Operation Ceasefire Research Articles

Eugene Rivers and the responsibility of intellectuals

Eugene Rivers and the responsibility of intellectuals

Ending Residual Paramilitary Domination in Northern Ireland? Restorative Economic and Social Inclusion Strategies

Paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland is unfinished but finishable. In response to the 2016 ‘Fresh Start’ Panel report (Northern Ireland Government 2016) on disbanding paramilitaries, is it time to finish through a restorative peace? This would require a focus on building justice as a better future for excluded working class neighbourhoods, challenging political and civil society organisations to unequivocally embrace the task of reconciliation, and resourcing a restorative strand of victim support complementing the valuable work of the current Commission for Victims and Survivors and the Victims and Survivors Service. Responsive adaptation of an ‘Operation Ceasefire’ policing strategy might also help underwrite restorative communities and restorative learning networks that do most of the work. Today’s elites could consider a shift from their neoliberal frames to acknowledge their own ambivalence around the complete rejection of violence and the class character of the Northern Ireland Troubles, so often trumped by the identity politics of that ‘ethnic frontier society’ (Wright 1987: 1-54). Restorative economic and social inclusion strategies at the level of micro-communities, within a ‘shared future’ vision (Northern Ireland Office 2005), forending the domination of the excluded by paramilitaries and other violent gangs are options. So are Operation Ceasefire strategies layered within a restorative societal fabric; not losing sight of the empirical insights of Toft (2010) and Walter (1999; 2002) that unless there is credible commitment in the years ahead to enforce the law against those who continue to rule neighbourhoods through violence—by the stick of locking them away if necessary—the carrots of peace will be gamed by the most ruthlessly militarised leaders. Complexity theory, responsive regulatory theory and restorative justice theory inform this policy analysis in response to the 2016 Paramilitaries Panel Report.

Law enforcement perceptions of their relationship with community: Law enforcement surveys and community focus groups

ABSTRACTThe Baton Rouge Area Violence Elimination (BRAVE) Project is a group violence reduction strategy based on the Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire. This violence reduction model is predicated on the idea that violence can be dramatically reduced when community members and law enforcement join together to directly engage with criminal groups. In Baton Rouge, selected law enforcement officers have received specialized training regarding the implementation of the BRAVE Project and additional training with regard to working with residents in the community. To that end, surveys and focus groups were administered to residents in the intervention target area to identify their perceptions of crime, law enforcement, and leaders in their community. In addition, law enforcement officers completed surveys that focused on their perceptions of crime and other problems in the target area and their thoughts about whether this intervention could be successful. Results suggest that law enforcement and community members agree on what the problems are but disagree on who is responsible for them and how to solve them. Follow-up surveys and focus groups have been administered to determine whether residents in the target area have changed their perceptions of law enforcement. This article discusses the results of those surveys, the implications of such a violence reduction model, and recommendations for similar models in other cities.

The Causes and consequences of group violence: from bullies to terrorists

THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GROUP VIOLENCE: FROM BULLIES TO TERRORISTS James Hawdon, John Ryan and Marc Lucht (eds.) Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014 281 pages, hardcover, S95.00The editors of this book take on the ambitious task of trying to explain group violence. As the title implies, the various authors of this chapter book divide their work into the causes of group violence (exploring both perpetrators and victims) and the consequences (on individuals, groups, and larger communities). In their introduction, editors Hawdon and Ryan outline the book as an exploration of the unknown dimensions of group violence which includes both empirical and theoretical discussions. This book does not disappoint, as the collection of writings offers a wide range of topics that are bound to interest people from a variety of backgrounds. Taken as a whole, the chapters of this book emphasize the notable gap between research, commonly held beliefs, and policy on violence. Thus, this book is a recommended read for almost everyone-social science students and scholars, law enforcement personnel, politicians-even parents.The first chapter is written by editor James Hawdon and sets the parameters of the readings by defining violence (focussing only on direct or physical violence) and offers a typology of violence. The typology organizes the various forms of direct violence to create four distinct categories. By focussing on the actors rather than the act, Hawdon organizes the violence according to whether the victim is an individual or group, and whether the perpetrator is an individual or group. This typology organizes lynching and capital punishment together (group perpetrator-individual victim) and organizes gangs and terrorism together (group perpetrator-group victim). Many of the subsequent chapters refer to this typology and thus lend special attention to both the perpetrators and targets of violence. The following paragraphs highlight several of the many lessons from the book: how much of our knowledge is based on either faulty research, incomplete knowledge or unsubstantiated myths; how current events (such as Syria) benefit from an analysis; how current policy is not working; current trends; and news theoretical frameworks.In the third chapter, David Kennedy investigates violence and street groups based on data gathered from the Boston Gun Project. Kennedy contests that much of the research into street gangs in the United States has resulted in skewed and faulty assumptions about the nature of street groups, their members and the communities in which they operate. For example, authentic research consistently reveals that street group members live in constant fear and experience very high levels of violence. However, the communities in which they operate do not typically support the violence. Kennedy writes: what reads from the outside as indifference or approval is in fact profound anger, exhaustion and alienation, resulting from often longstanding alienation between communities in poverty and the law enforcement agencies that are meant to protect them.Jeanne Chang and Alec Clott write the sixth chapter, where they explore the relationship between civil nonviolent action, violent insurrection, and state counter-insurgent activities, in the context of the current conflict in Syria. …

