Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) bring a unique challenge to the security community, namely persistent security. As NVM-based memories are expected to restore their data after recovery, the security metadata must be recovered as well. However, persisting all affected security metadata on each memory write would significantly degrade performance and exacerbate the write endurance problem. On the other hand, relying on encryption counters recovery scheme would take hours to rebuild the integrity tree, and will not be sufficient to rebuild the Tree-of-Counters (ToC). Due to intermediate nodes dependencies it is not possible to recover this type of trees using the encryption counters. To ensure recoverability, all updates to the security metadata must be persisted, which can be tens of additional writes on each write. In this paper, we propose Phoenix, a practical novel scheme which relies on elegantly reproducing the cache content before a crash, however with minimal overheads. Our evaluation results show that Phoenix reduces persisting security metadata overhead writes to 3.8% less than a write-back encrypted system without recovery, thus improving the NVM lifetime by 8x. Overall Phoenix performance is better than the baseline.