Targeting Of Noncombatants Research Articles

Exploring factors and implications of violence against civilians: a case study of the Soviet-Afghan war

ABSTRACT The Soviet-Afghan War serves as a significant case study to understand why states resort to violent acts against civilians during war. This study takes a multidimensional approach, examining strategic, operational, and individual factors and applying theories of violence and mass killing. By analyzing the conditions that led the Soviets to target civilians, this investigation identifies a nexus of interconnected factors. At the strategic level, Soviet leaders pursued a swift victory to establish a Communist client regime while minimizing casualties and controlling information flow. Operationally, the ill-preparedness of the Red Army for counterinsurgency warfare, coupled with an entrenched organizational culture, led to the adoption of counterproductive enemy-centric tactics against Afghan noncombatants. Additionally, inadequate training, prolonged deployments, and a lack of disciplinary measures at the individual level contributed to the perpetration of violent acts. Understanding the underlying causes of violence against civilians, particularly in the context of Russian forces, holds practical importance. This knowledge can assist policymakers in devising strategies that mitigate wartime violence and enhance the protection of citizens. Drawing parallels to contemporary conflicts involving Russia, the study concludes by recommending future research directions and emphasizing the relevance of comprehending the targeting of noncombatants in ongoing conflicts, notably the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

An Overview of International Terrorism

The origin of terrorism can be traced to the French Revolution. International terrorism can be described as warfare without territory, waged without armies. Every terrorist act contains the use of violence, and deliberate targeting of non-combatants and must have a political goal. During the days of the cold war both the superpowers employed terrorism against each other to intercept the spread of their respective ideologies and influence. International terrorism exacerbated the blatant display of carnage when Osama Bin Laden-led terrorist group destroyed the World Trade Center on 11th September 2001. Religious fundamentalism, low rate of socio-economic development, exploitative trends of globalization, brutal repression of petty offenders by the security personnel, growth of separatist groups, and overall degradation of moral values and humanism among the citizens of the global world are responsible for the emergence and acceleration of terrorism. Almost all the countries of the world have come under the all-embracing influence of terrorism. Though the United Nations at the global level have adopted various Conventions to curb terrorism, they have not produced desired results on account of a lack of unanimity among the member states and big powers. Despite a ban on a country’s territory to be used by terrorist groups, the terrorist groups are taking shelter and conducting training camps in the territory of a country at the indulgence of the ruling regime and when the opportunity comes, they kill innocent people and shatter the foundation of national symbol elsewhere.

Assessing the Role of Mass Media in Reducing the Menace of Insecurity in North-East Nigeria

Terrorism refers an unlawful violence or any other unlawful harmful act committed against civilians by groups or persons for political or other ideological goals, a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Since the emergence of Boko Haram terrorist group in the North-East Nigeria in 2002, human lives had been lost to their attacks in thousands. The killings have continued unabated until recently that they are being gradually overcome. Employing agenda setting theory, this study aimed at assessing the roles of mass media in reducing the menace of insecurity in North-East Nigeria. The study found among others that mass media can help to reduce the insecurity menace by articulation and pursuit of the national interests, conveying information to the people and security agencies, speaking out against societal ills and vices, providing informed criticism and viable alternatives to public policies on security matters and monitoring the performance of government security agencies and other concerned agencies. The study made additional recommendations on the roles that mass media can play in tackling insecurity in the region.

