Number Of Third Parties Research Articles

Retraction: Isosorbide mononitrate versus alendronate for postmenopausal osteoporosis.

Nabhan, A.F. and Rabie, N.H. (2008), Isosorbide mononitrate versus alendronate for postmenopausal osteoporosis. International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics, 103: 213-216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijgo.2008.07.011 The above article, published online on 21 September 2008 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com), has been retracted by agreement between the journal Editor in Chief, Professor Michael Geary, the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, and John Wiley and Sons Ltd. Concerns were raised by a number of third parties regarding the authenticity of the data and results presented in this study. In light of these concerns, the authors were asked to provide the raw data for the study. The authors cooperated fully and provided the raw data. Following review of the raw data by the journal's research integrity team, it was found that there were highly similar sequences of values of in the data for the two study groups, suggesting duplication of data. Since the data of are incompatible with randomisation, this invalidates the study results and gives rise to considerable uncertainty around the observed effect of the intervention. As a result, the journal is issuing this retraction.

Analysis of Sustainability and Inclusive Strategies in Achieving Profitability: Studies on Banking Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange

Sustainable and inclusive finance are concepts that are currently developing rapidly. This concept emerged as a response to the challenges and needs that exist in the current financial system. This study aims to determine the effect of implementing a green banking strategy, fintech adoption, and financial inclusion on profitability in the banking sector in Indonesia. The object of this study are banking companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 2015-2021 period. In this study, it was found that there were 46 banking companies listed on the IDX, but not all of them were sampled. Panel data regression analysis is used to see the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. This study shows the simultaneous results that green banking strategy, fintech adoption, and financial inclusion significantly affect banking profitability. Partly, implementing green banking strategies and ATM numbers affect bank profits. Meanwhile, fintech adoption, the number of loans, the number of third parties, and the number of branch offices have no effect.

Retraction.

Retraction: Seal, S.L., Dey, A., Barman, S.C., Kamilya, G., Mukherji, J. and Onwude, J.L. (2016), Randomized controlled trial of elevation of the fetal head with a fetal pillow during cesarean delivery at full cervical dilatation. International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics, 133: 178-182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijgo.2015.09.019 The above article, published online on 15 January 2016 on Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com), has been retracted by agreement between the journal's Editor-in-Chief, Professor Michael Geary, the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Following the publication of an Expression of Concern on this article,1 further concerns were emphasized by a number of third parties regarding discrepancies between the retrospective trial registration and the published article. Following further review by the journal's research integrity team, it was found that there were a considerable number of inconsistencies in the results presented. Unfortunately, there is no patient data available to explain or clarify these inconsistencies. This gives rise to considerable uncertainty around the benefit of the treatment intervention. As a result, the journal is issuing this retraction. REFERENCE 1. Expression of concern. Int J Gynecol Obstet. 2023;161:333.

Assessing the possibility of winning a WTO dispute before being involved

PurposeThis article focuses on whether there is a chance to win a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade dispute at the consultation stage. The study suggests an approach to resolving trade disputes on a bilateral level before involving formal WTO resolution procedures.Design/methodology/approachThe model describes the determinants of the probability of winning a trade dispute. The econometric model estimates two different groups of factors available during the consultation period – macroeconomic factors and the institutional features of the trade dispute, such as the number of third parties. The data includes WTO trade disputes from 1995 to 2014.FindingsThe suggested model predicts the result of trade disputes with a probability of 76.64%. The research proves that institutional factors such as the number of third parties and the subject of the trade dispute influence the probability of winning.Practical implicationsThe results of the study help predict the probability of winning a trade dispute at the consultation stage so that countries can decide whether to pursue a trade dispute.Originality/valueThe research presents several new hypotheses on the results of trade disputes. The authors show that the higher the number of countries involved, the higher the chance of the complainant winning and that if major parties such as the US or the European Union (EU) are involved as third parties, the chance of the complainant winning increases.

How Do the Third Parties Contribute to WTO Dispute Resolution?

