Nuclear Security Regime Research Articles

Turkey's Nuclear Security Regime: An Assessment

AbstractThe 9/11 attacks prompted the development of an international nuclear security regime. States are expected to adopt legislation and institutionalize measures to ensure cooperation among stakeholders and create their own national nuclear security regimes. This article evaluates the steps taken by Turkey, a newcomer in nuclear energy. It argues that while Ankara has acted in line with its traditional conception of security, this is not enough. The inadequate cooperation and coordination among stakeholders, and the insufficient development of a security culture specifically oriented to nuclear energy, leave the country vulnerable. The analysis explains the vulnerabilities and incomplete tasks, and proposes actions necessary for Turkey to create a sound national nuclear security regime.

Assessing the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme

ABSTRACT Although the broad outlines of Pakistan's nuclear weapons' programme are well documented, significant gaps remain in the understanding of the country's nuclear security regime. Nuclear security remains a highly politicised topic, with little robust information available regarding the steps taken to secure the country's nuclear assets. To help “fill the gaps”, this paper places official Pakistani documents, statements, and other open source information, into an analytical framework based on international standards of physical security. Although gaps in understanding remain, this paper finds that, in general, Pakistan has enacted robust security measures to protect its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons related infrastructure. Nonetheless, the prevailing perception of Pakistan's nuclear security remains dominated by embarrassing episodes that emphasise the importance of effective nuclear security culture. Based on its findings, this paper also offers policy recommendations which may offer additional confidence about the rigours of the country's nuclear security regime.

Assessing Nuclear Security Risks in Pakistan

Pakistan’s nuclear program and perceived nuclear security concerns have attracted global attention. The varying concerns range from the potential theft of nuclear weapons or materials to the unauthorized use of a nuclear device to terrorist groups taking control of the Pakistani government. The enduring debate, however, has oscillated between these doomsday scenarios and some optimistic considerations, where various quarters have shared their satisfaction over Pakistan’s nuclear security regime and its ability to deal with the emerging challenges. To address the evolving nature of these threats, Pakistan is constantly improving its nuclear security infrastructure. It has established a comprehensive legislative and institutional structure, nuclear security systems, and has also undertaken various international obligations. To further improve nuclear security perceptions, Pakistan should adopt a more transparent approach and learn from international best practices.

INSEN as Part and Propellant of the Nuclear Security Regime: An Insider’s View

This short piece presents an insider’s view of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), and shows that the Network is not only a part of the evolving nuclear security regime, but also it drives the regime forward through academic research, teaching and cooperation which are facilitated by the meetings at the IAEA and social activities in extracurricular time in Vienna.

The Human Dimension of Nuclear Security: Legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit

A deeply rooted nuclear security culture and adequate human resources at all levels – involving regulators, the law enforcement agencies, academia, industry - are universally recognized as the foundation of a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime, national and global. International cooperation and networks are fundamental elements in ensuring the development and sustainability of what may be called the “human dimension” of Nuclear Security, and the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has been the cornerstone for their consolidation.

An Overview of Approaches to Nuclear Security in Ghana

Ghana has significantly improved its nuclear security infrastructure over the years. However, as threats increase by the day and new applications of nuclear and radiological technology are designed and implemented, Ghana must develop a rigid and comprehensive approach to mitigating the negative impacts on its nuclear security while improving prevention, detection, and deterrence of nuclear and radiological terrorism within its geographical space. This paper overviews the approaches adopted by Ghana to build a strong nuclear security regime within the past decade. These include improving legal frameworks for nuclear security by establishing an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority; assessing nuclear security culture in facilities; strengthening nuclear security capabilities at facilities that hold radioactive materials by improving physical protection systems for deterrence and detection; and building strong and effective collaboration and cooperation with various stakeholders, both locally and internationally, to distribute responsibility and provide technical and logistic support to build a stronger nuclear security regime. Ghana also identified developments in human capacity in areas of nuclear security as a relevant approach to improving its nuclear security and has thus collaborated with the IAEA and the University of Ghana to establish a graduate school for training Ghanaians and Africans in nuclear-related disciplines.

Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: The Developing Nuclear Security Regime

Terrorism has always been a part of human history in various forms. However, it had not been such a clear and present danger until the 9/11 attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, terrorism evolved into a new kind of terrorism only aiming to change a system with sensational attacks that cause so many deaths. Today, it poses a threat in the form of nuclear terrorism. Its potential rate of lethality could not be compared with any other forms of terrorism if terrorists managed to detonate an intact nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device. In addition, the psychological effects of sabotaging a nuclear facility or exploding a “dirty bomb” would be much more powerful than any other form of terrorism. In response, states have already started to cooperate through various international responses, collectively known as nuclear security. But, nuclear security is still developing and seems not yet strong enough to effectively cope with the threat of nuclear terrorism. On the other hand, there is the international nuclear nonproliferation regime based on the three pillars of nuclear nonproliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. However, its scope is limited to address threats stemming from traditional state actors such as nuclear war and proliferation. Nonetheless, this regime still offers a useful base for nuclear security to develop a more effective framework for international responses to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The inspiration and guidance of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime would lead to more effective nuclear security.