America’s Use of Terror: From Colonial Times to the A-Bomb. By Stephen Huggins (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2019) 368 pp. $39.95

Huggins’ book is a detailed retelling of the United States’ use of violence against non-combatants. It advances two central arguments—first, that states, not just non-state actors, commit terrorism and, second, in the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, the United States is no exception. Like other nationalities, Americans have often attacked non-combatants when it suits their interests. In defending these positions, Huggins uses clear argumentation and highly accessible case studies from U.S. history.The first argument hinges on Huggins’ definition of terrorism as the deliberate attacking of non-combatants to alter their political will. He rules out both wanton, apolitical violence and genocide as neither act is about coercion but about revenge or sadism and extermination, respectively. Given the many competing definitions of terrorism in the legal, academic, and policy worlds, the addition of a new definition is neither necessary nor surprising. Still, Huggins’ view is worth considering as it has significant consequences for our understanding of political violence.Although Huggins’ definition prevents states from escaping the label of terrorism and aids in impugning immoral state actions, it muddies our understanding of violent behavior. Are aerial bombardment, state repression, lynchings, the burning of Native American villages, and the 9/11 attacks all best understood as one and the same phenomenon? Certainly they are all coercive acts centered on the repugnant killing of non-combatants. However, racial violence, state repression, and warfare have varying logics and are often studied separately. It is unclear that the strategic calculations of white supremacists, al Qaeda, Curtis LeMay, and George Custer are the same. Hence, although defining terrorism broadly aids condemnations of state actions and highlights them as forms of coercion, it clouds our understanding of the strategic thinking underlying these various forms of political violence. Huggins’ book makes clear that such trade-offs are inherent to any definition of terrorism and thus inescapable. Whether the gains from Huggins’ definition are worth the losses depends on readers’ interests.Huggins has a much easier time making his second argument. Through detailed case studies ranging from the 1600s to the 1940s, he shows that the U.S. government and private U.S. citizens have regularly attacked non-combatants, especially if they perceived those non-combatants as racial or ideological others. He covers a wide variety of instances, including wars with Native Americans, the repression of slaves in antebellum America and of blacks under Jim Crow, the use of torture in the Philippines, and the firebombing of Axis cities in World War II. Although these cases do not break new historical ground, having them all in one book makes for powerful, if grim, reading. They also make a compelling case against American exceptionalism—the theory that the United States is fundamentally different and better than other nations.Huggins sometimes includes attacks arguably outside his definition of terrorism. For instance, many campaigns against Native American tribes were genocidal in nature, and some of the detailed atrocities appear to have been acts of wanton violence driven by rage, rather than calculated political acts. He also occasionally references unintentional, collateral casualties, such as civilian victims during the siege of Vicksburg. His definition, however, could easily be modified to include such acts. The central point about Americans not being exceptional stands.Ultimately, the book is important for two reasons: (1) It forces Americans to come to terms with some of the more unsavory elements of their history, and (2) it illustrates that definitions of contentious concepts like terrorism shape how we analyze the world. In the absence of no singular, correct definition of terrorism, Huggins’ more expansive conception highlights the ways in which states often parallel or exceed the brutal actions of non-state groups in their attacks on non-combatants. For these reasons, the book is well worth reading.

Playing dirty to survive: the vulnerability of civilian targets within U.S. military aid recipient states

ABSTRACT U.S. military aid provides recipient governments the fighting capability they require to undermine domestic militant groups, which can undermine groups’ leadership structures and trigger group splintering. In this environment, brutal attacks against non-combatants become an effective mechanism for targeted groups to signal their resolve and outbid competitors. A large-n analysis of U.S. military aid between 1989 -2011 links higher levels of military aid with higher levels of rebel-perpetrated civilian killings, and deaths due to explosive attacks on non-combatant targets. A closer examination of the case of Pakistan sheds further light on the underlying causal mechanisms.

Noite de terror na cidade luz: os atos terroristas em Paris e a avaliação da imagem de destino por turistas brasileiros


 
 
