Norm Of Non-intervention Research Articles

The Saavedra Lamas Peace: How a Norm Complex Evolved and Crystallized to Eliminate War in the Americas

Abstracts After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere—until in matter of decades it disappeared. After the 1930s even low-level militarized interstate conflict became less frequent, shorter, and less severe over time. What explains the change in this specific region and historical jucture? We argue that leaders in the Americas identified territorial disputes and foreign intervention as interrelated problems that frequently caused the interstate war. In response, they developed a unique regional norm-complex that bundled together the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention with the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm complex emerged via Latin American entrepreneurship shortly after independence, cascaded with Pan-Americanism, and crystallized around the signature of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty in the early 1930s. We explain how, why, and when norm complexes develop. We then investigate the evolution and effects of the Latin American norm complex via statistics and within-case counterfactuals. We conclude that interstate war disappeared from the Americas with the acceptance and codification of this norm-complex.

Ideological Topography in World Politics: A Guide to the End of the Unipolar-Homogeneous Moment

AbstractThe immediate post–Cold War era was defined by the material and ideological dominance of the United States. Thirty years on, challenges to both types of dominance proliferate. What explains the systemic change currently underway? The conventional wisdom of a shift to bipolarity or multipolarity ignores the possibility of changes within unipolarity. Recent instability is better explained by the decreased dominance of liberal-democratic ideology and the re-emergence of ideological competition. Building on Raymond Aron's analysis of homogeneous and heterogeneous international systems, we propose a typology exploring the intersections of systemic distributions of power and ideological topographies. Homogeneous topographies operate on a principle of collusion, reducing uncertainty while promoting restraint, transnational society, and gatekeeping against challenger ideologies. Heterogeneous topographies follow a crisscrossing logic, raising the stakes of relations, contributing to breakdowns in norms of nonintervention, enabling subversion by splitting loyalties, and encouraging repression and the fragmentation of transnational society. Applying this framework, we reappraise the 1990s as a unipolar-homogeneous moment. The emergence of heterogeneity in the mid-2000s, with the rise of authoritarianism and transnational illiberalism, put greater pressure on US unipolarity. This work has implications for debates about US foreign policy, the stability of unipolar systems, and the consequences of systemic change.

Analysis of Bystander Behavior Towards Intimate Partner Violence via Peerformance.

This study of a South Asian community in the midwestern USA examines what bystanders do when they witness an incident of intimate partner violence (IPV). Because of ethical and safety constraints, in lieu of observation in a natural setting, data were collected at a Peerformance, a peer-led IPV prevention program, using the forum theatre method introduced in Augusto Boal's Theatre of the Oppressed. Event attendees were invited to respond to an IPV incident enacted by peer educators in which a controlling husband's behavior escalates to the point of suggesting physical violence. Using a grounded theory approach, we analyzed the videotaped bystander actions while applying pertinent aspects of visual analysis. Event attendees responded in variety of ways, exploring and/or de-escalating the situation, providing information, and encouraging the couple to resolve their conflict and/or seek outside help. They expressed empathy, support, and (dis)agreement with the husband and the wife. Their actions encompassed a number of dimensions: introductory, investigative, supportive/empathic, informational, instructional, instrumental, and confrontational. Participants' vastly varied responses to IPV within the same scenario suggest difficulty in developing a generic IPV bystander program. The findings also suggest possible directions for developing bystander programs to address IPV. In lieu of prescribing and/or proscribing specific actions in a given risk situation, bystander training can help participants build their repertoire of actions while collectively examining the strengths and limitations of various actions in their sociocultural context. Such bystander training is complex and difficult to manualize; it will involve reflexive and critical discussions and learning and trying out various possible alternatives. A Peerformance is a site of action, a realistic and familiar milieu where community members can imagine and try out interventions that may be different from the norm of indifference and non-intervention. It can open up new possibilities for addressing IPV in diverse communities.

