Non-bank Lenders Research Articles

Auto Finance in the Electric Vehicle Transition

Financing cost differentials tilt the calculus for households toward electric vehicles (EVs). Using 85 million observations on U.S. auto loans, we study households’ credit risk by engine type, seek to uncover the sources and ask if credit risk differentials are being priced. We find that EV borrowers default 29% less relative to internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) borrowers with a back-of-the-envelope value of $1,457 in lender savings. To disentangle selection from expost exposure to differential costs of running an EV, we implement a differential shock exposure by treatment model of Borusyak and Hull (2023). Do lenders passalong these savings to borrowers? EV borrowers pay 2.2 percentage point lower interest rate, the equivalent of $2,711 in foregone payments. This lower rate is only for captive (manufacturer-based) lenders, not for bank and nonbank lenders, suggestive of policy and strategic motives by manufacturers, not a passing along of credit risk value. Another $1,457 is probably not being priced to households. Finally, we find that the ABS market knows, at least partially, allowing for less in loan loss reserves buffering the ABS, reflecting $233 in savings for the ABS issuer.

Financial statements not required

Using a dataset covering 3 million commercial borrower financial statements, we document a substantial, nearly monotonic decline in banks’ use of attested financial statements (AFS) in lending over the past two decades. Two market forces help explain this trend. First, technological advances provide lenders with access to a growing array of borrower information sources that can substitute for AFS. Second, banks are increasingly competing with nonbank lenders that rely less on AFS in screening and monitoring. Our results illustrate how technology adoption and changes in credit market structure can render AFS less efficient than alternative information sources for screening and monitoring.

Financial statements vs. FinTech: A discussion of Minnis, Sutherland, and Vetter

Minnis, Sutherland, and Vetter (MSV) documents a sharp decline in lenders’ collection of attested financial statements (including unqualified audits, reviews, and compilations) over the period 2002 to 2017. They attribute this change to lenders adopting new technology and new non-bank lenders entering the lending market. In this discussion, I explore several dimensions of their findings. First, I provide a framework for usefulness of financial statement information in debt contracting. Using this framework, I consider how financial statements may be useful for the small and medium loans the authors study, and how this role could be disrupted. Second, I consider how financial technology (FinTech) has disrupted traditional lending and potentially changed the role of financial statements. Finally, I consider the implications for this change on the accounting profession.

The impact of fintech lending on credit access for U.S. small businesses

Small business lending (SBL) plays an important role in funding productive investment and fostering local economic growth. Recently, nonbank lenders have gained market share in the SBL market in the United States, especially relative to community banks. Among nonbanks, fintech lenders have become particularly active, leveraging alternative data and complex modeling for their own internal credit scoring. We use proprietary loan-level data from two fintech SBL platforms (Funding Circle and LendingClub) to explore the characteristics of loans originated pre-pandemic (20162019). Our results show that these fintech SBL platforms lent relatively more in zip codes with higher unemployment rates and higher business bankruptcy filings. Moreover, fintech platforms’ internal credit scores were able to predict future loan performance more accurately than traditional credit scores, particularly in areas with high unemployment. Using Y-14 M loan-level bank data, we compare fintech SBL with traditional bank business cards in terms of credit access and interest rates. Overall, while not all fintech firms follow the same approach, we find that fintech lenders could help close the credit gap, allowing small businesses that were less likely to receive credit through traditional lenders to access credit and potentially at lower cost.

Evolution of Debt Financing Toward Less-Regulated Financial Intermediaries in the United States

Abstract Nonbank lenders have been playing an increasing role in supplying debt, especially after the Great Recession. How important are the distortions in the greater regulation of banks that differentially limit risk-taking across alternative providers of credit? How might the growing role of nonbanks in credit markets affect financial stability? This selective review addresses these questions and discusses how banks and nonbanks helped provide liquidity to the nonfinancial sector during the COVID-19 pandemic shock. We argue that tighter bank regulation has created incentives for nonbanks to increase their participation in credit markets, a trend that creates concerns about financial stability.

Nonbank lenders as global shock absorbers: Evidence from US monetary policy spillovers

We show that nonbank lenders act as global shock absorbers from US monetary policy spillovers. For identification, we exploit monetary policy surprises and the global syndicated lending market, where detailed loan-level data allow us to compare the participation of banks and nonbanks in the same loan. When US policy tightens, dollar credit to non-US firms falls, but nonbanks increase credit supply (relative to banks), thereby mitigating the total credit reduction. This relative increase is stronger for riskier non-US firms, proxied by emerging market firms, high-yield firms, or firms in countries with stronger capital inflow restrictions. Finally, there are real effects associated with the international nonbank channel of monetary policy, as firms with better access to nonbank credit relatively increase total corporate debt, investment, and employment.