 
 O terrorismo contemporâneo pode ser considerado um dos males do século XXI e suas ações têm atingido um número cada vez maior de alvos não combatentes. Os grupos extremistas estão à procura de lugares com grande circulação de pessoas como pontos turísticos para realizar os seus ataques. Os atentados almejam alcançar um maior número de kafirs, termo para definir os incrédulos ou infiéis da doutrina islâmica, ou obter uma maior atenção da mídia. Assim, o presente estudo objetivou entender como turistas brasileiros, que estavam em Paris, percebem a interferência da noite dos atentados em 13 e 14 de novembro de 2015 na imagem turística da cidade. A investigação foi qualitativa exploratória com a triangulação dos dados: pesquisa documental, questionários abertos e depoimentos em vídeos, com o uso da análise de conteúdo. Os resultados mostram um impacto mediano na atividade turística, porém pouco importante na imagem da cidade de Paris nos meses subsequentes aos atentados, sendo o fluxo de visitantes reestabelecido em curto prazo. A relevância primordial deste artigo foi compreender o impacto na demanda turística pós-atentados terroristas a partir da percepção dos turistas sob a imagem do destino.
 
 
 

Intercultural Struggle and the Targeting of Noncombatants: The Case of the Islamic State

The prohibition against targeting noncombatants is a long-held commitment in both Muslim and Western military ethics. Nevertheless, some militant Muslim groups, and particularly the Islamic State, have created ever-widening space for attacking those traditionally considered immune from targeting in military operations. Our essay uses two theoretical apparatuses developed in social psychology—cultural cognition and moral foundations theory—to explain how certain aspects of post-9/11 tactics on the part of the United States and its allies have contributed to this phenomenon. We also use these same tools to show that similar dynamics work to contribute to the rightwing backlash against Muslims in the United States.

Third-Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War

This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900–2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

The Ethics of Insurgency

In the latter half of the twentieth century, lasting memories of two world wars and astonishment over the power of nuclear weapons left both policymakers and scholars of war largely preoccupied with the possibility of a catastrophic World War III. Instead, however, the face of war since 1945 has been that of regionally limited small wars and insurgencies fought with conventional weapons. Many of these conflicts began as armed rebellions against colonial regimes, but often later evolved into armed conflicts between and among various subgroups seeking control of state government. Such conflicts have usually been asymmetrical, with the party holding the reins of state power using aircraft, artillery, and armored vehicles, while those fighting against the regime have been limited to weapons that individuals can carry, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and improvised weapons of various sorts. The asymmetries have also typically gone deeper, with the fighters on the former side wearing uniforms and those on the latter often not; those on the former side making use of fortified bases and those on the latter side protecting themselves by blending in with the civilian population. Further, there have frequently been asymmetries in how each side has fought, with the militarily weaker side relying on stealth tactics, deception, and attacks against nonmilitary targets of more general public value, including direct attacks on people protected as noncombatants under the laws of war. The particular range of tactics classified as terrorism begins at this point, with the specific, direct, and intentional targeting of noncombatants. Such attacks not only have been the means of choice for transnational nonstate actors, including al-Qaeda and the self-styled Islamic State, but have also been used to considerable effect in local civil wars.

Impure Agency and the Just War

AbstractFeminist critiques of intention challenge some aspects of traditional just war reasoning, including the criteria of right intention and discrimination (particularly as interpreted using the doctrine of double effect). I take note of these challenges and propose some directions just war reasoners might take in response. First, right intention can be evaluated more accurately by judging what actors in war actually do than by attempting to uncover inward dispositions. Assessing whether agents in war have taken due care to minimize foreseeable collateral damage, avoided intentional targeting of noncombatants, corrected previous mistakes in their later actions, and taken responsibility to repair unintended damage they cause are examples of ways in which just war reasoners can evaluate intention by looking at actions.

In Internet's Way: Radical, Terrorist Islamists on the Free Highway

The article is opened with definitions of terms utilized throughout the article. Terrorism is defined as the threat or employment of violence against noncombatant targets for political, religious, or ideological purposes by sub-national groups and/or clandestine individuals who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. Terrorist conduct is designed to attract attention to the terrorist’s cause and to spread fear and anxiety among wide circles of the targeted population. Subsequently I analyse how terrorists use the Internet, and what can be done to counter their activities. The Internet is used to disseminate information, for propaganda, indoctrination, networking, psychological warfare, socialization, motivation, fund raising, spreading tactics, recruitment, planning activities and coordination. As the Internet became a major arena for modern terrorists, we need to devise appropriate methods to forestall their activities and establish security.