Nuclear security and Somalia

ABSTRACT Scholars have not regarded Somalia as a place of relevance to thinking about nuclear security. This article gives four reasons why this perspective is not well founded. First, as the state strengthens it needs an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security regime for the control of nuclear materials. Second, it has unsecured uranium reserves that could be smuggled abroad. Third, those unsecured uranium reserves could be accessed by terrorists for use in a ‘dirty’ bomb. Fourth, there is evidence of past ‘ecomafia’ intent and planning, and possible success, in dumping radioactive waste on land in Somalia or in its territorial waters. The article proposes an innovative system of uranium ore fingerprinting, covert sensors, mobile phone reporting and surveying and evaluation capabilities that would address all four issues. The proposed system would include a low-cost method for turning any smart phone into a radiation detector to crowdsource reporting of possible nuclear materials, plus aerial and underwater drones with low cost radiation sensors.

The proposed drafting process for nuclear security regulations: Egyptian case study

Egypt's concern is to enhance, maintain and improve the national nuclear security regime, including the legislative and regulatory framework. Egypt believes that a nuclear security legislative and regulatory framework better enables the State to prevent, detect and respond effectively to criminal and other unauthorised acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. In this work, the proposed drafting process for nuclear security regulations in Egypt will be presented taking into consideration the International Atomic Energy Authority model regulations and guidance as well as the nuclear security regulations of some selected countries to show the relationship between the evolution of nuclear and radiation activities and their national regulations. This study presents four different nuclear security regulations to be drafted by the Egyptian nuclear and radiological regulatory authority covering security of nuclear and radiation facilities as well as nuclear and other radioactive material during handling, use, storage, import, export and transport.

Ensuring effective and sustainable radionuclide delivery and its impact on the development of nuclear medicine in the developing world with special reference to Nigeria.

Recent activities of Boko Haram, a local extremist group in Nigeria, raise concerns about a nuclear terrorist attack. Whereas nuclear medicine (NM) relies on the timely delivery of radioactive sources, a robust security structure that assures public safety is the backbone for its beneficial use. NM radionuclides have short half-lives and carry an insignificant risk for acts of terrorism. Yet, their importation and delivery in Nigeria receive undue scrutiny in a bid to implement a strict nuclear security regime. These actions prevent timely delivery of radionuclides with direct consequences on quality and economic viability of nuclear medicine. There have been no accounts of terrorist acts accomplished with NM radionuclides. Thus, it is important the NM community question the current approach that has contributed to the loss of NM services in Nigeria and proposes a more logical strategy for securing their supply. We also highlight the need for developing local pragmatic solutions when implementing global recommendations in developing countries.

Nuclear Security: A Synonym of Physical Protection or A Component of Nuclear and Radiation Safety?

The paper considers the question of implementing nuclear security into the area of nuclear energy use in Ukraine. The comparative analysis of international conventions, IAEA recommendations, national regulations on physical protection and nuclear security and legislative framework of Ukraine on physical protection was provided for this purpose. The research presents the trends and patterns in historical development of physical protection and nuclear security and their position in nuclear and radiation safety regulatory framework. IAEA recommendations on essential elements of nuclear security regime and practical knowledge on basic components of nuclear security and interface with nuclear safety in Ukraine are examined. Recommendations on promising ways of physical protection regime maintenance and nuclear security regime implementation in Ukraine, as well as proposals on development of first-priority regulatory documents on nuclear security are provided.

Modification of legal system of the nuclear export and import control to implement nuclear security regime as well as nuclear nonproliferation regime

Modification of legal system of the nuclear export and import control to implement nuclear security regime as well as nuclear nonproliferation regime

Challenges and Responses for Ensuring Sustainability of INSA Training Programs

Providing a systematic training is critical for a state or international perspective to reinforce nuclear security regime nationally or internationally. Korea government recognizes the importance of such challenge, and established the INSA under the KINAC as a Center of Excellence for fostering national nuclear security capacity and contributing international nuclear security governance. INSA started with the government policy that the establishment of sustainable education and training infrastructure and processes is fundamental to the capacity building strategy. After established, INSA has been designing and delivering the domestic and international/regional training programs for the purpose of fostering human resources development in nuclear nonproliferation and security since Feb. 2014. This paper will cover a couple of new exercise modules which will be introduced newly in INSA training courses to achieve and ensure objectives of provided training programs.

The role of the health physicist in nuclear security.

