North American Aerospace Defense Research Articles

The Political Economy of NORAD

ABSTRACT This introductory article provides an overview of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) as well as the contents of this special issue. NORAD is one of the oldest bi-national defence agreements in the world but the economics assessment of it remains scant. This special issue is one attempt to address this oversight. The articles in this special issue focus on the economic aspects of NORAD and its modernization. They delve into economic theories of alliances, burden sharing, potential private benefits of modernization, public choice theory and the impact on local communities and industries. By focusing on the political economy of NORAD, this introductory article underscores the importance of NORAD in the face of evolving threats and calls for greater attention from defense economists to address the complex economic and strategic dynamics involved.

Non-Cooperative LEO Satellite Orbit Determination Using Single Station for Space-Based Opportunistic Positioning

Space-based opportunistic positioning is a crucial component of resilient positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems, and it requires the acquisition of orbit information for non-cooperative low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites. Traditional methods for orbit determination (OD) of non-cooperative LEO satellites have difficulty in achieving a balance between reliability, hardware costs, and availability duration. To address these challenges, this study proposes a framework for single-station orbit determination of non-cooperative LEO satellites. By utilizing signals of opportunity (SOPs) captured by a single ground station, the system performs initial orbit determination (IOD), precise orbit determination (POD), and orbit prediction (OP), enabling the long-term determination of satellite positions and velocities. Under the proposed framework, the reliability and real-time performance are dependent on the initial orbit determination and the orbit calculation based on the dynamical model. To achieve initial orbit determination, a three-step algorithm is designed. (1) An improved search method is employed to estimate a coarse orbit using single-pass Doppler measurements. (2) Data association is conducted to obtain multi-pass Doppler observations. (3) The least squares (LS) is implemented to determine the initial orbit using the associated multi-pass Doppler measurements and the coarse orbit. Additionally, to enhance computational efficiency, two fast orbit calculation algorithms are devised. These algorithms leverage the numerical stability of the Runge–Kutta integrator to reduce computations and exploit the strong correlation among nearby time intervals of orbits with small eccentricities to minimize redundant calculations, thereby achieving orbit calculation efficiently. Finally, through positioning experiments, the determined orbits are demonstrated to have accuracy comparable to that of two-line elements (TLE) updated by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

The ambivalence of the implementation of the US arctic policy: integrating and disintegration factors of the allies

The Arctic region is gaining increasing strategic importance due to its economic potential, resource richness, and shifting geopolitical landscape. The United States has recognized this significance and has established alliances and partnerships with various countries in the region to enhance its positions and interests. However, concerns exist regarding the limited understanding of the complex dynamics and evolving relationships among the US Arctic allies. The lack of comprehensive analysis and up-to-date information hinders the understanding of their strategic documents, military exercises, and interactions with global players like China and Russia. To address these concerns, our objective was to identify, analyze, and assess the factors that strengthen or weaken the interaction between US allies and partners in the Arctic region. We conducted an analysis of national Arctic strategies, reports, publications, and expert opinions from Western Arctic Council countries such as the USA, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. We also examined the reports and structures of the US defense services, interstate organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), as well as insights from leading experts on Arctic affairs in allied countries. The study revealed several factors that contribute to the strengthening of the US allies in the Arctic. These include active military cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and the development of Arctic infrastructure to enhance regional security and defense capabilities. However, we also identified factors that weaken engagement among the US allies. These include differences in strategic goals, competing territorial claims, domestic political considerations, and varying relationships with other Arctic stakeholders like Russia and China. These factors can lead to tensions and challenges, which undermine collective action and impede the achievement of common goals.

Ballistic Coefficient Calculation Based on Optical Angle Measurements of Space Debris.

Atmospheric drag is an important factor affecting orbit determination and prediction of low-orbit space debris. To obtain accurate ballistic coefficients of space debris, we propose a calculation method based on measured optical angles. Angle measurements of space debris with a perigee height below 1400 km acquired from a photoelectric array were used for orbit determination. Perturbation equations of atmospheric drag were used to calculate the semi-major-axis variation. The ballistic coefficients of space debris were estimated and compared with those published by the North American Aerospace Defense Command in terms of orbit prediction error. The 48 h orbit prediction error of the ballistic coefficients obtained from the proposed method is reduced by 18.65% compared with the published error. Hence, our method seems suitable for calculating space debris ballistic coefficients and supporting related practical applications.

