Ontological Debate Research Articles

Natural Selection and the Nature of Statistical Explanations

There is a widespread philosophical interpretation of natural selection in evolutionary theory: natural selection, like mutation, migration, and drift are seen as forces that propel the evolution of populations. Natural selection is thus a population level causal process. This account has been challenged by the Statistics, claiming that natural selection is not a population level cause but rather a statistical feature of a population. This paper examines the nature of the aforementioned ontological debate and the nature of statistical explanations given by population genetics. I claim that the Modern Synthesis provides good explanations of the changes in trait structure of populations without appealing to detailed causal information about the individual trajectories of the members of a population.

Why Care About What There Is?

Abstract There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are (in one or another sense) ultimate. I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary objects as a case study, I show that the arguments that animate these debates bear directly on the question of which objects there are and cannot plausibly be recast as arguments about what’s ultimate. I then address the objection that, because they are easily answerable, questions about what there is cannot be a proper subject of ontological debate.

A Functional Approach to Ontology

Abstract There are two ways of approaching an ontological debate: ontological realism recommends that metaphysicians seek to discover deep ontological facts of the matter, while ontological anti-realism denies that there are such facts; both views sometimes run into difficulties. This paper suggests an approach to ontology that begins with conceptual analysis and takes the results of that analysis as a guide for which metaontological view to hold. It is argued that in some cases, the functions for which we employ a part of our conceptual scheme might give us reasons to posit ontological facts regarding certain objects. The proposed approach recommends ontological realism about an object just in case our conceptual scheme gives us reason to. This yields a mixed overall metaontological view that adopts ontological realism to some issues and ontological anti-realism to others, and that avoids the difficulties that typically arise for the two views.

What is an institution? An ontological debate illustrating community forestry of Nepal

Illustrating Community Forestry (CF) of Nepal, this article discusses the concept of ‘institution’ through the perspectives of the phenomenology of Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann (1966), the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens (1984), and the conception of institution as people-nature relations. Phenomenologists concentrate on the structures of consciousness as individuals experienced and expressed while turning an objective world or phenomenon into a subjective one through objectivation, internalization and externalization/ institutionalization process. The structuralist holds that the creation of an institution is a reproduction of interaction between structures and actors. And other theorists (e.g., Leach et al., 1999; Ostrom 2005, 2009; Gupta et al., 2010; Young, 2010) consider that institutions for natural resources conflate with social institutions and mediate their relations. Although these theories are not explicit epistemologically in a pragmatic sense, they have indicated language, rules, (embedded) practices and knowledge are the referential artifacts of institutions. These theories are found applicable in the institutionalization/socialization history of CF as it had gone through the social rejection (i.e, objectivation) during the 1970s, internalization during the 1980s, and socialization of it during and after the 1990s. The socialization of CF after the 1990s was due to the formation of CF as a social space (a ‘structure’ or ‘institution’) to discuss social and environmental issues into one place where forest dependent users (‘actors’) rationalize the use of forest and its conservation for local environment in a more pragmatic sense (i.e., mediate people-nature relations). An institution for natural resources is, therefore, the combined perspectives of phenomenologists, structuralists, and those who think institutions as a mediator of people-nature relations. Thus, an institution is political (i.e., relations and interactions) and ecological/economic (i.e., access to natural resources, livelihood practices).

Spaces of Becoming: Lessons for Planners from the Square Movements

ABSTRACT The dilemma of openness reflects a long-standing ontological debate about public space. The dilemma is between creating boundless spaces that allow for an infinite diversity of uses but lack coherence, and bounding spaces to secure coherence at the cost of diversity. The implications for the theory and practice of public space planning, regulation, management and design are fundamentally different. By analyzing movement, occupation and identity in public spaces in the context of protest, I explore the concept of spaces of becoming: a fluid approach to public space interpretation and an alternative to the ‘dilemma of openness.’

Humans in Bestiaries: The Case of 200 años de monstruos y maravillas argentinas

The resurgence of the medieval bestiary in contemporary Hispanic literature has resulted in increasingly creative interpretations of the genre. Among these interpretations is 200 años de monstruos y maravillas argentinas (2015) compiled by Gabo Ferro, illustrated by Christian Montenegro, and designed by Laura Varsky. This article explores the ontological debate that ensues from 200 años's choice to place humans in literary spaces traditionally reserved for animals. 200 años compiles documentation denoting Argentine history's dark underbelly, brandishing the word bestia to blur the line between "appropriate" and "marginalized" historical subjects. In this work, images check historical documentation through sardonic interpretation, creating a space between text and image in which the reader/viewer may reconsider the veracity and underpinnings of official Argentine historical narratives and hegemony.

Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics

The argument from causal closure of the physical (CCP) is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the mental forces of a Newtonian nature, i.e. those which manifest themselves by causing accelerations. However, it is conceivable and possible that mental causation is manifested through the redistribution of energy, momentum and other conserved quantities in the system, brought about by altering the state probability distribution within the living system and leading to anomalous correlations of neural processes. After arguing that a probabilistic, interactionist model of mental causation is conceivable, which renders the argument from causal closure of the physical ineffective, I point to some basic features that such a model must have in order to be intelligible. At the same time, I indicate the way that conclusive testing of CCP can be done within the theoretical framework of physics.

Hi-individuals and Where to Find Them—Towards a Hi-world Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic

If to be is to be the value of a bound variable, then the acknowledgment and denial of the existence of chairs amounts to a serious disagreement about the range of a quantifier. However, by resorting to the intrinsic hierarchical structure of hi-world semantics, we find that the varying of domains from worlds to worlds can actually be accommodated within a unified framework. With the introduction of a universal domain D of hi-individuals and an existence predicate E that serves as a realization operator, a new semantics for quantified modal logic is proposed. It allows individual variables to range over individuals in different levels of a hi-world, and is indifferent to the ontological debate about the existence of chairs.

When I Grow Up I Want to Be an Indian

This essay examines ideas surrounding growth, based on experiential insights gained by the author while staying with indigenous leaders of the Kariri-Xoco in Northeastern Brazil as part of an artistic residency organised by Thydewa (NGO). This is not an ethnographic study, but a reflection into indigenous modes of learning through co-participation in the lifeworld, and how these learnings can help enrich a contemporary ontological debate on animism and indigeneity beyond identitary frameworks. The work also touches on a critique of developmentalism, through indigenous ideas concerning growth and change. Some insights into the performing arts practice developed with the Kariri-Xoco as part of the residency are also touched upon.

From “Meat Culture” to “Cultured Meat”: Critically Evaluating the Contested Ontologies and Transformative Potential of Biofabricated Animal Material on Culture and Law

This article calls into question how different the parallel ontologies of meat are in terms of the realities they enact. It argues that while biofabricated animal material is expected to transform the production and consumption of meat, the material’s ontologies reinforce existing interrelationships between the dominant meat culture and the law. Additionally, the expectations surrounding biofabricated animal material vests the material with transformative power, even though it does not challenge the structural factors, namely law and culture, which underlie the exploitation and commodification of animals. I begin by delineating the co-constituting relationship between law, the realities of meat production and consumption, and meat culture. I then unpack the interface between different ontologies of meat and consider why the contest has taken place in legal terrains. From here, I consider the key expectations that have assigned transformative power to biofabricated animal material. I suggest that these expectations work to reinforce existing meat culture, and the configurations of power that benefit from it, as supported via legal instruments.

Philosophically Speaking...

I like nothing so much as a good philosophical discussion. For one thing, it just feels so delightfully scientific to be bandying about high minded terms like "epistemology," "ontology," "realism," "relativism," and "paradigm" with great abandon. For another thing, it is simply essential in my view of the world of science to which I enjoy belonging that one should be fully engaged in the ethical and normative underpinnings of scientific practice. That, to me, operationally characterizes philosophy of science. Our scientific philosophies facilitate the debating, codifying, and explicating of our "agreed-to rules of the road" for doing our work. They are our scientific code of conduct, so to speak. In my way of thinking, the rules of the road are important for all good researchers to understand and share if we are to hew faithfully to our paradigms and do good normal science research. The problem for me is that I see the emerging debate over whether our field is a science or not through two distinct lenses, and I'm getting some parallax out of it. I've earned two doctorates at two different stages of my career; one in marketing when I was much younger, and one more recently in information systems. That does not make me any smarter than the average bear, and it could certainly be argued that it's a sure sign of not being smarter, since one could say I had to do it twice to get it right. Yet, it has afforded me a very unique perspective on the emerging ontological debate about our discipline because, quite literally, I Have Been There Before! I've studied the Philosophy of Science two fulsome times in my career, and I've gotten some interesting perspectives each time as each was in the midst of an existential debate over status, and both of these experience bear upon my agenda-setting here, as an editor. While learning my scientific craft as a first-time doctoral student in marketing, I reveled in the debate that much of academic marketing was enmeshed in during the 80s on whether marketing was a science or a technology and if a science, how best to be practiced. We future scientists all read Kuhn (1970) in our philosophy of science seminar, as well as Dubin (1978) and a flock of excellent philosophical essays collected in a tome edited by the redoubtable Jagdish Sheth (Sheth & Garrett, 1986) - a philosophy of science volume that many in marketing and elsewhere still use, aged though it might be. We marketers also saw a collection of philosophical essays by thought leaders of the field under such titles as "Marketing, Scientific Progress, and the Scientific Method" (Anderson, 1983), "On Making Marketing Science more Scientific" (Arndt, 1985), "Paradigms Lost" (Deshpande, 1983), and "Metatheory and Metamethodology in Marketing" (Leong, 1985). The debate in marketing continued well past that point and has extended into recent years (e.g., Brown, 1996; Easton, 2002), indicating that the debate we have now in information systems has years yet to go. It is not a simple question we deal with, and the answers take time and fulsome consideration.

