Non-Proliferation Of Weapons Research Articles

Internal Affairs Bodies and Their Place in the System of Tasks and Functions of a Modern Democratic State: Issues of Legal Doctrine

The author points out that among the main priorities of Ukraine’s domestic policy since independence has been the creation of reliable mechanisms for security, political stability, and democracy that would correspond to the relevant mechanisms employed in the European Union. The prospect of EU membership is defined at the constitutional level and is a strategic guideline for Ukrainian aspirations for transformation and a key goal for which reforms are being carried out within the Ukrainian state. The creation and implementation of such mechanisms is the standard that will allow Ukraine to join the EU’s common security system, increase the effectiveness of control over the movement and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and bring international cooperation in the fight against organized crime, illegal migration, smuggling, terrorism, and drug trafficking to a new level. It is noted that Ukraine’s intentions to integrate into the European space have necessitated significant changes in national legislation aimed at adapting to a wide range of norms and standards generally accepted in international and European practice. The sphere of public security protection deserves special attention from lawmakers, as human rights protection is an invariable «gold standard» that distinguishes a democratic state. Given the state-forming importance of the national police, its improvement is in the zone of increased attention from both the government and society. It is extremely important today to create an effective organizational model of police bodies capable of reliably protecting the interests of the economy and citizens, implementing such principles of reforming the Ukrainian police that would result not only in excellent work in detecting and stopping offenses but also in creating significant resources for preventing offenses. The author demonstrates the dependence of the functional orientation of police structures on the functional orientation of the state, in particular on the form of state-legal regime it implements, which directly lays the basic principles of the activities of law enforcement structures in the country and the principles of their reform. Therefore, the logical idea arises that the functional orientation of police structures may depend on the functional orientation of the state, in particular on the form of state-legal regime it implements, which directly lays the basic principles of the activities of law enforcement structures in the country and the principles of their reform.

In silico structures, mass spectra and retention indices database development for purposes of chemical weapons convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a science-based international treaty for the disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical weapons. However, reference Orgaization for prohibition of chemical weapons (OPCW) central analytical database (OCAD) of structures with mass spectra (MS) and retention indices (RI) includes only minor part of all possible chemical species defined in the Schedules of CWC. In this work we employed OCAD in silico augmentation based on chemoinformatics approach for chemical structures enumeration, MS data generation based on message passing neural network and based on P-alkyl molecular pairs RI prediction to support the verification activities as provided for in the CWC. Enumerated 879 noncyclic and 5270 monocyclic alcohols became the basis for generating hundreds of thousands molecules of Schedule 1 toxic chemicals like Sarin, Tabun, VX and Novichok. Trained on ordinary and neutral loss electron ionization mass spectrometry (EI-MS) a message-passing neural network (MPNN) outperformed other quantum chemistry and machine learning methods. Generated by this MPNN in silico EI-MS are very similar to the library's spectra and allowed to reach desired match factor above 800 within a scale of 0–1000. Statistical data for molecular pairs based on P-alkyl fragments was collected and used to predict RIs within desired 20 RI window for some toxic chemicals of Schedule 1.A.01, for which in the current OCAD version RIs are absent.

The role of the NPT in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons

The entire atmosphere created by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its presence in the world played one of the responsible roles, since after the US bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used in a military situation (unless, of course, you take into account that the nuclear powers conducted more than 2,000 nuclear explosions at their test sites).
 It can be said that this is the result of a broad consensus reached by the international community on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the result of the actual operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons during its more than 50 years of existence. Currently, no bilateral or multilateral meeting on international security issues, including at the highest level, is held without a mention of nuclear non-proliferation, and it is often at the top of the agenda.
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an international legal and ethical norm that has entered the minds of millions of people. Many countries have developed and adopted national legislation establishing export control rules for materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, as well as other laws (customs, etc.) to help ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Extensive training of young experts in basic knowledge to support the international non-proliferation regime of nuclear weapons is ongoing.
 In the field of technology, scientists and experts in reactor engineering are working in many countries to build nuclear power plants that will not produce materials used to create weapons of mass destruction. Many scientists are working to prevent the construction of reactors that threaten the proliferation of technologies and nuclear materials capable of producing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
 The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime contributed to a fundamental change in the world’s attitude to nuclear weapons. From the first impression in the eyes of the world public that nuclear weapons are a «genius» discovery, the latter is increasingly perceived as a mortal danger that threatens human existence, and this idea penetrates deeper and deeper into the consciousness of millions of people.

