Nuclear Posture Review Research Articles

The Biden administration nuclear posture review: a new vision?

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of US doctrinal documents - the Nuclear Posture Reviews of 2018 and 2022. The authors set themselves the objective of determining whether the nuclear threshold has decreased/increased during the Biden administration. Analysis of the corresponding sections of documents leads to the conclusion about continuity between the Reviews. This concerns issues of nuclear modernization, the “tailored deterrence” strategy, and regional aspects of the US nuclear deterrence. The section of the 2022 document devoted to arms control sounds relatively new, however, foreign policy landscape and virtual collapse of the modern arms control architecture do not allow the authors of the doctrine to be optimistic in this matter .

Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Analysis and Assessment

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Biden Administration was published in October 2022. What is its focus and how should we evaluate it? How is it different from previous administrations? Does the NPR reflect Biden’s proactive statements before its publication? This article introduces and examines pressing issues of the international security environment and threat perceptions, nuclear deterrence, declaratory policy, arms control, and nuclear capability as reflected in the NPR. Analysis is presented from two aspects, military and diplomacy, as the NPR emphasizes to “put diplomacy first”. The military aspects of the NPR, to strengthen and modernize nuclear deterrence as the main role of nuclear weapons, is strongly emphasized. On the other hand, diplomatic aspects of the NPR are narrowly and superficially treated, and it does not include proactive proposals. Future NPRs should include military and diplomatic positions more equally.

BIDEN ADMINISTRATION’S NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND AMERICAN NUCLEAR POLICY: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW

The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has been an important document detailing the US administration's policy preferences since its first issuance in 1994. Biden administration released its NPR in October 2022, which identifies nuclear rivals and focus areas examining the role of nuclear weapons in overall US strategy. Using the historical research method and open-source information, the paper provides an overview of the US strategic calculus on nuclear weapons since 1945, focusing on post-Cold War developments and how its nuclear policy and strategy evolved. The paper argues that despite advocating for nuclear disarmament, US presidents stayed within lip service and kept enhancing the US nuclear stockpile. It also highlights that President Trump’s decisions adversely affected US nuclear weapons policy and global security and that President Biden’s NPR would follow the route rather than fulfil his campaign promises. The paper has three parts: the first deals with US nuclear policy during the Cold War; the second looks at the policy during the post-Cold War era from President Bush Senior to President Biden. The third and final part critically analyses the overall nuclear policy challenges faced by the Biden Administration and how it might address them. Bibliography Entry Zeb, Rizwan. 2023. "Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and American Nuclear Policy: A Critical Overview" Margalla Papers 27 (1): 53-66.

Update on the United States Nuclear Strategy: from NPR 2018 to NPR 2022

The article follows the author's comparative analysis of American and Russian nuclear doctrines and armaments from the fall of 2021. It presents the current nuclear strategy of the United States of America based on a content analysis of three specific areas of the updated version of the Nuclear Posture Review. Applying interpretive analysis and a rich secondary sources apparatus, the author also reflects on his 2021-formulated assumptions and expectations about the further development of American nuclear strategy under President Joe Biden. The author analyzes the influence of the presidential administration's ideological and political ambitions together with the decisive geopolitical events of 2022 and concludes that mainly due to the second factor, the current shape of American nuclear strategy has not undergone any revolutionary changes and continues to maintain a long-standing continuity and consensus about its basic principles.

War and Arms Control: When to Pursue Cooperation

Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated nuclear threats in connection with the war in Ukraine since Russia invaded on 24 February 2022, and senior Russian military leaders have reportedly considered when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. On 27 October, in this context of rising nuclear risks, the US Department of Defense released its Nuclear Posture Review. It describes the present moment as a time to prepare rather than negotiate. Although now is not the time to begin negotiations towards a formal arms-control treaty, the end of the war in Ukraine will be an important opportunity for pursuing post-crisis arms-control efforts. Meanwhile, during this arms-control interlude, the United States and its allies should lay the groundwork for future arms-control efforts.

