North Atlantic Council Research Articles

The Armed Conflict in Ukraine: Use of Force, Prosecution, and Complicity

In the early hours of Thursday, 24 February 2022, President Vladimir Putin addressed the Russian people and declared to the world that Russia has decided to commence a “special military operation” against Ukraine. Shortly afterwards, the Russian military entered Ukrainian territory from many parts of the country. The conflict has resulted in heavy casualties, especially within the Ukrainians. The international community has condemned the invasion, stating that it violates Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it’s contrary to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). The North Atlantic Council has also identified the attack as “a grave violation of international law, including the UN Charter.
 In the wake of protests sounded by the international community, Russia has continued to oppose such arguments. As a preliminary analysis, it is evident that Russia’s actions against Ukraine consist of elements of force. Rather than denying the allegations, Russia has justified its use of force by referring to principles of international law. This paper examines a brief background of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s and Ukraine’s justifications in the war, the possible prosecution of high-ranking Russian officials in potential fora’s, and also Belarus’ involvement in the conflict. While this paper finds that Russia’s justifications for their invasion are unlawful and invokes their responsibility, there are obstacles in prosecuting the crimes. It also considers that Belarus is responsible for their involvement.

THE SOURCES AND DYNAMICS OF TURKEY’S ANTAGONISM TOWARDS THE EURO-ATLANTIC ASPIRATIONS OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND

Since 1949, NATO’s membership has increased from 12 to 31 countries through nine rounds of enlargement. Allegedly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Yet, any decision to invite a country to join the bloc is taken by the North Atlantic Council on the basis of consensus among all Allies. This dichotomy has attracted particular attention following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which ‘encouraged’ historically non-aligned Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership. Apparently, the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of both Nordic countries have immediately encountered strong Turkey’s antagonism. While Finland is now a NATO Ally as of 4 April 2023, Sweden has got merely an official Invitee status. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has highlighted that NATO’s priority is for Sweden’s accession to be completed as soon as possible as well. Although President Erdogan submitted Sweden’s accession protocol to the Turkish parliament for ratification in October 2023, there is an ongoing discussion on the reasons why the process has been held up by official Ankara. This article aims at exploring the genuine motives behind Turkey’s reluctance to clear the way for the country to become part of the Western military-political bloc. It argues that self-positioning of Turkey as a non-conventional NATO Ally pursuing an autonomous policy, trying to have its own national security concerns better accommodated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has been a critical factor.

Legal principles of international cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic alliance

The article analyzes the legal principles of Ukraine’s international cooperation with NATO and the European Union.The Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 1993 «Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy» was one of the first documents that established the basic principles of Ukraine’s foreign policy towards the Alliance. The defining feature of the foreign policy is the establishment of partnership relations with Western countries, mutually beneficial cooperation, participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the North Atlantic Assembly.The Partnership for Peace Framework Document stipulates that the signatory state will develop an individual partnership program. Participation in the Program involves cooperation with NATO in the military, military-techni-cal, military-political spheres, in the field of science, ecology, defense economy, etc.On 14 September 1995, the NATO-Ukraine North Atlantic Council approved an Individual Partnership Program, marking the beginning of an “expanded and deepened” relationship.The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and NATO on the estab-lishment of a NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine with the aim of disseminating the informa-tion about NATO was of great importance.The decisive factor was the adoption the Charter on a Special Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, a basic political document, on July 9, 1997.The subsequent legal regulations laid the grounds for a stable relationship between Ukraine, NATO and European Union member states. These are, in particular: the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, the Law of Ukraine “On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine”, “Military Doctrine of Ukraine”, Laws of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Ukraine’s Refusal to Implement a Non-Aligned Policy”, “On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine on the Foreign Policy of Ukraine” and “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (on the strategic course of the state to gain full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)”.Thus, the political and legal measures to form the foundation for significant rapprochement with NATO and the European Union are implemented.