Challenges and Opportunities Constraining and Enhancing Kenya and Tanzania Participation in the EAC Econo-Political Integration Process

Regionalism and regional institutions are increasingly being challenged and conditioned by the sovereignty-modifying effects of globalisation and humanitarian intervention. Regionalism is facing pressure to become less sovereignty-bound in the sense of going against the norms of non-interference and non-intervention that underpin the Westphalia international system. The study evaluates the challenges and opportunities that constrain and enhance Kenya and Tanzania participation in the EAC econo-political integration process. Three theories, Two-Good theory, Neoclassical Realism and Neo-functionalism theories, were adopted to guide the study. Descriptive research design was used. Respondents were both from Kenya and Tanzania and they comprised cross border business community, government officials in Ministries of EAC and Foreign Affairs, and EAC organs—the Secretariat and Legislative Assembly which were purposively sampled. Both primary and secondary sources data was used while instruments of data collection were: questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions guides. Findings revealed that challenges that constrain Kenya’s and Tanzania’s participation in the EAC integration emanate from structural, legal and administrative weaknesses and commissions or omissions. The fact that the issue of manifestation of non-tariff barriers disguised as administrative and technical policies is baneful and inimical. Additionally, import substitution strategy and the incongruity in taxation policies are some of the challenges that constrain Kenya’s and Tanzania’s participation in the EAC econo-political integration. The study therefore recommends that the citizens should be at the centre of the EAC integration process through structured stakeholders’ engagement where their input and participation are affirmed. Similarly, taxation of cross border business community should be reviewed and taxes should be harmonised to provide a level playing field in order to address their perennial complaints.

The Blockade on Qatar: Conflict Management Failings

ABSTRACT Current tensions in the Gulf region highlight the persistence of crises and conflict. A number of states within the area now regularly engage in interventionist actions that challenge previously held norms of sovereignty and non-intervention. Fragmentation characterises what were once considered fairly robust structures of unity and enduring regional organisation. Theoretical norms that presuppose non-intervention are tested by new forms of coercion and interventionism among Gulf actors that exacerbate rather than resolve security dilemmas. In turn, this highlights the inadequacies of normative models of conflict management and resolution, and in particular mediation. These developments are examined in the case of the blockade against Qatar instituted by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in June 2017.

The GCC in Crisis: Explorations of ‘Normlessness’ in Gulf Regionalism

ABSTRACT In a field that is so loosely theorised, an investigation into intra-GCC conflict is both apposite and challenging. Empirically, interventions by Gulf states have proliferated across the GCC and MENA since 2011. This Special Issue seeks to fill a void in scholarship by looking at the ongoing crisis through the lens of norms. A hypothesised ‘normlessness’ has taken root: a collapse of (local) guiding principles, some even laid down by member states. Disregard for norms of non-intervention, popular sovereignty, mediation, alliance-making and social solidarity poses risks for (sub)regional stability. Provisionally, one notable weakness lies in prescriptive and proscriptive (regulative) norms pertaining to intra-GCC rules of engagement.