World Trade Organization (WTO) judicial bodies face dual obstacles because of their limited legal authority: they do not have the power to investigate members, so they depend primarily on submissions from disputants. They have no authority to sanction members directly, so they rely on decentralized enforcement. The legalization of the trade regime depends on consent and voluntary compliance. This article focuses on the role of third parties in the dispute settlement process and investigates how they contribute to the legalization of the WTO. I use an original dataset covering all WTO disputes from 1995 to 2012, containing unusually detailed information about the number of third parties, the total dispute settlement period, and the final stage that disputants use, etc. In contrast to the existing literature, which characterizes third parties as spoilers that prevent early settlement, I find that WTO third parties have heterogeneous motivations for participation; moreover, participation by third parties with differing motivations has different effects on dispute settlement and compliance. In particular, third parties that claim to have ‘systemic interests’–a legal designation that allows them to participate despite their negligible stakes in a dispute–have considerable influence on dispute resolution. Specifically: (1) their briefs provide higher-quality information than other third-party briefs to panels and the Appellate Body; (2) they help to accelerate dispute settlement; and (3) their participation makes respondents more likely to comply with panel and Appellate Body rulings. WTO, third parties, trade disputes, legalization, trade laws, systemic interests, panels, Appellate Body

Dark clouds and silver linings: impact of COVID-19 on internet users' privacy.

ObjectivesTo examine the impact of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on the extent of potential violations of Internet users’ privacy.Materials and MethodsWe conducted a longitudinal study of the data sharing practices of the top 1000 websites in the United States between April 9 and August 27, 2020. We fitted a conditional latent growth curve model on the data to examine the longitudinal trajectory of the third-party data sharing over the 21 weeks period of the study and examine how website characteristics affect this trajectory. We denote websites that asked for permission before placing cookies on users’ browsers as “privacy-respecting.”ResultsAs the weekly number of COVID-19 deaths increased by 1000, the average number of third parties increased by 0.26 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.15–0.37) P < 0.001 units in the next week. This effect was more pronounced for websites with higher traffic as they increased their third parties by an additional 0.41 (95% CI 0.18–0.64); P < 0.001 units per week. However, privacy respecting websites that experienced a surge in traffic reduced their third parties by 1.01 (95% CI −2.01 to 0); P = 0.05 units per week in response to every 1000 COVID-19 deaths in the preceding week.DiscussionWhile in general websites shared their users’ data with more third parties as COVID-19 progressed in the United States, websites’ expected traffic and respect for users’ privacy significantly affect such trajectory.ConclusionsAttention should also be paid to the impact of the pandemic on elevating online privacy threats, and the variation in third-party tracking among different types of websites.

Privacy Preference Signals: Past, Present and Future

Abstract Privacy preference signals are digital representations of how users want their personal data to be processed. Such signals must be adopted by both the sender (users) and intended recipients (data processors). Adoption represents a coordination problem that remains unsolved despite efforts dating back to the 1990s. Browsers implemented standards like the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and Do Not Track (DNT), but vendors profiting from personal data faced few incentives to receive and respect the expressed wishes of data subjects. In the wake of recent privacy laws, a coalition of AdTech firms published the Transparency and Consent Framework (TCF), which defines an optin consent signal. This paper integrates post-GDPR developments into the wider history of privacy preference signals. Our main contribution is a high-frequency longitudinal study describing how TCF signal gained dominance as of February 2021. We explore which factors correlate with adoption at the website level. Both the number of third parties on a website and the presence of Google Ads are associated with higher adoption of TCF. Further, we show that vendors acted as early adopters of TCF 2.0 and provide two case-studies describing how Consent Management Providers shifted existing customers to TCF 2.0. We sketch ways forward for a pro-privacy signal.

When Three’s (Good) Company: Third‐Party Friendships on Cooperation across Departments

AbstractThe social embeddedness perspective highlights that socially embedded dyads are more cooperative than dyads that are not embedded by common third parties. Going beyond the traditional emphasis on the number of third parties, our study examines which third parties are more influential in promoting cooperation in interdepartmental dyads. Based on the logic of dependence from interdependence theory, we show that providers are more cooperative to recipients when third‐party friends have more organizational knowledge to offer socio‐emotional support to providers, but this effect is reduced when providers themselves have more organizational knowledge. Third‐party influence is also marginally attenuated when providers have a larger circle of friends. Overall, our findings advance the social embeddedness perspective by instilling a greater appreciation for dyad member’s dependence upon the third party in explaining third‐party influence on cooperation.

Physicians' attitudes towards accelerated access to medicines.

