Objective Performance Information Research Articles

Performance information and issue prioritization by political and managerial decision-makers: A discrete choice experiment

Abstract Issue prioritization is the first stage of attention-based theories of decision-making, but remains theoretically and empirically uncharted territory in public administration research. We propose and test how issue prioritization is informed by the characteristics of the performance information on which decision-makers rely, in particular its source (internal or external information), nature (objective or subjective information), aspiration level (historical, social, or coercive aspirations), and required cognitive effort (attention costs). Furthermore, we theorize how these characteristics of performance information determine issue prioritization decisions of political and managerial decision-makers in different ways. We empirically examine issue prioritization decisions in road maintenance and primary school education using a discrete choice experiment among 2,313 local government officials. The experiment reveals that decision-makers are more likely to prioritize issues that are signaled through objective performance measures and that are articulated relative to coercive aspirations, but that the effects of the information’s source and attention costs differ between policy domains. Comparison of observational variation regarding decision-makers’ roles indicates that public managers more strongly prioritize road maintenance issues that are articulated in objective performance information, but not in primary school education. The study advances public administration research and theory with a “horizontal” behavioral perspective on decision-makers’ information processing to prioritize between simultaneous performance issues.

Examining attitudes toward public participation across sectors: An experimental study of food assistance

AbstractPublic views of government are linked to trust, coproduction, regulatory compliance, and political participation. This study focuses on factors shaping public attitudes toward government programs by exploring whether direct participation in governance matters for how the public evaluates the performance of government programs. With an experiment involving governmentally funded food assistance, we randomize the presence of public participation, service providers' sector, and third‐party performance ratings and explore their influence on respondents' assessments of the program. We find that respondents have more confidence in the efficiency, equity, and other aspects of performance when ordinary people play a role in designing and implementing the program. We observe no sector bias among respondents. Individual assessments depend on objective performance information from a credible source. These findings have critical implications for the value people place on engagement in governance and point to the role of publicly available data in shaping public views of government.

The interaction of subjective and objective performance information in fixed payment schemes

I analyse the use of fixed payment schemes when compensation for a group of agents may be based on both objective and subjective performance evaluations. Under purely subjective performance evaluation, the optimal compensation rule entails third-party payments if liability constrains contracting. Verifiable information can improve the contract even if it provides no additional information. For verifiable information to be valuable, unambiguous identification of good news is more important than identification of bad news. Third-party payments can be avoided if an objective measure unambiguously identifies good news. For a group of identical agents, the optimal fixed payment scheme is a tournament if the agents are risk neutral or are of decreasing strong absolute risk aversion.

Liberté, Égalité, Crédibilité: An experimental study of citizens' perceptions of government responses to COVID-19 in eight countries.

During a global pandemic, individual views of government can be linked to citizens' trust and cooperation with government and their propensity to resist state policies or to take action that influences the course of a pandemic. This article explores citizens' assessments of government responses to COVID-19 as a function of policy substance (restrictions on civil liberties), information about performance, and socioeconomic inequity in outcomes. We conducted a survey experiment and analyzed data on over 7000 respondents from eight democratic countries. We find that across countries, citizens are less favorable toward COVID-19 policies that are more restrictive of civil liberties. Additionally, citizens' views of government performance are significantly influenced by objective performance information from reputable sources and information on the disproportionate impacts of COVID-19 on low-income groups. This study reinforces the importance of policy design and outcomes and the consideration of multiple public values in the implementation of public policies.

Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted toward more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group, managers obtained access to objective performance measures, which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

Multitasking and Subjective Performance Evaluations: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in a Bank

We study the incentive effects of grating supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted towards more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group managers obtained access to objective performance measures which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products.

Effectiveness of mortars composition on the embodied carbon long-term impact

Refurbishment activities represent more than 17% of the saving potential of the EU up to 2050. However, studies on buildings structure and finishing reparation of rendering mortars using LCA are still lacking. An innovative design approach is required to drive the minimisation of embodied carbon using objective performance information of buildings behaviour. This research work is focused on the reparation of rendering mortars and intends to demonstrate that the choice of mortars for buildings affects the maintenance actions needed and can increase the construction environment liability and embodied carbon expenditure. A new leaching risk analysis combined with LCA of different mortars composition (cement and lime based) was implemented enabling to predict the longevity of the rendering and the embodied carbon expenditure on 20th century buildings. It is demonstrated that some mortars may have a higher impact at the outset, such as cement-based mortars, but result in a much lower impact across the building service life. The embodied carbon of repair actions of mortars similar to OPC are expected to reduce the environmental impact of rendering repair actions at least in 10 times in comparison to less hydraulic mortars.

Halo Effect in Subjective Performance Evaluation Bias

This study aimed not only to examine the effect of the objective measure and controllability on subjective performance evaluation but also to prove empirically the halo effect phenomenon which is present in the evaluation process when evaluators are faced with two or more different measurement dimensions. This study used a 2x2 factorial web-based experiment involving 62 undergraduate students and 77 sales managers in the Telecommunications industry. The results reveal the subjective performance evaluation manager is directly influenced by objective measurement based on sales performance. Subjective evaluation of performance evaluator will be high when the objective performance information managers showed a high score and vice versa. The level of controllability affects undergraduate students in conducting subjective performance rating. This evidence suggests that the two subjects of this research using their discretion in conducting the performance appraisal rating. Halo effect is proven to have high correlation with two different dimensions of performance measurement.

Cooperation for a competitive position: The impact of hospital cooperation behavior on organizational performance.

