Opposition In Africa Research Articles

Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

Reintroducing a Local-Level Multiparty System in Uganda: Why Be in Opposition?

AbstractIn a referendum in July 2005 the people of Uganda voted overwhelmingly in support of reintroducing the multiparty system. As a result, one expected an increase in candidates running on party tickets other than the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) in the local elections in March 2006. However, the findings in this article reveal that politicians challenging the incumbent preferred to be non-partisan candidates rather than members of the opposition parties. Based on semi-structured interviews with 198 local leaders, this article connects local perspectives on the reintroduction of the multiparty system with well-known explanations of weak opposition in Africa, and discloses how formal institutions and people's notions of representation limit the prospects of the opposition at the local level.

Prophecy, Authenticity, Oppositional Models: Writers and Politics in Africa

THIS LONGISH TITLE BETRAYS THE COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES THAT I AM GRAPPLING with in this paper. How do we integrate disciplines to analyze and more fully understand the present dynamic reality in African societies and nations? The supposed modern situation seems almost like the traditional structures in the overlapping of what are presented in academic studies as separate institutions to be studied in different departments. Religion, literature, social studies, economics, and political science all seem interconnected by large contemporary themes of social justice, human rights, the state, democracy, and development. Religious, literary, and political prophets also are engaged in and are affected by the same problems of imperialism: hence my concern with resistance and models of opposition. I find it necessary to broaden the scope of my concern with prophecy and opposition in Africa to cross disciplines and histories. Focusing on the issue of gender, I draw comparisons of leadership from religion, literature, and politics, as tradition and modernity are juxtaposed in the context of capitalism, globalization, and the struggle for culture and self-determination. [End Page 5]

Opposition Parties and the Voters in South Africa's General Election of 1999

Variance in partisan choice among South African voters can be predicted on the basis of what is known about the way voters see economic trends, evaluate government performance, perceive political parties, and rate party leaders. However, in this analysis it is demonstrated that factors related to racial divisions shape and filter how voters perceive political performance, and to some extent lead different voters to emphasize different performance criteria. But race does not affect the way voters make decisions. Thus, South Africa's opposition parties are weak not because black voters, the overwhelming majority of the electorate, operate with a decision-making apparatus that emphasizes unity over performance or is hostile to pluralism and opposition. Rather, support for the African National Congress can be accounted for first, by positive ratings of its performance in government and second, by the fact that those black voters dissatisfied with the performance of the African National Congress (ANC) do not see a legitimate alternative among the existing opposition parties.

Crafting competitive party systems: Electoral laws and the opposition in Africa

After the resurgence of democracy in the 1990s, as was the case after independence, dominant party systems are predominant in Africa. This has occurred irrespective of the particular electoral system used. Both scholars and practitioners have so far failed to appreciate the fact that not fragmentation but concentration of the party system is the main challenge and that a choice between proportional representation or a plurality electoral system will do little to change the fortunes of the majority party and the opposition. This article goes beyond the current debate by suggesting that opposition parties in Africa could be crafted through a minority premium, preferably in combination with a majority ceiling. Such electoral engineering would in the long‐term contribute to the emergence of a two‐party system, generally recognized as the environment most congenial to a strong parliamentary opposition. In the short‐term, adoption of a minority premium would increase competitiveness.

Opposition in Tropical Africa

AT THE START OF THE 1990S, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF opposition movements in tropical Africa was dramatically transformed. Prior to 1990, in only a minimal number of states had legally tolerated opposition parties even been permitted, while in no case had any opposition party been able to assume power after defeating the incumbent government at the polls. Within a few years, multi-party systems were introduced within almost all African states, while several opposition parties achieved the ultimate test of gaining state power by electoral means. At first sight, at least, opposition in Africa had undergone a radical shift, bringing the continent into line with a movement towards multi-party electoral political systems that was taking place throughout the world.

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Towards Regional Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation

Southern Africa has become a battleground between two ideologically and fundamentally opposed constellation of states, Pretoria and Lusaka constellations. The conflict between the two basically concerns the domestic racial policies and the future of South Africa. The Pretoria constellation was launched on July 22, 1980, and is led by P. W. Botha, the South Africa's Prime Minister. The Botha's axis is a designed strategy which essentially aims at using South Africa's economic power and wealth to manipulate its neighboring nine black ruled states; and to exert subtle pressure to ensure that they cohere with the white minority regime of South Africa. This ambition of the Pretoria constellation is a vital part of the total strategy of survival of the Botha government. This particularly involves the use of the economy as an instrument of maintaining ultimate political power and control based on the maintenance of the basic structures of apartheid. This has in turn motivated South Africa's opposition to the policies of economic and political liberation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) states. The second, the Lusaka constellation and also known as the “Southern Nine” was launched on April 1, 1980. It consists of the nine Southern African States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The declared aim of the Southern Nine is to form an alliance which would pursue an economic strategy that would reduce or eliminate their economic dependence on South Africa. To this end, the Southern Nine and the South African-occupied territory of Namibia unanimously adopted a Programme of Action aimed at stimulating inter-state trade with the ultimate objective of economic independence from South Africa.

Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1966–9

Littleexists to document the widespread repression of opposition in Africa since independence. Current studies of the rise of capitalism and the post-colonial state largely ignore institutionalised authoritarianism, which characterises the political side of this process. This article discusses the restraints placed on opposition in Kenya up to 1969. Its salience continues with the creation of ade jureone-party state since the abortive coup of 1982.