The US Nuclear Posture Review in limbo

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in the United States has been written and shared with Congress in its classified form, but unusually, an unclassified version has not been made public. This is reportedly due to a dispute with some lawmakers over the pending cancellation of a programme to develop a nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missile – which the US Navy appears to support – and because the National Security Strategy written by officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden has not yet been finalised. The brief summary of the 2022 NPR that has been released suggests that it is largely a continuation of the nuclear policy adopted in 2010 by former president Barack Obama.

БЕЗПЕКОВА СТРАТЕГІЯ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА ДОНАЛЬДА ТРАМПА

D. Trump's republican administration has substantially modified US strategic estimation of security challenges and threats, facing the country. The "National Security Strategy – 2017" became a fundamental basis of the security policy. The authors of the "Strategy…" believed Russia and China to be the main security policy problems, threatening the world status of the U.S.A. and a challenge for it's interests. The answer to the challenges should include deployment of the ABM system, capable of neutralizing threats, created by N.Korea and Iran. Opposing China and Russia, called "revisionist states", seeking to change the international status-quo, requires building up and modernizing arms and Armed Forces, in particular, security predominance in nuclear forces, space and cyber-space. An active role was designed for diplomacy and reconnaissance community, involving an increase of their efficiency. On the regional level, priorities included Indo-Pacific region, where the United States had to contain Chinese expansion, and Europe, where Washington intended to counter Russian subversive activity and aggression and to support NATO's defense efforts. Nuclear Posture Review (2018) was one of the key foreign policy strategic documents for the administration of 45th US President Donald Trump. In the context of increasing political and economic confrontation with the People's Republic of China and the aggravation of relations with Iran and North Korea, which were caused by the nuclear component itself, this strategy returned to the methods of confrontation and the nuclear deterrence of the Cold War era. It emphasized the complementarity of the power potential of the armed forces and the diplomatic levers of the international struggle. In the period of new aggravation in the international system caused by the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, these very components of the doctrine can become prognostically effective for the current and future American administrations. This article is designed to analyze the key aspects of the National Security Strategy-2017 and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that relate to foreign policy and highlight the special aspects and tools that are still relevant for application by the current administration of Joseph Biden in the crisis of the international system.

The upcoming 2022 Missile Defense Review and the Biden administration missile defense policy

The U.S. Missile Defense Review (MDR) draws attention as a central document in this area. The two reviews published so far (2010 and 2019) within a year of the Nuclear Posture Review were an important addition to the National Defense Strategy. The latter is devoted to clarifying Washington's political-military course, and the Nuclear Posture Review, the MDR, and the Space Posture Review deal with the most important elements of the military policy of the United States. Taking into account the positions expressed by the Biden administration officials, conclusions are drawn about the content of the 2022 MDR. In addition, the prospects for the implementation of certain areas of the U.S. missile defense policy are assessed, taking into account the experience of 2002-2021. If the current document is made the same way as previous ones, then it covers five main topics – missile threats, homeland missile defense, regional missile defense, programs’ organization, and cooperation with allies. The Biden administration’s two budget requests for missile defense (FY2022 and FY2023) suggest a course of action. In general, the new approach to the development of missile defense being applied can provide tangible results in the face of a possible reduction in funding. The role of allies in regional missile defense architectures may increase as a result of the interpretation of experience of the use of missiles and air and missile defense systems.

No-first-use of nuclear weapons: Australian perspectives and possible contributions

Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.

THE TWOFOLD MEANING OF BRINKMANSHIP: EXPLAINING STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY IN RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY

Discussions and debates about whether or not the role of Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons underpins a so-called “Escalation to De-Escalation” strategy culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which declared the need for deploying a new low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in order to prevent Russia from escalating to the limited nuclear level and successfully terminate the conflict. While unofficial evidence barely suggests that Russia may exhort to its NSNWs in order to stave off the adversary in crisis situations, common Western discussions on Escalation to De-Escalation revolve around the alleged existence of an “offensive” Escalation to De-Escalation strategy. Thereby, Moscow would pre-emptively escalate to the limited nuclear level over NATO's Eastern flank in order to take over it while leaving Western countries without no escalation options, given the doubts surrounding the ability of B61s’ delivery systems at going beyond Russian air-defence. However, while Western countries are often busy with self-deterrence, thus perceiving immediate threats at each deployment by the adversary, they tend to overlook strategic manipulation of deployed capabilities. That is why analysis of ambiguity surrounding Russian NSNWs have been less popular in Western contexts. Based upon critical analysis of Escalation to De-Escalation and classic deterrence and escalation studies, this paper argues that ambiguity surrounding Russia’s NSNWs is part of a brinkmanship strategy, which inadvertently triggered destabilizing dynamics in US-Russia relations. The article proceeds as follows. First, an introduction sets the scene and the aim of the article, as well as the methodology, including the scope and background of facts. Second, the Escalation to De-escalation debate is broken down in the attempt of shedding light on the ambiguity it builds on. Third, it is argued that ambiguity surrounding NSNWs is strategically exploited according to Schelling’s concept of brinkmanship, though exacerbating the risk of inadvertent escalation with Western countries. Finally, a conclusion wraps up the argument and indicates its implications.

Arms Control Dialogue is Japan’s Interest: An Agenda for a New Nuclear Posture Review

ABSTRACT In debates on the Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the issue that has attracted the most attention in Japan is whether or not the declaratory policy of “no first use” or “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons will be adopted. There is a strong argument in favor of declaratory policies as a method to promote nuclear disarmament. However, it is unlikely that the adoption of a declaratory policy at this time will lead to progress in nuclear disarmament in Northeast Asia. This is because the security environment in the region is undergoing major changes. Force asymmetries, such as the medium-range missile gap between the United States and China, and the pursuit of a deterrent architecture based on entanglement between nuclear, conventional, cyber, and space domains, as well as the rise of emerging technologies that influence the modality of strategic stability, will have a significant impact on deterrence and arms control. Japan is moving toward ensuring the credibility of deterrence within the Japan-US alliance. Under such a circumstance, instead of focusing on declaratory policies to reduce nuclear risks and threats, it is important to establish communication mechanisms among stakeholders in the regional security for crisis management and a multi-layered mechanism to discuss issues of common interest, such as the impact of emerging technologies. Confidence building through these mechanisms for risk management and strategic dialogue provides a foundation for declaratory policies functioning for enhancing nuclear disarmament.

The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine

Abstract In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability

Abstract Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) represents a significant shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Using Cold War vintage theory, this article assesses whether the NPR signals a return to nuclear warfighting. The NPR is assessed against five primary drivers for warfighting strategy: enhanced deterrence; to deal with deterrence failure; to maximize damage limitation; to provide a theory of victory; and adherence to just-war theory. The article concludes that although the NPR represents a step in the direction of warfighting, it does not fully embrace it. This is primarily because the NPR fails to endorse an unrestrained theory of victory.

‘Peace through strength’: Europe and NATO deterrence beyond the US Nuclear Posture Review

Abstract With its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration expanded the scope of US nuclear deterrence, re-emphasizing the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons, perceptively lowering the threshold for nuclear use and casting doubt on the future of arms control. The authors argue that these changes are consistent with the administration's wider ‘peace through strength’ approach that draws on traditional Republican thinking on security policy. While designed to demonstrate credibility and resolve to both allies and adversaries, however, this assertive approach to security policy and specifically nuclear policy as a necessary precursor to renewed engagement in strategic negotiations may have unintended consequences. This article focuses on European reactions to the strategy and argues that the Trump administration's nuclear posture challenges common European understandings in three principal areas. First, changes to US declaratory policy contest European assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons in defending NATO. Second, US modernization plans and their implications for intra-alliance relations risk accentuating controversial debates about the US commitment to Europe. Third, the apparent US rejection of arms control widens the scope for discord with European leaders. If European leaders assert a clear and credible alternative vision advocating nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control they could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia, demonstrating real strength and ultimately leading to more genuine opportunities for peace and sustainable European security.