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS AND STRENGTHENING THE NATO’S EASTERN FLANK

A reflection process shall be launched to see if the NATO is ready to face the challenges of tomorrow. The main aim of this paper will be to outline what are the perspectives and challenges according to the Balkan countries and what is the role of NATO in the Eastern Flank. Collecting of views from the region will give some ideas and propositions how to make the Alliance stronger and more effective politically and militarily.
 The western Balkans is one of the longest lasting and largest investments that NATO has made throughout time. The Western Balkans is the most articulate because of the complexity of the region. As the WB is so articulate and complex and the relationships since the 1990s between NATO and the region of the WB have evolved. The three main pillars of the NATO strategic concept are deterrence and defence crisis management and cooperative security. Now we have two new NATO tools that are helping the region - capacity building to the civil military team (NATO advisory team which support the set up of security force in Kosovo) and enhanced interaction which is a basket of tailored activities (it is not a partnership because there are some of the Allies that do not the declaration of independence of Kosovo) that have been revised by the North Atlantic Council- building integrity and civil emergency planning. The common point between all the countries of the WB which have joined the partnership of peace is the contribution that they give to the security and stability of the region and to this idea of projecting stability. When NATO’s neighbours are stable the Alliance itself will be more stable. The open door policy a cornerstone of the Washington treaty– for many countries of the WB it is a cornerstone for becoming members and to assume the responsibilities and the obligations (and the willingness and ability to assume them) that come with this membership. Political dialogue and practical cooperation are crucial for the countries especially from the region of the Western Balkans to foster the regional understanding and to share common expertise. Speaking about the Geopolitics in the Balkans and in South Eastern Europe, my first point is about the current geopolitical dynamics. SE Europe and even The Balkans are not anymore in the centre of world politics in the role of the trouble maker in the region, like it was in the late 90s of the last and in the beginning of this century. But they continue to be a field for political manoeuvring of the geopolitical players dominated by the desire to confer spheres of interest and to mutually deter each other. We shall not forget that precisely democracy is the element that binds all members and the liberal economic principles are the cornerstone of this common identity. A more equitable burden sharing and ascending defense spending (2% or less currently) is an important benchmark for the future preparedness of the Alliance. The transatlantic relation was a point discussed largely in reflection process. A future goal for the Alliance shall be defining a mutually beneficial strategic and burden sharing equilibrium between North American and European members. An advance in the foreign and security policy objectives of Washington in Asia will be a good addition to this. What can be more is that NATO must continue to deepen and strengthen the already existing relationship. This mainly can be conducted through expanding its roster of partnerships, gaining actionable intelligence, strengthening early warning systems and improving crisis management to be nimbler politically and operationally.
 B9 Alliances members need to leave their operational comfort zones and look to further their contributions in zones of instability in Africa and Middle East that could spill over to Europe.

Archives and the Atlantic Pact: how the NATO Archives preserves and protects the records of an Alliance

In 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated 70 years of consultation, consensus and conflict prevention. The same year also marked 20 years since NATO first opened access to its archives to the public. The establishment of the NATO Archives in 1999 was hailed by then Secretary General Javier Solana as an important signal of the Alliance’s commitment to transparency and openness. NATO declassified and publicly disclosed thousands of documents and opened a dedicated Reading Room at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Behind the scenes, the establishment of the NATO Archives and of the Archives Committee also changed the way in which NATO managed its historical records. Up to this point, there was no NATO-wide policy on archives, no organizational archives and no consistency in any of the traditional archival functions. Starting in 1999, NATO could boast a professional archives programme, implemented by trained archivists and governed by a committee of national experts. The programme can claim a string of successes over the last 20 years, implementing archival strategy in novel and unique ways to respond to NATO’s organizational structure. While the Archives are part of NATO’s political headquarters, NATO itself is composed of multiple formal entities under the overall direction of the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee, including military commands, civilian agencies, military operations etc. Before 1999, each managed their archival material locally, according to internal procedures. This article outlines the Archives’ strategic policies and its governance, involving national experts of all its 30 member nations; presents its increasingly larger and more robust acquisition programme based on a strong and actively managed retention and disposition strategy; assesses its digital preservation activities; and provides an update on NATO’s declassification and public disclosure programme.

