North Atlantic Treaty Organization Enlargement Research Articles

“Tit-for-Tat:” Understanding Russia – NATO Interactions in Eastern Europe

Abstract This article analyzes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – Russia dynamics in Eastern Europe, focusing on the competition for influence in Georgia and Montenegro with comparisons to Moldova and Ukraine. Whereas all four countries have expressed a desire to join NATO – and Russia has consistently communicated its disapproval – Moscow has pursued divergent means to curb NATO expansion and escalated with tit-for-tat strategies. We argue that whether Russia deployed military strategies, economic levers, political tactics or covert actions has varied according to its relative power projection capacity along with the responses of NATO and the target countries. Where power projection capacity is greater due to its contiguous geography (Georgia, Ukraine), Russia staged military interventions, and where it was weaker, in non-contiguous countries (Montenegro, Moldova), it resorted to non-military means. Russia may be uniformly opposed to NATO expansion, but its strategies to keep its neighbours out of NATO and in Russia’s orbit are contingent upon its relative power.

Foreword: Expanding NATO: What Challenges and Opportunities Wait Ahead?

In an ever-changing world marked by geopolitical shifts and evolving security threats, it is crucial to reassess and adapt the collective defense architecture that underpins international stability. Established more than 70 years ago, NATO has been a crucial element of global security and a demonstration of the effectiveness of collective defense. The expansion of NATO's reach has become a significant topic of debate as the world evolves. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has effectively ensured the security of its member states through a collective defense framework, making it a successful alliance. The evolving global landscape, which includes emerging threats, changing power dynamics, and evolving security challenges, has led to a reassessment of NATO's role and scope. There are those who advocate for the acceptance of NATO's expansion as a means of strengthening security and fostering collaboration among nations with similar values. The argument posits that enlarging NATO's membership can function as a deterrent against acts of aggression, strengthen democratic principles, and promote a more stable global system. This special issue, which we had the great pleasure of working together with NATO’s Public Diplomacy Divison, seeks to delve into the multifaceted dimensions of expanding NATO, exploring the challenges and opportunities that lie on the horizon. As we examine this critical issue, it is important to emphasize that the views expressed in these pages are diverse and reflect the complex and varied perspectives on NATO's expansion. Our authors, specialists from a wide-range of different fields, contributed their valuable opinions regarding this important discussion which has become further important since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has escalated with simultaneously intensifying debates concerning the start of a new Cold-War in our time.

Russian hybrid warfare: A framework

Abstract As Montenegro sough to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2015, an attempted coup erupted within the country in October of that year. The Telegraph's Ben Farmer reported that, ‘An officer with Russia's GRU military intelligence service, is accused of running a web of Serbian and Russian nationalists and paramilitaries who plotted to assassinate the Montenegrin prime minister.’ Farmer, B. (2017, February 26). Montenegro to Indict Russian Spy Behind Coup Plot. The Telegraph. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/26/montenegro-indict-russian-spy-behind-coup-plot/. [accessed 5 March, 2017]. The failed coup and attempted assassination were conducted by Russian intelligence in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin's vision for a modern Eurasia in which NATO discontinues encroaching on Russia's sphere of influence and in which Russia ascends to regional hegemony. Knezevic, G. (2017, January 2). Montenegro's NATO-Russia Chess Match. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-nato-russia-chess-match/28210094.html. [accessed 5 March, 2017]. Although unsuccessful, this covert operation—conducted by Russian intelligence working in conjunction with disaffected Russian partisans within Montenegro—to stymie NATO's expansion captures the essence of modern Russian hybrid warfare. Nevertheless, Montenegro is not unique, but instead is one of many recent hybrid conflicts propagated by the Russian government. Speaking on the spectre of Russian operations in Eastern Europe, American general Michael Williamson commented, ‘In terms of state-based challenges, Russia's purported annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine demonstrated a sophisticated combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to achieve objectives below a threshold that the Russian leadership believe would elicit a concerted NATO response.’ Lt. Gen. Michael Williamson, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, and Lt. Gen. John Murray, statement to the Subcommittee on AirLand, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on Army Modernization in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2017, Second Session, 114th Congress, 5 April 2016. Since 2008, Russia's operations throughout Europe, its Near Abroad and Syria signal an evolved approach to the conduct of war. Many terms and phrases have been attributed to Russia's evolved model of war to include Grey Zone conflict and new generation warfare. However, hybrid war or hybrid warfare is quite useful, despite the contention the term generates. The term hybrid warfare is useful because it speaks of the bundling of capabilities, technology and ideas in a coherent, purposeful manner to accomplish tactical, operational and strategic objectives on behalf of policymakers and strategists. The work starting position is that the Russian hybrid warfare is in fact an applied way of war. Despite many arguments to the contrary, Russia's applied way of war introduces important nuances to the conduct of war. Resultantly, the purpose of this work is to clarify the concept of Russian hybrid warfare and to identify the characteristics that make it worthy of examination. Two basic methods exist to explain an observable way of war. The first is to paraphrase existing primary source information on the subject. This method requires access to primary source information and the physical ability to read that material. That method is not employed in this work because access to Russian strategic and tactical doctrine is not readily available to the layperson. Furthermore, in many cases doctrine is a preferred way of war-fighting, a narrative and tied to procurement strategies, and thus, not an applied method. Therefore, merely relying on doctrine or policy statements can mislead the researcher about the true character of a given way of war. That notwithstanding, the second method is to observe the phenomenon in multiple situations over a period of time. In doing so, the observer seeks to identify trends, inconsistencies, rules, relationships, reactions and boundaries that surface and recur therein and then generate an over-arching assessment about that phenomenon's boundaries and inner workings. That is the technique employed here.