Canada and the NORAD: Economics and Burden Sharing

ABSTRACT We quantify the burden sharing between the United States and Canada within the context of the bi-lateral defense relationship regarding the North American Aerospace. Also known as the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), this bi-lateral military alliance has existed since the late 1950s. We use insights from the economic theory of military alliances as well as disaggregated defense expenditures on capital, labor and R&D to tease out nuanced assessment of burden sharing between the two countries and peer groups (Arctic Council). In addition, we provide some funding scenarios for the planned policy review in Canada to guide decision makers. We also show that there are considerable strategic, institutional, and operational constraints facing the fulfilment of Strong, Secure, Engaged (Defence Policy) and possible NORAD modernization. Improving these institutional issues, along with fulfilling the commitments outlined in the Defence Policy, will go a long way to assuaging the burden sharing debate.

On Distinguishing Defence Inputs in an Alliance – The Case of NORAD

ABSTRACT Our model extends the joint-products models to allow for two types of defence inputs used to produce both an alliance-wide public defence output and a country-specific private output. Distinguishing different defence inputs is particularly appropriate in the case of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), as the alliance-wide defence output is produced with two inputs – military technology in the form of sensors and radars and land. These two inputs are complements in the production of the alliance-wide public output. At the same time, the military technology has country-specific private benefits as this can be used by the civilian economy. Our analysis shows that distinguishing between defence inputs may change the predictions of the joint-products model. We derive conditions under which an ally responds to an increase in the defence input by other allies by increasing or decreasing its own contribution of both or only one of the defence inputs.

Reduction of Space Debris Collision Prediction Uncertainty Based on Q-Sat Precise Orbit

Collision probability is employed for evaluating whether there will be a dangerous encounter between 2 space objects. The fidelity of the collision probability mainly depends on the accuracies of orbit prediction and covariance prediction for the space objects. In this paper, the collision probability between the Tsinghua Gravitation and Atmosphere Science Satellite, Q-Sat, and the space debris with a North American Aerospace Defense Command ID of 49863 on 2022 January 18 was calculated. The 2 objects approached each other dangerously close and the event was reported. First, the atmospheric density model is modified by a dynamic approach-based inversion to improve the accuracy of orbit prediction for the Q-Sat. Next, predictions of position error covariance are carried out. Orbits of the next 24 hours are predicted, and the predicted orbits are compared with the actual orbits of the Q-Sat. Backpropagation neural network was trained for predicting the position error covariance. For the space debris, the 2-line element data are employed. Orbit predictions for the space debris are also conducted and compared with the actual orbit. Another backpropagation neural network for predicting the position error covariance for the space debris is trained. Using the covariances from the backpropagation neural network, the error ellipsoids of the 2 objects are established. The error ellipsoids are later projected to the encounter plane to calculate the collision probability. Different from the reports from other institutes, the closest distance between the Q-Sat and the space debris calculated by the current method was 2.71 km. The collision probability was 1.16 × 10 −11 . It was not a dangerous encounter event. The onboard precise orbit determination device enabled improved orbit determination precision and orbit prediction accuracy, which is important for space safety management.

Small Satellite Orbit Determination Using Single Pass Doppler Measurements

The Doppler measurements of the telemetry radio signals nanosatellite CubeBel-1 for a single pass over the Belarusian State University ground station were carried out. Two methods for orbit determination of a small satellite (SS) are considered. The first method is based on the SGP4 model and requires additional information from the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) two-line elements (TLE) catalog of the satellite orbital parameters. An unknown SS is identified using the NORAD TLE catalog based on a probabilistic estimation of the elevation angle and the Doppler frequency shift of receiving telemetry signals. The first method was allowed to determine the nanosatellite CubeBel-1 unambiguously. The second method is based on processing experimental measurements of the Doppler frequency of the telemetry radio signals and the Keplerian circular motion model for SS. It does not require additional information from the NORAD database of satellite orbital parameters. The second method was allowed only to calculate the average state vector unknown satellite. Finally, the corrected state vector in the geocentric inertial coordinate system was obtained based on the differential correction method.

