Opaque Borrowers Research Articles

Lending relationships when creditors are in control

Violations of financial covenants shift control rights to lenders. When borrowers have lending relationships with these lenders in control, they experience not only smaller declines in investment, but also lesser deteriorations in both firm survival probabilities and in sales. These effects are largely driven by opaque borrowers without any credit ratings. They are present where lending relationships existed already before loan issuance (ex-ante), but also where a contractual relationship without pre-issuance interaction is more mature (ex-post). Surprisingly, there is no evidence of any “dark side” of lending relationships when creditors are in control, such as an increase in interest expenses or a lesser degree of financial discipline.

GARANTIAS DE CRÉDITO RURAL NO BRASIL: ACESSO, CONDIÇÕES Ε INADIMPLÊNCIA

ABSTRACT This study investigates the relation between the types of collateral offered in rural loans in Brazil and the access to credit, loan conditions and default rates. We use a novel proprietary database of rural loans granted by one of the largest private banks in Brazil containing more than 110 thousand loan observations. Our results show that the use of fiduciary lien, improves the access to loans for more opaque borrowers (i.e., those with shorter relationship with the bank). This type of collateral gives the bank the ability to seize collateral quicker, reducing loss given default, even if these borrowers are riskier, given that they present higher default rates on average. Our results also show that loan conditions are less restrictive as relationship length increases, and that this effect is more intense among loans collateralized by fiduciary lien.

Shareholder litigation and bank risk

Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate firm risk management? We explore how state universal demand (UD) laws (which limit shareholder litigation as a mechanism to discipline managers), affect bank holding companies’ (BHCs) risk. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we show that BHCs reduce their tail risk exposures after the implementation of UD laws, which is achieved by improving loan asset quality. Indeed, BHCs appear to apply stricter contract terms for syndicate loans to risky and opaque borrowers. We also show that UD law implementation leads to changes in BHC board composition by increasing the proportion of outside directors, the number of independent directors in audit committees and the number of independent directors with financial expertise.

Information Intermediaries: How Commercial Bankers Facilitate Strategic Alliances

AbstractWe investigate how bankers use information from lending relationships to help borrowers find partners for strategic alliances. Firms that have borrowed from the same banker or share an indirect connection through a network of bankers are significantly more likely to enter an alliance. Consistent with bankers overcoming informational frictions, their ability to facilitate alliances decreases with banker-network distance, and is stronger for opaque borrowers. Firms connected to more potential partners via banker networks enter more alliances. These alliances are associated with positive announcement returns, and brokering banks are more likely to receive future underwriting mandates.

Bank Competition and Credit Access: The Case of Informal Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa

Purpose of the study: This paper investigates the impact of bank competition on access to finance by informal firms in 14 sub-Saharan African countries, using World Bank enterprise survey data. Access to finance is one of the main factors identified as hindering the growth of opaque borrowers, who are generally characterised by poor financial transparency. Methodology: This study uses a discrete binary choice probit model to estimate the probability or likelihood of accessing finance, conditional on the level of bank competition and other firm-level characteristics. Findings: Results show that the impact depends on the competition measure used. The Lerner index shows a positive relationship supporting the information-based hypothesis, while the most robust competition indicator, the Boone index, is negative in line with the market power hypothesis. These results also show that reducing or minimising information asymmetry using public credit registries is good for enhancing financial access. Research implications: Improving the competitiveness of the banking sector by encouraging the entrance of more players should be promoted without compromising the soundness of the sector. Measures should be introduced to control anti-competitive behaviour in the banking industry. Originality: The informal sector contributes close to 50% to Africa’s GDP and 80% towards employment and, therefore, strategies aimed at eliminating the obstacles faced by these firms are important for livelihood protection. Many studies done on the African banking industry have generally found it to be less competitive and this affects financial access since banks tend to be risk averse in such settings. There are also few studies that have analysed the relationship between bank competition and credit access in the informal sector, mostly because publicly available data on these firms are scarce.

Options listings and loan contract terms: Information versus risk-shifting

We find that following options listings, U.S. firms enjoy an average 17 bps interest reduction in new bank loans. These savings are greater among more opaque borrowers, which provides support for the information production channel. This effect is, however, absent when the options market is illiquid or highly active. Consistent with risk-shifting, borrowers with more active options markets pay higher spreads. Post-options loans carry higher spreads than pre-options loans when managers exhibit stronger risk-shifting incentives. Options listings lead to shorter (longer) loan maturities for unrated (investment-grade) borrowers, while the influence on collateral and covenant restrictions is consistent with both channels.

Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany

The effects of large banks on the real economy are theoretically ambiguous and politically controversial. I identify quasi-exogenous increases in bank size in postwar Germany. I show that firms did not grow faster after their relationship banks became bigger. In fact, opaque borrowers grew more slowly. The enlarged banks did not increase profits or efficiency but worked with riskier borrowers. Bank managers benefited through higher salaries and media attention. The results are based on newly digitized microdata on German firms and their banks. Overall, the findings reveal that bigger banks do not always raise real growth and can actually harm some borrowers and the real economy.

Shareholder Litigation and Bank Risk

Does a decline in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate firm risk management? We explore how state Universal Demand laws (which limit shareholder litigation as a mechanism to discipline managers, UD law hereafter), affects bank holding companies’ (BHCs) risk. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we show that BHCs reduce their tail risk exposures after the implementation of the UD laws and that this is achieved by improving loan asset quality. Indeed, BHCs appear to apply stricter contract terms for syndicate loans to risky and opaque borrowers. We also show that UD law implementation leads to changes in BHC board composition by increasing the proportion of outside directors, the number of independent directors in audit committees, and the number of independent directors with financial expertise.

Common Auditors and Private Bank Loans*

ABSTRACTWe show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer‐tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the PCAOB. Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision making, based on a comparison of postloan performance of firms with common auditor loans versus those with noncommon auditor loans.

Does Bank Competition Affect Credit Access in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from World Bank Informal Firms Surveys

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the impact of bank competition on access to credit by informal firms in 14 Sub Saharan African countries using World Bank enterprise survey data. Access to credit is one of the main factors identified as hindering the growth of these opaque borrowers with poor financial transparency. This study uses a binary choice probit model to estimate the probability or likelihood of accessing finance conditional on the level of bank competition and other firm-level characteristics. Results show that the impact of competition measured using the recent and empirically robust Boone indicator is negative and significant in line with the market power hypothesis. These results suggest that improving the competitiveness of the banking sector by encouraging entrance of more players and curbing anti-competitive conducts should be promoted without compromising the soundness of the sector. Reducing or minimizing information asymmetry using public credit registries is good for enhancing financial access and governments should invest resources on maintaining, updating and increasing the coverage of these registries.

Hometown Lending

AbstractBanks open more branches and make more lending near their CEOs’ childhood hometowns. The effects are stronger among informationally opaque borrowers and among CEOs who spend more time in their childhood hometowns. Furthermore, loans originated near CEOs’ hometowns contain more soft information and have lower ex post default rates, implying that hometown loans are more informed. Hometown lending does not affect aggregate bank outcomes, suggesting that credit is being reallocated from regions located farther away to regions proximate to bank CEOs’ hometowns.

Cross-ownership and collateral in lending

Information asymmetry is a major obstacle in both formal and informal loan markets. However, when a borrower and a lender are connected via cross-ownership, this obstacle can be significantly reduced. Cross-ownership enables lenders to collect more concrete and precise information about borrowers, and this lowered information asymmetry reduces the likelihood that the lender will require the borrower to provide collateral. Using a data set of 1091 intercorporate loans from China, we find strong support for the prediction that cross-ownership between lenders and borrowers lowers the collateral requirements by more than 50%. This relation is more pronounced for informationally opaque borrowers and for lending firms with a controlling stake in the borrowing firms.

FinTech Credit: A Critical Review of Empirical Research Literature

FinTech credit has attracted significant attention from academics and policymakers in recent years. Given its growing importance, in this paper we provide an overview of the empirical research on FinTech credit to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs). We focus on three broad topics: i) the factors supporting the development of innovative business models for credit intermediation, such as marketplace lending; ii) the benefits of new credit risk assessment data and methods; iii) the implications of these innovations for access to credit. Three main messages emerge from the literature. First, the growth of lenders with innovative business models is mainly driven by the degree of local economic development and of competition in the banking sector. Second, new data and methods can improve traditional credit risk models because they are particularly helpful in screening opaque borrowers, such as those with scant credit history. Third, FinTech borrowers generally lack (or have limited) access to finance and tend to be riskier than traditional bank borrowers.

