Non-conceptual Representations Research Articles

Conceptualizing Mindfulness Using Construal Level Theory: A Two-Dimensional Model

Construal Level Theory (CLT) is a well-established, comprehensive framework that provides an account of the relationship between construal level and psychological distance, and the effects they have on cognitive processing and a wide range of phenomena. In this article we present a conceptualization of mindfulness based on the theoretical foundations of CLT. In light of mindfulness definitions and current research, it is difficult to determine whether mindfulness entails low psychological distance and concrete, non-conceptual representations of experience, or high psychological distance and abstract representations. We argue that mindfulness uniquely combines both. The two-dimensional model we present posits that mindfulness is characterized by a simultaneous decreased psychological distance from external sensory experiences and increased psychological distance from internal mental experiences. We highlight the uniqueness of this quality of mindfulness, and demonstrate how the formulation presented here not only aligns well with but also integrates research on mindfulness as a state of consciousness as well as a personality disposition. We further argue that this combination underlies the beneficial effects of mindfulness and delineate how it enables individuals to leverage the advantages and mitigate the drawbacks associated with both high and low levels of construal and psychological distance. The proposed two-dimensional model resolves contradictions in the literature, aiming to deepen our understanding of mindfulness, its benefits, and core mechanisms.

Picturing, signifying, and attending

In this paper, I develop an empirically-driven approach to the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual representations. I begin by clarifying Wilfrid Sellars's distinction between a non-conceptual capacity to picture significant aspects of our world, and a capacity to stabilize semantic content in the form of conceptual representations that signify those aspects of the world that are relevant to our shared practices. I argue that this distinction helps to clarify the reason why cognition must be understood as embodied and situated. Drawing on recent models of attention and valuation, I then argue that the human brain constructs a dynamic model of the world that it has encountered, encoding higher-level regularities in the form of linguistically structured representations. And I conclude by arguing that this approach to cognition provides a set of critical resources for understanding the situated nature of social cognition.

Experiencia perceptual y sustento epistémico

In this paper we analyze the problem of how our perceptual experiences give epistemic support to our beliefs. We begin with some considerations formulated by Fodor, but revise them in some respects. We consider, in particular, his recent proposal for the existence of non-conceptual representations in perceptual information processing. Our aim is to vindicate, against the arguments raised by some representatives of so-called ‘perceptual conceptualism’, a normative role for perceptual experiences insofar as they are conceived as representations with non-conceptual content.

Fodor’s Non-Conceptual Representations and the Computational Theory of Mind

Fil: Destefano, Mariela Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina

Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta-Representational.

Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta-Representational.

What Incongruent Counterparts Show

: In a recent paper, Robert Hanna argues that Kant's incongruent counterparts example can be mobilized to show that some mental representations, which represent complex states of affairs as complex, do so entirely non-conceptually. I will argue that Hanna is right to see that Kant uses incongruent counterparts to show that there must be a non-conceptual component to cognition, but goes too far in concluding that there must be entirely non-conceptual representations that represent objects as existing in space and time. Kant is deeply committed to the thesis that no representation of a complex state of affairs as complex can be entirely non-conceptual. For Kant, all representations of complex states of affairs as complex (including those of incongruent counterparts) are conceptually structured. I present an interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic according to which Kant not only aims at Leibnizian and Newtonian accounts of space and time, but also Hume's. Hume's account fails to make representations of complex states of affairs sufficiently determinate. Kant offers an account later in the Critique that is meant to correct this failing by requiring that all representations of complex states of affairs as complex be conceptually (inferentially) structured.

Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control

In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-directed movements underscores the capacity to acquire executable concepts of these movements, thus allowing them to come under intentional control. On the other hand, the degree of autonomy these nonconceptual representations enjoy, and the specific temporal constraints stemming from their role in motor control, set limits on intentional control over action execution.