A graphical method for the analysis of a satellite’s in-orbit breakup through optical observations

The incessant overcrowding of the space around the Earth with new operative satellites is a critical issue in the Space Traffic Management (STM) framework, especially in last years with the beginning of the new space economy. The operative life of the active satellites is seriously endangered by the numerous uncontrolled objects, i.e., the space debris, which populate the outer space. The consequence of an impact between these objects may be catastrophic, as proved by the events in the recent past. In this context, the in-orbit explosions both of dismissed satellites and rockets stages are one of the main causes of space debris generation. For this reason, a suitable observation and detection strategy of the fragments generated by these events is necessary, e.g., by means of optical systems. In this work, the Sapienza Space Systems and Space Surveillance Laboratory (S5Lab) shows the results, by means of a graphical method, of the short-term analysis of the in-orbit explosions that involved the third stage of the Russian rocket FREGAT-SB and the fragmentation of the military Chinese satellite YUNHAI 1–02. In order to approach the study of a fragmentation event, an observation strategy and an analysis method have been developed. The research of fragments was focused on the orbital plane leading to estimation of fragments’ number and their distribution. The measurements obtained through the images were analyzed in order to understand if the objects present in the images are either included in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) catalogue or not. The unknowns could be fragments. The next analysis follows the hypothesis of the isotropic explosion confined only on the tangential impulses. In first approximation, only semi-major axis and eccentricity change due to the impulse. Therefore, it is possible to generate a new Two-Line Elements (TLE) for each fragment leading to an association between the impulses and the affected TLEs. A new, simple, and fast analysis method was developed, specifically to improve the impulse association. It consists in a graphical method where it is possible to see the distribution of the fragments with respect to the original body using the angular distance trend between them.

Enhancing Challenge Framing in Defence Organisations: Towards Reflexive Methods

This article contributes to problem solving, design, and planning in defence organisations by arguing that a ‘problem’ or a ‘challenge’ is never objective, natural or ready-made. Challenges are contingent to the conditions under which individuals perceive and formulate them. As a result, this article understands ‘challenges’ and ‘approaches’ to address them as co-dependent on one another. This article recommends that officers should attempt to generate the most interesting and, we hope, innovative problem-solution pair or challenge-approach pair in order to integrate this insight into practice when problem solving, designing, or planning. Leaders and their teams can learn to inhabit this mind-set by finding inspiration in three modes observed through practice: initial challenge framing, challenge curation and co-evolution. For each of these modes, the article proposes reflexive methods and tools for enhancing introspection in challenge framing and formulation namely the Five Whys, question-storming, and loyal opposition. The article supports these recommendations and methods through insights gleaned from philosophy of knowledge, design theory, and on design experiences with the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in 2019.

Study on the Orbit Prediction Errors of Space Objects Based on Historical TLE Data

Two line element (TLE) released by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is widely used by aerospace workers, and the matched SGP4/SDP4 (Simplified General Perturbation Version 4/Simplified Deep-space Perturbation Version 4) model is used to propagate it. Nevertheless, no corresponding information about its accuracy and covariance is clearly given, thus the application of the TLE data is greatly restricted. In this paper, the determined and predicted orbits are compared to generate the orbit error data, based on the historical TLE data obtained from the Space-Track website and the SGP4/SDP4 model. By dividing different time bins, the fitting coefficients of the variation of orbit prediction error with time are given for each space object, and the characteristics of the error evolution are further discussed for the different types of orbits. The mean analytic model of the orbit prediction error evolution with time is given respectively for the four orbit types of space objects, which provides a valuable reference for extending the application of the TLE data.

Out of sight, out of mind NORAD vis-à-vis CANUS politics

ABSTRACT The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is insulated politically from tensions between Canada and the United States (U.S.). We argue the reasons why are three-fold. First North American defence is a low priority generally speaking and so NORAD is also low on the political radar. Second, NORAD is defended and challenged by misplaced politics of sovereignty (especially in Canada), both of which marginalize NORAD. Finally, NORAD is largely managed by the military professionals of both states at the bureaucratic/technical level. This means that NORAD is able to adapt and evolve without any political interference; indeed, often without any political guidance which is problematic from a civil–military balance perspective. Despite the fact that “defending Canada” and “defending North America” are priorities number one and two for every Canadian defence policy since 1964, far too little attention is paid to how NORAD has evolved over time to adapt to new threats and geopolitical trends. NORAD, like other aspects of the CANUS defence relationship is left to run unencumbered by political distractions in other issue areas. While the lack of political attention is perceived as beneficial, it may be what most challenges NORAD in the long run as it seeks more funding to modernize and continue to evolve against new and more dangerous threats to North America. NORAD should be careful for what it wishes.