Which Lenders are More Likely to Reach Out to Underserved Consumers: Banks Versus Fintechs Versus Other Nonbanks?

There has been a great deal of interest recently in understanding the potential role of fintech firms in expanding credit access to underbanked and credit-constrained consumers. We explore the supply side of fintech `credit, focusing on unsecured personal loans and mortgage loans. We investigate whether fintech firms are more likely than other lenders to reach out to “underserved consumers,” such as minorities; those with low income, low credit scores, or thin credit histories; or those who have a history of being denied for credit. Using a rich data set of credit offers from Mintel, in conjunction with credit information from TransUnion (TU) and other consumer credit data from the FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel/Equifax Data, we compare similar credit offers that were made by banks, fintech firms, and other nonbank lenders. Fintech firms are more likely than banks to offer mortgage credit to consumers with lower-income, lower-credit scores, and those who have been denied credit in the recent past. Fintechs are also more likely than banks to offer personal loans to consumers who had filed for bankruptcy (thus also more likely to receive credit card offers overall) and those who had recently been denied credit. For both personal loans and mortgage loans, fintech firms are more likely than other lenders to reach out and offer credit to nonprime consumers.

Capital Regulation and Shadow Finance: A Quantitative Analysis

Abstract This article studies the effects of higher bank capital requirements. Using new firm-lender matched credit data from South Korea, we document that Basel III coincided with a 25% decline in credit from regulated banks, and an increase of similar magnitude from non-bank (shadow) lenders. We use our data to estimate the effect of capital requirements on bank credit, and the spillover effect of the reform on non-bank lending. We then build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks and firms that replicates these micro estimates. We find that Basel III can account for most of the observed decrease in regulated bank lending and about three quarters of the increase in shadow lending. The latter is driven exclusively by general equilibrium effects of the reform.

Regulation and information costs of sovereign distress: Evidence from corporate lending markets

We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.

Banks, non-banks, and the incorporation of local information in CMBS loan pricing

Comparing banks to non-bank lenders, we investigate whether the geographical distance between lenders, borrowers, and their properties is reflected in the pricing of US mortgages that were included in US commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) pools during the 2000 to 2017 period. The difference in loan spreads when the bank-borrower distance increases from zero to the median of about 700 miles is 10 basis points, and this effect is more pronounced if the loan is collateralized by a riskier property. On the contrary, geographical distance does not seem to have any effect on the loan spread of mortgages granted by non-bank lenders. The difference in loan pricing across originator types (even after controlling for key mortgage and property characteristics) suggests that banks and non-bank lenders have different incentives, lending technologies, and/or different types of borrowers. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on non-bank lender behavior.

Green credit and its obstacles: Evidence from China's green credit guidelines

How effective are green credit policies in guiding credit flows? We find a significant penalty effect of China's 2012 “Green Credit Guidelines” (GCG) on firms in pollution intensive industries. The GCG achieves cross-industry credit allocation by steering bank loans away from pollution intensive industries. Nonetheless, further analyses suggest special interests associated with political connections, local aspirations for economic growth, and banking business preferences stifle this effect. Strong environmental management at the firm level does not improve firms' access to bank credit regardless of their industries, suggesting GCG fails to attain cross-firm credit reallocation within industries. Additional analysis shows that pollution intensive firms strengthen their environmental management when they are bank dependent. When segregating overall bank credit into short-term and long-term, we find the credit penalty effect is more substantial for short-term credit, and the obstacle effects are somewhat mixed. Our evidence also suggests that pollution intensive firms substitute bank debt with debt supplied by non-bank lenders who are arguably under less compliance pressure, and GCG do not affect pollution intensive firms' real investments. Overall, we highlight the tension between environmental policies' intended consequence and the special interests embedded in the political and economic institutions typical of a large developing economy.

Less Bank Regulation, More Non-Bank Lending

Bank deregulation in the form of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act facilitated the entry of non-bank lenders into the market for syndicated loans during the pre-2008 credit boom. Institutional investors disproportionately purchase tranches of loans originated by universal banks able to cross-sell loans and underwriting services to firms (as permitted by the repeal). A shock to cross-selling intensity increases loan liquidity at origination and over time. The mechanism is that non-loan exposures ensure monitoring even when banks retain small loan shares. Our findings complement the conventional view that regulatory arbitrage caused the rise of non-bank lenders.

