya would fully participate in the formation of their constitution. This article examines the legislative architecture of the constitution-making process with a view to exploring the magnitude of the participation of the people. In this vein, the article investigates the legitimacy of Kenya’s constitution-making enterprise. This article finds that the 2010 constitution-making process was fundamentally flawed, which, consequently, renders the 2010 Constitution of Kenya illegitimate. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n20p85