Normative Claims Research Articles

Doubts about Normative Skepticism

Abstract The ‘error theory’ holds that all normative claims are false. Of course, if there is any reason to believe the error theory then, since it would be a reason to believe something, that would show the error theory itself to be false. A recent book (Streumer, 2017) tries to block this argument by arguing on the basis of the claim that the error theory itself can’t be believed that there can be no reason to believe it. This is a paradoxical conclusion since it leaves the possibility that the error theory is true even though it is impossible to believe it and we can have no reason to believe it. In this paper I argue for a different paradox. Even if we can believe the error theory, we are committed to rejecting it, but this still leaves normative skepticism unanswered.

Capacity, Autonomy, and Risk: Reflecting on Asymmetries in Capacity to Consent and Capacity to Refuse

AbstractThere has been renewed interest in whether we should understand standards of decision-making capacity (DMC) to be risk-relative. Critics of risk-relative standards often highlight a puzzling asymmetry that they imply; a patient may have the requisite DMC to consent to a treatment that is in their best interests, whilst lacking the requisite DMC to refuse that same treatment, given the much higher risk that this would entail. Whilst some have argued that this asymmetry suggests that risk-relative standards are nonsensical, in this paper I defend a ‘quality of evidence’ view of such standards. I begin by outlining DMC’s purported gate-keeping role in medical ethics, and identifying three key normative claims that undergird this role. I then explain how two competing theories of risk-relative standards are incompatible with at least one of these claims. Drawing on Douglas’ distinction between standards of ‘true capacity’ and standards invoked in the ‘test’ for capacity, I then outline my ‘quality of evidence’ view. I explain how the view is compatible with the aforementioned normative claims, and outline the nature of the asymmetry it implies. I conclude by responding to the objection that there is no meaningful distinction between ‘true capacity’ and the ‘test’ for capacity.

Development or Ecocide? Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Contested Infrastructure in the “Tren Maya” Controversy

This article examines the controversy surrounding the Tren Maya railway megaproject in Mexico’s Yucatán Peninsula through the lens of sociotechnical imaginaries. We argue that the Tren Maya, much more than a technological intervention, came to embody differing visions of desired futures. Initially promoted by the Andrés Manuel López Obrador administration as a state-led reindustrialization program to mitigate social inequalities, the project was engulfed by the nationalist-developmental imaginary of the so-called “Fourth Transformation.” The local impacts that materialized in the construction process, however, sparked significant socio-environmental conflicts and mobilized a diverse opposition movement comprising indigenous communities, scientific experts, and environmental organizations. As the controversy unfolded, protest actors leveraged various legal mechanisms to challenge the epistemic and normative claims underpinning the government’s plans, eventually giving rise to a subversive imaginary that reframed the Tren Maya as a criminal, “ecocidal” enterprise. Our study reveals the intricate interdependencies between material and discursive processes in the (de)legitimization of competing infrastructural imaginaries and their role in mobilizing social forces. In particular, we underscore the crucial yet often overlooked role of legal channels and institutions in generating, validating, and amplifying imagined futures. By illustrating how social relations and normative ideals are co-produced with technoscientific knowledge and material facts, this research contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how different sociotechnical imaginaries interact, compete, and gain traction in the context of infrastructural transformations.

Mental integrity, autonomy, and fundamental interests

Many technology ethicists hold that the time has come to articulate neurorights: our normative claims vis-à-vis our brains and minds. One such claim is the right to mental integrity (‘MI’)....

Moral equality and social hierarchy

AbstractSocial egalitarianism holds that justice requires that people relate to one another as equals. To explain the content of this requirement, social egalitarians often appeal to the moral equality of persons. This leads to two very different interpretations of social egalitarianism. The first involves the specification of a conception of the moral equality of persons that is distinctive of the social egalitarian view. Social (or relational) egalitarianism can then claim that for people to relate as equals is for the relations between them to conform to this conception of their moral equality. I will argue against this type of view. Instead, I will argue that social egalitarianism should propose a distinctive conception of social equality as a purely sociological phenomenon. I will show how this conception allows us to formulate the types of normative claims social egalitarianism should make. On this picture, social egalitarianism, instead of identifying social hierarchy as a distinctive kind of wrong, makes standard normative claims about a distinctive kind of social phenomenon.

