Objective List Theory Research Articles

Modular Ontologies for Genetically Modified People and their Bioethical Implications

Participants in the long-running bioethical debate over human germline genetic modification (HGGM) tend to imagine future people abstractly and on the basis of conventionalized characteristics familiar from science fiction, such as intelligence, disease resistance and height. In order to distinguish these from scientifically meaningful terms like “phenotype” and “trait,” this article proposes the term “persemes” to describe the units of difference for hypothetical people. In the HGGM debate, persemes are frequently conceptualized as similar, modular entities, like building blocks to be assembled into genetically modified people. They are discussed as though they each would be chosen individually without affecting other persemes and as though they existed as components within future people rather than being imposed through social context. This modular conceptual framework appears to influence bioethical approaches to HGGM by reinforcing the idea of human capacities as natural primary goods subject to distributive justice and supporting the use of objective list theories of well-being. As a result, assumptions of modularity may limit the ability of stakeholders with other perspectives to present them in the HGGM debate. This article examines the historical trends behind the modular framework for genetically modified people, its likely psychological basis, and its philosophical ramifications.

Fit and Well-Being

AbstractIn this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of well-being, and they accept that objects call for some attitudes but not others. I argue that objective list theories and loving-the-good theories require the most minimal changes to accommodate Fit, so we have a pro tanto reason to favor these views over alternatives.

Is It a Wonderful Life? Frank Capra and Objective List Theories of Worth

Aaron Smuts argues that the holiday film It's a Wonderful Life should be understood as both an illustration and a cinematic vindication of objective list theories of worth. This article argues that he is right about the first point but wrong about the second. It's a Wonderful Life is an excellent illustration of objective list theories. However, it also exposes a problem for them – their susceptibility to sceptical anxieties about whether we can know if our lives are worth living. More specifically, I argue that It's a Wonderful Life shows how our lives are vulnerable to two sceptical anxieties, one arising from our potential inability to confirm our successes in promoting the good, the other from our potential inability to ascertain which goods can properly be said to be in our lives due to gaps in our self-knowledge and our potential for self-deception.

The Value of Unity

The Value of Unity

Old Age as a Stage of Life

ABSTRACTThe objective list account of wellbeing is usually taken to say that the same set of goods is relevant to wellbeing for any person, regardless of age. Coupled with reasonable assumptions about how goods are distributed over the lifespan, that leads to a picture of wellbeing as higher in midlife and lower in childhood and old age. I argue that a stage‐relativized objective list theory is more plausible, after exploring several ways to understand the concept of a life stage. On the stage‐relativized view, lists of goods that define wellbeing vary in the sense that there are shifting thresholds and subcategories relevant to different stages of life, but also because there are goods that count at one stage and count less or not at all at others. After exploring the list of goods for old age, I argue that the old age form of wellbeing can be welcomed even if the goods it offers are not superior to midlife goods.

Mood and Wellbeing

ABSTRACT The two main subjectivist accounts of wellbeing, hedonism and desire-satisfactionism, focus on pleasure and desire (respectively) as the subjective states relevant to evaluating the goodness of a life. In this paper, I argue that another type of subjective state, mood, is much more central to wellbeing. After a general characterization of some central features of mood (§1), I argue that the folk concept of happiness construes it as preponderance of good mood (§2). I then leverage this connection between mood and happiness to argue that having certain mood patterns in one’s life is sufficient for having a good life (§3), and explore their potential necessity for a good life (§4). I close with discussion of the role that mood patterns might play within the three leading philosophical theories of wellbeing: hedonism (§5), desire-satisfactionism (§6), and objective-list theory (§7).

Haidt’s Durkheimian Utilitarianism—a Charitable Interpretation

In the paper, I aim to reconstruct a charitable interpretation of Durkheimian utilitarianism, a normative theory of public morality proposed by well-recognised American moral psychologist – Jonathan Haidt, which might provide reasons to justify particular legal regulations and public policies. The reconstruction contains a coherent theory that includes elements of rule-utilitarianism, value pluralism, objective list theory and perfectionism, as well as references to Emile’s Durkheim views on human nature. I also compare Durkheimian utilitarianism with two similar theories – Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialism and Krzysztof Saja’s institutional function consequentialism.