Scientific and Technological Advances as Current Challenges to the Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime

The recent advances in biological sciences and biotechnology have resulted in new knowledge and capabilities that challenge existing understandings of biological threats and biological weapons (BW). The purpose of the article is to evaluate scientific and engineering decisions that pose potential challenges to the biological weapons non-proliferation regime and can reduce barriers to their development, production and use. Materials and methods. The scientific articles available through the PubMed, Google Scholar and Russian Electronic Library databases were used in the research. The method of analysis is the description. The results of the research. The success of biotechnology provides impetus for experimentation with biological weapons, particularly by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations and extremist groups. Transformative changes are occurring in areas not directly related to microbiology. However, the potential for their malicious use is no less of a concern than the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. The transformation of the concept of «biological threat» is traced. It becomes more complex and includes elements from other fields outside of biotechnology and the traditional understanding of biological weapons. In addition to biotechnology and synthetic biology, such technologies that are directly related to the BTWC issue, may include: additive manufacturing based on 3D printing technologies; big data analysis and artificial intelligence technologies; nanotechnology and materials science, as well as biological research automation and robotics. Conclusion. Many dual-use technologies have received close attention from the scientific community and international experts, but this does not always contribute to an accurate and balanced understanding of their potential in the context of BTWC issues. The convergence of new and emerging disciplines is creating new areas of scientific knowledge that address the problem of non-proliferation of biological weapons, which requires the expert community to make a balanced assessment from the point of view of both dual use and the risk of excessive prohibition and negative impact on further scientific and technological progress.

The role of the UN in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

According to the UN Charter (Article 26), the UN Security Council is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nuclear states agreed to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that provided positive security assurances. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution №255 on June 19, 1968, was of particular significance. This resolution stipulated that instances of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would require immediate action by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, who are nuclear-armed states.
 The aim of the work is to determine the role of the UN Security Council in the system of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The methodological basis of the study will focus on the analysis and understanding of the impact of the UN Security Council on strategies and measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international context.
 The results of our research have shown that the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear program, which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons, proved to be significant. To achieve this, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution №687 adopted on April 3, 1991, the Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established.
 During an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council at the highest level on September 24, 2009, Resolution UN Security Council Resolution № 1887 was adopted, aimed at supporting nuclear non-proliferation, criticizing Iran and North Korea. Resolution №1887 outlines measures to strengthen control and the rights of nuclear-weapon states to demand the return of nuclear materials and equipment in case of violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or withdrawal from it. It also involves enhancing security measures for the storage of nuclear materials and strict export controls.
 Conclusions. In our opinion, the powers of the UN Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be utilized more promptly and effectively. The insufficient effectiveness of this international mechanism in preventing proliferation remains a cause for serious concern among UN members worldwide. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, we propose the adoption of a comprehensive resolution that includes provisions on the procedure for a state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its violation of commitments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This resolution should stipulate the imposition of sanctions against such a state based on a special report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a mechanism can ensure an effective impact of the international community on states that withdraw from the NPT.