Conceptualization and Measurement of Individual Situation Awareness (SA) in Expert Populations across Operational Domains: a systematic review of the literature with a practical purpose on our minds

From the time when the first formal SA theories were introduced (Endsley 1995; Smith & Hancock, 1995), an underlying ontological debate concerning the nature of human perception and cognition became evident. Indeed, despite more than two decades have passed since their publication, SA epistemological status and methodology are still object of dispute. For that reason, and bearing in mind the ultimate practice-oriented goal of developing/adapting SA measurement methods for elite soccer, a systematic review of the literature was performed regarding the definition and the methods used for SA measurement in expert populations. Fifty-four studies (N=54) met the established inclusion criteria and revealed important differences concerning SA definition and assessment across different operational domains. The results are discussed regarding both the state of the art of SA literature and the adaption/development of SA assessment methods for elite soccer.

Importance and Explanatory Relevance: The Case of Mathematical Explanations

A way to argue that something (e.g. mathematics, idealizations, moral properties, etc.) plays an explanatory role in science is by linking explanatory relevance with importance in the context of an explanation. The idea is deceptively simple: a part of an explanation is an explanatorily relevant part of that explanation if removing it affects the explanation either by destroying it or by diminishing its explanatory power, i.e. an important part (one that if removed affects the explanation) is an explanatorily relevant part. This can be very useful in many ontological debates. My aim in this paper is twofold. First of all, I will try to assess how this view on explanatory relevance can affect the recent ontological debate in the philosophy of mathematics—as I will argue, contrary to how it may appear at first glance, it does not help very much the mathematical realists. Second of all, I will show that there are big problems with it.

Evidence-based or person-centered? An ontological debate

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) continues to be vigorously debated and person-centered healthcare (PCH) has been proposed as an improvement. But is PCH offered as a supplement to or as a replacement of EBM? Prima facie PCH only concerns the practice of medicine, while the contended features of EBM also include specific methods and the biomedical model. In this paper I argue that there are good philosophical reasons to see PCH as a radical alternative to the existing medical paradigm of EBM, since the two seem committed to conflicting ontologies. I will aim to make explicit some of the most fundamental assumptions that motivate EBM and PCH in order to show that the choice between them ultimately comes down to ontological preference. While EBM has a solid foundation in positivism, or what I here call Humeanism, PCH is more consistent with causal dispositionalism. I conclude that if there is a paradigmatic revolution on the way in medicine, it is first of all one of ontology.

Ontología fácil y sus consecuencias

Stephen Schiffer’s recent work in developing a pleonastic account of propositions (and other entities) leads to major, game-changing results in both first-order ontology and meta-ontology. This paper aims to clarify what these consequences are and why they are so important. In my view, the biggest threat to the metaphysical party comes from a view I have elsewhere called the «easy» approach to ontology: Schiffer’s arguments for «pleonastic» propositions, properties, fictional characters, states and events; the neo-Fregean’s arguments for the existence of numbers; and my own arguments for fictional characters, social and cultural objects, and ordinary objects such as tables and chairs. The paper draws out these three different forms of easy ontology, showing their interrelations, and argues that these approaches really give us a straightforward, out and out realism about the entities in question. On the meta-ontological level however, it suggests that serious ontological debate in metaphysics is confused because its ontological questions have so straightforward answers. This approach may be the most important threat to serious metaphysics but it is also extremely promising as a way of dissolving mysteries and clarifying the epistemology of metaphysics.