Health physics is a recognized safety function in the holistic context of the protection of workers, members of the public, and the environment against the hazardous effects of ionizing radiation, often generically designated as radiation protection. The role of the health physicist as protector dates back to the Manhattan Project. Nuclear security is the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. Its importance has become more visible and pronounced in the post 9/11 environment, and it has a shared purpose with health physics in the context of protection of workers, members of the public, and the environment. However, the duties and responsibilities of the health physicist in the nuclear security domain are neither clearly defined nor recognized, while a fundamental understanding of nuclear phenomena in general, nuclear or other radioactive material specifically, and the potential hazards related to them is required for threat assessment, protection, and risk management. Furthermore, given the unique skills and attributes of professional health physicists, it is argued that the role of the health physicist should encompass all aspects of nuclear security, ranging from input in the development to implementation and execution of an efficient and effective nuclear security regime. As such, health physicists should transcend their current typical role as consultants in nuclear security issues and become fully integrated and recognized experts in the nuclear security domain and decision making process. Issues regarding the security clearances of health physics personnel and the possibility of insider threats must be addressed in the same manner as for other trusted individuals; however, the net gain from recognizing and integrating health physics expertise in all levels of a nuclear security regime far outweighs any negative aspects. In fact, it can be argued that health physics is essential in achieving an integrated approach toward nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.

Nuclear Security Summit Process: An Indian Perspective

The third Nuclear Security Summit will be held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014. This visionary nuclear diplomacy will be facing both old and new questions at its third meeting. The basic question relates to the future of the summit process, which has made a significant contribution to international security in a very short span of time. The summit process, however, may serve it better, and the strengthening of the regime must be continued through the next two summits. However, with or without the summit process, the nuclear security regime has to be strengthened. Efforts for nuclear security must continue through proper institutionalisation, keeping the International Atomic Energy Agency at the centre.

The Role of Nuclear Forensics in Nuclear Security

The purpose of the nuclear security regime is to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear security events (e.g. illicit trafficking of nuclear material or a nuclear terrorism attack). Nuclear forensic analysis is a key technical capability that utilises signatures inherent to nuclear or other radioactive material to provide information on its source, production and history. It can be used as part of the response to the nuclear security event, as well as to help prevent it. Section I of this article will introduce the basic information about nuclear forensic analysis. Section II, which constitutes the main body of the article, will describe in detail how the process of nuclear forensic analysis works in case of a nuclear security event investigation, and provide examples to illustrate specific points. Section III will conclude the article by discussing how nuclear forensics can be utilised not just for a post-event investigation but also for prevention of nuclear security events.

The Emerging Nuclear Security Regime: Challenges Ahead

Several measures are being initiated by the international community to secure sensitive materials. Al Qaeda's open interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and the rise of terrorist activity in nuclear-armed Pakistan have triggered a global interest in the need to secure nuclear weapons and materials. In April 2010 President Obama invited some key countries and international organisations in Washington to frame a new regime for nuclear security. The emerging regime includes some older initiatives as well as some new mechanisms, and it must address a number of issues. These range from defining nuclear security threats to finding the right kind of institution promoting nuclear security. The enthusiasm for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit will depend on how the participating countries and the international community deal with these challenges.

Expanding the IAEA’s nuclear security mandate

Expansion of civilian nuclear power means that greater international cooperation is required to ensure that terrorist groups do not acquire nuclear and radiological materials. The global nuclear security regime urgently needs to be strengthened; the authors write that boosting the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the best place to start. The IAEA established a nuclear security program in 2002. Recently, this program’s successes, including helping states repatriate highly enriched uranium to Russia and the United States, have prompted more national interest in the IAEA’s nuclear security assistance missions and led to more requests for advisory and evaluation services. If given the authority, the IAEA could verify the continuous level of nuclear security of member states and assess and coordinate the implementation of any actions that need to be taken. The authors write that the problem of the IAEA’s limited authority is tied to fundamental debates in the international community over how to deal with threats in a globalized world. Resources need to be pooled; expertise needs to be shared and centralized; and common standards need to be set, monitored, and enforced in the interests of a safer world. But not all states are convinced of this, and some are suspicious that states advocating global governance are using their power to dominate the global security agenda. The authors explore the expansion of the IAEA’s mandate and ask the pivotal question confronting the international community: How can states build consensus on the need to prioritize nuclear security?

The World Institute for Nuclear Security: Filling a Gap in the Global Nuclear Security Regime

for Nuclear Security (WINS). Mohammed ElBaradei, then the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that “WINS fills an urgent gap in our need to strengthen the nuclear security system.” But the key question is, what is that gap? Cast your mind back to April 26, 1986, and the accident at Chernobyl that shocked the world and all but stopped further expansion of and investment in nuclear power. After that accident, “nuclear operators world-wide realized that the consequences had an effect on every nuclear power plant and international cooperation was needed to ensure that such an accident can never happen again.” That statement is from the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which was formed in May 1989 by nuclear operators worldwide to exchange operating experience and peer review so members could learn from one another’s experiences, challenges, and best practices, the ultimate goal being to improve plant safety, reliability, and performance. But WANO only handles nuclear safety. WINS was established to pursue similar objectives in improving nuclear security. In a world facing a global terrorist threat, we cannot afford to wait for a “security Chernobyl” before we take collaborative action to improve security. WINS is designed to complement, not compete with, existing efforts to improve nuclear security around the world.