HOW THE WEST WON: Post-Cold War negotiations on NATO enlargement in the 1990-2000s

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the triumphant military alliance in Europe. Following prolonged deliberations, NATO eventually conducted a systematic enlargement of the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. This expansion of the alliance was fiercely contested, and according to many critics was based upon a ‘broken promise’ of no-NATO expansion east of a newly-reunified Germany, an assurance given during the negotiations on German reunification by the leaders of the Western alliance. This paper will explore the enlargement of NATO in the 1990s, whether or not it was indeed based on a broken promise of non-expansionism, how this enlargement was accomplished, and how it has affected the subsequent geopolitics of Europe. In doing so, this paper shall argue that a multitude of false assurances on NATO expansion were given to Soviet officials during the negotiations on German reunification.

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?

Sharing the Burden? NATO and Its Second-Tier Powers Toronto by Benjamin Zyla

Reviewed by: Dominika Kunertova, Universite de MontrealFrom collective action dilemmas to the literature on international crises, scholars have addressed the casse-tete of how to determine an equitable distribution of collective defence costs in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In his new book, Benjamin Zyla offers comprehensive account of the burden-sharing practices of NATO's second-tier powers, such as Canada, Norway, Spain, and the Netherlands, during the first post-Cold War decade (1989-2001). Set in the framework of the changing regional order in Europe, the book evaluates existing burden-sharing measures and contextualizes the burden-sharing behaviour of second-tier power with an emphasis on Canada.Zyla advances two central findings. First, contrary to the expectations of collective action theory, NATO second-tier powers generally shouldered a proportionate share of the Atlantic (8). And second, rather than relying solely on material cost-benefit calculations, Canada acted according to Wolfers' norm of external responsibility, which points to a felt obligation to promote international economic, social, or political conditions to uphold the values of human rights and security, democracy, freedom, and the rule of law (10).[1] To demonstrate his arguments, Zyla broadens burden-sharing criteria to include both military and civilian indicators, and studies domestic preference formation toward NATO and European security governance in Canada. Rooted in liberal international relations (IR) theory, the author conducts an analysis based on explanatory understanding (10) and combines the methods of case study, qualitative content analysis, and semi-structured interviews.Sharing the Burden? is divided into three parts. The first presents the author's theoretical (chapter 2) and conceptual (chapter 3) frameworks for analyzing burden-sharing. Although these two chapters are rich on scholarly debates, Zyla does not always strike reasonable balance. After providing lengthy criticism of realism, followed by defence of liberal IR theory, he dismisses constructivism in single paragraph. Surprisingly, the author does not comment on neoclassical realism, which has recently made contribution to the allied burden-sharing problem in NATO. Furthermore, Zyla squeezes the main neorealist explanation for the absence of free-riding--the abandonment hypothesis--into one footnote (25). Nor is it clear why he omits studies that focus on domestic factors in explaining the contribution dilemma. Taken together, it is odd that at time when IR scholars have been striving to develop more eclectic research, Zyla glorifies liberal IR theory while making straw man out of realism.The second part of the book compares countries' shares of the military burden. Zyla examines NATO member states' participation in the Persian Gulf 1990-1991 and Balkan wars throughout the 1990s (chapters 4 and 5), and introduces the book's most original idea: relative force share index (117). The author claims that instead of comparing absolute allied force contributions, the comparison should be made in relation to national force strength. Finally, in the third part Zyla develops criteria for sharing the civilian burden among NATO's allies. He starts with less quantifiable aspects such as the construction of NATO institutional tools to provide consultation and expertise for Central and Eastern European states, and Canadian support for NATO enlargement policy (chapter 6). Zyla then broadens the burden-sharing discussion by introducing two sets of civilian power indicators, soft military and hard civilian, including national contributions to NATO common budgets and UN peacekeeping operations, or foreign aid (chapter 7).The author could have better explained his choice of military and civilian burden indicators. …

