Normative Truths Research Articles

The weight of truth

Belief is said to be subject to a norm of truth. A norm, intuitively, tells us what we ought to or may do. What sort of claim can truth make on us? On one standard view, the truth norm of belief is obliging. One ought to believe the truth and truth only. On another view, the truth norm of belief is permissive. One may believe the truth and truth only. Recently, it has been argued that the truth norm plays no interesting role in our normative theorizing for it issues excessive, unsatisfiable claims. This paper defends the truth norm of belief and proposes a novel answer to the question concerning its normative force on a reason-based framework. I argue that the normative force of the truth norm depends on the weight of truth as a normative reason for belief, which, just like that of any other normative reason, may vary across different contexts. I develop the idea that the weight of truth as a reason for belief is conditioned by what an epistemic agent can or cannot believe and modified by epistemic risk, among other things.

Antiracist Anger as Social and Moral Inquiry in Colectivo Ayllu's Devuélvannos el oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales (2018)

Abstract: My essay looks at how diasporic, racialized, and sexually-and gender dissident voices that collaborated with Colectivo Ayllu in their first year of residency at CRA Matadero Madrid (2017–18) approach antiracist activism from a decolonial feminist perspective that analyzes gender and sexuality in relation to race and coloniality. I analyze Devuélvannos el oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales , a compilation of visual, poetic, and essayistic pieces curated by Ayllu that emerge from experiential and political reflections, as well as anticolonial actions developed during the group's residency. I read Ayllu's emancipatory thinking first within a view of decolonial epistemology that enacts situated notions of knowledge, beauty, and truth outside Eurocentric frameworks. I also bring to light a concurrent understanding of decolonized epistemology that permeates Devuélvannos 's project and allows for making normative truth claims about systems of inequality and human flourishing. I discuss the consequences of both (compatible) notions of decolonial epistemology in Ayllu's formulation of antiracism activism. My essay bridges critical lenses from postpositivist realist theories of identity, women of color feminism and decolonial feminism to the study of emotions as embodied forms of knowledge that may offer "clarity" and insight into how ideologies and structures of power operate in a society.

Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality

Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths are metaphysically necessary. Rosen proposes to take normative truths to be normatively necessary, where normative necessity is different from and irreducible to metaphysical necessity. I argue that if Rosen is right, that creates a deeper problem for robust ethical realism (the view that there are mind-independent, non-natural moral facts). According to robust ethical realism, it is a normative fact that persons are an especially valuable kind of being. But if Rosen is right, that is a metaphysically contingent fact. The existence of persons is also contingent. According to robust ethical realism, then, there is a striking match between what the normative facts happen to be and the kinds of beings that happen to exist. Persons could have failed to exist and they could have failed to be valuable, but it just so happens to be a fact about the natural world that they exist and a normative fact that they have value. Given that this match is accidental, it amounts to a miraculous coincidence. To the extent that commitment to unexplained coincidences counts against a view, robust ethical realism faces a problem.

Assertion, Lying and the Norm of Truth

In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable.

Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind

AbstractWhat are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I'm interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I'll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force due to human activity: enactment by an authority or acceptance by a community. Rules are unlike orders in being not necessarily communicative, not an expression's of the giver's will, not evaluable for sincerity, and in that they have propositional content. And they're unlike normative truths in that they're themselves not even truth‐evaluable (though their contents are). This is because rules qua things that are in force are not like constatives which have a mind to world direction of fit, but more like performatives. Furthermore, they differ from normative truths in that their normativity is isolated from their background justification and is therefore not dependent on contributory notions like reasons coming together in a weighing explanation. As such, they occupy a middle ground between orders and normative truths, much like in H. L. A. Hart's opinion law occupies a middle ground between “coercion” and “morality” (Hart 1961/1994). I also illustrate the virtues of this understanding of rules by showing how proper appreciation of how they differ from normative truths helps us defuse a common objection to Hart's practice theory of rules.

The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism

AbstractMuch of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental‐cum‐irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists.

Political Legitimacy as Grounded in the Wills of Citizens: A Reply to Peter

Abstract Fabienne Peter (2020) recently proposed a taxonomy of accounts of the meta-normative grounds of political legitimacy. In this article, I argue that there is an important distinction left out of that taxonomy that complicates the picture. This is the distinction between attitude-independent and attitude-dependent conceptions of normative truth. Through an examination of these conceptions of normative truth (and correlate interpretations of what counts as a normative reason) I argue that what Peter calls a fact-based conception of legitimacy may collapse into a will-based conception. Further, the distinction has important implications for what Peter calls the belief-based conception. Finally, I defend the will-based conception against Peter's arbitrariness objection through an examination of ideally coherent eccentrics.