Ядерные силы США и перспективы их развития

This article analyzes the current state of the US nuclear forces and assesses the prospects of their development, based on the provisions of the new US nuclear strategy promulgated on February 2, 2018 in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Dr. Atomic by John Adams and Peter Sellars

Reviewed by: Dr. Atomicby John Adams and Peter Sellars Andrew Martinez Dr. Atomic. By John Adams and Peter Sellars. Choreographed by Emily Johnson. Santa Fe Opera, New Mexico. 07 14, 2018. The work of Dr. Atomicbegan the moment I exited the Hertz rental-car parking lot at Albuquerque International Sunport. The sunny, one-hour drive to Santa Fe along the Turquoise Trail was interrupted by short, intermittent showers. It was a markedly wet summer in Santa Fe, but the rain did not diminish the magnificence of New Mexico's terrain. The endless stretch of blue horizon, the terra-cotta mesas, and the Sangre de Cristo Mountains—all assembled at 7,000 feet above sea level—appropriately functioned as an immersive backdrop for Santa Fe Opera's (SFO) production of Dr. Atomicand the reparative community work it set out to address for the Indigenous and marginalized populations who live near the Trinity nuclear test site. The 2018 production of Dr. Atomicportended new approaches to achieving justice and parity in its form as a period drama and as a prolepsis of the current moment. The SFO's premiere of Dr. Atomicwas as much a house cleaning as it was a homecoming. Certainly, the significance of the New Mexico–specific opera coming to Santa Fe was expertly anticipated and celebrated by the company's marketing department, but the event also became an opportunity to confront the histories and present-day experiences of pain and suffering that New Mexico citizens have endured since that rainy summer night in July 1945 when the first atomic bomb was detonated. Through meaningful collaborations with local and Indigenous communities, the SFO's production of Dr. Atomicdeparted from its 2005 San Francisco Opera iteration as a period opera and became a more contemporary rendering of nuclear power and its threat to humanity. A 2,400-pound silver orb was the only set piece, suspended in a way that eclipsed the open-air view of the Santa Fe landscape beyond the stage. This particular view had a clear line of sight out to the Los Alamos laboratory where the 1945 bomb was developed and where nuclear weapons continue to be designed today. The cast of the production was joined by people from the Tesuque, San Ildefonso, and Santa Clara pueblos, as well as the folks known as "the downwinders," who live near the bomb's test sites and suffer from extreme cancers and other related health concerns due to exposure to radiation fallout. Dr. Atomicinitiated the first partnership between the SFO and the pueblo communities. A new inter-tribe corn dance was created expressly for the production and functioned alongside the John Adams score and Peter Sellars libretto as a coeval text. The summer dance, usually reserved for the pueblos, featured fourteen adults and children accompanied by five male musicians playing percussion instruments. The ritual demonstration was presented a half hour before the opera began. The dance was then reprised in the second act at the part of the story when it is decided that, due to national security, there would not be an evacuation of the surrounding areas and people. In this scene, dancers and downwinders held vigil and stared out into the audience as irrevocable decisions were made about their fate. Additionally, choreographer Emily John-son, of Yup'ik descent, layered movement danced by four Indigenous artists amid Sellars's staging. Their movement trajectories were like atoms, coming together and splitting apart, around and through the scientists and military personnel. Additional programming for Dr. Atomicincluded pre-show conversations with downwinders and pueblo community members and provided rich testimony about life and the land decades after the atomic bomb was detonated at Trinity. Speakers from the Tularosa Basin Downwinders shared their current decades-long plight to lobby for recognition, reparations, and healthcare resources from the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, which was passed in 1990. On another part of the SFO property, activists from the A.N.S.W.E.R. coalition interrupted the traditional "tailgate" picnic in the parking lot to protest Dr. Atomic. This was in response to the Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review directive for the Los...

