Despite their obvious limitations as explanatory concepts, `technological autonomy' and `determinism' have often been associated with nuclear power. This paper reviews the persistency of notions of `autonomy' and `determinism' in the context of the British nuclear power programme. In the corporatist and technocratic setting of the nationalized British Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), the perceived imperatives of nuclear power technology were often allowed priority in policymaking, to the extent that an appearance of the technology's autonomy and determinism was maintained for 30 years. This had its conveniences: technical rationales disguised more contestable institutional and political interests supporting the programme. At the same time, senior politicians and scientists at times displayed a faith in the technology approximating a belief in its autonomy and deterministic power, particularly during geopolitical or industrial crises. ESI privatization was associated with the marginalization of nuclear power in Britain. Once the Government's wider mission to liberalize electricity supply was threatened by unanticipated disclosures regarding the cost of nuclear electricity, it proved willing to abandon its longstanding support for the technology. As institutional and political support for the nuclear programme was removed, the fallacy of its supposed autonomy was exposed. Whilst Langdon Winner accurately identified the preconditions necessary for the introduction of inherently political technologies such as nuclear power, in reality these were ever-present requirements, however hidden by the apparent power of the technology itself. Nevertheless, the persistence of notions of autonomy and determinism reflects a significant aspect of the sociotechnical relations of nuclear power.
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