The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and a Partial Solution

The Dangers of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine, and a Partial Solution Matthew Bellinger (bio) Introduction When the United Nations (UN) was formed, one of its most important goals was to render war obsolete. The UN Charter states as a goal the hope to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."1 When President Franklin D. Roosevelt first described his vision for a post-World War II international organization, he envisioned an organization that would promote and facilitate "international cooperation . . . to consider and deal with the problem of world relations."2 He also wanted a council that would "concern itself with peaceful settlement of international disputes."3 The UN Charter itself took the then-unprecedented step of outlawing war, stating that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means," and that "all Members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."4 However, the UN Charter does not address the important potential exception of humanitarian intervention. This lack of clarity has led to a robust debate that continues to this day—can a state legitimately use [End Page 371] force for humanitarian purposes? Today, many countries have embraced the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, which allows countries to intervene in a humanitarian crisis if five criteria are met.5 One is that of reasonable prospects which asks, is "there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, and are the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?"6 Unfortunately, this level of scrutiny needs to be revised; instead, it should be more rigorous to account for world leaders' consistent inability to estimate the effects of their intervention. Additionally, cultural disruption should be considered as one of the negative effects in this balancing test to address concerns about the use of humanitarian intervention as a pretext for colonialism. In this article, I intend to offer a potential solution to address these concerns. In Part I, I will examine the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its transformation into the Responsibility to Protect. In Part II, I will discuss two of the potential problems with the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The first problem is countries using humanitarian excuses as a pretext to advance national aims. The second problem is countries not accurately assessing the consequences of intervention. In Part III, I will discuss my potential solution to address these problems–heightening the balance of consequences test. This will be used to determine whether humanitarian intervention should be attempted and requiring countries to consider the desires and culture of the country that is the object of the intervention before intervening. Part I: The Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine and the Responsibility to Protect The United Nations Charter seems to forbid intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. The Charter states that nothing in its contents "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,"7 but the Genocide Convention of 1948 quickly created an agreed upon exception.8 The Convention states that "[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action . . . as they consider appropriate for the prevention and [End Page 372] suppression of acts of genocide."9 However, none of the Charter nations acted on the Convention during the Cold War. Gareth Evans, in a piece in the Wisconsin Law Journal, argues that the large number of states joining the UN during the Cold War discouraged humanitarian intervention. States saw the norm of non-intervention as one of the few protections against more powerful international actors.10 Indeed, the general consensus in the twentieth century was that unilateral humanitarian intervention was illegal. The UN Charter doesn't exempt humanitarian intervention from the prohibition against the use of force, and the International Court of Justice ruled in Nicaragua v. United States that custom doesn't permit unilateral humanitarian intervention.11 This status quo changed with the end of the Cold War, as a new era of...

Pax Americana and the Dissolution of Arab States: The Humanitarian Consequences (1990–2019)

This article provides an assessment of three decades of US hegemony over the Arab-majority states of the Middle East's Gulf region. Since its direct military intervention in the 1990 war over Kuwait, the US increasingly engaged itself as an architect forging the region through deployment of its neoliberal economic and financial coercion, Janus-faced support for authoritarian regimes while promoting democracy, human rights and individual freedom rhetorically, as well as repeated direct military interventions into Arab states in an effort to bring about regime change. At the base of diplomatic and public justification for the 1990–91 intervention—or the Gulf War as it became known to Americans—was the assertion that the war was defensive in nature, protecting the territorial integrity of Kuwait as well as the enshrining the norms of non-intervention and the sanctity of borders. Over the following years, however, US military forces came to be active in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya with an expanded coterie of bases littered across the states of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman). While the US and its allies had been engaged in the region's politics throughout the Cold War, from 1990 through 2019, the US escalated its role to preside over regional politics through a hub-and-spoke latticework of relations between itself and regional states. From the perspective of nearly three decades since 1990, an appraisal of this coercive relationship, focusing on the humanitarian impacts it has wrought upon the region's peoples, suggests it has failed according to these criteria. Many of the region's peoples have experienced a marked decline in their economic well-being, personal safety and health, while the state apparatuses established following the retreat of European imperialism now lie in ruin in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen. The populations of these states now face a precarious future, without the protection of state institutions, against a range of predatory actors. Moreover, these actions have contributed toward the decline of US global influence, thereby encouraging further change in an environment where popular sovereignty and inputs into governance by regional peoples has been frustrated through the exercise of US power.

