The international to protect was born into a political climate which threatened its demise. The September 2005 millennium summit commitment of world leaders accepted responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.1 It came after almost two decades of a spreading global concern with peace, conflict, and human security-a global concern reflected in the increase in resolutions, treaties, money, and operations aimed at protecting civilians. The to protect imbued state sovereignty with a legitimacy derived from a state's ability to provide human security. But it has entered the pantheon of international norms at an historical moment in which the United Nations security council is still unable to transcend state interests in the name of humanitarianism. Two years earlier, the council had failed to either authorize or prevent the US-led invasion of Iraq. Even as world leaders met at the millennium summit in New York, the council found itself incapable of getting beyond Chinese opposition, based on its support of the regime in Khartoum, to the authorization of meaningful military intervention to stop an apparent genocide underway in Sudan's Darfur region.It is not news that the to protect has yet to be matched by a willingness to intervene to protect. This failure has been all too apparent, particularly to those most affected. In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to name a few places, the member states of the UN have been incapable of bringing the political will, resources, and organization capacity to bear at the right place and at the right time. There is, on the other hand, some recent evidence that international responses to conflict, when they happen, have been effective. It seems possible that the post-Cold War experiments in humanitarian assistance and protection, conflict resolution, and peace-building are saving lives.2 Yet a formula for the use of international force in defence of human security remains elusive, both because of the changing nature and conduct of war and because of shifts in the international politics of multilateral interventions. Together, these pose real challenges to the governance of the use offeree by the international system.IRREGULAR WARS. IRREGULAR STATESIn early 1995, Yassir Arafat played dinner host to a group of senior European diplomats at his new, makeshift office near the beach in Gaza City. He had arrived in mid-1994 and, ever since, a steady stream of official visitors had made the pilgrimage to Gaza eager to show their support to the peace process launched by the Oslo accords.On this occasion, Arafat was particularly gracious. His guest, the minister of development from a European country, had pledged a lot of money to the nascent Palestinian Authority and was a staunch supporter of the state building project at the heart of the Oslo process. So staunch, in fact, that the host government had been paying the bills of the Palestinian ambassador to its country for some time.At one point during the dinner, Arafat turned to his guests, smiling, and asked whether the host government would continue to care of my as he put it.How shall we take care of him, Abu Ammar? asked one of his guests cheekily. Like this? he said, pointing his index finger at the luckless ambassador, thumb up, playfully mimicking a pistol, Or like this? he asked rubbing the same thumb and forefinger together in the universal sign for money.Arafat didn't miss a beat: I usually find it best to do both.3At the time, indeed throughout his career, Arafat had been doing a lot of both. Arafat's construction of a national security state in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was based on guns and money as they key components of political power, particularly in the form of jobs in the security forces for his unemployed political cadres. …