Notion Of Judgment Research Articles

AN INTENSIONAL VIEW OF JUDGMENT IN KANT’S KRV

This paper presents an elucidation of Kant’s notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions (or singular representations); iii) the relation to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the ‘x’ that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical judgments. The overall purpose is to build up an understanding of judgment that supports a latter assessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Schiller's Idea of Aesthetic State

Man must pass through the aesthetic condition from the merely physical in order to reach the rational or moral, Schiller says. Schiller developed aesthetics to perfect all the works of arts of man and for the construction of true political freedom. He expanded aesthetics into a comprehensive system of diverse intellectual faculties, incorporating Kant’s notion of judgment together with the elements derived from Rousseau. Schiller’s deepest concern is not with law or reason or morality in themselves, but with human freedom through an aesthetic approach.

Improvisation in Process

The language we use to talk about things, as is self evident, affects what we are able to think and do. Western musical culture, as Small has eloquently argued, has a strong focus on the musical work, music as a thing rather than an activity. There are parallels with judicial process being focused on judgments, the outcomes of the process. However, bringing judicial process and musical improvisation into a dialogue resonates the extent to which terminologies may block understanding and possibilities for progress/alternative views. In this paper I argue that the concept of the musical work is inimical to an understanding of improvisation, and speculate on the extent to which this is paralleled by the notion of judgment as outcome rather than process.

A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking

This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual's judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one's moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates viewing critical thinking as a form of judgement that is action-oriented, spiritual, ethical and interpersonal.

Theologie als Zeitgenossenschaft Zum 90. Geburtstag von Jürgen Moltmann

Abstract The article presents Jürgen Moltmann as one of the most important contemporary theologians worldwide. It describes the development of his theology as a journey of theological discoveries and explorations which have influenced many central themes of theology in the 20th century and beyond. Moltmann’s Theology of Hope in 1964, which established his worldwide fame, was an important reference point for various liberation theologies in different parts of the world. His book on The Crucified God made clear that hope in a Christian sense always includes a deep theological account of suffering. God in Creation presented his ecological doctrine of creation, which attempted to overcome an anthropocentric theological thinking that ignored the presence of God’s Spirit in non-human nature. In his messianic Christology he describes redemption as something including the whole cosmos and all victims of evolution. Moltmann’s eschatology relates God’s justice and love by developing a notion of judgment as healing and saving judgment

Project specification: creativity and rhetoric in scientific research

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify different types of project in relation to their degree of specification and the creative possibilities that more highly specified projects offer researchers. Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents the limitations of project management methods when managing research in relation to creativity. If projects are rigorously formulated and fulfill the requirements of project management, they may be compared to a mechanical task in which active decision making no longer applies. The conceptual framework develops the study of the spaces of creativity that research projects offer based on intentional action in which the notion of project is considered to be more flexible than that of more traditional approaches, and the notion of judgment is seen as a source of creativity. The empirical research presents the study of two scientific projects and compares their degree of the goal and task specification, the time required to specify them and how creativity emerges from routinized activities. Findings – The spaces of creative possibilities in projects are related in two ways: first, these spaces are related to a critical view of the concepts of repeated action and routines, and second, they are related to the ways researchers use projects and the methods of project management not only as a method but also as a form of rhetoric. Originality/value – Constituting a contribution to organizational change and innovation theory that enlarges the concept of project and brings understanding of how researchers define their projects, confront project specifications and are creative in a constrained framework.

Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions

Philosophical cognitivists have argued for more than four decades that emotions are special types of judgments. Anti-cognitivists have provided a series of counterexamples aiming to show that identifying emotions with judgments overintellectualizes the emotions. I provide a novel counterexample that makes the overintellectualization charge especially vivid. I discuss neurophysiological evidence to the effect that the fear system can be activated by stimuli the subject is unaware of seeing. To emphasize the analogy with blindsight, I call this phenomenon blindfright. Cognitivists may reply that blindfright is nothing but an unconscious judgment subcortically elicited. This reply is in line with the strategy commonly employed by cognitivists against their critics. I call it the Elastic Strategy, because it consists of ‘stretching’ the notion of judgment in order to accommodate counterexamples. This strategy, I argue, turns cognitivism into a theory that is at worst unfalsifiable and at best trivially true. The final portion of my article aims to rescue cognitivism from the damage done by the Elastic Strategy. I distinguish three varieties of cognitivism, one concerned with what emotions essentially are (Constitutive Cognitivism), one concerned with what causes emotions (Etiological Cognitivism) and one concerned with what emotions represent (Representational Cognitivism). I conclude that what cognitivism has to offer to emotion theory are primarily insights concerning the causes and representational content of emotions. The constitutive identification of emotions with judgments, on the other hand, does more harm than good. 1. Introduction2. The Emergence of Cognitivism3. Blindfright4. The Master Argument Against Cognitivism5. The Elastic Strategy6. Three Varieties of Cognitivism 6.1 Constitutive Cognitivism6.2 Etiological Cognitivism6.3 Representational Cognitivism7. Conclusion

Emotional clichés and authentic passions: A phenomenological revision of a cognitive theory of emotion

This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call "emotional cliches," and not for authentic passions. In contrast with Solomon's account which conceives the subject as constituting, this account of emotion requires us to understand subjectivity as moved by meanings in the world, and as sometimes, in an authentic passion, dispossessed by those meanings.

An invitation to compare: Frans van Mieris's Cloth Shop in the context of early modern art collecting

With Frans van Mieris's Cloth Shop as case study, this article explores how the cultural practice of art collecting in the seventeenth‐century Dutch Republic informed an artist's pictorial strategies. An analysis of the imagery and execution of the painting shows that Van Mieris makes judgment and comparison the central themes, cleverly urging viewers to compare his creation to the works of his renowned compatriots, including Gerrit Dou and Gerard ter Borch. The notion of judgment was particularly apt in the context of early modern collecting, for it was the site where viewers demonstrated their taste, which in turn was a badge of cultural and social distinction. Combining motifs from diverse conventional subjects, Van Mieris invites viewers to draw connections between The Cloth Shop and numerous other works either on display in the same space or in their memory. In the process, he succeeds in underscoring his technical virtuosity, and in not only satisfying but also surprising viewers with his imagery. Van Mieris thus provides the occasion for privileged viewers to perform their roles as liefhebbers, thereby underlining their cultural superiority.

Wholly Otherwise1

The notion of messianic time seems to evoke an aporia that refuses dialectical resolution with Aufhebung as the operative concept of a speculative—dialectical determination of historical time — the messianic aporia that is how to think of messianic coming which is here and now, a future arriving which is, at the same time, a here and now. This demands a rigor of thinking that ventures beyond the dialectical aporia to think of an existential coming, irreducible to the predicative determination that is intimately tied to the metaphysical thinking of language guided by the logical notion of judgement. This article takes Schelling’s notion of Scheidung — meaning both “de‐cision” and “cision” — to consider a coming beyond the predicative process of dialectical history. Hence, the de‐cision, which is the cision of ground and existence as a non‐conditional opening for the coming to presence, cannot be thought of on the basis of Aufhebung. It has a relation to a time that falls outside dialectical—speculative time and remains as a remnant, and also points towards the messianic coming of redemption that remains beyond death. 1. Dedicated to Paul Fletcher and Saumyabrata Choudhury, with gratitude and admiration. Thinking means venturing beyond. (Bloch 1986, p. 5)

Wayne Martin on judgment

Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment marks a significant advance in the philosophical analysis of judgment. He understands that the domain of judgment is so large that it allows only a selective treatment. We can expand Martin’s insight by acknowledging that this domain is, in fact, hypercomplex and therefore unsurveyable in Wittgenstein’s sense. Martin’s treatment of judgments can, however, be extended in a number of directions. Of particular importance is it to understand the linguistic aspect of theoretical judgments, the challenges to the synthetic conception of judgment constituted not only by existential, but also by impersonal and negative judgments, and the exploration of the links between the notions of judgment and truth.