Common Auditors and Private Bank Loans

We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office audits the bank and borrower. A common auditor connection also matters more for longer-tenured auditors, for geographically proximate borrowers, and when the syndicate involves fewer lenders. The effect does not hold for auditors recently sanctioned by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Finally, the interest rate discount is not the consequence of homophily or biased decision-making, based on a comparison of post-loan performance of firms with common-auditor loans versus those with non-common-auditor loans.

Does credit type matter for relationship lending? The special role of bank credit lines

Theory suggests that a bank's information production about a borrower varies with credit type. In this paper, I show that credit type plays an important role in relationship lending. Specifically, while repeated borrowing from the same bank reduces information asymmetry thus lowers the cost of loan, I find this effect mainly rises from prior borrowings in form of credit lines instead of other loans. This effect is stronger among more opaque borrowers and is robust to tests accounting for potential endogeneity. My paper highlights the importance of credit types in relationship lending and the special informational role of credit lines.

Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany

The effects of large banks on the real economy are theoretically ambiguous and politically controversial. I identify quasi-exogenous increases in bank size in postwar Germany. I show that firms did not grow faster after their relationship banks became bigger. In fact, opaque borrowers grew more slowly. The enlarged banks did not increase profits or efficiency, but worked with riskier borrowers. Bank managers benefited through higher salaries and media attention. The paper presents newly digitized microdata on German firms and their banks. Overall, the findings reveal that bigger banks do not always raise real growth and can actually harm some borrowers.

Are Bigger Banks Better? Firm-Level Evidence from Germany

The effects of large banks on the real economy are theoretically ambiguous and politically controversial. I identify quasi-exogenous increases in bank size in postwar Germany. I show that firms did not grow faster after their relationship banks became bigger. In fact, opaque borrowers grew more slowly. The enlarged banks did not increase profits or efficiency, but worked with riskier borrowers. Bank managers benefited through higher salaries and media attention. The paper presents newly digitized microdata on German firms and their banks. Overall, the findings reveal that bigger banks do not always raise real growth and can actually harm some borrowers.

Direct Lending: The Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans

I explore the determinants, characteristics and performance of direct corporate loans, that is, loans originated by nonbank institutional investors without banks’ intermediation. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, direct lending has been the most rapidly growing credit market segment. I document that direct lending activity increases when commercial banks face greater regulatory pressure and during periods of weak bank loan and securitized debt issuance. Direct lenders are particularly active in geographic regions that experience more bank mergers and primarily focus on informationally opaque borrowers with limited credit history and few financing alternatives. Moreover, direct loans have higher interest rate, more flexible covenant structures and are more likely to be secured by borrower’s capital stock compared to institutional loans issued by banks. I further show that direct loans experience similar or somewhat better post-issuance performance compared to bank-originated institutional loans. Overall, I provide evidence consistent with the view that direct lending expanded the credit space without giving rise to adverse selection costs.

Who monitors opaque borrowers? Debt specialisation, institutional ownership, and information opacity

AbstractIn this study, we suggest that the level of information opaqueness determines the propensity of publicly listed firms to have debt financing from only a few debt types (i.e., debt specialisation). Using accruals quality as a proxy for information opaqueness, we find that the degree of debt specialisation is lower for firms with high‐quality accruals. This result is consistent with the notion that information collection and monitoring costs are higher for firms that have higher informational opacity, explaining the tendency towards debt specialisation. We further argue that creditors need not monitor borrowers so closely when they are monitored by institutional owners. The empirical findings support this argument and show that firms with more stable institutional ownership are likely to have less specialised debt types. The empirical evidence is also consistent with the expectation that stable institutional ownership is likely to reduce the demand for monitoring over accruals management. Using S&P 500 membership as an exogenous event driving institutional ownership changes, we further document that debt specialisation is decreasing in accruals quality when institutional investors are expected to have an influence.

Foreign and Domestic Loans over the Business Cycle

During good economic times, the likelihood of obtaining a loan from a foreign bank increases in the borrower firm's opacity. During bad economic times (recessions), this relation reverses as the probability of obtaining a foreign loan decreases for all firms, but drops disproportionately more for opaque borrowers. Independently of the business cycle, firms with a higher share of foreign sales are more likely to obtain a foreign loan. We derive these predictions in a formal theoretical framework and confirm them empirically using a loan-bank-firm level dataset covering forty countries during the 1999-2016 period.