Omni-channel Supply Chain Research Articles

Investment ability: a catalyst for omni-channel supply chain integration

Investment ability: a catalyst for omni-channel supply chain integration

Optimal product pricing and lot sizing decisions for an omni-channel supply chain

In an omni-channel supply chain, companies offer customers multiple channels to interact with their brand. This allows for greater outreach and sales, resulting in increased customer loyalty and trust. Furthermore, there has been little discussion on the simultaneous consideration of strategic and tactical decisions under return policies in omni-channel supply chains. To maximize total profit, this research proposes a two-echelon supply chain, comprising a manufacturer and multiple retailers, including traditional, electronic and omni-channels. The non-deterministic demand function takes into account the sales price, refund price, delivery time and order quantities. A heuristic algorithm based on analysis of Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions used to solve a nonlinear programming model. This research presents an analysis of the factors influencing the decision variables and profit of the entire supply chain and offers retailers a unique way to evaluate their performance and make operational decisions regarding price, delivery time and order quantities.

An efficient bi-objective optimization approach for the optimal design of omnichannel supply chain distribution networks with sustainability

ABSTRACT This article studies a bi-objective omnichannel supply chain network design (SCND) problem, while simultaneously minimizing the overall supply chain (SC) cost and associated environmental emissions. A novel bi-objective mixed integer linear programming model is formulated, then an efficient optimization approach is proposed for the problem. Experimental studies on a case study and 210 random testing instances were conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed model and approach. For the case study, 10 Pareto-optimal solutions were obtained within 1.9 s. For the random testing instances, the average number of Pareto-optimal solutions and computational time were 10.19 and 18.85 s, respectively. The overall results show that the proposed method is efficient and outperforms the adapted non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm II on test instances. Computational results indicate that this approach could assist decision makers in making good decisions, with considerable SC cost saving and carbon emission reductions in different situations.

Research on Supply Chain Contract of Omni-channel Retail with BOPS Mode

T With the rapid development of e-commerce, consumers' consumption patterns have changed, more and more consumers are used to shopping online. Therefore, in order to better connect with the consumer market and save total cost of the supply chain, more and more manufacturers have expanded their online channels, which undoubtedly has an impact on the operation of brick-and-mortar shops. Therefore, under the background of new-retail development, BOPS mode is introduced to integrate online and offline. It protects offline physical resources, and brings profit gains to different subjects of omni-channel supply chain. This paper focuses on the omni-channel supply chain members who jointly manage BOPS mode, but as different profit subjects, what kind of supply chain contracts should manufacturers and retailers adopt to guarantee their respective interests, improve the enthusiasm of each subject, and make omni-channel supply chain operate continuously. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to study the influence of traditional wholesale price contract, quantity discount contract, sales rebate contract and revenue sharing contract on the profit and return of manufacturers and retailers in omni-channel supply chain, so as to effectively encourage the main body of omni-channel supply chain to actively provide BOPS, protect offline physical store resources and bring gains to omni-channel supply chain by taking advantage of online and offline advantages. It is found that sales rebate contract and revenue sharing contract can achieve Pareto optimization on the basis of traditional wholesale price contract, and the choice mainly depends on BOPS demand.

Addressing Omni-Channel Supply Chain Challenges: the Importance of Supply Chain Coordination

Addressing Omni-Channel Supply Chain Challenges: the Importance of Supply Chain Coordination

Centralized Decision Making in an Omnichannel Supply Chain with Stochastic Demand

With retailers increasingly adopting the omnichannel retailing model as a core strategy in their daily operations, this study investigates the impact of random demand on the omnichannel supply chain that employs a combination of the online channel, retail channel, and buy online and pick up in store (BOPS) channel, in light of the more stochastic market after the occurrence of COVID-19. To enhance the sustainable profitability of the omnichannel supply chain, this study considers price and lead time dependent demand with both known and unknown distributions, and establishes mathematical models to maximize profit under centralized situations. The study analyzes the variations in demand with lead time in the three channels and examines the effects of price and lead time on profit. Additionally, it investigates the interactions between price and lead time. Through numerical examples, the study illustrates the effects of the mean and variance of random demand on decision variables and examines the influence of potential demand and the sensitivity of lead time. Overall, this analysis provides valuable insights into the impact of demand randomness on the profitability of an omnichannel supply chain, highlighting the importance of considering price and lead time in the decision-making process.