The Modal Future

<i>The Modal Future</i>

Hasil Belajar Matematika Melalui Model PJBL dalam Blended Learning Ditinjau dari Tingkat Integritas Akademik

Integrity is honest, fair behavior and shows consistency between words and actions. In the field of education, the term academic integrity is known. Academic integrity is behavior that is in accordance with the norms of truth in the academic context. there are five aspects in academic integrity, namely honesty, trust, fairness, respect, and responsibility. Academic integrity is very important to have so that a person behaves ethically in the learning process. a decrease in academic integrity has the potential to affect students' professional lives when working later. Lack of integrity in academics in a person can be influenced by several factors, both internal and external. The internal factor causing the lack of integrity is academic anxiety. This happens because of the worries that arise over failure in the exam, so students do various ways to get good test scores. the purpose of this study is to determine with the application of the PjBL learning model, whether there are significant differences in learning outcomes between students with high, medium and low integrity. The project given in the application of the PjBL model is expected to provide a different, fun, meaningful and challenging learning experience for students. The method used in this research is through cluster random sampling technique. The application of PjBL in blended learning with a project-shaped evaluation model produces the same learning outcomes for the three integrity groups. With the highest average learning outcomes coming from the medium integrity group followed by the high integrity group and the lowest average coming from the low integrity group.

A Normativity Wager for Skeptics

Several philosophers have recently advanced wager-based arguments for the existence of irreducibly normative truths or against normative nihilism. Here I consider whether these wager-based arguments would cause a normative Pyrrhonian skeptic to lose her skepticism. I conclude they would not do so directly. However, if prompted to consider a different decision problem, which I call the normativity wager for skeptics, the normative Pyrrhonian skeptic would be motivated to attempt to act in accordance with any normative reasons to which she might be subject. Consideration of the normativity wager will not inevitably cause the normative Pyrrhonian skeptic to lose her skepticism, but there are at least three routes by which it might: first, in considering the wager the agent may spontaneously (non-rationally) acquire a normative belief; second, considering the wager can motivate the agent to cause herself to (non-rationally) acquire a normative belief. Via either of these indirect, non-rational routes, she would cease to be a normative Pyrrhonian skeptic. Thus, consideration of the normativity wager may have value, even if it does not supply a rational argument that will dissuade skeptics. In addition, I consider the possibility of a third (rational) route by which the agent might lose her skepticism.

Ought We to Believe the Truth and Nothing But the Truth?

According to the so-called truth norm, we ought to believe that A if and only if A is true. There are many possible interpretations of this norm. What does 'ought‘ in this norm mean? Does 'ought‘ have a wide or a narrow scope, etc.? In this paper, I will investigate one version of this norm and I will discuss two arguments for it. The 'ought‘ in the paper will be interpreted as a kind of 'rational‘ ought that takes wide scope. I will call the first argument for the truth norm 'the extrapolation argument‘ and the second argument 'the abductive argument.‘ According to the extrapolation argument, we 'derive‘ the truth norm from a reflection on what it means to be a perfect believer. According to the abductive argument, the truth norm is supported by the fact that it can be used to deduce many other plausible doxastic norms. If this argument is successful, the truth norm can be conceived as the fundamental norm of (theoretical) rationality (or wisdom).

Von Hildebrand, Scheler, and Marcel on Interpreting One’s Friends

It is generally accepted that truth is a norm of belief and that, whatever else this might mean, it implies that a person is obligated to believe a proposition only if it is true. Yet this seems to conflict with the norms by which friends form beliefs about each other. For instance, if friends are required to practice interpretive charity in the formation of their beliefs about each other, obligations to believe propositions that are false might arise. In this paper, I assume that there is some such obligation of interpretive charity, and I investigate whether it may be reconciled with the truth-norm. I take for my starting point an account of interpretive charity from the work of Dietrich von Hildebrand, which I develop by critical retrieval of related works by Max Scheler and Gabriel Marcel. The paper concludes that Marcel’s thought on fidelity and reflection is best suited to complete von Hildebrand’s account in such a way as to achieve the sought-after reconciliation of the norms of truth and friendship

Realism and relativism about the normative

ABSTRACT I defend normative realism—the claim that there are mind-independent, absolute normative facts—mostly by arguing against its rivals. Against mind-dependent theories of normativity, I argue that at least one highly influential version of such a view, Lewis's dispositional theory of value, is subject to at least three severe problems: the problem of the implausible contingency of value, the problem of ideal conditions, and the problem of lack of convergence. Against relativistic conceptions of normativity, I argue that either they fail to evade a commitment to absolute normative truths, or they fail to distinguish themselves from Nihilism. Finally, against Nihilism, I argue that it is not a coherent option at least for the normative domain of rationality, since facts about rationality are presupposed by any judgment, including any judgment meant to express a skepticism about facts about rationality.