Limitations of resource determinism in international energy studies

Most of the energy related studies do often fall into a trap of resource-determinism, which turns the arguments around a primary importance of energy resources. The present commentary attempts to highlight major shortcomings of the resource-determinism and aims to conversely argue for a necessary social dimension in the resource–society interactions. Four critical points are then raised about resource-curse, energy dependencies, consumer–producer juxtaposition and about resource market interrelation. The comment draws an attention to the ontological debate in social sciences and to societal embeddedness of economic processes. On these grounds, the comment suggests to consider a resource as a dependent variable in international energy relations analysis.

The ontological pitfalls of Islamic exceptionalism: A re-inquiry on El-Bassiouny's (2014, 2015) conceptualization of “Islamic marketing”

In response to Jafari and Sandıkcı's (2015a) critique of her 2014 article entitled “The one-billion-plus marginalization”, El-Bassiouny (2015) dismisses the authors' key ontological debate over exceptionalism as a historical and political discourse and diverts attention to new areas of enquiry (e.g., disciplinary legitimacy, Islamic jurisprudence and methodological pluralism) to further her original “transcendental values integration” approach to marketing theory, practice and education. While offering new insights, El-Bassiouny's account is still largely driven by discourses of marginalization, exceptionalism and Islamism. This article therefore: (1) reappraises the oversimplification of the marginalization discourse; (2) reiterates the pitfalls of Islamic exceptionalism at an ontological level; (3) cautions against the consequences of ideological readings of Islam in marketing and consumer research; and (4) re-emphasizes the importance of understanding identity dynamics in the analysis of the complex intersections of Islam, marketing and consumption. In conclusion, the article offers some areas for future research.

Whole-for-part metonymy, classification, and grounding

Since the early 1980s, metonymy has progressively gained central stage in linguistic investigations. The advent of cognitive linguistics marked a new turn in the study of this trope conceived, not as a deviation from semantic conventions (contra classical rhetorical theories), but as a phenomenon rooted in non-language-specific mechanisms of conceptualization of the world. Acknowledging that metonymy is ultimately cognitive in nature, this paper proposes to consider metonymy from its multiple levels of manifestation, integrating cognitive, pragmatic, semantic, but also ontological angles of approach. Taking whole-for-part (WP) metonymies as a case study, I aim to show how recent developments within these respective disciplines can enrich our understanding of such metonymic mechanisms, sometimes without even identifying them as such. This paper proposes to establish a dialog between these disciplines on the topic of WP-metonymy. So, after a presentation of the most standard cognitive and pragmatic approaches to WP-metonymy, I will argue for the relevance of recent semantic investigations on quantity gradability, and for the theoretical importance of keeping these two kinds of part-reference clearly apart. I will show that the literature on gradability provides strong semantic arguments for doing so. Finally, connecting the debate on WP-metonymy with the ontological debate on property inherence will open the way for a formal treatment of WP-metonymy within ground logic.

The Plural Subject Approach to Social Ontology and the Sharing Values Issue

I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the question of the collective feeling value.

The Positionless Middle Way: Weak Philosophical Deflationism in Madhyamaka

In this paper, I explore the connections between meta-ontological and meta-philosophical issues in two of Nāgārjuna’s primary works, the Mūlamadhyamakārikā and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I argue for an interpretative framework that places Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as a meta- and ultimately non-philosophical evaluation of philosophy. The paper’s primary argument is that an interpretative framework which makes explicit the meta-ontological and meta-philosophical links in Nāgārjuna’s thought is both viable and informative. Following Nāgārjuna, I start my analysis by looking at the positions that exist within the ontological debate and show that the Mādhyamika should be understood as an ontological deflationist who aims to discredit ontological questions altogether. I argue, however, that the Mādhyamika does not wish to engage in meta-ontological debates either and that Nāgārjuna’s ontological deflationist arguments necessarily lead to a position of philosophical deflationism: the rejection of all philosophical and meta-philosophical debates. Further on, I provide a sketch of denegation, the language operator in Madhyamaka that allows Nāgārjuna to make seemingly philosophical claims while not having the commitments that traditional philosophical claims do. I conclude with a defense of my interpretation of Madhyamaka as weak philosophical deflationism compared to other deflationist construals, an explicit discussion of the ways in which my understanding differs from contemporary western interpretations that prima facie resemble weak philosophical deflationism, and an identification of weak philosophical deflationism with dequitism, a variant of quetism.