Commonalities between Perception and Cognition

Perception and cognition are highly interrelated. Given the influence that these systems exert on one another, it is important to explain how perceptual representations and cognitive representations interact. In this paper, I analyze the similarities between visual perceptual representations and cognitive representations in terms of their structural properties and content. Specifically, I argue that the spatial structure underlying visual object representation displays systematicity – a property that is considered to be characteristic of propositional cognitive representations. To this end, I propose a logical characterization of visual feature binding as described by Treisman’s Feature Integration Theory and argue that systematicity is not only a property of language-like representations, but also of spatially organized visual representations. Furthermore, I argue that if systematicity is taken to be a criterion to distinguish between conceptual and non-conceptual representations, then visual representations, that display systematicity, might count as an early type of conceptual representations. Showing these analogies between visual perception and cognition is an important step toward understanding the interface between the two systems. The ideas here presented might also set the stage for new empirical studies that directly compare binding (and other relational operations) in visual perception and higher cognition.

Sellars on Hume and Kant on Representing Complexes

In his graduate-seminar lectures on Kant—published as Kant and Pre-Kantian Themes (Sellars 2002)—Wilfrid Sellars argues that because Hume cannot distinguish between a vivacious idea and an idea of something vivacious he cannot account for the human ability to represent temporally complex states of affairs. The first section of this paper aims to show that this argument is not properly aimed at the historical Hume who can, on a proper reading, distinguish these kinds of representations. This is not, however, Sellars’ only argument for this conclusion. The next section of this paper continues with a discussion of an argument that Sellars presents on Kant’s behalf in Science and Metaphysics, and its key Kantian premise that, pace Hume, only conceptual representations can represent any complex states of affairs as such. The conclusion of this discussion is that Sellars does indeed present compelling reasons for rejecting a Humean account, reasons centred on the ambiguity of the associative structure of mental representation (which Sellars subsequently replaces with inferential structure). The paper concludes with an examination of the sense in which non-conceptual representations—such as those that Hume considers—represent and the role that these play in conceptual representation for both Sellars and Kant.

An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content

The overall goal of this paper is to offer an independent, empirical route to characterize the content on nonconceptual content. I pursue a recent move by Pylyshyn, a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of mental representation, who focuses on empirical considerations in favor of nonconceptual representations. Pylyshyn proposes a minimalist view of nonconceptual representations. I offer empirical reasons that force us to go beyond minimalist account and reinstate empirically defensible richer nonconceptual representations into a theory of content.

Conceptuality in Spatial Representations

The notion of conceptuality is still unclear and vague. I will present a definition of conceptual and nonconceptual representations that is grounded in different aspects of the representations’ structures. This definition is then used to interpret empirical results from human and animal navigation. It will be shown, that the distinction between egocentric and allocentric spatial representations can be matched onto the conceptual vs. nonconceptual distinction. The phenomena discussed in spatial navigation are thereby put into a wider context of cognitive abilities, which allows for new explanations of certain features of spatial representations and how they are linked to other capacities, like perception and reasoning.

Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts

In the recent literature on concepts, two extreme positions concerning animal minds are predominant: the one that animals possess neither concepts nor beliefs, and the one that some animals possess concepts as well as beliefs. A characteristic feature of this controversy is the lack of consensus on the criteria for possessing a concept or having a belief. Addressing this deficit, we propose a new theory of concepts which takes recent case studies of complex animal behavior into account. The main aim of the paper is to present an epistemic theory of concepts and to defend a detailed theory of criteria for having concepts. The distinction between nonconceptual, conceptual, and propositional representations is inherent to this theory. Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that some animals, e.g., grey parrots and apes, operate on conceptual representations.

Mark DeBellis. Music and Conceptualization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. viii, 163 pp. ISBN 0-521-40331-6 (hardcover)

Mark DeBellis. Music and Conceptualization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. viii, 163 pp. ISBN 0-521-40331-6 (hardcover). Un article de la revue Canadian University Music Review / Revue de musique des universités canadiennes (Volume 18, numéro 2, 1998, p. 1-134) diffusée par la plateforme Érudit.