Pillars of the Soviet Dictatorship at the Local Level Donald J. Raleigh (bio) Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, Substate Dictatorship: Networks, Loyalty, and Institutional Change in the Soviet Union. 445 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020. ISBN-13 978-0300230819. $65.00. Saulius Grybkauskas, Governing the Soviet Union’s National Republics: The Second Secretaries of the Communist Party. 226 pp. New York: Routledge, 2021. ISBN-13 978-1138391758. $160.00. The comparative and theoretical literature on dictatorships shows that deeply ideological one-party states such as the Soviet Union—especially if forged in civil war—not only tend to survive longer but also show more resiliency than other types of authoritarian rule.1 Despite the recent publication of archival-based biographies of I. V. Stalin, N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev, and M. S. Gorbachev that throw light on politics at the top, remarkably little research has been conducted on how local leaders governed under these rulers. Making substantial contributions to our understanding of how the USSR functioned at the regional level, the two complementary books under review draw on strategic archive-based research, memoirs, and the secondary literature (and, in Grybkauskas’s case, on oral interviews) to reveal how local leaders—first secretaries of oblasts (and of Soviet republics) and second secretaries in republic party committees—functioned after World War II and how their modus operandi changed as the USSR became less oppressive. [End Page 379] ________ Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s impressive study comprises ten chapters, a conclusion, eight appendices, and a glossary. Building on the findings they present in their monograph Cold Peace and in related articles, especially that a number of key institutional changes in the highest party echelons occurred while Stalin was still alive, they in Substate Dictatorship focus on the scores of substate (Rogers Brubaker’s term) regional leaders tasked with managing the ruling coalition locally while thwarting revolts from below and dealing with pressures from above.2 Given the unfeasibility of examining all 139 possible units of analysis, the authors fashioned an inductive research design of 30 in-depth oblast- and republic-level case studies over a 30-year period and hired full-time researchers to tap local archival sources. Observing that from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s, the Soviet political system “moved from being a repressive autocracy to an oligarchy with low to medium levels of repression” (5), Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin laid the foundation for this transformation that reflected the resiliency of the Soviet regime and its institutions. To chart the change, they identify and compare three models of local dictators: substate dictators (“little Stalins”—not their term) and contested autocrats (those challenged by other influential networks in the region) who prevailed in the late Stalin era, and party governors, who appeared under Khrushchev to become the norm in the Brezhnev era. Like substate dictators, party governors oversaw appointments to the local nomenklatura, but they ran organizations governed by a set of informal rules such as seniority and by adherence to systems of local practices that linked together the local political elite. To handle pressures from above and to foster local patronage systems, substate dictators employed three strategies to make followers dependent upon them: forms of exclusion (including expulsion from the party); the use of kompromat, sensitive or compromising material, as leverage; and overpromotion of cadres who remained indebted to their patron. Offering informative examples of how substate dictators used these approaches, the authors show how, in time, a stratification took place at the regional level as a system emerged of seniority marked by age, length of service, and levels of political education, reinforced by a package of benefits (salary, allotments of foods and goods, hard to get items, etc.) that undermined Moscow’s system of remuneration. [End Page 380] After the war, most oblast party committees (obkomy) fell into the hands of young substate dictators, who proliferated because of the need for regional leaders to assume decision-making powers during the conflict, the legacy of quasi-military forms of ruling, the trials of achieving uncompromising reconstruction quotas, and the fact that Stalin realized that he had to give them breathing space to meet state targets. Directors...
Read full abstract