Compliance with International Humanitarian Law

This article examines compliance with international laws prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war, specifically focusing on the role of third-party states in enforcement. We argue that the expectation of third-party coercion, when sufficiently high, can induce war participants to comply with this body of law. We identify the conditions under which combatant states will anticipate a high likelihood of coercion, demonstrating that third-party states are most likely to coerce combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Democratic third parties that value the rule of law and human rights possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while strong allies, trade partners, and intergovernmental organization (IGO) partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to engage in coercion by linking combat-ant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants who have ratified the Geneva/Hague Conventions prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war are more likely to comply with the legal obligations included in those conventions when they interact with relatively strong democratic alliance, trade, and IGO partners. In a series of quantitative tests on a data set of all interstate wars from 1900 to 2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for the role of third parties in inducing compliance with the law.

Intending to err: the ethical challenge of lethal, autonomous systems

Current precursors in the development of lethal, autonomous systems (LAS) point to the use of biometric devices for assessing, identifying, and verifying targets. The inclusion of biometric devices entails the use of a probabilistic matching program that requires the deliberate targeting of noncombatants as a statistically necessary function of the system. While the tactical employment of the LAS may be justified on the grounds that the deliberate killing of a smaller number of noncombatants is better than the accidental killing of a larger number, it may nonetheless contravene a reemerging conception of right intention. Originally framed by Augustine of Hippo, this lesser-known formulation has served as the foundation for chivalric code, canon law, jus in bello criteria, and the law of armed conflict. Thus it serves as a viable measure to determine whether the use of lethal autonomy would accord with these other laws and principles. Specifically, examinations of the LAS through the lenses of collateral damage, the principle of double effect, and the principle of proportionality, reveal the need for more attention to be paid to the moral issues now, so that the promise of this emerging technology--that it will perform better than human beings--might actually come to pass.

In Internet’s Way

The article is opened with definitions of terms utilized throughout the article. Terrorism is defined as the threat or employment of violence against noncombatant targets for political, religious, or ideological purposes by sub-national groups and/or clandestine individuals who are willing to justify all means to achieve their goals. Terrorist conduct is designed to attract attention to the terrorist’s cause and to spread fear and anxiety among wide circles of the targeted population. Subsequently the author analyses how terrorists use the Internet, and what can be done to counter their activities. The Internet is used to disseminate information, for propaganda, indoctrination, networking, psychological warfare, socialization, motivation, fund raising, spreading tactics, recruitment, planning activities and coordination. As the Internet became a major arena for modern terrorists, we need to devise appropriate methods to forestall their activities and establish security.

Nonlethal Weapons, Noncombatant Immunity, and Combatant Nonimmunity: A Study of Just War Theory

Frequently, the just war principle of noncombatant immunity is interpreted as morally prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants. Apparently, many just war theorists assume that to target means to (intend to) kill. Now that effective nonlethal weapons have been envisaged, it should be evident that there is no conceptual connection between intentionally targeting and intentionally killing. For, using nonlethal weapons, there could be intentional targeting without intentional killing. This paper explores the question of whether the noncombatant immunity principle should be revised, so as to allow uses of nonlethal weapons. Preliminary to answering this question, some other questions are explored, among which are the following. Why should a noncombatant immunity principle be accepted? Why is it morally permissible to intentionally target enemy combatants? Are noncombatants grievously harmed when they are incapacitated by nonlethal weapons? Is it morally permissible to intentionally incapacitate enemy combatants with nonlethal weapons, while knowingly but not intentionally incapacitating noncombatants? In order to focus on moral questions involving nonlethal weapons, questions about their effectiveness or legality are set aside. Instead of the idea of noncombatant immunity as expressed above, a delimited principle of noncombatant immunity is proposed—namely, that, in the conduct of war, the intentional grave injuring or killing of noncombatants is morally prohibited. Also proposed is a principle of noncombatant targeting, which would allow some uses of nonlethal weapons to intentionally incapacitate noncombatants.

Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-45 (review)

Reviewed by: Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-45 Randall T. Wakelam Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-45. By Randall Hansen.. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2008. ISBN 978-0-385-66403-5. Illustrations. Notes. Index. Pp. xi, 353. $35.00 Cdn. Fire and Fury by Canadian political scientist Randall Hansen is an examination of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany. Using a story telling style reminiscent of Martin Middlebrook, Hansen argues that Air Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris's area bombing did not win the war, but rather lengthened it. While this line of reasoning has been well debated by military historians, Hansen uses it as the basis for a long and fairly aggressive attack on Harris and the immorality of area bombing in comparison to the ethical precision campaign waged by the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF). There is relatively little new research in this volume, but it will cause readers, new and experienced, to ask themselves about the morality of bombing of non-combatant targets, and perhaps by extension of war itself. Hansen does use many first hand accounts of what civilians on the ground experienced in raids against such centres as Hamburg and Dresden, to name the most controversial of Bomber Command's targets. He also does a good job of counterpoising these vignettes with the policy decisions, tactical debates and technical challenges faced by both the RAF and the USSTAF. While these qualities make the book worthy of a read there are several limitations which detract from it. First, the work seems to be a fairly obvious attack against Harris. Hansen occasionally admits to Harris's character strengths; however, the author by and large misses no opportunity to explicitly or implicitly criticize the head of Bomber Command as a commander who readily ignored both direction and argument that he shift the Command's targeting away from [End Page 999] apparently pointless and ruthless city busting. By comparison Hansen paints the leadership and rank and file of the USSTAF as white knights who had the means to hit militarily relevant targets with precision and who abhorred the rare occasions when directed to attack cities. Hansen in taking this approach has not done his homework, or so it seems. Sources consulted and used, according to the bibliography, are considerable, but he has missed or misread a number of key ones which would allow a different understanding of what really happened. A curious omission is that of the Canadian official history, The Crucible of War 1939-1945, which actually takes a critical view of Harris. As well, Hansen seems to be very selective in his use of two sources which point out that the USSTAF did do city bombing by policy and practice. Both Richard G. Davis in Bombing the European Axis Powers and Tami Davis Biddle in Rhetoric and Reality make clear and unequivocal reference to these circumstances. Davis cites primary sources and even shows that there were occasions where such sources were at the time doctored to avoid having to talk about area bombing. He also offers a discussion of the area bombing of Japanese cities, concluding that while Harris destroyed 60 German cities, Spaatz did the same in Japan—an issue which Hansen all but ignores. One other important omission from Hansen's bibliography is William Hays Parks's 1995 article, "'Precision' and 'Area' Bombing: Who Did Which and When?" (which Davis too neglects) which draws from extensive primary data to show that while the RAF bombed cities so too did the USSTAF. Adding to this curious and unbalanced treatment of the literature, the book contains a number of glaring errors of fact. Hansen claims for instance that the 1941 Butt report showed that two thirds of RAF bombers bombed more than 75 miles from their targets while in fact Butt said that aircraft were bombing outside of a five mile radius of the target (an area of 75 square miles). On another occasion Hansen refers to a raid of 11,000 aircraft while the figure was in fact 1100. As well he indicates that the Harris Papers are in the Churchill Archives when they are most definitely...

Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity: Is it Permissible to Target Noncombatants?