Several public policy initiatives, particularly those involving managed care, aim to enhance cooperation between partners in the health care sector because it is expected that such cooperation will reduce costs and generate additional revenue. However, empirical evidence regarding the effects of cooperation on hospital performance is scarce, particularly with respect to creating a comprehensive measure of cooperation behavior. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of hospital cooperation behavior on organizational performance. We differentiate between horizontal and vertical cooperation using two alternative measures-cooperation depth and cooperation breadth-and include the interaction effects between both cooperation directions. Data are derived from a survey of German hospitals and combined with objective performance information from annual financial statements. Generalized linear regression models are used. The study findings provide insight into the nature of hospitals' cooperation behavior. In particular, we show that there are negative synergies between horizontal administrative cooperation behavior and vertical cooperation behavior. Whereas the depth and breadth of horizontal administrative cooperation positively affect financial performance (when there is no vertical cooperation), vertical cooperation positively affects financial performance (when there is no horizontal administrative cooperation) only when cooperation is broad (rather than deep). Horizontal cooperation is generally more effective than vertical cooperation at improving financial performance. Hospital managers should consider the negative interaction effect when making decisions about whether to recommend a cooperative relationship in a horizontal or vertical direction. In addition, managers should be aware of the limited financial benefit of cooperation behavior.

Public Opinion and Public Sector Performance: Are Individuals’ Beliefs About Performance Evidence-Based or the Product of Anti–Public Sector Bias?

ABSTRACTPublic management scholars have long observed that Americans’ attitudes about public sector performance are negative, even though public sector organizations often perform at a high level. We use a survey experiment to test whether this negativity is a product of anti-public sector bias, using package delivery as our context. We also test whether objective performance information can correct this bias. Our results suggest that individuals expect a lower level of performance from the United States Postal Service (USPS) than Federal Express (FedEx), a prominent private sector shipping organization. Moreover, our results suggest that objective performance information does not completely override this “expectation bias”—individuals rate USPS and FedEx differently, even when their ratings are based on identical favorable performance updates.

The impact of the board’s strategy-setting role on board-management relations and hospital performance

The appropriate governance of hospitals largely depends on effective cooperation between governing boards and hospital management. Governing boards play an important role in strategy-setting as part of their support for hospital management. However, in certain situations, this active strategic role may also generate discord within this relationship. The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the roles, attributes, and processes of governing boards on hospital performance. We examine the impact of the governing board's strategy-setting role on board-management collaboration quality and on financial performance while also analyzing the interaction effects of board diversity and board activity level. The data are derived from a survey that was sent simultaneously to German hospitals and their associated governing board, combined with objective performance information from annual financial statements and quality reports. We use a structural equation modeling approach to test the model. The results indicate that different board characteristics have a significant impact on hospital performance (R = .37). The strategy-setting role and board-management collaboration quality have a positive effect on hospital performance, whereas the impact of strategy-setting on collaboration quality is negative. We find that the positive effect of strategy-setting on performance increases with decreasing board diversity. When board members have more homogeneous backgrounds and exhibit higher board activity levels, the negative effect of the strategy-setting on collaboration quality also increases. Active strategy-setting by a governing board may generally improve hospital performance. Diverse members of governing boards should be involved in strategy-setting for hospitals. However, high board-management collaboration quality may be compromised if managerial autonomy is too highly restricted. Consequently, hospitals should support board-management collaboration about empowered contrasting board roles.

Unfairness begets unfairness: Victim derogation bias in employee ratings

This research investigated criterion contamination in human resource evaluations, specifically victim derogation in which third parties (e.g., managers, co-workers) systematically undervalue the performance and potential of individuals who have previously suffered organizational injustices. A policy capturing design (Study 1) found that managers rated job applicants who had been treated unfairly by their previous employers as less suitable than fairly treated applicants, after objective performance information was controlled. In Study 2, the effect of unfair treatment on job applicant ratings was found to be moderated by managers’ just world beliefs, with applicant ratings reflecting more derogation among managers with higher (vs. lower) Belief in a Just World. In Study 3, the pattern of results from Study 2 was replicated in a performance evaluation context using peers as raters. Moreover, in Study 3 an intervention that activated raters’ moral identity was found to attenuate victim derogation bias.

Disability-Job Fit Stereotypes and the Evaluation of Persons with Disabilities at Work

The present paper describes a laboratory experiment in which raters evaluated the videotaped performance of ratees who did or did not have a disability. This disability was stereotypically either a poor fit with the job in question or not. The results indicated that actual appraisals were not influenced by stereotypes about fit or by disabilities, but that expectations concerning future performance and a number of other decisions and recommendations were influenced by this perceived fit. These results suggest that people do hold clear stereotypes about what types of disabilities lead to poor performance on a given job, and that these stereotypes are relied upon for certain personnel decisions, even in light of performance evidence that suggests that these stereotypes are invalid. Employees' disabilities may not influence supervisors' evaluations of their past performance when supervisors have clear objective performance information available. However, bias still exists in expectations for future performance and training recommendations. This bias can have severe long-term consequences on one's career within an organization. The scenario is worse when one's disability is stereotypically believed to be unsuitable to the job in question.

Judgment by quantity.

Five studies are presented that demonstrate the influence of computationally simple quantity information on judgment and the regulation of behavior. Study 1 revealed that Ss used the height of a pile of pages of text to judge their proofreading performance, even when pile size was obviously not determined by the amount of text proofread. In Studies 2 and 3, Ss also used nondiagnostic size information to regulate the amount of time and effort they spent on the task. In Study 4, Ss regulated the amount of effort they spent on a complex essay-writing task by using nondiagnostic page length information. In Study 5, nondiagnostic size information dominated objective performance information, but only when the completed task was in full view of the S. A linguistic mechanism is suggested to explain the use of a judgment by quantity strategy.

Predicting ratings of sales success with objective performance information.

Predicting ratings of sales success with objective performance information.