The In Dubio Pro Natura has evolved as a separate principle from the precaution principle under environmental law. This article aims to analyse both the In Dubio Pro Natura principle and the precaution principle in the light of scientific evidence and state responsibility. The precaution principle applies as a general rule in cases in which there are potential risks of serious environmental damage irrespective of the existence of scientific certainty over the said risks. On the other hand, the In Dubio Pro Natura principle offers a higher degree of protection to the environment and their interests than the obligation to act with precaution since it is the basis for preferring the interpretation of norms that grants the highest degree of protection to the environment. The author of this article, argues that in scenarios in which state authorities have a higher degree of responsibility over the handling of a situation and could control the adverse effects of a threat to the environment, public health or sustainability, for instance in extractivist projects, the use of the In Dubio Pro Natura principle should be preferred. Conversely, this article examines the global fight against climate change and the setting of global goals in one hand and the potential risks new technologies may have over biodiversity on the other as two examples where the In Dubio Pro Natura principle cannot be applied. In the first case, there is scientific consensus over the urgency to address climate change. However, in spite of global commitments, the individual state responsibility and control over this course of action is weak. In the second scenario, the author refers to the regulation to the use of new technologies where national authorities exercise a higher degree of control in cases where there is not enough certainty over the risks posed to the environment or public health. In these cases, the precaution principle is preferred.
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