Pediatric Assent in Clinical Practice: A Critical Scoping Review

Background This study assesses how pediatric assent is conceptualized and justified within the therapeutic context. Pediatric ethicists generally agree that children should participate in medical care decisions in developmentally appropriate ways. Much attention has been paid to pediatric assent for research participation, but ambiguities persist in how assent is conceptualized and operationalized in the therapeutic context where countervailing considerations such as the child’s best interest and parental permission must also be weighed. Methods Searches were conducted in 11 databases including PubMed, Embase, Cochrane Library, and Web of Science. Articles published between 2010 and 2020 were screened in COVIDENCE for meeting each of four criteria: (1) focusing on pediatric assent, (2) focusing on clinical care, (3) including normative claims, and (4) containing substantive statements about the meaning of pediatric assent. Full texts were abstracted for (1) operational definitions of assent, (2) discussion of the temporal nature of assent, (3) description of the concept of “understanding,” and (4) ethical justifications for soliciting assent. These excerpts were coded and code patterns formed themes presented in the results. Results The final analytic data set contained 29 articles. Analysis yielded three key themes. First, valid assent varies by treatment, population (e.g., younger versus older), and geographic/cultural context. Second, assent represents two distinct longitudinal processes: One involves eliciting preferences over a disease course or care episode; the other focuses on children’s developmental maturation. Third, ethical justifications for assent draw variously on instrumental and intrinsic reasons, but often remain ambiguous. Conclusions There is widespread agreement that assent is morally valuable, but there remain substantial ambiguities or disagreements about its meaning, process, and ethical justification.

Transhumanism within the Natural Law: Transforming Creation with Nature as Guide

Transhumanism is an unsettling prospect for proponents of a natural law ethic. The goal of transhumanism is to fundamentally alter our human nature, while the natural law tradition relies on this nature for producing normative claims. The tension seems clear. But beyond the need to explore this underdeveloped relationship, it may be that natural law provides precisely the sort of ethical framework—a framework centered on human nature—for best evaluating transhumanism and bioenhancement technologies. Building on the work of Jason T. Eberl and Brian Patrick Green, I articulate how a Thomistic theory of natural law can guide us in a brave new world. Along the way, I note ways in which both Eberl and Green are too limiting in their interpretations of natural law, but in offering these critiques, I hope to bring out how natural law proves an invaluable guide for navigating life in creation—even a creation that has been tampered with.

Knowledge and the Aesthetics of Nature

Abstract Conceptualism in natural aesthetics takes knowledge of natural objects to be necessary for their appropriate appreciation. Concentrating on animals, I explore a particular version of conceptualism – functionalism – in light of debates about the effects of cognition on perception - so-called ‘cognitive penetration of perception.’ I establish the claims about cognitive penetration to which functionalism is committed, and assess the implications of its assumptions for the normative claim that functional appreciation is most appropriate to nature. I argue that functionalism has not yet provided strong reasons for thinking that knowledge affects perception in the relevant ways, and in ways required by its normative claims.

Rhetorical entrapment in international negotiations: A new pathway and mechanisms

Rhetorical entrapment plays a key – but often overlooked – role in the theory and practice of international relations. In this article, we develop a new pathway and mechanisms of rhetorical entrapment. Our key argument is that current literature has focused too much on normative forms of rhetorical entrapment. Although insightful, this misses empirical forms of rhetorical entrapment. Drawing on Habermasian theory, we suggest that normative and empirical validity claims give rise to alternate pathways and mechanisms of rhetorical entrapment: the normative pathway encapsulates framing, identity and legitimacy; whereas the empirical pathway is mediated by information, reputation and trust. To explore this theoretical argument, we engage in a plausibility probe of international investment agreement negotiations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with various state negotiators, we find that empirical rhetorical entrapment is pervasive. We document this pathway and mechanisms. We conclude by developing the broader causal and normative implications of our argument.

Are the normative rationales of local autonomy related to democratic legitimacy justified? Evidence from 57 countries in Europe and beyond (1990–2020)

ABSTRACT Frequently, increasing local autonomy is recommended to improve democratic legitimacy and government effectiveness. This paper attempts to verify to what extent these normative rationales are empirically sound. By using observations of local autonomy from the LAI 2.0 project (57 countries from 1990 to 2020) as independent variables and a set of governance indicators as dependent variables, we examine the possible impacts of local autonomy on various input-, output-, but also throughput-related aspects of legitimacy. The results show that local autonomy positively influences various aspects of input and throughput legitimacy, but not across the entire array of examined indicators. Our fixed effects regression models indicate that local autonomy is significantly related to the existence of elected local government, quality of democracy, accountability, transparency, equality of participation and openness. This research allows us to justify the normative claims of local autonomy facilitating efforts towards a more legitimate functioning of local governments.