Flexible democratic conditionality? The role of democracy and human rights adherence in NATO enlargement decisions

What explains NATO’s decision to admit new members even when they fall short of the organisational expectations of democracy and adherence to human rights? After the end of the Cold War NATO put in place an elaborate scheme of democratic conditionality; however, recent waves of enlargement since 2004 have proven increasingly incompatible with these criteria. This paper argues that this policy results from gradual erosion in the prominence of democratic discourse within the organisation, normalising deviations from previous optimistic expectations that became increasingly unsustainable, inducing within-organisation socialisation. This process is paralleled by an increasingly hostile Russian foreign policy, that served as a catalyst for the cognitive normalisation process. To support the argument, the author conducts interviews with key NATO officials previously or presently involved in the enlargement process, building on unique institutional accessibility, performs content analysis of North Atlantic Council discussions (ministerial/heads of state level) and NATO Summit Declarations in 1995‒2019, diving into Albania’s accession in 2009 as a case study. The results suggest that NATO decision-making over expansion was subject to significant politicisation that increased over time, normalising the deviations, reducing the democratic discourse in periods that preceded the integration of states that did not meet the criteria for democracy (most notably, Albania in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020). The results emphasise the place of cognitive processes in IO decision-making on enlargement.

Features of financing NATO's armed forces

The aim of the article is to investigate the peculiarities of financing NATO's armed forces. The following methods were used in the study process: comparative analysis method, correlation analysis, content analysis. The current state of defense financing in the world and in NATO countries has been clarified. Sources of funding for civilian and military budgets and NATO security investment programs are highlighted. The civilian budget covers staff costs, operational costs, capital expenditures and expenses for the International Secretariat's programs at NATO Headquarters. The military budget covers the costs of operating and maintaining the structure of NATO military management bodies. The procedure for the payment of direct and indirect contributions to NATO content by the Allies is disclosed. The tasks of the bodies responsible for financial control over the formation and use of NATO finances are described: the North Atlantic Council, the Resource Policy and Planning Council, the Budget Committee, the Investment Committee, the NATO Independent International Audit Board. Shares of financing of civilian and military budgets, as well as NATO programs by NATO member countries, the ratio of defense expenditures to GDP in NATO countries, the share of capital expenditures in the structure of defense expenditures of NATO countries are analyzed. The volumes and structure of defense financing expenditures in Ukraine are compared with NATO countries. It is revealed that during 2014-2018 Ukraine significantly increased the amount of defense financing, at the same time the share of capital expenditures in the structure of defense spending in Ukraine remains insignificant. It is proposed to increase the share of expenditures on military investments and innovations, purchase of armaments and military equipment, construction of military facilities and, at the same time, limit the share of current expenditures on the maintenance of the armed forces.

NATO adaptation to current challenges and mechanisms of Ukraine’s cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The purpose of the article is to describe the changes NATO undergoing in response to the challenges of our time. Today NATO, as a key element of European and Euro-Atlantic security, is adapting to changes in the modern security environment by increasing its readiness and ability to respond to any threat.
 Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. Responsiveness NATO Response Force enhanced by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, was established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a new Allied joint force that deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. NATO emphasizes, that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
 Cooperation with NATO already contributes to the implementation of national security and defense in state policy. At the same time, taking into account that all decision-making in NATO based on consensus, Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance quite vague perspective. In such circumstances, in Ukraine you often can hear the idea of announcement of a neutral status. It is worth reminding that non-aligned status did not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Neutral status will not accomplish it either. All talks about neutrality and the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO are nothing but manipulations, as well as recognition of the Ukrainian territory as Russian Federation area of influence (this country seeks to sabotage the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine). Think about it, Moldova’s Neutrality is enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1994. However, this did not help Moldova to restore its territorial integrity and to force Russia to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria.