Информационные угрозы и международная информационная безопасность в работе ООН и ШОС

The purpose of this article is to comparatively analyze the work carried out by the leading countries in the UN and the SCO on international information security (IIS). The UN activities in the sphere of IIoS are disclosed in the working formats of the GGE and the OEWG. The authors show that the Russian side is moving from the goal of establishing an international regime of non-proliferation of information weapons to the creation of an international regime of non-use of information weapons on critical infrastructures. The article notes that the Western approach has evolved from recognizing that there is no need to create additional norms to the norms of international law and the need to develop an international universal, legally binding instrument to the exact opposite objectives. Based on the highlighted areas of comparison between the UN and the SCO, the authors conclude that, unlike the UN, the SCO addresses the problem of cyber threats promptly and consistently through several forms of interaction (at least four): signing international documents, creating and developing regional institutions to combat cyber threats, etc. At the UN level, work is carried out only in two areas, which requires improvement and expansion of these areas.

Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap. Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023

Control over the circulation of dual-use goods and technologies within the international regimes of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

International legal cooperation in the field of control over the export, transfer, transit of dual-use goods and technologies is based on a number of mechanisms of general competence (for example, the UN, WTO) and specific regimes, the core of which constitute international treaties on the non­proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention) and related multilateral export control groups (Zanger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australian Group).
 While the mentioned international treaties define the goals and basic principles of cooperation of their parties to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the critical task of intergovernmental export groups, capable of responding more promptly to security challenges in the light of technological progress and market dynamics, is to ensure the development and regular updating of lists of controlled goods, dissemination and exchange of best practices in this area, articulation of instructions for participating states regarding the strengthening of national export control systems.
 Such a structure, promoting transparency and responsible behaviour of states, objectively increases the level of international security, ensures more profound and comprehensive cooperation and interaction of participating states, regular exchange of information on sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, which leads to a consensus on the specifics of the implementation of export control systems and harmonisation of national policies and regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, taking into account the "softness” of obligations arising from the activities of specialised export groups, the effectiveness of the control mechanism depends on the goodwill of the participating states and their commitment to the values and goals of these regimes and is also complicated by the limited participation of individual actors (for instance, India, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.).

АНАЛІЗ ТРЕНДІВ У ТРАНСФЕРІ ТЕХНОЛОГІЙ ПОДВІЙНОГО ПРИЗНАЧЕННЯУ ГЛОБАЛЬНІЙ ЕКОНОМІЦІ

B a c k g r o u n d . In recent decades, an international system of export control of both military products and TPP has been formed. Due to objective reasons, this system is constantly changing, which requires appropriate adaptation of national legislation and administrative mechanisms. In view of this, an important scientific and practical task is the study of trends in the development of the international export control system, in particular in relation to the TPP. This is necessary for the development of measures aimed at deepening international cooperation and increasing the effectiveness of TPP export control at the national level. M e t h o d s . The following methods were used: analytical, retrospective, comparative. R e s u l t s . The article specifies the essence and features of the implementation of export control of dual-purpose technologies. C o n c l u s i o n s . Export control, as a set of norms of international law, contractual and political obligations aimed at reducing the risk of the use of military force, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery and countering terrorism, is an important component of the international security regime. The relevance of export control is determined by two factors: the possibility of export control to contribute to the interests of international security and the possibility of achieving their own national interests by the states that apply it.

EU strategic trade controls and sanctions: are we talking about the same thing?

Strategic trade controls and sanctions might sometimes be considered interchangeable terms or concepts due to the fact that both are instruments that are used to interfere in international trade for political reasons. On the one hand, sanctions are usually an instrument that states use to exert pressure on one another, often regardless of the intended uses of the goods transferred; on the other, strategic trade controls focus on the potential end use of items and may pursue diverse objectives, from the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the protection of cultural goods. This contribution investigates the relationship between strategic trade controls (or export controls) and sanctions (or restrictive measures). The article analyses their respective scopes, objectives, decision-making processes, implementation, lifting and revision procedures, and prosecution of violations within the European Union. Furthermore, the contribution specifically outlines the competences granted to the Union with regard to export controls and sanctions, as well as their evolution over time. The article concludes that strategic trade controls and sanctions are not synonymous. It specifies their peculiarities, their differences and similarities in light of the scopes, objectives, and procedures that the research has identified. Finally, based on this categorization, the article establishes general trends and principles.