ڈیوڈ بیناتر کے دلائل کا فلسفیانہ جواب A Philosophical Answer to the Arguments of David Benatar

Declaring life to be the worst and consequently abandoning comforts and giving preference to non-existence over human existence is an ancient concept. The earliest traces of which were found in ancient Greek civilization. A glimpse of this concept is found in Christianity in the form of monasticism and in Buddhism in the method of attaining Nirvana. In modern times the term "Antinatalism" is used for this concept. The basic premise of this theory is that humanity must be eliminated from the world and that it is the responsibility of the people to abandon Procreation. Many contemporary Western Thinkers have tried to revive this ideology by presenting it in a modern way. One of the leading thinkers is David Benatar, who in his book “Better Never to Have Been, The Harm of Coming into Existence” presented Hedonistic Theory, Desire Fulfillment Theory, and Objective List Theory to declare worldly life worse. Also, by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of existence and non-existence, it is claimed that every human being is harmed by being created and all forms of life are worse. The purpose of this research paper is to provide a philosophical review and answer to these views. As a result of philosophical critique, this research leads to the conclusion that his arguments are flawed and weak, due to which non-existence has no superiority over human existence.

Welfare Theory: Social Impact Aspects of Digital Technologies

The review and analytical article examines the multidisciplinary concept of “well-being”, redefined from the standpoint of various fields of sociohumanitarian knowledge, as well as the basic theories of well-being. Within the framework of the philosophical approach, three modern groups of well-being theories are characterized: hedonistic, desire theories and objective list theories. In psychology, there are three groups of theories focused on the study of psychological well-being: developmental psychology, personality psychology and clinical psychology. In sociology, the directions of studying the social well-being of the object and the social well-being of the subject are highlighted. Attention is also focused on the actualization of the impact of digital technologies on the well-being of the population, with the allocation of three areas of expert assessments: relative optimism, predominant pessimism and balanced rationalism. The current discursive problems of the impact of digital technologies on human well-being and on the well-being of various social groups are identified. The ambiguity of the impact of the use of digital technologies is considered on the example of two least protected social groups: adolescent children trying to rebuild from their parental family and form their personal decision–making trajectories, and older people, often with the termination of employment, and almost always with a reduction in social ties, health and a decrease in the quality of life. It is noted that the situational use of digital technologies is more significant for hedonistic well -being (gaining pleasure) and to a lesser extent — for eudemonic (as prosperity) significant throughout life. Procedurally-indicates that in the future a low and excessive level of involvement in digital technologies leads to a decrease in the well-being of growing teenagers, and moderately active-to its growth.

A Painful End for Perfectionism?

This paper examines perfectionist attempts to explain the prudential badness of pain (its badness for those who experience it). It starts by considering simple perfectionist explanations, finding them wanting, before considering the most sophisticated perfectionist attempt to explain prudential badness: Gwen Bradford’s tripartite perfectionism. The paper argues that Bradford’s view, though an improvement on earlier perfectionist proposals, still does not satisfactorily explain the full set of prudentially bad pains. It ends by showing how this provides grounds for a general kind of pessimism about perfectionism and the badness of pain and how this case undermines a general purported advantage of perfectionism over the objective list theory.

Explanatory perfectionism: a fresh take on an ancient theory

AbstractThe ‘Big Three’ theories of well-being – hedonism, desire-satisfactionism and objective list theory – attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they do not attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big Three and, I argue, quite attractive.

The commitments of objective list theory for heart donation

No abstract available

Wellbeing and health psychology: the difficulty to measure quality of life

We present a conceptual overview around Wellbeing (WB) and some reflections about the necessity and difficulty of measure it. We start by analyzing the WB concept from the different axis, components, and dimensions (that form part of it. Also, we include and present different theories and conceptions that have been evolving through history, from Hedonism and Eudaimonic to modern psychological WB, Self-Determination Theory, Objective list, or Desires Theories to Authentic Happiness. Based on this revision, we are going to analyzing critically some of the most influential measure indicators of WB proposed during last two decades. Two are the main conclusions of our work: one is that indicators proposed lacks of integration of multiple WB dimensions that can offer a precise idea of the multidimensionality of the concept; second, an accurate, integrate and rigorous WB concept and measurement is an essential condition for effective and fair public policy.