A novel entropy-based decision support framework for uncertainty resolution in the initial subjective evaluations of experts: The NATO enlargement problem

We introduce a novel decision support framework that allows decision makers (DMs) to assess the informativeness of a ranking of alternatives provided by different experts and to extrapolate additional evaluations based on the distributional bias and entropy inherent to those received from the experts. In the proposed framework, expert analysts rank several alternatives within opportunities versus threats space of potential evaluations. The resulting rankings of alternatives vary among experts due to differences in the set of evaluation criteria chosen and to the subjective weights assigned by the experts to the criteria considered. As a result, DMs observe biases in the evaluations provided by the experts and variations in the degree of informativeness among alternatives. Thus, DMs must use the information available to them to assess the reliability of the ranking obtained from the experts' evaluations. In this regard, the distributional bias generated by the evaluations received will be used to define the dynamic structure of an algorithm that allows DMs to extrapolate additional expected evaluations and modify the initial ranking proposed by the experts accordingly. At the same time, the entropy generated by the evaluations will be used to validate the reliability of the resulting rankings and to determine the stopping rule for the data generating algorithm. A numerical example based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership enlargement problem is presented, where several teams of experts provide different evaluations on a set of applicant countries. A battery of Monte Carlo simulations has been performed, and alternative biased approaches have been followed. The rankings obtained have been compared with those resulting from our framework.

Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999

<i>Rusya-NATO i sredata na sigurnost sled Studenata voina: Chast 1—1989–1999</i>

NATO Enlargement and Russia: Discerning Fact from Fiction

ABSTRACT In justifying Russia's new assertiveness, Russian observers often stress the humiliation that their country has suffered because of the West's many broken promises, including the promise not to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) beyond the borders of a reunified Germany. However, all available research on this subject indicates that no legally binding commitments on the West not to extend NATO beyond the borders of a reunified Germany have ever been made, nor has a concrete invitation ever been extended to Russia to join NATO. Moreover, the discussions at the time took place without the voices of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which were still members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. The alleged Western promises about NATO enlargement thus remain a myth that distracts from the key issue of how to build durable relations between Russia and the West.