International legal issues on biosafety: general overview

Objective: The legal concept and content of biosafety is discussed in the context of International Law. Biosafety issues are enumerated as part of a definition of concrete aspects related to responsibility of the states for using biological weapons. The latest trends in international law on ensuring the international biosafety are analysed. Legal issues concerning the definition of a just war are discussed in terms of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle of necessity governing the use of force, the right of states to self-defence in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, arms control, and responsibility). The article presents an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of states, along with the legal concept of international biocrime (genomocide), as well as classifications of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics and bioeconomics. Under current conditions, the importance of facilitating a broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety is emphasized.Methodology: The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.Results: Despite the prohibition of biological weapons, urgent issues, such as establishing an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons, remain. Moreover, the Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, is yet to be fully adopted and / or ratified by all member states. Identifying certain types of biomedical research that should be banned according to generally accepted principles, the study concludes that the problem of banning these research activities has yet to be solved by some states. The concept of biosafety is interpreted broadly in terms of issues arising in relevant industrial processes. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and the security of outer space. Principles governing effective legal regulation for ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety are presented.

Problems of Biosafety in Current International Law

INTRODUCTION. The presented article is devoted to an extremely curious and, without exaggeration, urgent topic. The authors seek to understand the content and legal concept of biosafety in International Law. The researchers seek to list the biosafety issues in order to define concrete aspects related to responsibility of the States for using biological weapons. The authors analyze new legal trends on ensuring the international biosafety. The article is focused on legal issues by raising many questions about what should be considered a just war in the view of international humanitarian law, the issues of fundamental principles in current international law (the principle use of force, the right of States to self-defense in case of a bioattack, the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, arms control, and responsibility). The writers give an overview of new types of sovereignty such as biosovereignty, cyber sovereignty, cyberbiosovereignty, and genomic sovereignty of States, the legal concept of international biocrimes (genomocide), the legal classification of bioterrorism, bioaggression, biopolitics, and bioeconomics. The authors consider the importance of facilitating the broad interpretation of the concept of biosafety.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The research uses general scientific and special cognitive techniques wherein legal analysis and synthesis, systemic, formal-legal, comparative-legal, historical-legal and dialectical methods are applied.RESEARCH RESULTS. The authors found out that despite the prohibition of biological weapon there are still other urgent issues such as an international control mechanism for monitoring the non-proliferation of biological weapons has not been established yet. The Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has not been adopted yet. The study concludes with an idea that the problem of banning certain types of biomedical research has not been solved in some States and at the international level. The authors note such important problems as the lack of an international control mechanism for monitoring the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, as well as the threat to the safety of genomic research and confidentiality of genetic data. In this paper, we interpret the concept of biosafety rather broadly, considering the issues typical of allied industries. Biosecurity and biosafety are directly related to ensuring environmental security, marine security, food security and outer space security. The researchers paid attention to the issue of legal regulation of ensuring environmental, biological, and food safety. Due to this fact, it is hard to do so with regard to the causal link between the acts (bioterrorism) of state agencies, the violation of the principles of international law, standards of human rights and the consequences that occurred. It is not clear from the text of the BTWC Convention which international organ/body can investigate such acts in international affairs and which norm of international law directly should be applied.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. Following a review of the content, the authors raise possible problems, strategies, suggestions and guidelines for ensuring biosafety in international law. The authors conclude that near future new categories of weapons of mass destruction appear in the world, moreover, genetic weapons should be classified as weapons of mass destruction, along with chemical, biological, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons. Technological developments will trigger the issues of fundamental principles in current international law. The authors came to the conclusion about extension of the universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in case biological and genetic weapons are used. The authors encourage the complement to the international legal regulation the necessity to adopt a Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), establishing an international control mechanism for verifying prohibitions on the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is obvious. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction adopted in 1993, which contains a mechanism for verifying compliance with the prohibitions of the Convention, can be considered a precedent for the effective regulation of the circulation of hazardous substances all over the world.