Canadian-American defence relations under the Trump administration

During last two years Canadian-American defence relations are influenced by two factors: the negotiations of two countries on revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the overall commitment of Canada and the US to modernize their joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The negotiations with the US on NAFTA, a vital issue for Canada, demanded from Canada not to allow any irritants on other issues (not connected with NAFTA) in bilateral relations with the US. On the other hand, the problem of modernization of NORAD during Trump’s first two years in power has turned for Canada into a much more complicated issue – to participate or not to participate in the missile defence of North America.

Orbital and attitude evolution of SCD-1 and SCD-2 Brazilian satellites

The SCD-1 and SCD-2 satellites were launched in 1993 and 1998, respectively, with use of the Launcher “Pegasus” of the OSC (Orbital Sciences Corporation). 21 and 16 years later, the satellites are still in orbit around the Earth and providing data for users. Mission and Operational data from Satellite Tracking Center Network are stored in mission files in the Satellite Control Center (SCC) and made available to the users. The SCC also stores history files of the satellite orbit and attitude ephemeris, besides the on-board telemetry, temperatures, equipment status, etc. This work will present some analysis of the orbit ephemeris evolution based upon the Two-Line Elements sets (TLE’s) obtained from NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command). Attitude evolution along time is also presented for both satellites from SCC data. The orbit decay will be explained as resulting mainly due to the solar activity during the satellite lifetime. This work aims to report the history of more than 20 years of continuous operation of SCD-1 and SCD-2. At the end, an estimation of the orbital decay is forecast with the use of NASA’s DAS software.

The NORAD conundrum: Canada, missile defence, and military space

Concerns about the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) have forever dominated Canadian policy considerations regarding participation in the US missile defence program. Yet, fears that a Canadian decision not to participate could lead to the “demise” or marginalization of NORAD appear entirely unfounded in the wake of the formal Canadian refusal in 2005. This article identifies the reasons behind these fears relative to the nature and future of NORAD, and explains why they are both understandable and misplaced. Since the United States neither has, nor has ever had, a significant system requirement for Canadian participation, Washington has separated missile defence from the NORAD question. While this change in approach and legitimate concerns about NORAD’s marginalization have been managed through a Canadian military space contribution, it is likely that missile defence and military space cooperation will be managed on a bilateral basis largely outside of, and in support of, existing NORAD missions. This process reflects the reality of Canada–US North American defence cooperation, and NORAD’s limited place within it.

Canada, the Arctic, and NORAD: Status quo or new ball game?

The Arctic is perceived as an area that requires increased North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) attention. On the one hand, the region has always been of particular concern to NORAD, especially during the Cold War. From this perspective, attention to the Arctic is business as usual. On the other hand, increased potential traffic in the region due to warmer temperatures, natural resource exploitation, and tourism could increase threats to North America and create the need for a new NORAD posture. This paper reviews the challenges facing the Arctic, the perceived new urgency for attention, the command and control structures of NORAD, and NORAD's specific preoccupations in order to answer the question: does the Arctic represent status quo for NORAD or does NORAD need to change, fundamentally, its approach to the North? This paper ultimately argues for the former.

At Home and Abroad: The Canada–US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World, by Patrick Lennox

