Normative Moral Theory Research Articles

Where psychological science meets moral theory: Linking up motivational primitives with normative ethics

The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define as “motivational primitives,” and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes.

Normative ethics, human rights, and artificial intelligence

At some point in the future, nearly all jobs currently performed by humans will be performed by autonomous machines using artificial intelligence (AI). There is little doubt that it will increase precision, comfort, and save time, but this coincides with the introduction of many ethical, social, and legal difficulties as well. Because machines will be performing all of the tasks that humans used to, they cannot be kept exempt from the ethical principles that humans follow. However, because digital machines can only understand 0 and 1, encoding complex philosophical ideas in 0 and 1 would be an assiduous task. These great difficulties offer the opportunity to revisit some of the basic and time-tested normative moral theories advanced by modern philosophers. There could be significant advantages for the many players in AI, namely producers and consumers, thanks to these moral philosophies. Customers could use it to make a purchase decision concerning AI machines, whereas manufacturers could use it to write good ethical algorithms for their AI machines. To handle any ethical difficulties that may develop due to the use of these machines, the manuscript will summarise the important and pertinent normative theories and arrive at a set of principles for writing algorithms for the manufacture and marketing of artificially intelligent machines. These normative theories are simple to understand and use, and they do not require a deep understanding of difficult philosophical or religious notions. These viewpoints claim that good and wrong may be determined merely by applying reasoning and that arriving at any logical conclusion does not necessitate a thorough understanding of philosophy or religion. Another goal of the manuscript is to investigate whether artificial intelligence can be trusted to enforce human rights and whether it is right to code all AI machines with one uniform moral code, particularly in a scenario where they will be doing different jobs for different parties. Is it possible to use the diversity of moral principles as a marketing strategy, and could humans be allowed to choose the moral codes for their machines?

Précis: Concern, Respect, and Cooperation

Précis: <i>Concern, Respect, and Cooperation</i>

Recognition, second‐personal authority, and nonideal theory

AbstractI consider the relation between the role recognition plays in Axel Honneth's social theory and its function in a fundamentally second‐personal normative moral and political theory. I argue, first, that Honneth's social explanatory claims need not strictly depend on any normative propositions of moral and political philosophy. It may be sufficient for Honneth's explanatory purposes that the attitudes through which his explanations run have normative content, even fundamentally second‐personal normative content. And that can be true whether or not the propositions having this content hold as matters of normative moral and political theory. Even so, second‐personal moral philosophy may be able to vindicate these normative propositions. Perhaps more important, however, is the way in which second‐personal moral philosophy can draw on Honnethian recognitional social theory to provide a distinctive approach to nonideal moral and political theory. I argue that nonideal theory should be viewed as a distinctively second‐personal form of theorizing that aims to hold its addressees accountable for injustices that consist in failures adequately to recognize our equal second‐personal authority as persons.

Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?

AbstractIt is commonly thought that morality applies universally to all human beings as moral targets, and our general moral obligations to people will not, as a rule, be affected by their views. I propose and explore a radical, alternative normative moral theory, ‘Designer Ethics’, according to which our views are pro tanto crucial determinants of how, morally, we ought to be treated. For example, since utilitarians are more sympathetic to the idea that human beings may be sacrificed for the greater good, perhaps it is permissible (or, even under certain conditions, obligatory) to give them ‘priority’ as potential victims. This odd idea has manifold drawbacks but I claim that it also has substantial advantages, that it has some affinities to more commonly accepted moral positions, and that it should be given a significant role in our ethical thinking.

Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention

ABSTRACT For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.

I See Me: The Role of Observer Imagery in Reducing Consumer Transgressions

As the number of consumer transgressions (i.e., acts of deliberately violating the established marketplace codes of conduct) continues to increase, so do their financial repercussions for companies. Though academic and managerial interest in addressing this issue is growing, research on how to dissuade consumers from committing transgressions remains scarce. Drawing on the mental imagery literature and normative moral theory, the present research examines a novel way of reducing consumers’ appraisals of their own transgressions. Whereas an actor-imagery perspective fosters a teleological, egoistic view of morality and, in turn, induces moral leniency, having consumers adopt an observer-imagery perspective fosters a deontological view of morality and, in turn, induces moral stringency. The effects are robust across various types of consumer transgressions, including the purchase of counterfeit products (Studies 1 and 3) and return fraud in the form of wardrobing (Study 2). Study 2 also rules out vividness as an alternative explanation for these effects. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

Is a "Good Death" at the Time of Animal Slaughter an Essentially Contested Concept?