Pushing the boundaries : judicial review of legislative procedures in South Africa

This article contributes to the growing scholarly interest in judicial review of legislative processes by analyzing the current comparative outer boundary of the practice, in South Africa, and presenting a defence of it that suggests the need for a friendly amendment to Ely-style political process theory. In recent years, the South African Constitutional Court has dramatically shed the general reluctance it had shared with most courts around the world to review legislative processes as distinct from outcomes. In a series of graduated steps culminating in two 2017 cases, the Court has engaged in increasingly robust oversight of various types of legislative procedures. These include not only the lawmaking process itself, but also internal National Assembly rules, especially those relating to its other key function in a parliamentary democracy of holding the executive politically accountable. Moreover, it has not only found existing National Assembly rules unconstitutional, as violating the constitutional rights of individual members of parliament, but also mandated the creation of others where they do not already exist. The article begins with a brief discussion of the background norm of non-intervention in legislative procedures from which the Court has progressively and so notably departed. It then charts the three steps by which this departure has come about, showing how each of them marks a new stage in the degree of judicial supervision. The heart of the article explores why the Court has been able to take these steps and what the normative justification for them might look like, in terms of such core values of constitutional democracy as the separation of powers and rule of law. Although there is a certain general tension between these two values, which underlies the background norm of judicial non-intervention, it is argued that in the specific contexts in which these cases were decided, they increasingly came together. Special separation of powers and rule of law problems, arising not merely from the existence but the systematic abuse of dominant party status, called for special remedies of the type employed by the Court. The article concludes by arguing that acknowledging this type of political process failure requires an elaboration and extension of Ely's theory of judicial review.

Norm Contestation and Global Governance: Taking Actor Configurations and Practical Reasoning Seriously

Norm Contestation and Global Governance: Taking Actor Configurations and Practical Reasoning Seriously

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach

This article proposes to explain the post-Cold War practice of humanitarian intervention by drawing on the English School’s international society approach. It argues that although the sovereignty versus human rights debate traditionally was framed in dichotomized terms, the post-Cold War practice of humanitarian intervention illustrated the possibility of a via media approach to these competing normative claims. Post-Cold War developments regarding the place of the conventional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand and the growing space for the protection of human rights on the other, have eased worries about the prospect for order in the international system and created a suitable environment for including of humanitarian intervention without jeopardizing that order. To contextualize this development, the article will argue that Hedley Bull’s discussion of such key terms as the international society, the centrality of states, the importance of norms, and normative change helps explain intervention in today’s world. By building on that framework, the article draws attention to the enabling and constraining factors highlighted by the international society approach, and as such, concludes that the English school suggests both promise and caution regarding the prospects for humanitarian intervention in modern international relations.

Russia's droit de regard: pluralist norms and the sphere of influence

Following the end of the cold war and throughout the 1990s, Russia was described as the readily ‘joining’ international society. According to the English school perspective on IR, this meant that Russia was expected to adjust and accept the norms and rules established and propagated by mostly Western liberal states but hailed as common for the family of states. With Vladimir Putin's ascendance to power and Russia's economic recovery followed by Moscow's more assertive stance on global affairs, Russia was increasingly seen as the supporter of a pluralist vision of the international society, i.e. one characterized by limited cooperation, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. These depictions ignored the fundamental differences in Russia's approach towards relations between states in the regional and global perspective. While on the global scale Russia cherishes norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, the regional realm has been subject to a variety of moves compromising the sovereignty of post-Soviet states. In the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia has been ready and willing to engage in undermining states’ sovereignty in a number of ways: attempting to establish a sphere of influence, directly intervening in a civil strives, policing borders, waging wars on ‘humanitarian’ grounds and stimulating separatisms, as well as undertaking less explicit interventionist activities of regional integration, security provision and development assistance. This article discusses these cases in order to make the point that Russia's approach to its most immediate neighbours cannot be subsumed under pluralist or solidarist vision of interstate relations. It highlights the difficulty to approach the Russian global-regional split using the conceptual apparatus of the English school and links it to a more perennial problem – that of the English school disregard for the specifics of post-colonial situations.

Sovereignty and self-determination: Where are we?