Options for Avoiding Counterinsurgencies

Abstract: How can the West continue to shape international order without over-committing itself to ruinous and ambiguous operations on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan? This article addresses this question by examining the failures of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and by outlining three alternatives for future engagements: the Libya model, the indirect approach, and contingency operations in support of multilateral organizations. Each presents unique possibilities, but the imperative for strategic clarity and commitment is consistent. ********** By December 2014, the large-scale Western military effort in Afghanistan will be over, ending more than a decade of direct intervention in that country and Iraq. A page is being turned in the history of warfare and, as most recognize, there is a need to take stock of the diverse but often painful experiences of the past, and to translate these into appropriate lessons for future interventions. That the recent campaigns, despite substantial investment, have yielded such limited results is difficult to accept. Yet denial will not prepare us for the future. Indeed, if the West is to remain in the business of shaping global affairs, sometimes by force of arms, it must resolve the contradictions raised by its recent campaigns. (1) Most pressingly, it seems, the West wants the rights that go along with global leadership, but not the responsibilities and costs. How can we bridge this gap? How can the West sustain its contribution to a very particular international order, without falling into the pitfalls that characterized the last decade? Creative solutions are urgently needed. This article examines three such solutions in light of the failures of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. These alternate approaches provide more limited applications of force and more modest roles. Recent history suggests that--within key contexts and preconditions--such approaches can be successful. The Challenges in Afghanistan An important first step to understanding the challenges faced in Afghanistan is to broaden the scope of analysis beyond the mere conduct of operations. Many of the mistakes in Afghanistan were strategic and, therefore, had little to do with counterinsurgency. These include the creation of a highly centralized form of governance, the wasted opportunities provided by the fall of the Taliban, the massive diversion caused by the war in Iraq, and the decision to expand the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) area of operations beyond Kabul without committing a fraction of the resources necessary for security and stability. Underlying these missteps was the inability of international allies to establish common political and strategic aims. The campaign was defined by three separate and poorly coordinated efforts: the US-led counterterrorism effort of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -led ISAF effort to provide security and to enable the third mission, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), a UN effort devoted to political and economic development. On one side of the spectrum, Afghanistan was a narrow exercise in counterterrorism; on the other, it was statebuilding aimed at establishing democracy, gender equality, and human rights. Rather than a propitious division of labor, the broad spectrum of aims provided the West with the false comfort of doing it all, all at once, and with little need for prioritization. Tensions between competing interests were glossed over, but became strikingly apparent with NATO's expansion beyond Kabul and the steady deterioration of security thereafter. The bloodshed deepened strategic divisions, both between and within individual governments. In a context where victory was not really a relevant concept, the lack of political and strategic direction had serious consequences. Most importantly, it thwarted the essential process of balancing ends, ways, and means, and the mismatches therein which became increasingly obvious. …

Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The “NATO Enlargement Question” in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991

Controversy arose in the mid-1990s when Russian officials accused Western governments of reneging on binding pledges made to Moscow in 1990 during German unification diplomacy. According to the allegations, Western leaders had solemnly promised that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would never expand beyond Germany into Central and Eastern Europe. Were such pledges ever made? Was the Soviet Union betrayed, and if so, by whom, how, and when? Or have various tactical comments been misinterpreted in hindsight? This article seeks to offer new answers to these questions by exploring not simply U.S.-Soviet-West German triangular diplomacy in 1990 but also the evolution of different approaches, ideas, and visions regarding Germany's security arrangements and the wider European security architecture. These ideas were floated publicly and privately, at home and abroad, by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and other senior West German officials. In showing how ultimately a “unified Germany in NATO” came about after months of intense diplomacy in 1990 to resolve the “German question,” this article refutes the recently made claim that the extension of full membership to the whole of Germany was a precedent-setting expansion of NATO.

