On what basis do researchers posit that humans and other animals share cognitive capacities? We argue that such claims are not based on inherent, pre-existing similarities, but rather emerge through a two-step process, which we will call 'anthropofabrication'. In the initial stage, embodied action-based strategies and environmental context in human studies are ignored owing to the need for measurement and quantification. Consequently, cognitive terms become disconnected from the context to which we apply them, and human classificatory cognitive terms are transformed into broad explanatory terms, assumed to be 'species-neutral'. The second phase entails translating and applying these generalized explanatory terms to specific nonverbal animals in ways that serve to further cloak differences between animals and other species. Here, again, researchers selectively discard contextual information to facilitate the comparison with humans. To limit anthropofabrication, we should (re)acknowledge that cognitive abilities are not species-neutral and cannot be detached from embodied action, perception and their context of occurrence. We illustrate our points about anthropofabrication using the example of memory research. This article is part of the theme issue 'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence'.
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