Offshore Crew Research Articles

Improving PSM and HSEMS compliance in Malaysian upstream oil and gas industry: A case study assessment for plug and abandonment activities

AbstractProcess safety incidents in the oil and gas industry can have serious consequences. In the United States and Malaysia, standards for process safety management (PSM) have been established by US OSHA and PETRONAS, respectively. However, these standards are not always properly understood or followed by employers, resulting in ineffective safety programs and uncontrolled hazards. Plug and abandonment (P&A) activities in the upstream oil and gas industry require high control of well barriers. To assess the gap between PSM industrial standards and crew awareness in P&A activities, a study was conducted throughout one cycle of the project campaign. The study found that 70% of offshore crews had a high awareness level of the health, safety, and environment management system (HSEMS) and PSM, and 96% compliance was achieved from audit activities. However, two proposed PSM elements scored low in the assessment, indicating a need for improvement in site implementation. The study provides valuable information for offshore crews and readers seeking to improve and assess PSM elements in process safety. The results can help identify and control potential hazards related to technical safety, operational safety, and personnel safety. Furthermore, the study aims to support the development and implementation of PSM standards in Malaysia.

Offshore COVID-19 risk assessment based on a fishing vessel

Offshore crews often work near each other due to limited space, signifying a complex environment for the airborne transmission of the coronavirus (COVID-19). During offshore operations, a fishing vessel can be subjected to miscellaneous airflow conditions and will respond dynamically to ocean waves. To understand the risk of COVID-19 contagion, this research establishes a new computational model to analyse the airborne transmission of COVID-19 and develops effective mitigation strategies where possible. The concentration and coverage of coronavirus are scrutinised, considering typical airflows and wave-induced vessel motions. Furthermore, the COVID-19 infection risk is quantified using a probability index. The results show that the overall infection risk of a ship in tailwind is lower than in head or beam wind. Structural motions are for the first time coupled with the virus transmission, and it was found that the vessel's oscillating movement in waves can reinforce the virus concentration in close proximity to the infected person and may help diffuse the virus outside the proximal region. The presented findings can inform the airborne contagion risks and corresponding hygienic measures for maritime and offshore operations, facilitating long-term human health in seas.i

Improving O&M decision tools for offshore wind farm vessel routing by incorporating weather uncertainty

AbstractThe growth of offshore wind farms depends significantly on how well offshore wind turbines (OWTs) are operated and maintained in the long term. The operation and maintenance (O&M) activities for offshore wind are relatively more challenging due to uncertain environmental conditions than onshore and due to this, vessel routing for offshore on‐site repair is remain complex and unreliable. Here, an improved data‐driven decision tool is proposed to robust the vessel routing for O&M tasks under numerous environmental conditions. A novel data‐driven technique based on operational datasets is presented to incorporate weather uncertainties, such as wind speed, wave period and wave height (significantly influence offshore crew repair works), into the O&M decision‐making process. Results show: (1) The inclusion of weather conditions improves the O&M model uncertainty and accuracy, (2) the implementation of a model allowing weather conditions to evolve has been added to vary the probabilities of successful transfers throughout the day, and (3) the reduction of risk of transfer failure by 15%. These conclusions are further supported by the performance error metrics and uncertainty calculations. Last but not least, by generating a variety of policies for consideration, this tool gave wind turbine operators a systematic and transparent way to evaluate trade‐offs and enable choices pertaining to offshore O&M. The full paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed technique for offshore vessel routing as well as how the environmental conditions affect them.

Concurrent 10. Presentation for: Honey, I shrunk the boat? Uncrewed subsea inspections leveraging remote operations technology