Operation CeaseFire-New Orleans: an infectious disease model for addressing community recidivism from penetrating trauma.

CeaseFire, using an infectious disease approach, addresses violence by partnering hospital resources with the community by providing violence interruption and community-based services for an area roughly composed of a single city zip code (70113). Community-based violence interrupters start in the trauma center from the moment penetrating trauma occurs, through hospital stay, and in the community after release. This study interprets statistics from this pilot program, begun May 2012. We hypothesize a decrease in penetrating trauma rates in the target area compared with others after program implementation. This was a 3-year prospective data collection of trauma registry from May 2010 to May 2013. All intentional, target area, penetrating trauma treated at our Level I trauma center received immediate activation of CeaseFire personnel. Incidences of violent trauma and rates of change, by zip code, were compared with the same period for 2 years before implementation. During this period, the yearly incidence of penetrating trauma in Orleans Parish increased. Four of the highest rates were found in adjacent zip codes: 70112, 70113, 70119, and 70125. Average rates per 100,000 were 722.7, 523.6, 286.4, and 248, respectively. These areas represent four of the six zip codes citywide that saw year-to-year increases in violent trauma during this period. Zip 70113 saw a lower rate of rise in trauma compared with 70112 and a higher but comparable rise compared with that of 70119 and 70125. Hospital-based intervention programs that partner with culturally appropriate personnel and resources outside the institution walls have potential to have meaningful impact over the long term. While few conclusions of the effect of such a program can be drawn in a 12-month period, we anticipate long-term changes in the numbers of penetrating injuries in the target area and in the rest of the city as this program expands. Therapeutic study, level IV.

Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime: Concepts and Practicalities

Focused-deterrence strategies, selective targeting, and sequential interdiction efforts are being increasingly embraced as more promising law enforcement alternatives. They seek to minimize the most pernicious behavior of criminal groups, such as engaging in violence, or to maximize certain kinds of desirable behavior sometimes exhibited by criminals, such as eschewing engagement with terrorist groups. The focused-deterrence, selective targeting strategies also enable overwhelmed law enforcement institutions to overcome certain under resourcing problems. Especially, in the United States, such approaches have produced impressive results in reducing violence and other harms generated by organized crime groups and youth gangs. Such approaches have, however, encountered implementation difficulties elsewhere in the world.This report first outlines the logic and problems of zero-tolerance and undifferentiated targeting in law enforcement policies. Second, it lays out the key theoretical concepts of law-enforcement strategies of focused-deterrence and selective targeting and reviews some of their applications, as in Operation Ceasefire in Boston in the 1990s and urban-policing operations in Rio de Janeiro during the 2000s decade. Third, the report analyses the implementation challenges selective targeting and focused-deterrence strategies have encountered, particularly outside of the United States. And finally, it discusses some key dilemmas in designing selective targeting and focused-deterrence strategies to fight crime.

Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior

The relatively weak quasi-experimental evaluation design of the original Boston Operation Ceasefire left some uncertainty about the size of the program’s effect on Boston gang violence in the 1990s and did not provide any direct evidence that Boston gangs subjected to the Ceasefire intervention actually changed their offending behaviors. Given the policy influence of the Boston Ceasefire experience, a closer examination of the intervention’s direct effects on street gang violence is needed. A more rigorous quasi-experimental evaluation of a reconstituted Boston Ceasefire program used propensity score matching techniques to develop matched treatment gangs and comparison gangs. Growth-curve regression models were then used to estimate the impact of Ceasefire on gun violence trends for the treatment gangs relative to comparisons gangs. This quasi-experimental evaluation revealed that total shootings involving Boston gangs subjected to the Operation Ceasefire treatment were reduced by a statistically-significant 31 % when compared to total shootings involving matched comparison Boston gangs. Supplementary analyses found that the timing of gun violence reductions for treatment gangs followed the application of the Ceasefire treatment. This evaluation provides some much needed evidence on street gang behavioral change that was lacking in the original Ceasefire evaluation. A growing body of scientific evidence suggests that jurisdictions should adopt focused deterrence strategies to control street gang violence problems.