Patrick Lennox At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada's Place in the World Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010. 192 pp $32.95 (paper) ISBN 978-0-7748-1706-6Canada's sprawling land mass and vast seaboards, wrote Robert Sarty, indefensible by its tiny population without the assistance of strong allies.1 Indeed, Canada stretches almost a quarter of the way around the globe and yet even today boasts a population less than of Tokyo-Yokohama. From the country's earliest times, policymakers have remained acutely aware of this geostrategic quandary. The Fathers of Confederation, for example, knew enough to squeeze out of Britain a pledge to rescue the fledgling dominion if threatened militarily. Mackenzie King was similarly adroit, eliciting a security guarantee from the US in August 1938, after it had become increasingly apparent Britain was no longer up to the task of defending vast tracts of Canadian wilderness. I give to you assurance, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt declared, that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire.2 This confirms Robert Bothwell's observation the overarching task of Canadian foreign policy is to ensure neighbourly relations with our all-important benefactors.3 So sprawling and sparsely populated a nation confronts no alternative. We either cultivate friendly and cooperative ties with powerful patrons or face extinction at more powerful hands.Canadian foreign policy should therefore be a relatively simple affair. Above all else, Ottawa must avoid displeasing our protector, lest it retract its outstretched security umbrella. Careful alignment of Canadian policy with of the United States is the obvious expectation. Yet Patrick Lennox, in his impressive At Home and Abroad, points out Canada's international policies have frequently defied Washington's wishes. More often than not... Canada and the United States find themselves at odds on the international stage (ix). Rather than steady cooperation between the two countries, we see the occasional broadside from a prime minister aimed across the southern border. Lester Pearson's criticism in 1965 of America's Vietnam policy at Temple University stands as the paramount example. Diplomatic efforts to appear as a helpful fixer in the international community-even if it runs contrary to US interests-similarly throw a wrench into relations. Canadian manoeuvrings at the United Nations during the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq are evidence of that. Dealings between the two countries are therefore far more tumultuous than one would initially assume.Lennox-quite uniquely in the Canadian foreign policy literature-turns to system structure to explain this pathology. Neither theories at the state level, such as those of political culture or regime type, nor at the individual level, focusing on prime ministers, cabinets, and the like, properly illustrate the oscillation between foreign policies gratify domestic constituencies and those appease our great-power neighbour. What can, Lennox argues, is a theory appreciates the two competing structural conditions confront minor powers. On the one hand, Canada exists within a clear continental hierarchy (5). For example, 94 percent of the North American Aerospace Defence Command's (NORAD) personnel and 84 percent of its funding comes from the United States (7). Such a clear discrepancy in economic and military power encourages subordination and conformity with the hegemon's wishes. On the other hand, Canada is still a state operating within an anarchical international system, and therefore relies on selfhelp to ensure its sovereign autonomy. …

NORAD does not need saving

In the current Canadian discussion of missile defence, it is often claimed that the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is under threat and that it will be saved only if Canada opts in. The command does not need saving, however. Any such claim draws attention away from the real North American defence challenges that Canadians need to face in a debate about continental strategic defence: whether or not Canada needs to be protected by a missile defence system (a point that a Senate committee strongly emphasized in 2014) and what Ottawa needs to do about its own air defences that fall under NORAD.

Estimation of Simplified General Perturbations model 4 orbital elements from global positioning system data by invasive weed optimization algorithm

In this paper, a novel approach is introduced to estimate the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)-type two-line elements (TLE) data based on the invasive weed optimization (IWO) method, which is a stochastic numerical optimization algorithm inspired by colonizing weeds. Many satellite applications use the NORAD Simplified General Perturbations model 4 (SGP4) for satellite position prediction. The input of SGP4 consists of TLEs which are published via NORAD freely through the worldwide web. Since it is generated irregular, a new TLE which is independent of NORAD is required to access data about the satellite location each time. An alternative to independent computation of TLE can be made feasible by the existing emersion of GPS receivers in the space project and using IWO. Using this stochastic algorithm increases the success probability to find a more accurate TLE. The estimation is performed for six Keplerian orbital elements and SGP4 drag term ( B*) by using the satellite position data achieved from the GPS receiver. Also, the feasibility study of the concept is performed by using the actual GPS data of CHAMP and corresponding NORAD TLE. The time length of the GPS data used in the estimation is studied for practical application purposes. The results show that 500 samples of position data, with 1-min time intervals, are sufficient to keep the position error within 10 km in 3 days after epoch time in orbital elements with known drag term estimation. Moreover, for orbital elements with drag term estimation, 1000 samples of position, with 1-min time intervals, are sufficient to keep the position error within 15 km in 3 days after epoch time. If there is no considerable constraint for position-data time-length or time available for performing numerical computations, the estimated TLE can be more accurate than corresponding NORAD TLE.

Estimation and Analysis of Two-Line Elements for Small Satellites

This paper presents an assessment of two-line element sets for one nano- and two micro-satellites in low Earth orbit. Both the publicly available element sets issued by the North American Aerospace Defense Command and element sets estimated from GPS tracking data are assessed. The nanosatellite, which carries an intermittently operated dual-frequency GPS receiver, presents one of the first opportunities to assess two-line-element accuracy for an object measuring only using precise reference orbits. The larger satellites provide continuous GPS coverage as well as insight into the impact of maneuvers and formation flying on two-line element sets. It is found that, overall, the North American Aerospace Defense Command two-line element sets provide reliable position information accurate to a few kilometers for small satellites in low Earth orbit and that, with an arc length similar to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, two-line elements estimated from continuous GPS data or even intermittent GPS data collected sufficiently often can improve the spread of five-day along-track propagation errors from 10 km down to 2 km for a nanosatellite.