Georgia Again in Putin’s Shadow

IntroductionAs the government of Georgia continues its quest for economic modernization and admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU), it must first normalize relations with the Russian Federation to facilitate achievement of these long-term goals. The nation must weigh the benefits of a patient short- and medium-term policy of non-alignment versus an aggressive policy of immediate Western integration. This will be the most effective path for Georgia to improve its citizens' living conditions while ensuring physical security along its borders, which are currently areas of heightened tension. The animosity between the Russian and Georgian governments is counter-productive for both nations, though much more so for the Georgian populace. Georgia has the most to gain from rapprochement, and therefore should initiate the dialogue, ensuring that Russian withdrawal from South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not preconditions for negotiations.The recommendations put forth in this essay will likely be anathema to many citizens of Georgia, and especially to those in the Georgian political sphere. The events that have transpired and sacrifices that have been made in Abkhazia and South Ossetia can only truly be appreciated by the citizens directly involved. Distaste for Russia among the Georgian people is understandable. Most sovereign nations have no appetite for foreign advice involving their internal affairs, but Georgia must recognize and consider the factors identified below related to their security situation, even if they choose not to act.Perhaps the most notable facts to consider are the following:* Vladimir Putin has been elected to the Russian presidency* Iran is becoming more unstable* No nation has provided Georgia with security guarantees* The EU and Turkey are too energy dependent on Russia, and are economically and politically unwilling to significantly pressure their trade partner.With respect to Georgian hopes for assistance from the United States, the U.S. has no desire to aggressively antagonize Russia over Georgian matters. Notably, the most significant outcome of the meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the White House on 31 January 2012 was a commitment to studying a free trade agreement between the two nations. This identical commitment had been made three years earlier in the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, announced on 9 January 2009. There were no U.S. security guarantees resulting from the visit. The United States is also reluctant to antagonize Russia for other reasons. The U.S. needs Russia to ferry astronauts and supplies to the International Space Station. Washington is pursuing economic interests in Russia resulting from Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization, including repealing the JacksonVanik Act. In addition to the effort to resent U.S.-Russia relations, the U.S. is also facing its own financial challenges, and the military is shifting some of its focus from Europe to the Pacific. The United States has great respect for Georgia and its leadership, but has broader strategic interests that must be considered. Noting these factors (and others that are not discussed here), Georgia must recognize the need to take steps to reduce tensions with Russia if they hope to achieve an atmosphere of security and improved economic vitality.What Can Georgia Do?There are several immediate, simple, and inexpensive options available to Georgia to encourage detente with Russia. These efforts will not compromise Georgian sovereignty and may actually improve Georgia's relationships with Western governments, since any endeavor that seeks to lessen friction in the Caucasus would be viewed favorably by EU and U.S. politicians. Options that could be considered include:* Deemphasize the role played by the North Caucasus in Georgian politics* Positively promote the 20 14 Sochi Olympics* Assuage Russian anxieties about the possibility of NATO expansion* Reduce the level of overt anti-Russian rhetoric in public statements, official documents, and parliamentary actions* Lower the priority of resolving Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence in national politics. …

NATO Membership for Albania and Croatia: Military Modernization, Geo-Strategic Opportunities and Force Projection

While research on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its out-of-area operations continues to thrive, very little analysis exists on NATO's ongoing membership enlargement. This article examines NATO's newest members, Albania and Croatia, and their recent efforts to transform themselves into security producers for the alliance. This research examines each state's recent military purchases, their potential geo-strategic value to the alliance, and their ability to contribute to NATO missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo. While their abilities to project force remain limited, the findings presented here suggest that these states have made measurable military advancements and bring meaningful geo-strategic advantages to the alliance, which provides additional evidence of the success of NATO's enlargement policies.

An integrated strategic benchmarking model for assessing international alliances with application to NATO membership enlargement

PurposePromoting security, stability and cooperation is the raison d'être of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and these are the aims of its strategy of membership enlargement. The incentive of NATO membership has led some former Warsaw Pact applicant countries to reform their political systems, transform their economies, deal with corruption and improve social justice and human rights. However, controversy has surrounded NATO's enlargement because of the current ambiguous and subjective decision‐making process and the effect that it could have on the organization. This paper aims to present the results of a study to develop a benchmarking model as a means to assist NATO evaluate and screen potential applicant countries.Design/methodology/approachA novel and structured multiple‐criteria decision analysis model that considers specific NATO applicant evaluation criteria and environmental forces is offered and a template for a membership evaluation process is proposed. A total of 120 researchers in France, Germany, Switzerland and the USA provided the necessary data on the 23 countries that are analyzed in order to develop the benchmarking model. Four distinct categories were established to categorize these countries. The ranking of the countries based on Euclidean distance from the ideal state is illustrated with a classification schema outlining four typologies as beneficial believers, detrimental disadvantaged, perilous partners and apathetic acquaintances.FindingsAmong the potential applicant countries considered as “beneficial believers” are Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Ireland while other countries, such as, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Montenegro, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are considered as “detrimental disadvantaged”. Furthermore, Russia and Ukraine were identified as “perilous partners” and Malta, FYR Macedonia, Cyprus, Serbia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armenia and Moldova were identified as “apathetic acquaintances”.Practical implicationsThis model could be applied to other supranational organizations and multinational firms when assessing international strategic alliances.Originality/valueThe paper presents the results of a study to develop a benchmarking model as an aid in evaluating and screening potential NATO applicant countries.

Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations

The second enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end of the cold war fueled an ongoing debate over whether the alliance contributes to democratization in Europe. In the 1990s, critics warned that the 1999 NATO enlargement would cultivate a new cold war and prove irrelevant to democratic consolidation in central Europe. Events have not borne out these forecasts, however. In Poland, not only did NATO build a civilian consensus in favor of democratic control over the armed forces corresponding to NATO norms, but it also delegitimized Polish arguments for defense self-sufficiency that had derived their credibility from Poland's experience of military vulnerability and foreign domination. Such democratizing and denationalizing trends have contributed to stability in postcommunist Europe. An assessment of the seven states that joined in 2004 similarly reveals some scope for NATO's influence in all cases. The alliance's access to domestic reform processes, however, will be uneven across cases in ways largely consistent with the predictions of the theoretical framework in this article. Rachel A. Epstein is assistant professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

NATO Expansion: Strengthening the Alliance?

The Future of NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies. By Zoltan Barany. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 278 pp., $65.00 (ISBN: 0-521-82169-X). Despite the outwardly placid front associated with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion in the post-Cold War era, many strategic and political issues simmer behind the facade of consensus among alliance members and designated new members. In The Future of NATO Expansion , Zoltan Barany sets out to evaluate systematically and in considerable detail the preparedness of four states for full NATO membership in the second enlargement round. The emphasis is on comparative analysis with no attempt at constructing or testing theory. The book is a contribution to scholarship on alliance operations and politics, offering much for an understanding of NATO's challenging project to reconfigure itself and its mission in the altered security environment that emerged after 1989. Barany argues in broader terms that NATO should indeed expand into Eastern Europe but that the prospective states should satisfy the alliance's membership criteria before acquiring full member status. NATO's first round of expansion came in 1999 with the accession of three erstwhile Warsaw Pact members—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—forming a nineteen-state alliance. Barany admits that, at that time, he had criticized the expansion because it was not essential to the alliance and potentially provocative for Russia. However, Barany shifted his stance once the process had commenced, advocating further enlargement. The second round of expansion, announced at NATO's Prague Summit in November 2002, slated Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania for membership. Barany has chosen to focus his study on the first …

Engagement, Containment, and the International Politics of Eurasia

Notwithstanding the end of the cold war, Russia continued to occupy a prominent place in some of the most divisive debates in American foreign policy in the 1990s and promises to do so in this decade as well. One of these debates concerns the impact of Western economic advice and aid to Russia. While some have blamed Russia's poor economic performance and rampant corruption on the economic prescriptions of the Washington consensus and American support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin against his domestic rivals, others have attributed Russia's problems to Moscow's half-hearted implementation of the reform program recommended by Western governments and international organizations. The debate over expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that raged in the mid-1990s also centered on Russia. While many advocates of expansion raised the prospect of resurgent Russian imperialism in the future, opponents universally stressed the reality of Moscow's hostile reaction in the present. One round of NATO expansion is complete, yet two even more momentous decisions remain: whether to expand the alliance to include one or more of the non-Russian former Soviet republics, as is strongly advocated by the Bush administration, and whether to invite Russia itself to become a member, as was advocated by Bill Clinton during his final presidential trip to Europe and has been raised as a possibility by President Bush as well.' Finally, the most basic debate among American policy makers is whether to give priority to cultivating relations with Russia-in effect, a con-

US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks?