‘I am the Servant of the Council’: Lord Ismay and the Making of the NATO International Staff

AbstractBased on analysis of Lord Ismay's private papers and on documents from the NATO archives and the Foreign Office archives, this article examines the role of Lord Ismay as the first Secretary General of NATO. As the first person to occupy the role, with little guidance from the national governments and no previous examples to use as a guiding light, Ismay had the opportunity – and the challenge – to shape the new role and to lay the basis for the long-term development of the International Staff. This article argues that Ismay's careful approach was essential in cementing political consensus within the North Atlantic Council at a time in which the members of the Alliance were still learning to work together.

“Key to the defense of the free world”: the past, present and future relevance of NATO for US allies in the Asia–Pacific

Between 2004 and 2014, NATO developed a range of global partnerships as it redefined its role in the post-9/11 world, leading some to suggest it become a global alliance. NATO’s relevance for its Asia Pacific partners in fact long pre-dates this period, as NATO is a locus of global strategic–political exchange; the world’s closest and most institutionalized political–military alliance; a focus of US strategic attention and leadership; the centre of the Euro-Atlantic security system; and a provider of interoperability and capability. Still, NATO partnerships have catalysed opportunities for greater exchange than existed during the Cold War, and their value goes beyond technical and operational cooperation. In an era of renewed great power competition, NATO and US allies in the Asia-Pacific should look to their shared interests, values and need for functional cooperation as the main benefits of their partnership, with particular focus on using the North Atlantic Council as a forum for political–strategic exchange between European and Asia-Pacific allies.

The 2019 NATO Summit on NATO Leaders and Expectations for Ukraine

Ukraine's accession to NATO has been and remains one of the priorities of our country's foreign policy, its strategic goal. Since independence, Ukraine has been moving towards joining NATO, but this movement has been slow and sometimes declarative compared to other neighboring countries. At present, the transformation of NATO's views in Ukrainian society is rapidly turning into a positive side, and membership in this organization is regarded as a pledge to realize the national interests of the country. The great positive is that on February 7, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on the constitution of Ukraine's strategic course for membership in the European Union and NATO. The recent visit of the North Atlantic Council to Ukraine, as well as the 2019 London Summit, have been of particular interest, primarily because of the prospect of NATO enlargement in the coming years. There is every reason to believe that the transition to enhanced partnership programs will take place in the near future. And, of course, we should take the most serious steps to improve Ukraine's political system, de-oligarchization, fight against corruption and other urgent tasks of building a civil society and a full-fledged democratic order that will fulfill the political criteria of membership in the Alliance. And, ultimately, it will create the right conditions for security in the face of the challenges of the modern world. The next Alliance Summit will be held on December 3-4, 2019 in London to commemorate NATO's 70th anniversary. For Ukraine, an event such as the NATO Summit should theoretically be an opportunity to declare its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, with the likelihood of making any statements and making demarches in this regard. At the moment, it is important for Ukraine, prior to the start of the dialogue on the submission of the NATO Membership Action Plan, to demonstrate to NATO member countries progress in meeting the criteria for NATO membership and to understand the prospects of NATO enlargement in the coming years.