This article discusses the historical evolution of norms of sovereignty, non-intervention, territorial integrity, and self-determination in international relations. It shows the degree to which their meanings and weight have varied and considers the bumpy historical relationship between international norms and practice. The twentieth century witnessed increasing tension between the hardening of sovereignty and non-intervention norms and the development of international human rights norms. The article then discusses normative inconsistencies and the variability of application of norms in practice in the post-Cold War era. It concludes by suggesting ways in which international society might mitigate these inconsistencies and the confusion that attends them.

Kant and Habermas on International Law

AbstractThe purpose of this article is to present a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas' reformulation of Kant's philosophical project Toward Perpetual Peace. Special attention is paid to how well Habermas' proposed multi‐level institutional model fares in comparison with Kant's proposal—a league of states. I argue that Habermas' critique of the league fails in important respects, and that his proposal faces at least two problems. The first is that it implies a problematic asymmetry between powerful and less powerful states. The second is that it entails creating a global police force that has an obligation to intervene against egregious human rights violations worldwide, and that this seems incompatible with the idea that every person has an innate right to freedom. There are important normative constraints relevant for institutional design in the international domain that Habermas does not take sufficiently into account. However, this does not mean that Kant's league cannot be supplemented with more comprehensive forms of institutional cooperation between states. On the basis of my assessment of the multi‐level model, I propose a hybrid model combining elements from Kant and Habermas.

Normer, intervention og kon ikt på Afrikas Horn – betydningen for Somalia

Inter-state con ict in Africa is rare. ough the continent has seen more than its fair share of con icts, the majority of these have been internal rather than inter-state. A notable exception is the Horn of Africa, where inter-state con ict is more common than in Africa as a whole. An important factor in explaining this is the region’s colonial history, which di ers from the general African history of colonization in that the region’s central state, Ethiopia, was never colonized. is article argues that Africa has a stronger non-intervention norm than the rest of the world, because it is underlined by a strong anti-colonialism norm. Due to Ethiopia’s special role in the region, the two norms run counter on the Horn resulting in a weaker non-intervention norm. e article analyses how the weaker non-intervention norm a ects inter-state relations on the Horn and what this means for the current political developments in Somalia.

Was Westphalia ‘all that’? Hobbes, Bellarmine, and the norm of non-intervention

AbstractRecently, historians of the international system have called into question the significance of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 as the moment when the international system formed. One of their primary arguments is that the non-intervention norm typically associated with Westphalian notions of sovereignty developed much later. This paper will examine the early 17th-century debates over the right of the Pope to depose monarchs in the defense of spiritual matters. I read Part III and Part IV of Hobbes’Leviathanin its intellectual context to see how his theory of sovereignty was partially developed to support a theory of non-intervention. This reading leads to two important contributions to current political science debates. First, it refutes the growing consensus that non-intervention developed as an aspect of sovereignty only in the late 18th and early 19th century. Second, the paper addresses current attempts to assert a right of humanitarian intervention. By exploring similarities between these recent debates and those between Bellarmine and Hobbes in the 17th century, I offer a fresh perspective on what is at stake in current claims to international community.

The Norm Dynamics of Asian Regionalism

Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism. By Amitav Acharya. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009. 200 pp., $39.95 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-80144-751-8). Given the emergence of regional security organizations throughout the world in the wake of World War II, why did one fail to take root in Asia? Moreover, why does Asian regionalism remain “soft” or lack the degree of institutionalization found elsewhere? Amitav Acharya's latest study on Asian regionalism tackles these empirical puzzles, which have significant implications for scholars who study international organizations, regional security, and Asian politics. Acharya critically engages international relations theories, particularly constructivist approaches, in arguing that the ability of the United States to create an Asian security organization after World War II was primarily hamstrung by normative opposition from Asian leaders. He further claims that early post-war interactions, while strengthening the norm of non-intervention in Asia, largely predisposed the region to a less institutionalized form of multilateralism. Acharya broadly contributes to constructivist approaches, therefore, in showing that local practices and norms matter and how they help shape the diffusion process from the global to the regional context. Acharya begins his study by examining international relations theories to explain post-war Asian regionalism. This discussion builds on his earlier pioneering work that applied constructivism …

Democracy and Human Rights in the European-Asian Dialogue: A Clash of Cooperation Cultures?