Analysis of Omni-Channel Evolution Game Strategy for E-Commerce Enterprises in the Context of Online and Offline Integration

With the upgrading of people’s consumption patterns, the omni-channel supply chain becomes the mainstream form of e-commerce platform enterprise development. Aiming at two different e-commerce enterprises, we construct an evolutionary game model for enterprises’ “online+offline” omni-channel construction strategy by self-build or cooperating with brick-and-mortar stores. It is based on the Stackelberg and Cournot competition model, combined with the omni-channel pricing strategy, using the theory of perfect rationality and bounded rationality, and combing the non-cooperative game and evolutionary game to realize. Moreover, the evolutionary game process is simulated. Through the dynamic changes of the system, the strategy selection behavior mechanism of the retail channel subjects is deeply analyzed. It is found that enterprises’ strategy choices are influenced by both competitors and profits, and evolutionary stabilization strategies are not unique. In addition, changes in consumer loyalty, physical feelings, and sharing ratio during the evolutionary process will affect the stability rate of enterprises’ behavioral choices.

Buy online and pickup in-store: Co-opetition strategy of omnichannel supply chain players

Buy online and pickup in-store: Co-opetition strategy of omnichannel supply chain players

Inventory strategy of fresh products for omni-channel supply chains

By constructing the consumers’ utility function, this article calculates the optimal order quantity and optimal expected profit of a fresh retailer under the centralized and decentralized inventory strategy in an omni-channel supply chain. In addition, the impact of consumers’ channel preference, consumers’ demand transfer behavior, and the "buy-online-pickup-in-store" (BOPS) service on retailers’ inventory strategy are analyzed. The results show that opening a BOPS service is not always beneficial to retailers. However, it is always beneficial for retailers to eliminate the differences between channels. Under the centralized inventory strategy, the optimal order quantity and expected profit are only affected by the freshness-keeping cost, while under the decentralized inventory strategy, they are affected by various consumer behaviors. A reasonable inventory management strategy should be adopted according to the product type, inventory cost, consumer preferences, and order quantity.

Supply Chain Relationships in Omnichannel Retailing

The omnichannel supply chain changes the relationship between vertical and horizontal market agents. The author advocates the thesis that the cooperation between the participants in the supply chain and the cross-functional integration inside the company are key factors for the success of the commercial business in the conditions of digitalization. The aim of the study is to analyze the impact of retail transformations on supply chain relationships in an omnichannel environment. The object of research is the transformation of business models in retail trade through integration and convergence of marketing and logistics operations, symbiosis between online and offline sales and creation of omnichannel models.

Advancing the marketing‐operations interface in omnichannel retail

Advancing the marketing‐operations interface in omnichannel retail

Cross effects of government subsidies and corporate social responsibility on carbon emissions reductions in an omnichannel supply chain system

As online shopping continues to grow, more manufacturers are gradually bracing themselves for both online and traditional marketing, then the omnichannel supply chain (OSC) becomes popular. An OSC has two marketing channels and they may compete with each other for selling the same product. Since emission reduction has become a national consensus and the government may encourage the supply chain to reduce emissions by subsidies and corporate social responsibility (CSR), the OSC members have to change their strategies accordingly. To reveal the interactive effects of subsidies and CSR on emissions in an OSC system, two decentralized decision-making models with/without subsidies are designed to investigate their effects on product prices, profits, and carbon emissions. Then a cost-sharing contract model is developed to coordinate their behaviors to minimize carbon emissions. We find that: (1) a higher cross-price elasticity between two channels can reduce emissions and improve the profits of the OSC members; (2) both subsidy and CSR can reduce emissions and improve the overall supply chain profits; (3) the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the OSC members to reach a Pareto improvement. This paper contributes to revealing the cross effects of subsidies and CSR in an OSC system and designing a cost-sharing contract to achieve a Pareto optimization in reducing carbon emissions.