Harm reduction for the supply-side: Its time has come

f use. Once the market is large and well-established, supplyriented interventions can be a terribly inefficient way to suppress se. Yet, even then enforcement agencies remain the only viable way o address many associated harms. Some years ago when the apartent of an elderly gentleman living downstairs was strafed in a rive-by shooting, he called the police. He didn’t demand that a reatment centre be set up next door. He didn’t ask the schools hether they were implementing a model prevention curriculum. e called the police, and as the Boston Gun Project, High-Point, nd other initiatives have demonstrated, good policing can temer the behaviour of even the most noxious gangs (Kleiman, 2009). he police can say, in effect, “Tone it down or take your fight elsehere.” For those living cheek by jowl with drug distributors, law nforcement is not a futile anachronism, but a welcome bulwark gainst brutal violence. So before asking leaders and rank and file of supply-oriented gencies to change their practices and self-image, we might first hank them sincerely for keeping away all the drug markets that ave not matured. And it might be worth reassuring them that we now they’re still the ones we’ll call in a scrape. We appreciate hem and their efforts, and it is precisely because we know they are and have so much to offer, that we grant them permission to no longer chase the Quixotic dream of a drug-free nation, allowing them instead to focus on fulfilling their oath, “To protect and serve.” I have pitched this vision to law enforcement at multiple levels in multiple countries, and it is very well received. I believe law enforcement will embrace Greenfield and Paoli’s message if it is presented positively and delivered on their terms. It would be a tragedy if ideas with so much potential were squandered because of unwillingness to present the harm reduction message in a way that is “culturally appropriate” to the people whose behaviour it seeks to change.

The Impact of Newark's Operation Ceasefire on Trauma Center Gunshot Wound Admissions

We examined the impact of Newark's Operation Ceasefire on gunshot wound admissions (GSW) to the Level 1 Trauma Center at University Hospital for a three-year period. Interrupted time series analyses revealed that there were no statistically significant reductions in GSW rates in the Ceasefire Zone after the introduction of Ceasefire in Newark. Similarly, there were no statistically significant changes in GSW rates in the matched comparison zone or the Trauma Center's wider catchment area. A dual kernel density hot spot map confirmed these findings by identifying changes in hot spots that were non-systematic, with no consistent pattern of change over time. Future research should focus on conducting both process and outcome evaluations of the various adaptations of the Ceasefire model in order to help inform policy makers' decisions regarding the selection of violence reduction programs.

Beyond Boston

Focused deterrence initiatives, including the most famous, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, have been associated with significant reductions in violence in several U.S. cities. Despite early successes, some cities have experienced long-term sustainability issues. Recent work in Cincinnati, Ohio, has focused on institutionalizing focused deterrence in an attempt to achieve sustainability. Despite these efforts, it became apparent that institutionalization was necessary, but insufficient, to achieve long-term success. This study turns to criminological theory to understand why focused deterrence works and how the model can be improved to maximize crime prevention potential. In doing so, the authors draw from the principles of effective intervention from correctional rehabilitation research and describe how these elements have been integrated into the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence.

Understanding and Tackling Gang Violence

Gang-involved shootings comprise a serious problem. A Manchester-based project addressing the issue was tracked and its development is discussed. The initiative moved from a planned focus on the situational determinants of shootings, drawing on the successful Boston Gun Project, to one that focused instead on the social determinants of gang membership. The term “gang” itself is highly ambiguous. Equally there are difficulties in defining and operationalizing the concept of “gang membership” for preventative and enforcement purposes. Practical uncertainties followed for the identification of individuals who belong to gangs or are at risk of becoming members, and hence warrant special project attention. This intrinsic uncertainty paved the way for disagreements between the practitioners in their estimates of the risks of gang involvement faced by individuals, in the selection of young people to focus on within the project, and in levels of concern about the consequences that might follow from negatively stereotyping young people as gang members. It is concluded that it may be more effective and efficient to target specific patterns of violent behaviour rather than gang membership for preventative and enforcement attention.