Nonbank Lenders as Global Shock Absorbers: Evidence from US Monetary Policy Spillovers

Nonbank Lenders as Global Shock Absorbers: Evidence from US Monetary Policy Spillovers

Nonbank lenders as global shock absorbers: evidence from US monetary policy spillovers

Nonbank lenders as global shock absorbers: evidence from US monetary policy spillovers

Do Non-Bank Lenders Mitigate Credit Supply Shocks? Evidence from a Major Bank Exit

Do Non-Bank Lenders Mitigate Credit Supply Shocks? Evidence from a Major Bank Exit

Nonbanks and Mortgage Securitization

This article reviews the dramatic growth of nonbank mortgage lending after the Global Financial Crisis, especially to borrowers with lower credit scores, and the related importance of mortgage-backed securitization. Our literature review suggests that the existing theoretical and empirical work on securitization is more relevant to bank than to nonbank lenders, thus leaving outstanding questions as to why nonbank market shares have increased to their current levels and how best to structure nonbank oversight. To highlight key differences in the mortgage-lending incentives of banks and nonbanks, we build a simple theoretical model of bank versus nonbank mortgage lending and use it to generate and test empirical hypotheses. We find, in particular, that loans issued by nonbanks are more likely to prepay early than loans issued by banks, the difference not explainable by nonbank borrowers prepaying more rationally. Using regulatory filings from nonbanks that are typically unavailable to academic researchers, we examine the balance sheets and liquidity and capital positions of large Ginnie Mae nonbank servicers, which face and pose more risk in the current mortgage system. We find that on average these servicers have reasonable liquidity and capital positions relative to standard regulatory thresholds, particularly in 2022:Q1 after a few quarters of elevated profits. However, some large Ginnie Mae servicers appear to have inadequate capital, as gauged by risk-based capital measures. If defaults rise on a large scale, the liquidity and capital positions of these servicers may amplify the disruption in the mortgage and housing markets.

Time to Assess Bias in Machine Learning Models for Credit Decisions

Focus on fair lending has become more intensified recently as bank and non-bank lenders apply artificial-intelligence (AI)-based credit determination approaches. The data analytics technique behind AI and machine learning (ML) has proven to be powerful in many application areas. However, ML can be less transparent and explainable than traditional regression models, which may raise unique questions about its compliance with fair lending laws. ML may also reduce potential for discrimination, by reducing discretionary and judgmental decisions. As financial institutions continue to explore ML applications in loan underwriting and pricing, the fair lending assessments typically led by compliance and legal functions will likely continue to evolve. In this paper, the author discusses unique considerations around ML in the existing fair lending risk assessment practice for underwriting and pricing models and proposes consideration of additional evaluations to be added in the present practice.

International bank credit, nonbank lenders, and access to external financing

AbstractUsing a cross‐country firm‐bank dataset, we examine how an unexpected increase in bank capital requirements by the European Banking Authority affects firms' financial choices. We find that the regulatory shock implies a reduction in the supply of bank credit, with US firms affected the most. Yet, US firms can tap into the public bond markets and secure credit lines from nonbank financial institutions. This has implications for their capital structure and their real outcomes. These results suggest that diversified domestic loan markets, in which banks and nonbank financial institutions lend to corporations, can help overcome reductions in cross‐border bank funding.

Monetary Interventions and the Rise of Non-Bank Lenders

Monetary Interventions and the Rise of Non-Bank Lenders

Discrimination in lending? Evidence from the Paycheck Protection Program.

We assess the role of race in loans made through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The PPP program, created by the U.S. government as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, provides loans to small businesses so they can keep employees on their payroll. We argue that the historical record and PPP program design choices made it likely that many Black-owned businesses received smaller PPP loans than White-owned businesses. Using newly released data on the PPP program, we find that Black-owned businesses received loans that were approximately 50% lower than observationally similar White-owned businesses. The effect is marginally smaller in areas with more bank competition and disappeared over time as changes to the PPP program were implemented allowing for entry by fintechs and other non-traditional lenders.Plain English SummaryWe find that Black-owned businesses received loans through the Paycheck Protection Program that were approximately 50 percent lower than White-owned businesses with similar characteristics. However, this difference in loan size shrank over time as more non-bank lenders such as fintechs were allowed to participate in the program and began approving PPP loans. Loan size differences were also slightly smaller in zip codes containing a larger number of bank branches. These results are consistent with prior research which shows lending discrimination by commercial banks against Black borrowers. It is also consistent with studies showing that greater access to and competition among banks and other lenders can reduce discrimination. In light of these results we recommend that policy makers account for existing racial inequalities within banking or other systems in their program design to produce more equitable outcomes.