The concept of noncombatant immunity prohibits the intentional targeting of noncombatants. The availability of nonlethal weapons (NLW) may weaken this prohibition, especially since using NLWs against noncombatants may, in some cases, actually save the noncombatants’ lives. Given the advancement of NLWs, I argue that their probable appearance on the battlefield demands close scrutiny due to the moral problems associated with their use. In this paper, I examine four distinct cases and determine whether the use of NLWs is morally permissible. While it seems that the reduced harm caused by NLWs makes their use more acceptable, adhering to noncombatant immunity requires more than not killing noncombatants. It also requires that military forces treat noncombatants a certain way. In the cases I present, to use NLWs against noncombatants treats them as combatants and coerces them to do something against their will. While a consequentialist foundation for noncombatant immunity may permit this action, a rights-based concept of noncombatant immunity does not. I contend that only a rights-based concept of noncombatant immunity is viable, and that the availability of NLWs should not significantly alter the prohibitions prescribed by noncombatant immunity.

The Chechnya Conflict: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists?

The term terrorism is one of the most politicized and contested concepts in the modern era. Russia has consistently framed the conflict in Chechnya as an issue of terrorism and banditry. Western policy has been inconsistent, oscillating between criticism of Russia's excessive application of force and sympathy for Russia, in particular after 9/11 and the start of the war on terror. This article examines the debates over the nature of terrorism and explores whether terrorism is an analytically meaningful and useful concept to explain the conflict in Chechnya. It demonstrates that if we employ the most widely accepted and plausible definition of terrorism—the targeting of noncombatants—then the use of such tactics has been peripheral to the Chechen resistance, although it has gradually becoming more systematic in response to Russia's disproportionate brutality against Chechen civilians.

Organized Arson as a Political Crime. The Construction of a «Terrorist» Menace in the Early Modern Period1

Throughout the early modern period there were numerous rumors about organized arson. When the emerging administrations of the early modern states organized fire-fighting, policing, and measures against the homeless poor, they often did so under the assumption that they were threatened by incendiarists’ conspiracies. A critical look at the source materials makes it more than likely that the arsonist scare was a delusion comparable to the fear of witches, poisoners or Jewish plotters. Using a supposed peasant upheaval, the ‘Bundschuh’ rebellion of 1517 as an example, this article discusses how and why arsonist scares originated. There are parallels between modern terrorism and the imaginary organized arson of the early modern period: The conspiracy structure, the violent attacks against non-combatant targets carried out by non-soldiers in furtherance of political goals, the spread of insecurity and anxiety as an end in itself. Thus, terrorism as a concept was known to the early modern period and influenced processes of state building.

Commentary on Khalid and Olsson's “Suicide Bombing: A Psychodynamic View”

Khalid and Olsson provide us with a concise interpretation of suicide bombing, which I prefer to refer to as homicide/suicide or just homicide bombing. Homicide bombing has been with us long before the crisis in the Mideast and has been regarded by the United States army as a form of unconventional warfare “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (Robinson, 2004, p. XVI). Most experts agree with the authors that homicide/suicide bombers do not evidence psychopathology in the traditional sense. Khalid and Olsson discuss the psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism and use the term “vengeful” in describing Osama bin Laden and other individuals. They discuss “identity gaps” resulting from “perceived and shared personal trauma imposed on these individuals by other groups.” I know of no empirical data to support such a position. As Marc Sageman (2004) has noted the vast majority of homicide/suicide bombers have been described as “happy kids” who liked school are were often overprotected by their parents. He states, “I found no evidence of ‘childhood trauma’ described by self, friends or relatives. . . . As a group they had surprisingly little personal trauma in their lives. . . . Mohamed Atta suffered no childhood trauma. If anything, he was overprotected by his mother (p. 86).” Sageman gives many similar examples from his direct research study. He notes no evidence of pathological narcissism in homicide bombers and even notes that one of the most attractive features about Osama bin Laden has been “specifically his lack of narcissism, his humility, which impresses his followers and admirers—especially because he had the means to live luxuriously and chose to give up that lifestyle to live simply, among his mujahedin” (Sageman, 2004, p. 86). “His statements are also self–deprecating rather than grandiose.” Al Qaida and similar groups are careful to avoid a cult of personality placing emphasis on local autonomy and initiative. In a similar concept authoritarianism is contrary to the tenets of Salafism noting that only God