Carbon Pricing and Intergenerational Fairness

Abstract John Broome and Duncan Foley have proposed an ingenious way to transfer benefits backwards in time, from people who are not here yet to people who will not be here in the future. Present people can crowd out conventional, and often brown, investments by issuing global climate bonds (GCBs). The debate about GCBs has focused on whether it is justified to use this financial instrument to allow future people to buy off present people for climate mitigation. In this article, I ask whether it is fair to use GCBs to share the cost of a global carbon price between present and future people. My answer is that it depends on the approach used to calculate the carbon price and, of course, on the normative claims underlying the different approaches. Specifically, I argue that the internalisation principle underlying the cost-benefit approach does not justify intergenerational cost-shifting if, as in most cases, the social cost of carbon is determined using, inter alia, a social discount rate. Instead, the conservative justifications underlying a cost-effective carbon price consistent with the Paris mitigation target allow for intergenerational cost-shifting, but only to the extent of the difference (if any) between the Paris-consistent and the Pareto-efficient carbon price.

Experience and naturalism

AbstractMuch of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this.

Didactical model to promote perspective taking

ABSTRACT Many approaches within subject didactics have in common that they highlight the importance of perspective taking, precisely describe the benefits of this skill and develop didactical scenarios in which this skill is crucial. Nevertheless, there is a diagnosed lack of a differentiated didactical model on how to teach perspective taking step by step. This article addresses this desideratum of research in the context of religious education. Therefore, it presents first educational and psychological research on perspective taking after discussing various terms and definitions. Responding to the latter findings, a didactical model of how to promote perspective taking in the classroom is presented in six dimensions: recognising perspectives, exploring perspectives, comparing perspectives, adopting perspectives, coordinating perspectives, identifying with a perspective. The activities of the model suggest some sort of sequence without specifying a fixed order of performance. Finally, the question of cognitive and emotional components in perspective taking is discussed and the problem of how the model deals with normative claims is explained since religions and world views make normative claims.

Antiracist Anger as Social and Moral Inquiry in Colectivo Ayllu's Devuélvannos el oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales (2018)

Abstract: My essay looks at how diasporic, racialized, and sexually-and gender dissident voices that collaborated with Colectivo Ayllu in their first year of residency at CRA Matadero Madrid (2017–18) approach antiracist activism from a decolonial feminist perspective that analyzes gender and sexuality in relation to race and coloniality. I analyze Devuélvannos el oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales , a compilation of visual, poetic, and essayistic pieces curated by Ayllu that emerge from experiential and political reflections, as well as anticolonial actions developed during the group's residency. I read Ayllu's emancipatory thinking first within a view of decolonial epistemology that enacts situated notions of knowledge, beauty, and truth outside Eurocentric frameworks. I also bring to light a concurrent understanding of decolonized epistemology that permeates Devuélvannos 's project and allows for making normative truth claims about systems of inequality and human flourishing. I discuss the consequences of both (compatible) notions of decolonial epistemology in Ayllu's formulation of antiracism activism. My essay bridges critical lenses from postpositivist realist theories of identity, women of color feminism and decolonial feminism to the study of emotions as embodied forms of knowledge that may offer "clarity" and insight into how ideologies and structures of power operate in a society.

Climate concepts for supporting political goals of mitigation and adaptation: The case for “climate crisis”

AbstractClimate concepts are crucial to understand the effects of human activity on the climate system scientifically, and to formulate and pursue policies to mitigate and adapt to these effects. Yet, scientists, policymakers, and activists often use different terms such as “global warming,” “climate change,” “climate crisis,” or “climate emergency.” This advanced review investigates which climate concept is most suitable when we pursue mitigation and adaptation goals in a scientifically informed manner. It first discusses how survey experiments and social science reviews on climate frames draw normative recommendations about which terms to use for public climate communication. It is suggested that such normative claims can be refined by including the scientific alongside lay uses of a climate concept, and by using explicit assessment conditions to evaluate how suitable a concept is for formulating mitigation and adaptation goals. Drawing on philosophical theories of conceptual change in science and conceptual engineering, a novel framework with two assessment conditions is introduced and then applied to “global warming,” “climate change,” “climate emergency,” and “climate crisis.” The assessment suggests that currently, “climate crisis” is most suitable to formulate and pursue climate mitigation and adaptation goals. Using this concept promotes the epistemic goals of climate science to a high degree, bridges scientific, political, and activist discourse, and fosters for democratic participation when articulating climate policies.This article is categorized under: The Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Climate Science and Decision Making The Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Knowledge and Practice Perceptions, Behavior, and Communication of Climate Change > Communication

NIPT for adult-onset conditions: Australian NIPT users' views.

Noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has become widely available in recent years. While initially used to screen for trisomies 21, 18, and 13, the test has expanded to include a range of other conditions and will likely expand further. This paper addresses the ethical issues that arise from one particularly controversial potential use of NIPT: screening for adult-onset conditions (AOCs). We report data from our quantitative survey of Australian NIPT users' views on the ethical issues raised by NIPT for AOCs. The survey ascertained support for NIPT for several traits and conditions including AOCs. Participants were then asked about their level of concern around implications of screening for AOCs for the future child and parent(s). Descriptive and comparative data analyses were conducted. In total, 109 respondents were included in data analysis. The majority of respondents expressed support for NIPT screening for preventable (70.9%) and nonpreventable AOCs (80.8%). Most respondents indicated concern around potential harmful impacts associated with NIPT for AOCs, including the psychological impact on the future child and on the parent(s). Despite this, the majority of participants thought that continuation of a pregnancy known to be predisposed to an AOC is ethically acceptable. The implications of these data are critically discussed and used to inform the normative claim that prospective parents should be given access to NIPT for AOCs. The study contributes to a body of research debating the ethical acceptability and regulation of various applications of NIPT as screening panels expand.

Internalism from the ethnographic stance: from self-indulgence to self-expression and corroborative sense-making

Abstract By integrating Bernard Williams’ internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’ later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent's motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not a normative claim, but an example of sense-making from ‘the ethnographic stance’. This leaves a worry over whether moral conviction can coexist with an internalist understanding of reasons. Here too, however, Williams’ later thought provides an answer. Differentiating corrosive from corroborative sense-making, it elucidates how internalism, though not normative, can nonetheless affect our confidence in reason statements, thereby informing how we deliberate and how we address those whose motivations differ from our own.

The Contemporary Landscape of Narrations and Jurisprudence: The Legal Imagination and Nomos and Narrative half a century later

Abstract In 1973, James Boyd White published The Legal Imagination, broadly credited with the foundation of a new discipline, law and literature, which underlined the importance of narratives in legal thinking and practice. A decade later, in an introduction to the review of the 1982 SCOTUS term, Robert Cover identified the need for further discussion regarding the close connection between norms and narratives. ‘Nomos and Narrative’ set a precedent by launching a more in-depth investigation into the role of stories as the foundation of normativity and its participation in dealing with competing normative claims. Since then, various strands of jurisprudence have struggled with the view of law as a set of interpretive commitments. By taking a closer look at both, this article reflects on the relevance and significance of these texts half a century later. As the article argues, despite a significant following among the scholars, the arguments posed by White and Cover did not find broad implementation in the juridico-political systems around the world. On the contrary, the opposite tendencies seem to dominate today. Thus, the article reflects on the contemporary relevance of both texts in critical, constructive, and explorative terms.

The Ethics of Commons Organizing: A Critical Reading

AbstractIn this article, we seek to explore the different normative claims made around commons organizing and how the advent of the digital commons introduces new ethical questions. We do so by unpacking and categorizing the specific ethical dimensions that differentiate the commons from other forms of organizing and by discussing them in the light of debates around the governance of participative organizations, the cornerstone of commons organizing (Ostrom in Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990). Rather than contesting commons organizing or endorsing it blindly, our goal is to critically reflect on its deontological and instrumental assumptions, and analyze the arguments upholding that it possesses ethical qualities that render it fairer, more equitable and sustainable than other centralized or hierarchical models—as well as any forms of privatization. We conclude by assessing the definitional dislocation of the digital commons where, unlike traditional commons, extractability can be endless and generate unintended consequences such as commodification or alienation. Taking stock of recent debates around the digital commons, we open the debate for future possible research avenues on normative claims, particularly under rapidly changing technological conditions.

Empirical Foundation of Normative Arguments in Legal Reasoning

Empirical legal studies are often challenged by traditional doctrinal legal scholars as irrelevant to normative legal reasoning. This article explores, through the lens of jurisprudence and by drawing on dozens of empirical works, the junction between empirical facts and normative arguments. Both teleological and consequential arguments, in one of their premises, employ “difference-making facts” which identify the causal effects of certain legal measures as reasons for normative claims. Empirical works make causal inferences and their findings thus constitute an essential part of teleological and consequential arguments, which are prevalent in normative legal reasoning. All causal-identifying empirical findings can be framed as the required empirical premise in teleological and consequential arguments. Finally, although some classical canons of legal interpretation, such as textual and systemic arguments, appear not to take the form of teleological or consequential arguments, the use of these specific legal arguments must nonetheless be justified by teleological or consequential arguments at the meta-level. Thus, normative legal reasoning, one way or another, must have empirical foundations.