Teachers judging without scripts, or thinking cosmopolitan

A cosmopolitan ethic invites both an appreciation of the rich diversity of values, traditions and ways of life and a commitment to broad, universal principles of human rights that can secure the flourishing of that diversity. Despite the tension between universalism and particularism inherent in this outlook, it has received much recent attention in education. I focus here on one of the dilemmas to be faced in taking cosmopolitanism seriously, namely, the difficulty of judging what is just in the context of an increasingly divergent public—and classroom—discourse about values, rights and equality. I propose in what follows that judgement cannot rely on any script, even one as attractive, perhaps, as cosmopolitanism. To explore what is at stake in making judgements in an educational context, I draw on both Hannah Arendt's and Emmanuel Levinas's notions of judgement and thinking. The paper discusses the educational significance of thought and judgement as conditions for reframing the universalism–particularism problem found in a cosmopolitan ethic. My argument is that there is a world of difference between educating for cosmopolitanism, which entails a faith in principles, and ‘thinking cosmopolitan’, which entails a hope in justice for my neighbours.

Frege's Redundancy Thesis

The redundancy theory of truth is normally considered to be a form of the deflationist theory of truth. Frege is sometimes counted as an advocate of the deflationist theory, because he emphasizes the redundancy of the truth predicate. In this paper, following Thomas Ricketts's interpretation, I will argue that this is a misunderstanding of Frege's view. Even if Frege is a deflationist, it cannot be because he accepts the redundancy thesis. Indeed, truth plays an indispensable role in Frege's picture of judgement and assertion. In light of his notion of judgement and assertion, what the redundancy of the truth predicate means to Frege will be clarified.

Kant’s Notion of Judgment from the Perspective of the Theory of Tacit Knowing

Kant’s Notion of Judgment from the Perspective of the Theory of Tacit Knowing

Hannah Arendt on Judgement: Thinking for Politics

Many of Hannah Arendt's readers argue that differences between her earlier and later work on judgment are significant enough to constitute an actual break or rupture. Of Arendt's completed works, the 'Postscriptum' to Thinking , the first volume of The Life of the Mind , and her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy are widely considered to be her definitive remarks on judgment. These texts are privileged for two primary reasons. First, they were written after Arendt's controversial text, Eichmann in Jerusalem . It was Arendt's recognition of the role that Eichmann's inability to think played in his war crimes which motivated her to analyse more fully not only the 'mental activity' of thinking, but those of willing, and judging as well. Second, in The Life of the Mind and the Kant Lectures , Arendt treats judgment as a distinct mental activity; in her earlier work judgment is connected to both politics and thought. In this essay I argue that while Arendt does indeed reformulate her notion of judgment, she does not depoliticize it. I begin by calling into question Ronald Beiner's claim that Arendt's later work on judgment can stand in for the unwritten third volume of The Life of the Mind . I then consider two more specific claims, the first of which is that judgment is relevant only in 'rare' times of 'crisis'. I argue that a crisis as Arendt understands it is not necessarily and merely a 'rare' and short-lived phenomenon. The effects of what Arendt refers to as 'dark times' are long-term and pervasive and, moreover, the function of making judgments within such an expanded context is politically germane. Second, I problematize the idea that conceiving of judgment as a distinct mental faculty necessarily disconnects it from politics. I examine the nature of Arendt's relationship to Kant and argue that she appropriates and reconceptualizes his work in such a way that judgment, while a distinct faculty, nonetheless retains its political relevance. I conclude by suggesting that the impulse to systematize Arendt's unsystematic treatment of judgment ought to be resisted.