Big data analytics and artificial intelligence technologies based collaborative platform empowering absorptive capacity in health care supply chain: An empirical study

The healthcare supply chain involves the manufacturing and delivery of medicines at the right time, at the right place, and in the correct quantity. In the world of uncertainties, especially deadly pandemics, the digitalization of the healthcare supply chain has emerged as one of the urgent phenomena to implement, for which organizations are focussing on the omnichannel healthcare approach. This paper explores (a) the antecedents of big data analytics and artificial intelligence (BDA-AI) technology-based collaborative platform for empowering absorptive capacity in omnichannel health care processes; (b) the effect of BDA-AI collaborative platform powered absorptive capacity in omnichannel health care processes and organization performance. The data is collected using a structured questionnaire from healthcare supply chain executives working in South Africa. The findings indicate that the involvement of managerial factors will improve the capacity of health care organizations to develop a BDA-AI technology-driven collaborative platform to assimilate, transfer and exploit critical information from large data sets. It will capacitate healthcare supply chains to deliver innovative performance to healthcare businesses. This work is the first of its kind to examine big data-based knowledge gained in the context of the omnichannel supply chain.

Pricing and coordination models before and after the integration of omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet

Under the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet, considering both cooperation and competition, this article establishes the pricing model before and after the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet and the coordination strategy model under the mobile internet e-commerce logistics cooperation, so as to obtain the wholesale price decision and retail price decision and compensation decisions etc. of supplier S. Furthermore, it can also obtain the corresponding price of retailer T accordingly. Based on the analysis of the above two models, numerical simulations are carried out to compare the optimal decision-making volume before and after the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet and the overall profit level. With the help of the numerical simulation results of the above models, the effectiveness of the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet is demonstrated which achieving win-win and multi-win in both greater breadth and depth in the supply chain.

Coupon strategies for competitive products in an omnichannel supply chain

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to investigate the optimal price and coupon promotion strategies in an omnichannel supply chain. The manufacturer sells competitive products via the BOPS (Buy Online, Pick-Up In-Store) channel and the retailer’s offline channel. Four coupon distribution models are investigated and compared, that is, non-coupon, coupons only offered by the manufacturer or the retailer, and coupons offered by the manufacturer and retailer simultaneously. We find that the distribution of coupons leads to increasing prices. However, coupon promotion does not necessarily lead to profit improvement, and it happens only if the product information in the channel is high enough. We also find that the most profitable case is the manufacturer and retailer implementing coupon promotion unilaterally. Facing the manufacturer’s promotion, the retailer conducting coupon promotion may be uneconomic. Conversely, in the presence of retailer promotion, the manufacturer can derive increasing profit with coupon promotion. Additionally, the manufacturer should endeavor to capture consumers who show a product preference, whereas the retailer should target consumers who show a channel preference.

Impact of bundling on the omnichannel supply chain under price competition

Purpose Many e-commerce firms suffer from high returns because of inaccurate and incomplete product information. Omnichannel and bundling settings can help firms improve operational efficiency and lower returns costs. However, no studies have been conducted on omnichannel supply chains considering bundling strategies. The purpose of this study is to examine the comparison between test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) and online retail, comparing manufacturers’ bundling with retailers’ bundling. Design/methodology/approach The supply chain discussed here consists of two competitive manufacturers and one retailer. The retailer sells both manufacturers' products online and displays one manufacturer's product in a showroom who bears the display cost. Stackelberg game theory is used to develop mathematical models that help manufacturers and retailers make the most effective decisions. Here, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, while the retailer is the follower. Using the backward induction approach, the authors determined the optimal values for selling price, wholesale price and service effort level. Findings The results show that the total TSBO retailing profit under manufacturer bundling is highest when the second manufacturer integrates with the online retailer. The result additionally establishes that when the bundling cost exceeds a certain threshold (1.5), the total profit is higher for the non-integrated type of supply chain channel as compared to the integrated retailer bundling-based configuration. Practical implications The operations and logistics manager will likely undertake the TSBO omnichannel strategy during manufacturers bundling and retailer bundling under the integrated strategy. Originality/value The main contribution of the study is to examine the effect of TSBO retailing on supply chains profit and individual decision-making under different bundling strategies. The authors developed different mathematical models in the TSBO retailing and bundling context and extended the earlier work in the area of integration frame.

Optimal Pricing and Customer Experience Investment Strategy in an Omnichannel Supply Chain Under BOPS

Optimal Pricing and Customer Experience Investment Strategy in an Omnichannel Supply Chain Under BOPS

Barrier analysis for channel synchronisation and implementation of omni channel supply chain strategy meeting customer preferences

Barrier analysis for channel synchronisation and implementation of omni channel supply chain strategy meeting customer preferences

Blessing or Curse? The Bullwhip Effect of an Omni-Channel Supply Chain with Channel Interactions

Blessing or Curse? The Bullwhip Effect of an Omni-Channel Supply Chain with Channel Interactions

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.