NATO’s new strategic concept in cybersecurity issues in the context of up-to-the date vulnerability and threat information

The focus of the article revolves around NATO’s roadmap of smart defense against cyber attacks as the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security. The author discloses NATO’S new policy and cutting-edge technical initiatives, aimed at focusing on countering global threats and cyber security challenges. It is stressed out, that new ideas towards a more synergetic approach between all the NATO Cyber Defense agencies should be explored to develop a shared framework for cybersecurity that might provide up-to-the date intelligence in order to ensure the development, acquisition and maintenance of the necessary military capabilities. The research highlights the core aspects of the 2010 Lisbon Summit that adopted NATO’s Strategic Concept ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Members of the North Atlantic. Treaty Organization’, that recognizes Cyber Defense as one of its strategic priorities. In particular, to foster Allied Nations’ cooperative efforts to counter terrorism, cyber attacks, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Reinforce energy security and environmental constraints. Develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of trategic assessments and contingency planning; In July 2011, NATO Defense Ministers adopted revised NATO Policy on Cyber Defense, which highlighted three areas: • The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which involve the assistance provided only upon request, in any other cases, the principle of selfresponsibility of sovereign states is applied; • Avoiding unnecessary duplication of the structures or capabilities and approaches on the international, regional and national levels; • Collaboration based on trust, with regard to the potential sensitivity and vulnerability of the system, the access to which has to be given. After the 2014 Wales Summit, in the revised NATO Cyber Defense Policy, cyber threats were identified as a potential prerequisite for collective defense under the Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Noteworthy, Cyber Security is responsible for providing the broad spectrum of services in the following specialist security areas: CIS Security, Cyber Defense, Information Assurance, and Computer & Communications Security. Cyber defense is provided by many Alliance bodies: any NATO response concerning collective defense against cyber attacks will be subordinated to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), The Cyber Defense Committee (CDC) – the leading advisory body of the NAC. The executive level is represented by The Cyber Defense Management Board (CDMB), NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), Cyber Security incorporates the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical Centre, providing specialist services to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from cyber security incidents.

Conditions for socialization in international organizations: comparing committees of permanent representatives in the EU and NATO

Cooperation in international organizations (IOs) is sustained by the socialization of state agents and their internalization of the organizations’ norms and identity. This article builds on a structured comparison of the scope conditions for socialization among permanent representatives in two organs of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). In this study, we present some unexpected findings: First, the NAC is experiencing greater internalization (stronger socialization) than the PSC, normally held as a critical case of international socialization. Second, unambiguous norms favour socialization to a larger degree than ambiguous norms, refuting a widely held assumption about the pro-internalization effect of diffuse norms. Given that member states seem to grant their representatives larger “room for manoeuvre” when the norms of the IO have material stakes, the socialization effect of an IO’s norms is dependent on the perceived utility of the organization’s mission.

The Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost: a Grounded Theory approach to the comparative study of decision-making in the NAC and PSC

ABSTRACTStudies of the relationship between the EU and NATO often focus on the limitations of cooperation, be it at the political or the operational level. However, little is known about the functioning of the political institutional linkages between the EU and NATO. This article therefore studies the main decision-making bodies of the two organisations at the political, ambassadorial level, namely the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in NATO, as well as their joint meetings. The article employs an inductive Grounded Theory approach, drawing on open-ended interviews with PSC and NAC ambassadors, which reveal direct insights from the objects of analysis. The findings emphasise the impact of both structural and more agency-related categories on decision-making in these three fora. The article thus addresses both the paucity of study on these bodies more broadly and the complete lacuna on joint PSC–NAC meetings specifically, warranting the inductive approach this article endorses.

‘Far away from the Atlantic…’: Goa, West New Guinea and NATO's out-of-area policy at Bandung 1955

During the cold war, Afro-Asian leaders had been highly critical of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) out-of-area initiatives. This article will focus on the Portuguese strategy to use the North Atlantic Council to pursue national, colonial interests in Asia and Africa. The solicitation of support from the USA constituted a key element in this diplomatic exchange. As a result, at Bandung, the leaders of the newly independent nations challenged not a specific European colonial empire, but transferred their outrage to the entire Atlantic Alliance. In the end, the promotion of colonial interests in the Atlantic Alliance led to several conflicts with the newly independent nations and a loss of face for the Western world.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE INTERVENTION OF NATO IN KOSOVO