The questions of whether North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be enlarged and, if so, to what degree have been among most difficult and sensitive issues facing Alliance since end of Cold War. In shaping US National Security Strategy regarding US interests in Europe and US NATO policy, President Clinton has declared his support for NATO membership for well-qualified democracies regardless of geography or history, including those in northeastern Europe. US policy regarding NATO enlargement should seek to strengthen Alliance as well as to bolster democratic advances, deter potential threats, and increase regional stability throughout Europe. However, by promoting a policy that supports NATO membership for Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Administration is jeopardizing vital US national interests and undermining NATO's collective defense mission. [1] This article examines US strategy regarding NATO enlargement, assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and recommends changes to protect vital US interests in Europe while providing Baltic republics with a security alternative to NATO membership. NATO'S Strategic Concept and Enlargement Beginning in 1989, unexpectedly rapid political, military, and social changes resulted in end of ideological and military stalemate in Europe and breakup of Soviet Union. Those changes and regional instability caused by ethnic and religious conflict occurring within Europe prompted NATO to examine and adjust its policies, missions, and structures. NATO's new strategic concept, approved at Washington Summit in April 1999, reflects new security challenges and dangers extant in Europe. It also reflects Alliance's increased commitment to coordinate and cooperate with other international institutions in supporting out of operations (those conducted outside territory of NATO member states). [2] However, despite NATO's increasing involvement in nontraditional operations, Alliance's essential and enduring mission is to guarantee territorial integrity, political independence, and security of its members. [3] It is that mission that has resulted in a flood of Central and Eastern European applicants seeking NATO membership. Article 10 of Washington Treaty provides that the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further principles of this Treaty and to contribute to security of North Atlantic area to accede to this [4] This commitment was reaffirmed by NATO leaders during 1994 Brussels Summit, where they declared that membership in Alliance remained open to those nations who could further principles established in Washington Treaty. [5] The strategic goals served by enlargement and methods used to achieve enlargement were examined following year. The product of that examination was Study on NATO Enlargement, wherein Alliance's principles for accessing new members were documented. The study concluded that enlargement of Alliance contributes to stability and security of Euro-Atlantic area. It also addressed selection and accession of new members and confirmed that accession would occur in accordance with provisions of Article 10 of Washington Treaty, with new members receiving all rights of Treaty membership. [6] However, when addressing rights of new members, study also designated their obligations by declaring that new members must be prepared to contribute to NATO's budget and support Alliance's evolving missions and its fundamental collective defense role. [7] To ensure that new members are able to contribute to NATO's collective defense as well as benefit from it, study states that before accessing new members, Alliance will evaluate effects of their admission to ensure that enlargement will not diminish NATO's military credibility. …

Slovenia and NATO Enlargement

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into central-east Europe has been the subject of lively debate for almost a decade. Opinions and positions on this subject in Europe and North America have ranged from angry denunciations through solid criticisms, serious doubts, and guarded support to enthusiastic accolades. These contrasting attitudes underline the flux and uncertainties, as well as the divisibility, of security in the post-cold war era. Less than three years after NATO's initial stonewalling on enlargement in late 1994, invitations to join have been extended to three former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. But nine of the twelve central-east European candidates still remain at NATO's gates, not satisfied with the status of so-called 'partner countries.' One of them is the Republic of Slovenia.According to many experts and observers, reducing the 'grey zone' of insecurity and uncertainty in Europe is an important rationale for NATO enlargement. Javier Solana, the secretary general of NATO, con firmed this when he stated that 'enlargement must ... promote greater stability not only to the territories of the new invitees but through them to the neighboring regions.(f.1) Although this statement and its underlying contention have certain merits in general terms, they raise some serious questions in relation, for example, to Slovenia, whose candidacy was deferred at the NATO meeting in Madrid in July 1997.On the whole, the lines separating secure and insecure areas in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Asia do not coincide with the division between NATO members and non-members. Furthermore, flash-points of violence and terrorism in the territories of NATO members - Ulster, the Basque country, Corsica, parts of Turkey, for example - have existed for decades. Actual or potential interstate conflicts have taken place or might conceivably (again) take place between NATO member-states, for example, on the Greek-Turkish border, in Cyprus, or over Gibraltar. It is true that Slovenia is situated in the geographic proximity of recent armed hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, a string of trouble spots stretches from Bosnia across the 'Eurasian Balkans,' as Zbigniew Brzezinski calls them, all the way to southeast Asia. However, Slovenia, together with a number of other European countries, including neighbouring Austria, belongs to an area of stability and security. As for Slovenia's intentions, there is no room for uncertainty or for treating the country as part of a 'grey zone' in Europe.Soon after Slovenia became independent in June 1991 its political elite found little comfort in relying on membership in the United Nations and participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) alone. The ineffectiveness of the international community in dealing with even a relatively small aggressor in the Balkans only contributed to the sense of unease.Since then the Slovenian government has abandoned ex-Yugoslavia's stance of 'active non-alignment.' During the same period, the considerable political strength of the pacifist 'Greens,' who advocated Slovenia's unilateral disarmament and neutrality, has practically evaporated. Because of this shift in the political scene, and with no tradition of neutralism and no constitutional or international legal obligations in this respect, Slovenia did not opt for a defence policy of armed neutrality. As a non-member in the only remaining effective regional security organization (NATO), Slovenia has been left for the time being with no option but to pursue external non-engagement and armed self-reliance - a posture practiced by the state but not desired by the largest coalition party. In addition, the Slovenian defence ministry signed bilateral co-operation protocols with its counterparts in the United States, Britain, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic, among others, and a trilateral protocol on military co-operation with Italy and Hungary. …