Group‐deliberative competences and group knowledge

AbstractUnder what conditions is a group belief resulting from deliberation constitutive of group knowledge? What kinds of competences must a deliberating group manifest when settling a question so that the resulting collective belief can be considered group knowledge? In this paper, we provide an answer to the second question that helps make progress on the first question. In particular, we explain the epistemic normativity of deliberation‐based group belief in terms of a truth norm and an evidential norm, introduce a virtue‐reliabilist condition on deliberative group knowledge, and provide an account and a taxonomy of the types of group competences that are necessary for this type of collective knowledge.

Believing for truth and the model of epistemic guidance

ABSTRACT Belief is said to be essentially subject to a norm of truth. This view has been challenged on the ground that the truth norm cannot provide guidance on an intuitive inferentialist model of guidance and thus cannot be genuinely normative. One response to the No Guidance argument is to show how the truth norm can guide belief-formation on the inferentialist model of guidance. In this paper, I argue that this response is inadequate in light of emerging empirical evidence about our system of belief-formation. I will then motivate an alternative response and present, in rough outline, a viable, reason-responsive model of epistemic guidance on which the truth norm can guide.

Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the knowledge norm and the truth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative.

A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief

AbstractIt is a platitude that belief is subject to a standard of correctness: a belief is correct if and only if it is true. But not all standards of correctness are authoritative or binding. Some standards of correctness may be arbitrary, unjustified or outrightly wrong. Given this, one challenge to proponents of the truth norm of belief, is to answer what Korsgaard (1996) calls ‘the normative question’. Is the truth norm of belief authoritative or binding regarding what one ought to or may believe? If so, what grounds its authority? The aim of this paper is to offer a novel answer to the grounding challenge on a reason-based normative framework. I develop and defend a practice-based account of the truth norm, according to which, the authority of the truth norm of belief is grounded in what I call the T-practice, a justified social practice that functions to facilitate knowledge production, maintenance, and social cooperation.

Implementation of corporate social responsibility based on the triple bottom line concept in the era of Covid 19 pandemic

In the age of the COVID-19 pandemic, the practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a form of corporate focus on the corporate environment is necessary to reduce the financial burden on communities. Pelindo III, one of Indonesia's state-owned enterprises, implements its corporate social responsibility through a community empowerment program for hydroponic farmers in Surabaya. The assistance provided is not only in the form of funds for the procurement of hydroponics infrastructure and facilities, but also for administrative and financial management training, marketing and packaging. This study aims to describe how Pelindo III can implement CSR concepts and models in sustainable community empowerment, and to disseminate the CSR implementation model so that it can be replicated in other community empowerment programs. This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach and presents a case study of Pelindo III implementing CSR in a hydroponic farming community in Surabaya. The results of this study show that Pelindo III applies the principles of balancing and normative truth: sustainability, accountability and transparency, marked by a commitment to upholding the social contract. through this community development program. Pelindo III uses business ethics as a guide to its conduct in business competition in accordance with the normative norms and rules. Along the way, Pelindo III is faced with not just single bottom line (SBL) or only economic (financial)-based corporate value responsibilities, but more triple bottom line (TBL) responsibilities. Synergize three elements, including economy, society and environment, or better known as the 3Ps (profit, people and planet).

The Representation of Obsession in Korean Drama (Study on the Movie “Door Lock”)

This study aims to see the representation of obsession by showing repetitive thoughts and being obsessed with getting something desired. The methodology used in this study is descriptive qualitative with Roland Barthes' semiotic analysis method consisting of denotation, connotation and myth. Through the selection of scenes in which there were elements of obsessive violence, there is an obsession between mysterious men and women, indicated by various kinds of physical violence, such as murder, cutting off organs, hands and feet, and drugging women. A mysterious man is obsessed with a woman named Jo Kyung Min because he has a feeling of wanting to be near her. This violence also illustrates the distance from the norms of truth, ethics, and disrespect for others. Judging from the obsessive violence carried out by the man involving the closest person to Jo Kyung Min, his best friend at work and the person above his apartment being victims of physical violence, this mysterious man has psychopathic thoughts, and the desire of a man to add a woman against the opposite sex but unseen, so he does a strange thing which is to try to enter Jo Kyung Min's apartment and sleep next to her, because of an uncontrollable desire.

Transparency and the truth norm of belief

Transparency and the truth norm of belief