Presented on Wednesday 18 May: Session 10 Between May and November 2021, Woodside, in collaboration with Fugro, completed multiple, world-first, fully uncrewed inspection campaigns of trunklines and subsea infrastructure in the North West Shelf, all utilising a surface vessel and underwater robot (ROV), remotely operated via beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications architecture. Similar work is traditionally performed by a Multipurpose Support Vessel (MPSV) with >50 people onboard, consuming >20 m3/day fuel during transits. Transition to uncrewed remote operations technology has enabled the use of a much smaller (12 m) vessel, removing health and safety risk associated with offshore crew, and with <0.2 m3/day fuel consumption during transit. High-resolution hull and ROV-mounted multi-beam data, ROV-mounted laser point cloud data, ultra-high-definition images and videos and Cathodic Protection (CP) field gradient data were all successfully collected, and operations were completed from the busy Dampier Port with no incidents. Delivery of this landmark achievement was enabled by a multi-year staged technology plan in collaboration with Woodside’s subsea Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR) contractor, Fugro, including establishment of a dedicated remote operations centre based at International Communications Facility. Extensive stakeholder engagement was performed internally and with external regulatory bodies to ensure that all risks were captured, understood and managed so that all parties were aligned on implementation of the novel approach. Application of this technology is forecast to transform the costs of IMR operations vs traditional methods, effectively eliminate carbon emissions and offshore personnel exposure hours, and create opportunities for a more diverse workforce in the sector. To access the presentation click the link on the right. To read the full paper click here

Honey, I shrunk the boat? Uncrewed subsea inspections leveraging remote operations technology

Between May and November 2021, Woodside, in collaboration with Fugro, completed multiple, world-first, fully uncrewed inspection campaigns of trunklines and subsea infrastructure in the North West Shelf, all utilising a surface vessel and underwater robot (ROV), remotely operated via beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications architecture. Similar work is traditionally performed by a Multipurpose Support Vessel (MPSV) with >50 people onboard, consuming >20 m3/day fuel during transits. Transition to uncrewed remote operations technology has enabled the use of a much smaller (12 m) vessel, removing health and safety risk associated with offshore crew, and with <0.2 m3/day fuel consumption during transit. High-resolution hull and ROV-mounted multi-beam data, ROV-mounted laser point cloud data, ultra-high-definition images and videos and Cathodic Protection (CP) field gradient data were all successfully collected, and operations were completed from the busy Dampier Port with no incidents. Delivery of this landmark achievement was enabled by a multi-year staged technology plan in collaboration with Woodside’s subsea Inspection, Maintenance and Repair (IMR) contractor, Fugro, including establishment of a dedicated remote operations centre based at International Communications Facility. Extensive stakeholder engagement was performed internally and with external regulatory bodies to ensure that all risks were captured, understood and managed so that all parties were aligned on implementation of the novel approach. Application of this technology is forecast to transform the costs of IMR operations vs traditional methods, effectively eliminate carbon emissions and offshore personnel exposure hours, and create opportunities for a more diverse workforce in the sector.

Listening to the Well, Listening to Each Other, and Listening to the Silence─New Safety Lessons from Deepwater Horizon

It is common for accident reports and the analysis of large-scale disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout, to point to communication failures. This narrow explanation implicitly assumes that accidents could be prevented if employees spoke up about safety. In contrast, the first author of this paper, whose professional experience is introduced in this Commentary to provide context, has frequently observed that there are, in fact, many cases when employees speak up but are not listened to. These patterns of communication (or lack thereof) occur at the intersection of personal, leadership, and organizational factors, which jointly affect how safety issues are recognized, communicated, and addressed. As such, communication problems are at “the tip of the iceberg” of safety problems, not at their root. In this paper, we review research on high-reliability organizations (HROs) with excellent safety records to identify their communication patterns and practices and how they contribute to the ability to enact five principles of HROs: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, deference to expertise, commitment to resilience, and sensitivity to operations. We then apply this lens to investigate the Deepwater Horizon disaster, based on court documents, expert reports, and personal interviews. Specifically, we investigate how the communication patterns between the onshore experts and the offshore crews compared to the recommendations of HRO theory and how existing discrepancies might help explain the accident. We found that many employees were aware of safety issues and communicated concerns openly, but there was little organizational response to the issues they raised. This failure to listen was largely owed to factors that were not directly related to communication, such as time pressure and lack of resources, and a culture that valued a “can do attitude” and getting things done so much that it got in the way of sensitivity to operations, expert-based guidance, and communication about problems. Moreover, the challenges of the project and its aggressive timeline created an extreme, almost toxic, commitment to resilience. Based on these findings, we discuss recommendations for improving safety in offshore oil and gas production.