Objective List Theories and Ill-Being

What, if anything, directly detracts from well-being? Objective list theorists affirm basic goods such as knowledge, friendship, and achievement, but it is less clear what they should say about opposing bads. In this paper, I argue that false beliefs, unhealthy relationships, and failed projects are not basic bads and do not directly detract from well-being. They can have bad effects or elements, or block the realization of basic goods, but do not themselves carry negative weight with respect to well-being. This is shown by comparing cases where these bads are present and absent, examining their relation to negative overall well-being, and considering the role of these bads in the pursuit of positive goods.

CHOICE: an Objective, Voluntaristic Theory of Prudential Value

It is customary to think that Objective List (“OL), Desire-Satisfaction (“D-S”) and Hedonistic (“HED”) theories of prudential value pretty much cover the waterfront, and that those of the three that are “subjective” are naturalistic (in the sense attacked by Moore, Ross and Ewing), while those that are “objective” must be Platonic, Aristotelian or commit the naturalist fallacy. I here argue for a theory that is both naturalistic (because voluntaristic) and objective but neither Platonic, Aristotelian, nor (I hope) fallacious. In addition, this proposal, called “CHOICE,” is an example of neither an OL, D-S, nor HED theory. It is a theory according to which uncoerced choosings create objective values that we (even everyone) may be wrong about, because valuations are conative rather than epistemic activities. On this view, intrinsic prudential goods necessarily involve likely (pursuant to lawlike regularities) net increases in successful free choosings.

Happiness and the Good Life: A Classical Confucian Perspective

This essay examines the classical (or early) Confucian perspective on the topic of happiness through the lens of three Western theories: hedonism, desire satisfaction theory, and objective list theory. My analysis of the two classical texts—the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子)—reveals that three salient aspects of the Confucian conception of happiness, namely ethical pleasure, ethical desire, and moral innocence, play the fundamental role in the guidance and evaluation of an individual’s life. According to Confucius (Kongzi 孔子, 551–479 BCE) and Mencius (Mengzi 孟子, 371–289 BCE?), happiness consists primarily not in pleasure, but in ethical pleasure; the good life is not a life in which all or most of one’s desires are fulfilled, but a life in which the satisfaction of prudential desires is subject to the constraint of ethical desire; the source of the greatest happiness lies not in the attainment of the greatest political power, but rather in the cognizance of one’s moral innocence. For classical Confucian thinkers, the relationship between happiness and the good life is that happiness is a critically important constituent of the good life. However, happiness—defined in terms of pleasure, desire satisfaction, or a list of goods—needs to be tempered by moral constraints. In light of their views on happiness and the good life, I conclude that Confucius and Mencius each lived a good life that exemplified the three salient features of happiness, and to that extent they were happy.

On the Importance of the Philosophy of Well-being

Objective: A weak approach to well-being policy means that government’s goal should be to choose policies that make people better off over those that make them worse off, with other things being equal. The question is what kind of underlying assumptions should be fulfilled to achieve this goal. In particular, do policymakers have to agree on some substantive theory of well-being, like hedonism or objective list theory, or persist in choosing the formal preference satisfaction theory of well-being? According to Haybron and Tiberius (Well-being Policy: What Standard of Well-being?, “Journal of the American Philosophical Association” 2015, vol. 1, no 4), we can avoid raising such questions by drawing a strict distinction between the varieties of concepts or theories of well-being and policy processes aiming at promoting the well-being of citizens. They claim that such policies are “justified only when they are grounded in the conceptions of the well-being of those on whose behalf policy is being made”, and call this approach “pragmatic subjectivism” (p. 713). From their reasoning it follows that policymakers need not develop the appropriate concept of well-being, but can leave it to citizens to choose. The paper examines Haybron and Tiberius’ proposal and defends the claim that while theoretically we can avoid discussing the concept of well-being when we follow pragmatic subjectivism, we cannot do this in practice.Research Design & Methods: The paper uses an argument analysis.Findings: One way or another we will have to move in the direction of purely formalistic preference satisfaction theory or some substantive approaches like hedonism or objectivism. If we do not want to take for granted the incoherent intuitive concepts of well-being people hold, and because “well-being” is a normative concept, we have to develop philosophical theories of well-being that openly reveal their strengths and weaknesses.Implications / Recommendations: To facilitate the process of political decision-making, philosophically informed measures of well-being are needed. To a certain extent, those measures already exist, and they are widely applied by policymakers, e.g., GDP per capita, the Human Development Index or various happiness / subjective well-being indices. However, they seem to be either insufficient or purely philosophically informed.Contribution: The paper contributes to the development of the analysis of well-being and measures its philosophical underpinnings.

Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: the Harmless Pleasures Objection

Well-being is that which is non-instrumentally good for a person. It is identical to how well someone's life goes. There are three main theories of well-being: hedonism, desire-fulfillment, and objective list theories. Each of these theories is subject to criticism, which has led some philosophers to posit a hybrid theory in which well-being is defined as taking pleasure in objective goods. One problem that comes with such an account is the possibility of what I will call harmless pleasures; that is, pleasures that while not taken in something bad, are neither linked to objective goods. It is counterintuitive to say that such pleasures do not make a person's life go better, yet this seems to be what hybrid theories entail. I call this the harmless-pleasure objection. In this paper, I argue that there is no obvious solution to this objection and this result casts doubt on hybrid theories of well-being.

Objective List Theory of Well-Being as an Explanatory Theory.

Generally it is argued that the Objective List Theory (OLT) cannot support an explanatory view of what well-being is because OLT cannot identify one single good-maker property that it is responsible for unifying all the element that compose well-being. Then, Objective List Theory only can be an enumerative view of well-being. In this paper, I aim hold that we may offer an explanatory view of well-being even without identify a single good-maker property that is shared by all the elements that compose well-being. I hold that the OLT is still explanatory, because it is possible to identify each good-maker property in each element that is supposed to compose the list that is responsible for defining what well-being is. In addition, I hold that in order to have a full explanation about the concept of well-being we need to keep separate two question: 1) why something is good intrinsically and; 2) How the things that are good intrinsically could benefit us. My conclusion is that we may conceive one explanatory and pluralistic list that having constitutive elements of well-being and that a good explanation of well-being should keep separating the two question listed above.

Well-being orthodox theories and Islamic views

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to assess orthodox theories of well-being in western civilization at first, and second, to investigate Islamic views regarding this concept. Then, comparing these two groups of views, it tries to show that there is a kind of convergence between them that it provides a common point for political aspect of well-being. Design/methodology/approach – To investigate this convergence, orthodox theories of well-being were analyzed critically and Islamic views were revealed. Both orthodox theories and Islamic views of well-being were discussed theoretically (not practically) via descriptive-analytical method and based on a philosophical approach. Since the problem that this paper is going to involve and resolve is conceptual (concept and nature of human well-being and finding a common point among different theories), so the proper method will be the descriptive-analytical and dialectic discussion. Findings – This paper found that, despite some similarities between orthodox theories and Islamic views of well-being, the most important difference between Avicenna and hedonistic view is his approach to the concept of enjoyment and his spreading of the meaning of it. Molla Sadra’s approach to well-being is close to the objective list theories of well-being – particularly that of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s. It is concluded that there is a convergence in theories based on movement from instrumental reason to the intellect in specification and investigation of people’s well-being and its elements. Social implications – There is a kind of convergence, so that we can achieve a common point which could be the base for policy making in national and international level to solve problems arising from complexity, ambiguity and boring and dismal disagreements regarding this concept which is an important obstacle in front of the policy makers. Moreover, moving from instrumental reason to the intellect and considering ethical virtues in people’s well-being could be helpful in removing some social problems such as conflicts between labor and employers and financial crises. Originality/value – Description and calcification theories of well-being especially for economists that they are very far from these subjects and introducing of Islamic views via philosophical approach is absolutely original in this paper. Moreover, paper attempts to show the convergence in orthodox theories and between orthodox and Islamic views in which it provides a common point for practical aspect of well-being.