On the date of June 12th 1998, the North-Atlantic Council, gathered on the level of theministers of defense, required the evaluation of the possible additional measures which NATOcould take under the conditions of aggravation of the crisis from Kosovo. Consequently, onthe date of October 13th 1998, pursuant to the aggravation of the situation, the North-AtlanticCouncil authorized orders of activation for the air attacks. This measure is meant to supportthe diplomatic efforts in order to determine the regime of Miloşevici to withdraw the forcesfrom Kosovo, to cooperate for the end of violence and to facilitate the return of refugees totheir homes. However, in the last moment, pursuant to other diplomatic initiatives of theofficials of NATO and United States, the president Miloşevici accepted to collaborate, and theair attacks were cancelled

Canada, NATO, and the Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962: “Slow-boil” or “pressure cooker?”

Historians of Canadian foreign affairs have argued that Canada played an important role in influencing allied policy during the Berlin Crisis of 1961–1962. Newly declassified documents reveal the opposite. Canada opposed much of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingency planning during the crisis, especially plans calling for the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons. Despite Canada’s efforts to modify NATO’s Berlin Contingency plans (BERCONs), Canadian diplomats found themselves isolated in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and accepted plans they considered to be dangerous. Canada had no significant influence on NATO military planning during one of the most serious crises of the Cold War.

Demonstration Control Agents

An uncontrolled use of "demonstration control agents" commonly known as "teargas agents" has recently been a common practice in Turkey. One of the first massive uses of these agents had been during a meeting of the North Atlantic Council and NATO in 2004, in Istanbul. After the demonstrations, 64 patients were evaluated and treated by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. Their files have been reviewed retrospectively and were classified regarding age, sex, physical findings related of chemical agents, and other injuries.The patients were received 1 to 9 days after the chemical gas exposure. The maximum referral was 35 patients on the day of the gas exposure. The last application was 9 days after the exposure. Complaints and physical findings/symptoms were highest during the first 3 days.This study has been carried out to reveal the short- and long-term aftereffects of "demonstration control agents." The safety and effects of these agents are discussed in this article, based on our findings and existing references.

Dealing with the devil: NATO and Gaullist France, 1958–66

Charles de Gaulle regarded NATO as a hated symbol of US hegemony. From 1958 to 1966, France incrementally reduced its military and political participation in the Western alliance. This article analyses how ‘NATO Paris’ – the NATO secretary-general, the 15 national ambassadors forming the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Paris and NATO insiders in allied governments – coped with the Gaullist challenge and tried to find solutions to the French ‘malaise’ and to de Gaulle's obstructionism. By ‘working around the General’, these NATO players strengthened the cohesion of the ‘NATO 14’ (minus France) and prepared the ground for a multilateral revitalisation of the Western security alliance once de Gaulle finally withdrew France from all military commands and councils in March 1966.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Non-Traditional Threats and Bridging Military Capability Gaps

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept (SC) in order to provide the Alliance with strategic guidance over the next decade. The goal of this essay is to identify and examine the gaps between SC statements, goals, and plans and the military capabilities of NATO members concerning today‘s environment of defense budget cutting. In particular, this article will focus on military roles and capabilities for tackling issues such as terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy security, which as non-military threats require a more comprehensive approach. The Strategic Concept is an official and comprehensive policy document that outlines NATO‘s enduring purpose, nature, and the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance. It characterizes the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance‘s approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces in order to address new challenges. The new SC is concise, concrete, and public, and its broader purpose is to explain the Alliance‘s political objectives and vision for the future decade. NATO‘s Security Concepts are documents intended to give political guidance on NATO‘s role, missions, and objectives. These SCs are accompanied by documents prepared by the Alliance‘s Military Committee (AMC) on the military assets, capabilities, and structures necessary for carrying out the strategic objectives identified by the political authorities of the Alliance, as represented by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). According to the previous two explanations, the ―Strategic Concept‖ can be defined as a ―grand strategy‖ document in terms of political and military guidance for