Major accident prevention illustrated by hydrocarbon leak case studies: A comparison between Brazilian and Norwegian offshore functional petroleum safety regulatory approaches

Despite laws, regulations, or risk management tools designed to avoid loss events, a hydrocarbon leak (HCL) in an offshore oil and gas platform11Also mentioned in this paper as ‘offshore platform’ or ‘platform’. is a major hazard event that reveals failures in risk control. In addition, similarities between different HCLs challenge the efficiency of current improvement mechanisms and the completeness of applied risk management practices. Accident causation models sustain that different roles in different levels, including regulators, companies, and the work environment, create the necessary conditions to a loss event, and therefore should be part of the accident analysis. This paper analyzes similar HCLs occurred in Norwegian and Brazilian offshore platforms to compare the regulatory approaches to risk control, aiming to identify influences related to the recurrence of HCLs in functional regulatory regimes (FRRs). As a result, each HCL among case studies consists of human errors that occurred while offshore crews were operating unsafe systems created by improper design or changes to address operational demands. An inappropriate context may support the impairment of safeguards that may not always be available or reliable in an environment which has as particular aspects the remoteness and the need to be self-sufficient. As a consequence, unsafe systems impose safety rules to offshore personnel and more relevance to human performance in the overall risk picture. In FRRs, the combination of regulatory requirements and enforcement activities is part of the safety context and influence risk owners’ behavior. The current comparison identifies differences between Brazilian and Norwegian regulatory regimes that may influence safety in offshore systems, as well as risk constraints related to human performance, which is strongly dependent on influencing factors such as safety culture.

Dexterous Underwater Manipulation from Onshore Locations: Streamlining Efficiencies for Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles

Underwater manipulation is a challenging problem. The state-of-the-art technology is dominated by remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). ROV operations typically require an offshore crew consisting of, at minimum, an intendant (or supervisor), an operator, and a navigator. This crew must often be doubled or even tripled due to work shifts. In addition, customer representatives often wish to be physically present offshore. Furthermore, underwater intervention missions are still dominated by a significant amount of lowlevel, manual control of the manipulator(s) and of the vehicle itself. While there is a significant amount of research on autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) in general and fieldable solutions already exist for inspection and exploration missions, possibilities remain for adding intelligent autonomous functions for interventions.

연근해 선원을 위한 맞춤형 레이더 시뮬레이션 교육

연근해 선원을 위한 맞춤형 레이더 시뮬레이션 교육

Reducing Incidents in Marine Personnel Transfer

Summary Millions of crew transfers take place each year, and whether they are by boat or helicopter, this remains one of the most high-risk activities in offshore operations. Although the safety of crane transfers compares favorably with other methods of crew supply, incidents and associated litigations are not infrequent. Why does such an apparently simple operation go wrong? One reason is a lack of recognition of the true risks. Operators go to great lengths to improve the safety of helicopter operations, while marine transfers rarely get a second thought. The underlying objective, however, remains the same: to move personnel to and from their place of work in a safe, cost-effective, and reliable manner. This paper looks at the real risks, the root causes, of recorded incidents and outlines how transfers can be made safer. Risk can be managed in two ways: Engineered protection. A modern car provides a secure environment that can protect passengers from impacts. A transfer device can do the same and guard against the inevitable human factors that contribute to the majority of incidents. Improved operational control. Procedures, pre-lift planning, communications, and training can all play a significant role in reducing risk. The paper also describes how analysis of past incidents led to the development of improved equipment and operating practices. Considerable focus was given to human factors to prevent minor misjudgments, for example by a crane operator or a vessel skipper, leading to serious incidents. After 10 years working with enhanced systems and after millions of safe transfers, the author explains why serious transfer incidents are not an inevitable feature of offshore life. Modest investments and changes in operational practices have provided many operators with a dual benefit of safer operations and reduced downtime. Finally, the author takes a look at the future of offshore crew supply, providing details of a groundbreaking new project that will utilize a state-of-the-art high-speed catamaran and newly developed transfer system. This will be the first time that a vessel and transfer system have been custom-built to provide swift, comfortable, and safe transfers to offshore installations. The system, developed for the new Crewzer Class of vessel, is due to be commissioned in the Gulf of Mexico in late 2007.