In recent years, a variety of 'accelerated access' schemes have been introduced by pharmaceutical regulators and funders globally. These schemes aim to overcome perceived regulatory and reimbursement barriers to accessing medicines - particularly for patients with limited time or therapeutic options. However, patient access to approved medicines is mediated by a number of third parties including regulators and payers, and physicians who act both as gatekeepers and guides to prescribed medications. It is therefore essential to know how physicians think about accelerated access as they are responsible for advising patients on and prescribing medicines made available via these pathways. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 Australian physicians focusing on their attitudes towards accelerated access. We identified three 'archetypes' of physicians: 'confident accelerators', 'cautious accelerators', and 'decelerators'. Although all acknowledged the potential risks and benefits of accelerated access, they disagreed on their magnitude and extent and how they should be balanced in both policy formation and clinical practice. Overall, our results illustrate the diversity of clinical opinions in this area and the importance of monitoring both the prescribing and clinical outcomes that result from accelerated access programmes to ensure that these are both clinically and morally acceptable.

MEASUREMENT DESIGN FOR SME’S BUSINESS PERFORMANCE IN BANGKOK

This research study is dedicated to measurement design for SMEs business performance in Bangkok. The objective was to create some sort of a metrics for assessing the performance of SMEs in Bangkok. This is a documentary research since it is using secondary data. Analysis and synthesis methods were used in relation to the obtained information so that to come up with a measurement of business performance for SMEs operating in the city of Bangkok. Our research results found that the innovation management model of SMEs is usually composed of 3 structural elements: 1. Finance, 2. Customers, and 3. Stakeholders. Further, 1. The structural element of Finance is composed of the following indicators: 1). Growth revealed through increased sales, market share, profit growth; 2) Return, namely 2.1) Return on assets, 2.2) Return rate for shareholders, 2.3). Average return on sale, and 3) Cash flow as 3.1) Net cash flow, 3.2) Cash flow from sales, 3.3) Inventory turnover. 2. The structural element called Customer is measured through the following indicators: 2.1) Satisfaction of customers with product delivery meeting Terms and Conditions of agreements, 2.2) Satisfaction of customers with a company as compared to competitors, 2.3) Satisfaction of customers with competitive position this company has already received. 3.The structural element of Stakeholder is measured through the following indicators and their parameters: 3.1) Employees and how they are satisfied with returns, 3.2) Return on investment and returns for shareholders when compared to the previous 3-year period, 3.3) Service quality in its dynamics, 3.4) Number of third parties (distributors) involved and how it increases with every new year, 3.5) Activities’ arrangements as responding to society’s or community’s needs, including company’s environmental responsibility.

Group size effect and over-punishment in the case of third party enforcement of social norms

One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by group size in collective action dilemmas. This paper experimentally studies how the strength of third party punishment in a prisoner's dilemma could differ by the number of third parties in a group. Our data indicate that as the number of third party punishers increases in a group, the average punishment intensity per third party punisher decreases. However, the decrease rate is very mild and therefore the size of total punishment in a group substantially increases with an increase in group size. As a result, third party punishment becomes a sufficient deterrent against a player selecting defection in the prisoner's dilemma when the number of third party punishers is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, when there are too many third party punishers in a group, a defector's expected payoff is far lower than that of a cooperator due to strong aggregate punishment, while some cooperators are even hurt through punishment. Therefore, the group incurs a huge efficiency loss. Such over-punishment results from third party punishers’ conditional punishment behaviors: their punishment intensity is positively correlated with their beliefs on the peers’ punitive actions. Some possible ways to coordinate punishment among peers even when group size is very large, thus enabling the efficiency loss to be mitigated, are also discussed in the paper.

The Global Tobacco Epidemic, the Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, and the World Trade Organization

In response to complaints by Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Indonesia, the government of Australia has defended the introduction of plain packaging of tobacco products in the World Trade Organization. This article focuses upon the legal defence of Australia before the WTO Panel. A key part of its defence has been the strong empirical evidence for the efficacy of plain packaging of tobacco products as a legitimate health measure designed to combat the global tobacco epidemic. Australia has provided a convincing case that plain packaging of tobacco products is compatible with the TRIPS Agreement 1994, particularly the clauses relating to the aims and objectives of the agreement; the requirements in respect of trade mark law; and the parallel measures in relation to access to essential medicines. Australia has also defended the consistency of plain packaging of tobacco products with the TBT Agreement 1994. Moreover, Australia has provided clear reasons for why the plain packaging of tobacco products is compatible with GATT. The position of Australia has been reinforced by a number of third parties — such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Canada, and others — which have also been pioneers in tobacco control and public health. Australia’s leadership in respect of tobacco control and plain packaging of tobacco products is further supported by larger considerations in respect of international public health law, human rights, and sustainable development.

Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms

One of the important topics in public choice is how people’s free-riding behavior could differ by group size in collective action dilemmas. This paper experimentally studies how the strength of third party punishment in a prisoner’s dilemma could differ by the number of third parties in a group. Our data indicate that as the number of third party punishers increases in a group, the average punishment intensity per third party punisher decreases. However, the decrease rate is very mild and therefore the size of total punishment in a group substantially increases with an increase in group size. As a result, third party punishment becomes a sufficient deterrent against a player selecting defection in the prisoner’s dilemma when the number of third party punishers is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, when there are too many third party punishers in a group, a defector’s expected payoff is far lower than that of a cooperator due to strong aggregate punishment, while some cooperators are even hurt through punishment. Therefore, the group incurs a huge efficiency loss. Such over-punishment results from third party punishers’ conditional punishment behaviors: their punishment intensity is positively correlated with their beliefs on the peers’ punitive actions. Some possible ways to coordinate punishment among peers even when group size is very large, thus enabling the efficiency loss to be mitigated, are also discussed in the paper.

Подведомственность корпоративных споров третейским судам (к дискуссии о проектах законов, направленных на реформирование законодательства о третейских судах)

Article is devoted to a discussion issue arbitrability corporate conflicts. The emphasis in the study made on the analysis of draft laws developed by the Ministry of Justice to reform the law on commercial arbitration. Article underlines that the establishment of the possibility of considering commercial arbitration corporate conflicts is possible only if certain conditions are met. In particular: a clear and unambiguous guidance on the law on which disputes are disputes corporate; strict compliance with the legal position of the Constitutional Court that the appeal to the Commercial Arbitration — a way of resolving civil disputes arising out of contractual freedom; the establishment of a special procedure in the law dealing with such disputes commercial arbitration, which takes into account the fact that the decision on a particular dispute may relate to an unlimited number of third parties, the participants of corporate relations. Indicates that the prepared draft laws can not be supported and requires full processing.

Supply Chain Outsourcing in Response to Manmade and Natural Disasters in Colombia, a Humanitarian Logistics Perspective

This paper analyses the level of outsourcing among the actors of the humanitarian response system to aid those impacted by natural disasters as well as the system to aid those impacted by the armed conflict in Colombia. Based on reports produced by the actors involved, in addition to several interviews conducted with individuals directly involved in the relief operations, this paper characterizes the supply chain food aid distribution and analyses the implications drawn from the differences between the levels of outsourcing identified. Supply chains are codified in four segments for analysis purposes: logistics operations supporting the disaster area (upstream), in the disaster area (midstream), and to beneficiaries directly (downstream and last mile distribution as two individual segments). The number of third parties, whether humanitarian aid organizations or private contractors, participating in the supply chains as actors orchestrating food aid distribution to beneficiaries, drives the levels of outsourcing. Groups of supply chains from representative established organizations deploying a vast portion of food aid distribution are studied. These groups are analysed to illustrate differences and commonalties, and reach conclusions of general applicability. Based on the findings, the paper makes policy implications to increase performance of future food aid distribution operations in response to larger scale disasters as well as opportunities for future research.

Third Party Election Spending in Canada and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract Both the United Kingdom and Canada recently implemented substantial revisions to their electoral laws, including policy measures designed to regulate third parties. Despite similar policy objectives, the limits placed on third parties vary significantly between the two countries, leaving the potential for significant differences in practice. Using an original dataset, this article undertakes a comparative study of recent national elections in each country (UK: 2005, 2010; Canada: 2004, 2006, 2008) to evaluate policy outcomes. Our analysis finds that while there are differences in both the number of third parties and the range of spending in Canada and the UK, one commonality is apparent: there is no “typical” third party in either country. As anticipated, given differences in spending limits, UK third parties outspent their Canadian counterparts; however, in both countries third parties rarely came close to spending to their limits. Rather, third parties are found to play a limited role, at least...

Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes

AbstractThird parties complicate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement by adding voices and issues to a dispute. However, complainants can limit third parties by filing cases under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rather than Article XXII. We argue that third parties create “insurance” by lowering the benefit of winning and the cost of losing a dispute. We construct a formal model in which third parties make settlement less likely. The weaker the complainant's case, the more likely the complainant is to promote third party participation and to settle. Article XXII cases are therefore more likely to settle, controlling for the realized number of third parties, and a complainant who files under Article XXIII is more likely to win a ruling and less likely to see that ruling appealed by the defendant. We provide empirical support using WTO disputes from 1995 to 2011.

An Efficient Key Agreement Scheme for Wireless sensor Networks Using Third Parties

This paper contributes to the challenging field of security for wireless sensor networks by introducing a key agreement scheme in which sensor nodes create secure radio connections with their neighbours depending on the aid of third parties. These third parties are responsible only for the pair-wise key establishment among sensor nodes, so they do not observe the physical phenomenon nor route data packets to other nodes. The proposed method is explained here with respect to four important issues: how secret shares are distributed, how local neighbours are discovered, how legitimate third parties are verified, and how secure channels are established. Moreover, the performance of the scheme is analyzed with regards to five metrics: local connectivity, resistance to node capture, memory usage, communication overhead, and computational burden. Our scheme not only secures the transmission channels of nodes but also guarantees high local connectivity of the sensor network, low usage of memory resources, perfect network resilience against node capture, and complete prevention against impersonation attacks. As it is demonstrated in this paper, using a number of third parties equals to 10% of the total number of sensor nodes in the area of interest, the proposed method can achieve at least 99.42% local connectivity with a very low usage of available storage resources (less than 385 bits on each sensor node).

Fear of Crowds in WTO Disputes: Why Don't More Countries Participate?

WTO members that are aected by a trade dispute can join litigation as a third party and gain access to otherwise private negotiations. Participation has a negligible cost. Yet states rarely join cases as third parties, even when they have a material interest at stake. We construct a formal model of strategic third party participation in the WTO, and arrive at two testable implications. First, participants receive higher utility from dispute outcomes than nonparticipants. Second, despite this apparent advantage, the decision to participate raises the total number of third parties, which lowers the likelihood of early settlement. This creates strategic interdependence: as more states become third parties, the marginal benet of participation decreases and each state becomes less likely to join. We test our theoretical model by examining each country’s decision to participate or not in every WTO dispute since 1995. The ndings oer strong support for our model: states shy away from joining when it’s too crowded.

Brief Amici Curiae of 133 Academic Authors in Support of HathiTrust Digital Library

The HathiTrust digital library contains over 7.3 million potentially in-copyright books. The complaint in this case has demanded that the court impound the in-copyright books in this repository and enjoin the use of all 7.3 million of these books, although the Authors Guild and its co-plaintiffs have identified only 116 works in which they claim to hold copyrights. Relying on an exceptionally broad conception of associational standing, the plaintiffs have asserted an entitlement to litigate this case and to attain injunctive relief that goes far beyond what the law allows.The Authors Guild’s broad theory of associational standing is wrong for two reasons. First, the Copyright Act itself prohibits suits by non-rightsholders. The Guild does not claim to hold such an interest in its members’ copyrights; the district court therefore correctly held that the Authors Guild does not have associational standing to bring broad claims of infringement under the Act. Second, the Authors Guild’s theory of standing violates prudential limits on associational standing that have been developed carefully by courts over time. Article III courts have prohibited third party associations from pursuing claims when those claims would require more than the limited participation of individual association members. Because the works in the HathiTrust corpus likely implicate the rights of a very large number of third parties — including ourselves, co-authors, publishers, and other transferees — it would take involved participation by individual association members to prove who holds the rights in the works which the Guild claims to represent. Academic authors — whose works are likely more typical of those in the HathiTrust corpus than works of the Authors Guild and its members — would be harmed by the outcome that the Authors Guild seeks because we typically benefit from HathiTrust, both because it makes our books more accessible to the public than ever before and because we use HathiTrust in conducting our own research. HathiTrust’s fair use defense is more persuasive to us than the Authors Guild’s theory of infringement. If granted, the Guild’s request for an injunction to stop HathiTrust from making its corpus available would directly harm academic author interests. In short, a “win” for the Authors Guild would be a “loss” for academic authors. This divergence in the interests of academic authors and of the Guild and its members, which may also affect the fair use calculus, is an additional reason why this Court should limit the Guild’s standing to the copyrights it actually holds.