DID CEASEFIRE, COMPSTAT, AND EXILE REDUCE HOMICIDE?*

Research Summary:Police officials across the United States often claimed credit for crime reductions during the 1990s. In this article, we examine homicide trends in three cities that mounted widely publicized policing interventions during the 1990s: Boston's Operation Ceasefire, New York's Compstat, and Richmond, Virginia's Project Exile. Applying growth‐curve analysis to data from the 95 largest U.S. cities and controlling for conditions known to be associated with violent crime rates, we find that New York's homicide trend during the 1990s did not differ significantly from those of other large cities. We find some indication of a sharper homicide drop in Boston than elsewhere, but the small number of incidents precludes strong conclusions. By contrast, Richmond's homicide reduction was significantly greater than the decline in other large cities after the implementation of Project Exile, which is consistent with claims of an intervention effect, although the effect may have been small.Policy Implications:Criminologists gave police and other public officials something of a free ride as they claimed credit for the 1990s crime drop. We propose that researchers employ comparable data and methods to evaluate such claims‐making, with the current analysis intended as a departure point for ongoing research. The use of common evaluation criteria is especially urgent for assessing the effects of the multiple interventions to reduce violent crime launched under the nation's primary domestic crime‐control initiative, Project Safe Neighborhoods.

Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire

Operation Ceasefire is a problem-oriented policing intervention aimed at reducing youth homicide and youth firearms violence in Boston. It represented an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners to assess the city's youth homicide problem and implement an intervention designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the problem. Operation Ceasefire was based on the “pulling levers” deterrence strategy that focused criminal justice attention on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of Boston's youth homicide problem. Our impact evaluation suggests that the Ceasefire intervention was associated with significant reductions in youth homicide victimization, shots-fired calls for service, and gun assault incidents in Boston. A comparative analysis of youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities also supports a unique program effect associated with the Ceasefire intervention.

Testing for Structural Breaks in the Evaluation of Programs

A standard methodology in program evaluation is to use time series variation to compare pre- and post-program outcomes. However, when the timing of a break in a statistical relationship can be determined only by looking at the data, then the usual distribution of the test statistic which assumes exogenous timing of the break is no longer valid. Tests for parameter instability provide a flexible framework for testing a range of hypotheses commonly posed in program evaluation. These tests help pinpoint the timing of maximal break and provide a valid test of statistical significance. These tests are particularly useful when the start date of the intervention and any effect is unclear and possibly endogenous due to implementation lags. A test of parameter instability is applied to the evaluation of the Boston Gun Project, a comprehensive effort to reduce youth homicide in Boston in the mid 1990s. The dynamics of gang violence meant that no parts of the city could be used as reasonable comparison sites, and thus time series analysis is the only feasible means of evaluating the program impact. The statistical procedure identifies a statistically significant discontinuity in youth homicide incidents shortly after the intervention was unveiled. The intervention was associated with about a 60 percent decline in youth homicide.

Problem solving and youth violence: an evaluation of the Boston Gun Project

The Boston Gun Project is a problem-solving policing initiative aimed at reducing homicide victimization among young people in the city of Boston. It represented an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners to assess the city's youth homicide problem and implement an intervention intended to have powerful impacts in the near term. In early 1996, a working group representing a variety of law enforcement and social service agencies implemented an intervention that strategically responded to gang violence, focused enforcement efforts on gun trafficking, and emphasized communication of the strategy to generate deterrence. The intervention is associated with a 60% decline in youth homicide victimization (i.e., two fewer victims per month). There are smaller declines in other measures of violence. The decline in youth homicide is sharp and occurs coincident with the introduction of the intervention. Competing hypotheses appear unable to account for the decline.

The Medium Is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault

* Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University of Chicago. Jerald Kessler, now a third-year student at the University of Chicago Law School, performed with diligence and creativity as a research assistant on this project. Steven Harris, a second-year student at the Law School, conducted a helpful survey of the literature on intent in violent attack. The Chicago Police Department, in particular Mr. Michael Spiotto, provided access to the department files on reported fatal and nonfatal attacks that were used in this study. 1 Franklin E. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely To Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 721-24, 730-37 (1968). A third report, Homicide in Chicago, 1965-70, grows out of the same research project, a study of violent attack in Chicago supported by the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at the University of Chicago. Other data on the issue of weapon dangerousness are developed in George D. Newton and Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Violence in American Life (Staff Report (7) to the Nat'l Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 1969). See, e.g., id. at 44 and 177-79 (relationship between relative degree of gun use and extent to which guns are more lethal than knives), 46-47 (death rates from gun vs. nongun armed robbery), 69-74 (effect of increase in gun ownership and use on death from assault in Detroit), 76-77 (relationship between relative gun use in robbery and assault in major cities).