Whereas the European Union (EU) favors a formal, binding, output-oriented, and to some extent supranational approach to cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is based on informal, non-binding, process-oriented intergovernmental forms of cooperation. This article addresses the question of whether these differences between European and Asian cooperation norms or cultures can account for interregional cooperation problems in the areas of democracy and human rights within the institutional context of EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The author argues that a clash of cooperation cultures basically occurs in both forms of interregional collaboration between Asia and Europe, with slight differences due to the institutional context: while disagreements over the question of democracy and human rights between the EU and ASEAN have led to a temporary and then a complete standstill in cooperation, the flexible institutional mechanisms of ASEM seem, at first glance, to mitigate the disruptive effects of such dialogues. Yet informality does not remove the issues from the agenda, as the recurrent disputes over Myanmar's participation and the nonintervention norm favored by the Asian side of ASEM clearly indicate. Antagonistic cooperation cultures thus play a significant role in explaining the obstructive nature of the interregional human rights and democracy dialogue between Asia and Europe.

ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality

Despite their other theoretical differences, virtually all scholars of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agree that the organization's members share an almost religious commitment to the norm of non-intervention. This article disrupts this consensus, arguing that ASEAN repeatedly intervened in Cambodia's internal political conflicts from 1979 to 1999, often with powerful and destructive effects. ASEAN's role in maintaining Khmer Rouge occupancy of Cambodia's UN seat, constructing a new coalition government in exile, manipulating Khmer refugee camps and informing the content of the Cambodian peace process will be explored, before turning to the ‘creeping conditionality’ for ASEAN membership imposed after the 1997 ‘coup’ in Phnom Penh. The article argues for an analysis recognizing the political nature of intervention, and seeks to explain both the creation of non-intervention norms and specific violations of them as attempts by ASEAN elites to maintain their own illiberal, capitalist regimes against domestic and international political threats.

State Sovereignty after 9/11: Disorganised Hypocrisy

This article examines the implications of the 9/11 attacks and the US-led ‘global war on terror’ for debates about state sovereignty. To support its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush administration put forth a ‘selective sovereignty’ thesis that would legitimise intervention in states that are accused of supporting terrorists. This new rationale for intervention was paradoxically justified as a means of ensuring a ‘well-ordered world of sovereign states’, which had been imperilled by transnational terrorist networks. This article argues that the ‘selective sovereignty’ thesis exaggerates the challenge posed by terrorist organisations to Westphalian sovereignty, and understates the US's own unprincipled violation of its core norm of non-intervention. A related argument of this article is that on the face of it, the ‘selective sovereignty’ approach fits the notion of ‘organised hypocrisy’ put forward by Stephen Krasner, which refers to ‘the presence of long-standing norms [in this case non-intervention] that are frequently violated’ for the sake of some ‘higher principles’ – violations that are generally tolerated by the international community. But the higher principles evoked by the US to justify its war on Iraq, such as the human rights of the Iraqis, and democracy promotion in the Middle East, are now clearly seen to have been a façade to mask the geopolitical and ideological underpinnings of the invasion. In this sense, the war on terror has revived national security and naked self-interest as the principal rationale for intervention, notwithstanding the self-serving efforts by some Bush administration officials to ‘graft’ the ‘selective sovereignty’ thesis on to the evolving humanitarian intervention principle. This policy framework is hypocrisy for sure, but as the international response to the war on Iraq (including the lack of UN authorisation for the war and the transatlantic discord it generated) demonstrates, it should be viewed more as a case of ‘disorganised hypocrisy’.