Simple SummaryThe question of how to kill animals for food has persisted unresolved in the Anglo-American and European social and political discourse for more than a century. Scientific informed narrative has been directed at “documenting” the experience of the slaughtered animal in the last few seconds of life. Other narratives include wide social informed narratives of cultural, historical and religious meanings of food. Slaughter by rapid exsanguination is examined as an “essentially contested” concept as a response to the resiliency of this question in modern society.The phrase “essentially contested concept” (ECC) entered the academic literature in 1956 in an attempt to better characterize certain contentious concepts of political theory. Commonly identified examples of contested concepts are morality, religion, democracy, science, nature, philosophy, and certain types of creative products such as the novel and art. The structure proposed to identify an ECC has proven useful in a wide variety of deliberative discourse in the social, political, and religious arenas where seemingly intractable but productive debates are found. Where a strongly held moral position is contradicted by law, a portion of the citizenry see the law as illegitimate and do not feel compelled to respect it. This paper will attempt to apply the analytic structure of ECC to the concept of animal wellbeing at the time of slaughter specifically a “good death.” The results of this analysis supports an understanding that the current slaughter debate is a disagreement in moral belief and normative moral theory. The parties to the dispute have differing visions of the “good.” The method of slaughter is not an essentially contested concept where further discourse is likely to result in a negotiated resolution. The position statements of veterinary organizations are used as an example of current discourse.

Responsibility and Normative Moral Theories

Responsibility and Normative Moral Theories

Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics

Abstract In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

Sharing business partner behavior

Purpose – The new concept of business partner behavior sharing practice is addressed from three perspectives: technical/technological, legal and ethical/moral with the aim to elaborate its sharing feasibility, value added, legal restrictions and moral considerations. Research results are synthetized to present an overview on business partners behavior sharing direct and indirect value added, costs and risks and proposing mitigation strategies. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – To evaluate technical feasibility, a real-life sharing experiment is conducted. Using a sharing agency data are collected, summarized and reported. For the purpose of legal evaluation, relevant legislation is analyzed. Ethicality/morality is assessed utilizing theoretical applied-ethics analysis. Two major normative moral theories – teleology and deontology – are selected for this purpose. The synthesis of the research results is represented in system dynamics model. Findings – Results show no significant technical obstacles for the systematic business partner behavior sharing. Also, no major legal or ethical arguments against it are found, although some important conditions are identified that have to be met in order for the practice to be performed legally and to be qualified as ethical/moral. Research limitations/implications – Analysis of legality is limited to the EU and legislation of the Republic of Slovenia. Ethicality of the practice is assessed from the utilitarian and rights perspectives. Practical implications – Important technical, legal and ethical insights into business partner behavior sharing concepts and practices are provided. Originality/value – To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first time that the practice of business partner behavior sharing is addressed simultaneously from technical, legal and ethical perspectives using a real-life experiment. Therefore it is an important contribution to a more holistic account/insight of/into such a business practice.

Slote, Michael, A Sentimentalist Theory of the Mind

Michael Slote is no doubt the most radical and yet consistent sentimentalist philosopher that we have ever seen (and perhaps also will ever see). In his previous books, sentimentalism is developed not only as an ethical theory concerned about an individual’s emotions and actions but also as a political theory about a just society. This is significant, since one of the commonly perceived weaknesses of virtue ethics—of which Slote’s moral sentimentalism is a version—in comparison with its rivals, deontology and consequentialism, is its inability to develop a robust political philosophy. But Slote did not stop there. He develops sentimentalism not only as a normative moral theory but also as a metaethical theory, using our moral emotions as the foundation of moral approvals and disapprovals. If you are wondering whether Slote goes too far in making such a versatile use of emotions in so many different areas, then hold fast before you read the book under review here! As indicated by the title, it is about a sentimentalist theory of mind; and it is not over yet: as announced by the title of a fairly long appendix (173–203), he is also going to develop a sentimentalist virtue epistemology (at this moment of writing, I have learned that the book is already finished and will be forthcoming very soon). In this book, arguing against the prevalent rationalist account of human mind as purely rational and cognitive, Slote attempts to show not only that there are aspects of the mind that are not purely conceptual, mathematical, or scientific, as can be expected, but also that, as not easily expected, even those aspects considered to be conceptual, mathematical, or scientific are not as pure as the rationalist accounts claim them to be but are shot through with emotions. In addition to a short preface, a short introduction, a short conclusion, and a long appendix (review of which is reserved until the book on the topic is published), the book consists of six chapters. In Chapter 1, “Epistemology and Emotion,” Slote revisits the notion of empathy, the central topic of at least two of his previous books, but this Dao (2015) 14:307–313 DOI 10.1007/s11712-015-9430-5

The Development of the Ethical Approach Scale: An Operationalization of Moral Theory

The diversity of normative and descriptive moral theories divides research efforts and slows the study of business ethics. This paper reconciles this division by developing the first multi-dimensio...

Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics

In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.

Writing Philosophy for the Public is a Moral Obligation

Writing philosophy to be read by people who are not professional philosophers ought to be central to the work of professional philosophers. Writing for the public should be central to their work because their professional end is to produce ideas for use by people who are not professional philosophers. Philosophy is unlike most disciplines in that the ideas produced by professional philosophers generally have to be understood by a person before they can be of any use to them. As a tool for delivering philosophical ideas to the public, writing philosophical works is invaluable. The need to write philosophy directly for the public should be clear regardless of one’s conception of the value of philosophy, since writing directly for the public is in the spirit of all the most popular modern philosophical movements. 1. The centrality of work written for the public Writing philosophy to be read by people who are not professional philosophers ought to be central to the work of professional philosophers. Yet there is a tendency within the discipline to view such work as peripheral at best, and irrelevant at worst. As will be argued, writing for the public must be central because the professional end of philosophy is to produce ideas for use by people who are not professional philosophers. The argument takes the form of an appeal to the moral obligations of professional philosophers. That there are such things as moral obligations will not be argued for, nor will I argue for any particular normative moral theory, as these issues are beyond the scope of the paper. However, if we both accept that there are moral obligations and adopt any popular normative theory of moral obligation, we will be compelled to conclude that writing for the public should be central to the work of professional philosophers.

Using Classic Social Media Cases to Distill Ethical Guidelines for Digital Engagement

Through systematic case analyses of much-discussed social media cases, both negative aspects and best practices of social media use are revealed. Ethical theory is applied to these cases as a means of analysis to reveal the moral principles associated with each case. Four cases are analyzed, ranging from bad to arguably innovative. Based upon comparing the moral principles upheld or violated, descriptive ethics are used to infer normative ethical guidelines to govern the use of social media. Fifteen ethical guidelines derived from the cases and normative moral theory are offered as a way to begin a discussion that leads to a deeper understanding of ethics in the burgeoning realm of digital engagement.

Virtue and Climate Ethics

How do we deal with global warming? Recent moral discussions on climate change focus on what governments and global institutions ought to do in order to mitigate and adapt to global warming. States and international organizations need to adopt relevant policies and programs that address climate change. These policies and programs however need to be complemented by an ethics that cultivate the virtues needed to live in a warmer world. In this paper, I will propose a virtue ethics approach to climate change. Virtue ethics as a normative moral theory focuses on developing and cultivating the right attitude and disposition rather than principles and duties regarding a moral issue. An ethics based solely on principles and duties may not be enough to curtail global warming, because they only regulate and control human behavior but do not shape and mold the right character necessary for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Some Contemporary Views on Jaina Values and Conduct Among Indian Lay Jainas from Jaipur and Delhi

This paper is based on interviews conducted in India in the summer of 2007 with seven lay Jainas from Jaipur and Delhi: three men and four women, with ages ranging from early twenties to late sixties. The questions I am interested in are: what is the main Jaina value or values according to my interviewees? In particular, what is the place and status of ahimsa (nonviolence) among contemporary notions of value, and is ahimsa repositioned or redefined in the contemporary context? Do Jaina values impact the social sphere and if so, how? In what ways does a particular form of conduct result as a consequence of those values? What does this say about the ways contemporary Indian lay Jainas imagine society? In analyzing the positions of my interviewees, I note similarities to and differences from the position of a group of Terapanthi nuns, whom I also interviewed. By means of my ethnographic material, I demonstrate that Jaina normative moral theory, though rooted in ahimsa, nevertheless exhibits flexibility based on individual and socio-historical contexts.

Reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics

For the past four decades, debate has occurred in respect of situational social psychology and virtue ethics. This paper attempts to reconcile this debate. Situationists propose a fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of dispositions, each of which has a restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of character (behaviour is regulated by long‐term dispositions). In order to support this view, they cite a number of experiments. It is proposed that the substantive claims made by situationist social psychologists, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stem from a misunderstanding of concepts of moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations in respect of experimental results. Situationists take a narrow view of character and morality. Evidence from organizational behaviour and managerial research literature supports the view that both situational (organizational) features and inner characteristics (including virtues) are powerful influences and determinants of morally upright and morally deviant behaviour. The role of practical judgement in bridging these views is discussed. As a way forward in reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics, the paper proposes an Aristotelian–Thomistic framework to overcome some of the problems associated with inadequate regulative ideals in building a normative moral theory.

Intuitions, heuristics, and utilitarianism

a common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions. understanding the role that heuristics play in moral judgments undermines this objection. it also indicates why we should not use john rawls' model of reflective equilibrium as the basis for testing normative moral theories.