Steps Toward a Rhetoric of Judgment in Montaigne's "De Democritus et Heraclitus" (I,50)

This article presents a close reading of Montaigne's "De Democritus et Heraclitus" (Essais I,50) and explores the notion of judgment that Montaigne develops in this chapter as well as the rhetoric used in expressing this notion. I argue that several rhetorical structures used by Montaigne in this essay – structures such as paradox, inversion of subject and object, and polysemic language that invites multiple interpretations – play an important role in expressing Montaigne's critique of judgment. As he notes in his "Apologie de Raimond Sebond," sceptical views of judgment are difficult to express: they are subject to logical paradoxes similar to the liar's paradox. The rhetoric of "De Democritus et Heraclitus" can be understood as an answer to this logical difficulty. At the heart of my reading is a reinterpretation of a maxim well known to readers of the Essais: "Tout mouvement nous descouvre." This reinterpretation grew out of a study of the polysemous words used in this maxim, of Montaigne's claims about judgment in other essays, and of a careful inspection of the way that it appears in the Exemplaire de Bordeaux.

Perceiving white and sweet (again): Aristotle, De Anima 3.7, 431a20-b1

In chapter 7 of the third book of De anima Aristotle is concerned with the activity of the intellect (nous), which, here as elsewhere in the work, he explores by developing parallels with his account of sense-perception. In this chapter his principal interest appears to be the notion of judgement, and in particular intellectual judgements about the value of some item on a scale of good and bad. In this paper I shall argue, firstly that there is in fact a coherent structure and focus to this chapter, which has therefore unjustly been criticized as disorganized or corrupt; and secondly that, in the light of such a coherent understanding of the chapter as a whole, we can resolve the difficulties in interpreting the central passage concerned with cross-modal perceptual judgements, and thereby also throw some further light on the related passages in the second chapter of De anima 3, which had been directly concerned with that topic.

The designer's judgement

Judgement is ubiquitous in engineering work but the demand for the exercise of good judgement is particularly evident in engineering design. Every advance, or change of direction, in the design process is the result of the designer's judgement, But the notion of judgement is somewhat elusive. What is it? How can we know whether a judgement is good or bad? Can judgement be taught and if so when and how? This paper attempts to answer at least in part these questions. It draws on the work of Sir Geoffrey Vickers, seeking; to adapt and relate his ideas on judgement to engineering design. It constructs a framework for design in which judgements are made in three knowledge domains; the formative, the commercial and the instrumental, It then considers the efficacy of contemporary academe and industry in developing the capacity for judgement in the neophyte engineer. It concludes with a broad strategy for teaching design in engineering courses.

Freges Erläuterung des Urteils

According to Frege the notion of judgement cannot be defined, but must be explicated by referring to natural language. Frege uses a subjective and an objective notion of judgement: on the one hand a judgement is an inner mental process, on the other hand judging is explained as advancing from the thought to the truth-value. The subjective notion of judgement logically depends on the objective conception of a judgement, but nevertheless remains indispensable. To clarify the objective notion of judgement, the relation of thought and truth must be explicated by using Frege's theory of sense and reference. Only an intersubjective and action-guiding knowledge of the way in which the truth-value of a sentence is determined can make it possible to advance from the thought and the understanding of a sentence to the acknowledgement of its truth. Since by this advance a sentence receives a cognitive value, Frege's theory of sense and reference makes a contribution not only to semantics but also to epistemology.

Empiricism, judgment, and argument; Toward an informal logic of science

In an attempt to explore the role of argumentation in scientific inquiry, I explore the conception of argument that appears fruitful in the light of the recent trends in the philosophy of science, away from logical empiricism, and toward a greater emphasis on change, disagreement, and history. I begin by contrasting typical instances philosopers’ theories of both empiricism and apriorism, with typical instances of scientists’ uses of these two attitudes, suggesting that such practice shows a judiciousness lacking in epistemological theory. Then I examine at some length three important version of scientific judgement, namely Einstein's opportunism, Boltzmann's pluralism, and Huygens's eclecticism. I go on to discuss some recent work in the philosophy of science, exploring connections between the notion of judgment and Feyerabend's anarchism, Harold Brown's view of rationality, and Dudley Shapere's analysis of scientific change. All of this suggests a notion of argument in the sense of informallogic, and I examine some aspects of Galileo's work in its terms.