In early February 2010, the administration stopped work and withdrew the Department of Energy (DOE) application for a construction permit for the Yucca Mountain geological repository from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Also, a “blue ribbon” Commission was appointed to explore alternatives for storage, processing, and disposal, including evaluation of advanced fuel cycles and to provide a final report in 24 months. That decision, however, failed to recognize that: (1) the U.S. will need an early alternate geological repository (AGR) for its HLW irrespective of the findings of the “blue ribbon” Commission; (2) the once-through spent fuel inventory from commercial nuclear power reactors will continue to rise and so will the damages against the government for its failure to remove spent fuel from reactors sites, as specified in contracts; (3) there are prepackaged DOE and nuclear weapons HLW ready for shipment to a repository which must be taken into account because of government penalties for failure to do so; (4) the current Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) needs to be modified to allow the early search and approval of Alternate Geological Repository (AGR) and for an interim centralized HLW storage facility to reduce government liabilities; and (5) the methodology used to license Yucca Mountain needs to undergo serious modifications, including a different non-politicized management and siting credo. This paper reviews and discusses all the preceding shortcomings and proposes significant changes to pursue AGR as soon as possible and to get site approval by the NRC first under a formal, stepwise, well-structured risk-informed decision approach as recommended by the ( National Academy, 2001).