Russia and NATO Expansion Eastward

AN EASY ASSUMPTION THAT the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) worries only the foreign policy elite in Moscow has been a characteristic of Western explanations of Russia's response to enlargement since 1996. This view, often supported by references to public opinion polls showing that Russians are more concerned about economic and social issues, is dangerously misleading. Russia's signature on the NATO-Russian Federation Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security of 27 May 1997, and official acquiescence in the formal invitations offered to prospective new NATO members at Madrid two months later, seem to have lulled Western leaders into believing that the Russia 'problem' has been resolved.The idea that the Russian public has scant interest in NATO's ambitions in the East has been advanced by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a prominent adviser on Russian affairs to American policy makers,(f.1) even if every political leader in Russia, from President Boris Yeltsin and members of his government to strident opposition faction heads, has spoken out strongly and consistently against NATO expansion to the east. They have all called it, in one way or another, a mistake of historic proportions and continue to express that opinion, even while accepting the inevitable. Leaders of every organized political party portray expansion as a potential threat to Russia. Although the two largest parties - the Communist party and Our Home is Russia, the 'government' party - are virulent adversaries, both include opposition to NATO expansion in their official platforms. Every obvious candidate for the presidency has decried expansion. A clear majority of the popularly elected State Duma deputies are hostile to NATO's inclusion of former Warsaw pact countries and adamantly against the admission of former Soviet republics. Their stance has the support of all the mainstream newspapers. Indeed, expansion to the east is a subject on which there is a very rare consensus in the extremely diverse and often mutually incompatible political landscape.If one takes Russian commentary on NATO expansion at face value, the question of membership for former Soviet republics is the matter on which Moscow has drawn its final 'line in the sand.' The degree to which the line is taken seriously in the West, furthermore, may well determine the success or failure of NATO's enlargement enterprise. An analysis of Russian discourse on the Baltic republics as it relates to NATO expansion can shed some light on the possible consequences for the Founding Act if one or more of those states are included in enlargement's 'second wave.'Russian expectations of a vigorous Baltic campaign to join NATO have a long history. A prominent Russian journalist predicted as much in September 1991, a few weeks after the failed coup against the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the subsequent Baltic declarations of independence from the USSR.(f.2) By 1998 Russian foreign policy analysts were speaking of the absorption of the Baltic states by NATO as the 'most acute issue' facing Moscow and predicting bitterly that Russia's strategic interests in the Baltic region would be ignored by Western leaders.(f.3)Until recently, Moscow comfortably thought of the Baltic Sea as its rightful sphere of influence. But Russia has only two remaining bases for its once huge Baltic fleet: Kronstadt near St Petersburg and Baltiisk in Kaliningrad. Its sense of vulnerability was reinforced in 1997 when all three Baltic countries applied and were formally accepted as candidates for NATO membership. Early in that year, the possibility of Estonian entry drew the first words of warning from Yeltsin and his government.(f.4) On 20 February 1997, despite assertions by the Estonian president, Lennart Meri, that his country's aspirations were not anti-Russian, Moscow's diplomats in Tallinn threatened Estonia with economic sanctions if it persisted in its efforts to join NATO. …