“Tailored” Country Strategies in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

The new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in January 2018, stipulates a “tailored” strategy towards each country which Washington sees as presenting a nuclear challenge to the United States. Yet each “tailored” strategy is based on the same reiterated assumption that the U.S. measures and programs are developed in response to external hostile actions. The NPR cites other countries’ aggressive behavior and military buildup as the reason to reinstitute the role of nuclear weapons as the key component of the U.S. deterrent, modernize the U.S. strategic triad and dual-capable aircraft, develop new small-yield warheads, create sealaunched cruise missiles, and reinforce the C3 systems to support them. These initiatives go along with the new expanded understanding of “extreme circumstances” which allow for a U.S. nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack, as well as with other new features of the U.S. nuclear doctrine: the creation of “more usable” types of nuclear weapons, the integration of nuclear and conventional elements of planning and operations, the enhanced focus on cyber threats, and the prioritization of “flexibility,” “uncertainty,” and “hedging” – which all increase the danger of an actual use of nuclear weapons. The NPR presents Russia as a higher threat compared to China, while China – as a major challenge to the United States in the Asian region. Yet the NPR does not call these two states “adversaries” and stresses the need to avoid confrontation and an arms race. Besides Russia’s “aggressive policies,” military programs and bellicose declarations, the NPR focuses on its alleged adherence to the concept of “escalation for de-escalation” – early first use of nuclear weapons to end a conventional conflict on favorable terms – a notion that the NPR sets to counteract. The requirements formulated by the NPR towards Iran and North Korea include ensuring their non-nuclear status, countering their growing influence in the respective Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, preventing the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies and sensitive materials to third parties and states, and convincingly demonstrating that their aggression, including a conventional one, would be met with resolute action by the United States and its allies. Yet, in a shuffle of a kind, opposite to how the Obama Administration renounced military solution to the Iran problem and chose negotiations with this country with no preliminary condition, – and at the same time preferred the tactics of isolating North Korea and disregarding its claims, – now it is with Seoul that Washington may engage with, while simultaneously demonstrating a tough line towards Teheran. Yet the shifts towards a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, along with certain signs of restraint in the NPR, offer some grounds to hope that – given political will and active international efforts – the worst-case scenarios and further deterioration of international situation may successfully be avoided.

US Nuclear Posture Review 2018: Unwisely Re-opening ‘Settled’ Nuclear Issues

The latest NPR released in 2018 under the watch of President Trump, unabashedly echoes the sentiment of America First. Many nuclear war-fighting issues and concepts that had been settled in the past after having been experimented with and discarded for the risks they carried have yet again been adopted by the current NPR. But, America’s sole focus on its own security alone could end up creating more security dilemmas for the US, and others. This article identifies the main highlights of the NPR, as well as its limitations, and the implications of both for nuclear strategies of major nuclear players. It describes and analyses the context, the content and the consequences of the NPR. It specifically flags some issues/actions that India must particularly watch out for since some of these need to be monitored for their implications on the nuclear strategies and trajectories of India’s nuclear armed neighbours.

The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Back to Great Power Competition

ABSTRACT The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) covers all aspects of nuclear weapons policy – the role of nuclear weapons, the conditions under which the United States would consider the use of these weapons, the operational aspects of nuclear planning, force structure requirements, and key decisions on the supporting infrastructure. This document does not only send a deterrence message to potential adversaries, but it is also an important reassurance to the allies and partners of the US. A NPR is traditionally in effect for a period of 5–10 years. The Trump administration’s 2018 NPR shows many continuities with previous strategies. However, it also implemented important changes, especially with regards to the number and composition of nuclear forces. The new NPR re-introduced two low-yield warhead types in response to the deteriorating relations with Russia and China. Unlike the former NPR, it put great power confrontation in the center of the document, instead of strategic stability. This shift in focus reflects a renewed emphasis on nuclear deterrence and modernizations, and a sceptical approach towards arms control measures. This paper examines how the administration’s deterrence policy has changed vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing, why these changes were implemented, and how this shift affects the security of the allies of the US The author argues that the justification of the proposed modernization programs is questionable, and these steps might lead to a renewed arms race in low-yield nuclear capabilities. This could force Russia and China to lower the nuclear threshold, undermining the security of the US and its allies, and also weakening alliance cohesion and solidarity.