Notion Of Phenomenon Research Articles

Грэм Прист о противоречивости понятия ноумена у Канта

Graham Priest in Beyond the Limits of Thought claims that the notion of noumenon in Kant contains a true contradiction consisting in that Kant simultaneously denies the possibility of making judgments concerning noumena and makes nevertheless those judgments. That said, Priest relies on the not merely epistemic, but conceptual inaccessibility of noumena (‘the limit of expression’). However the notions of phenomena, noumena, cognition, transcendental idea and others that he uses are very simple in comparison with those of Kant and often do not allow him to adequately express the subtleties of Kants’ viewpoint. Limitations in the cognition of noumena are connected with the empirical knowledge and do not exclude their knowledge in general, in particular transcendental investigations. At the same time the applicability of the concepts of understanding is not limited by phenomena and Kant in fact applies them beyond the experience when posits objects ‘in idea’. Priest’s simplifications also prevent him from characterizing the peculiar character of transcendental idea in Kant having the form of phenomenon but reducible neither to phenomena, nor noumena. In conclusion, Priest’s thesis about the contradiction in the notion of noumenon in Kant proves to be unfounded.

Stitching Stories of Broken Hearts: Living Response-ably with the Technologies of Death and Dying at the Beginning of Life

ABSTRACT Born with half a heart, my firstborn child died when he was three weeks old. This auto-ethnographic article takes as its point of departure one of the questions that this tragic event made me ask: How do technologies reconfigure responsibility for death, as technologies are involved in ending or saving the lives of children like my son? With this question, I introduce a new research agenda within reproductive studies regarding how technologies remake death and dying at the beginning of life. Drawing on the notion of phenomena from agential realism, I examine how responsibility emerges in different ways as I tell my son’s story together with media and medical stories told about foetuses or infants who died after having been diagnosed with hypoplastic left heart syndrome. I show that we need to challenge the idea of the autonomous subject that shapes the Cartesian understanding of ethics and responsibility. By stitching stories of broken hearts together, my storytelling is not only a call for a feminist ethics of living response-ably with technologies of death and dying at the beginning of life, it is a way to find response-able practices of living with the deaths of foetuses and infants.

Fenómeno, trascendencia y trascendental. Reflexiones husserlianas

This text analyses the meaning that Husserl gives to the term "transcendental". To do this the author analyses Husserl's texts in two stages. First, he lists some central features that characterise the transcendental. Second, he relates these features to the phenomenological method and the notion of phenomenon. Together with this the author analyses the Kantian motifs that Husserl collects, giving an account of the critical extension that Husserl makes of them

Роль скептичної очевидності в Першій і Другій Медитаціях. Стаття перша. Сумнів за Декартом і Секстом Емпіриком

The first article of the cycle “The role of skeptical evidence in the First and Second ‘Meditations’” compares the Cartesian and Sextus Empiricus’ concepts of doubt in, respectively, “Metaphysical meditations” and “Outlines of Pyrrhonism”. The article starts with the current state of the problem “Descartes and skepticism” and admits the existence of consensus about Cartesian perception of skeptical tradition: Cartesius (1) was influenced by all skeptical movements, known in his time, and (2) created a generalized notion that contains elements of both Academic and Pyrrhonian origin. This consensus is the source of many contemporary studies on how different skeptical doctrines influenced certain parts of Cartesian philosophy. This article attempts to analyze possible Descartes’ use of Sextus Empiricus’ notion of phenomenon. Sextus clearly states in “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” that one cannot doubt phenomenon as something perceived directly. The article proves that (a) Sextus’ thesis about the “sensory” nature of phenomenon is metaphorical, so far as it includes (without distinction) both sensuality and the experience of thinking; (b) the phenomenon is realized through a wide range of passive states of mind that all have irresistible force of influence; (c) the impact of phenomena is always mediated by our self, because all skeptical phrases are strictly correlated with the first person singular. Some researchers distinguish Sextus’ isostenia, as one of such insurmountable states, from Cartesian doubt at the First Meditation, which is allegedly based on a purely volitional decision. The article proved that this argument is artificial, since Descartes’ volitional decision is caused by initial inability to take the dubious as if it were certain. Thus, Cartesian approach can be considered a specific kind of isostenia. Such parallelism is a reason to assume a key role of Sextus’ understanding of insurmountable power of phenomena in Cartesian anti-sceptical argumentation. This assumption will be tested in the following articles of the cycle.

Scham und Schuld

This essay tries to elaborate an accurate description of shame and guilt from the agent’s point of view by focusing on typical cases of such experiences. In a first step, we approach the peculiarity of a phenomenological investigation by introducing three methodical directions. All of them are formulated in a negative mode, i.e., in terms of prohibition, namely: the instruction not to adhere to a naïve notion of phenomenon, not to project reflective attitudes into the prereflectively given, and not to go beyond the relevant situation of experience. Following these methodological considerations, we discuss the familiar characteristics of shame and guilt. According to a wide-spread view, we are faced with self-related feelings that are, more or less overwhelmingly, encountered as troublesome. These feelings either, in case of guilt, trigger special types of social interaction (avowal and reparation) or, in case of shame, entail isolation, an intensified self-perception and introspective embarrassment. Whether and to what extent this current picture can be sustained, will be discussed on phenomenological grounds. We take it that the social features of shame and guilt result from their inherent self-relatedness. Thereto, we try to answer, among others, the following questions: Do feelings of shame and guilt, apart from their social functions, represent characteristic modes of self-awareness? How are they correlated with specific modes of time-consciousness? Can a phenomenological description contribute to our understanding of the moral impact of shame and guilt?

How to Make Analogies in a Digital Age

I will start with a truism even though, like all truisms, it reduces and conflates distinctions and nuances to which I will need to revert: in the sense of painting as an has been a classic analog mode of representation, whether or not every painter in the history of art has used it this way. It cannot be a surprise, then, that it might be specifically in in its specifically painterly and pictorial achievements and reversions that we might best be able to gauge the depth and direction of digital technologies of image production, as well as notions of phenomena, appearance, and representation associated with them in their theoretical foundation and recent history.

The Comparative Phenomenology of Japanese Painting and Zen Buddhism

SINCE PHENOMENOLOGY COVERS a wide variety of complex theories, I shall indicate the few features of the method which will be involved in this paper and which derive from Edmund Husserl's book Ideas. I shall indicate something of the ways in which this method has been applied to the study of art and religion by other phenomenologists, and then state and investigate the problem of this paper in those terms. The notion of phenomenon, that is, something which appears, is an old one in philosophy. It is often contrasted with what a thing really is in itselfthe contrast between appearance and reality. Phenomenology has nothing to do with this distinction. It does, however, make a related distinction, namely, between the naturalistic and phenomenological point of view. We often tell others and sometimes ourselves to open our eyes and see what is there. If we describe what is there we shall doubtless talk in terms of physical things such as trees, rocks, waterfalls, and birds, and perhaps some characteristics of the appearances which obviously would have no existence if we were not in the picture too, such as the colors of foliage and the sounds of the birds. In doing this we are looking at things from the naturalistic standpoint. Now Husserl asks us to shift our point of view. Our belief in this natural world presented to our eyes and ears remaining exactly as before, let us put this belief in brackets, or out of action. This means to turn our attention away from the phenomena as appearances of things and concentrate on the appearances themselves as the things. Another way of stating it is that the object of our investigation has become pure consciousness or pure subjectivity. Husserl believed