Strengthening biological security after COVID-19: Using cartoons for engaging life science stakeholders with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of ‘dual use’ in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC.

RE-THINKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE AGE OF PANDEMICS

The magnitude of COVID-19 pandemic caught the world off guard. Therefore, strategic anticipation in policy making, exit strategy out from COVID-19 environment, and strategic impact of the pandemic for international, regional, and national security in post-COVID-19 world will be the most important issues in the foreseeable future. Increasingly complex and complicated strategic security environment of the beginning of the 21st century will be characterized by further global and regional instability in failed and/or failing states, and regional crises and conflicts. Moreover, global security environment in post-COVID-19 world will finalize transition from unipolar, the United States dominated global security framework – legacy of post- Cold War settlement after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991-into multipolar global security order with China, Russian Federation, India and other actors who will be increasingly challenging the United States and the West politically, economically and militarily. Post-COVID-19 global security environment will be further challenged by decreased ability of international organizations, such as UN, OSCE, EU, and others, to address urgent and simultaneous security threats and challenges, therefore, the role of the state will increase bothinternationally and domestically. However, since numbers of states are rather weak in terms of social cohesion and institutional capability- these states will be increasingly vulnerable to maintain effective institutional framework in order to address security challenges of the post-COVID-19 world. Moreover, these security challenges will specifically target small states due to the fact that small states are heavily dependent for their own security and defence arrangements on politically powerful and militarily capable global actors, therefore, small states will become increasingly vulnerable to address their political, social, economic and military challenges. The threat of terrorism, illegal migration, conventional military conflict, organized crime, cyber threats, CBRN threats, conventional arms control (CAC) issue, further development and control of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction- these are just a few domains of global and regional security, which will remain of utmost importance in post-COVID-19 world. Subsequently, defence, security and law enforcement institutions will face substantial legal, operational, moral, and institutional challenges in post-COVID-19 security environment. These challenges will include the limits of recruitment, standing operational procedures (SOP), rules of engagement (ROE), morale of personnel, and other relevant domains. Moreover, possibility of open involvement of active and former members of defence, security and law enforcement institutions into internal political affairs of a state will significantly increase.

Supporting the fight against the proliferation of chemical weapons through cheminformatics

Abstract International frameworks have been put in place to foster chemical weapons nonproliferation and disarmament. These frameworks feature lists of chemicals that can be used as chemical weapons or precursors for their synthesis (CW-control lists). In these lists, chemicals of concern are described through chemical names and CAS Registry Numbers®. Importantly, in some CW-control lists, some entries, rather than specifying individual chemicals, describe families of related chemicals. Working with CW-control lists poses challenges for frontline customs and export control officers implementing these frameworks. Entries that describe families of chemicals are not easy to interpret, especially for non-chemists. Moreover, synonyms and chemical variants complicate the issue of checking CW-control lists through names and registry numbers. To ameliorate these problems, we have developed a functioning prototype of a cheminformatics tool that automates the task of assessing whether a chemical is part of a CW-control list. The tool, dubbed the Nonproliferation Cheminformatics Compliance Tool (NCCT), is a database management system (based on ChemAxon’s Instant JChem) with an embedded database of chemical structures. The key feature of the database is that it contains not only the structures of the individually listed chemicals, but also the generic structures that describe the entries relative to families of chemicals (Markush structures).

Controlling the Export of Digital and Emerging Technologies

Abstract Dual-use export control regulates the trade of items which serve both civilian and military purposes. Justification for imposing export controls has been furnished by the need for safeguarding regional and international security, especially the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The rationale for applying export controls has been subject to challenges, however. This Security and Human Rights special issue addresses the underlying justification for imposing export controls by focusing on their technological fronts. Scott A. Jones’ piece sheds light on the regulatory challenges that have arisen for the US’ control over so-called “emerging” technologies. Cindy Whang moves on to compare the US’ approach with that of the EU’s dual-use export control. Ben Wagner proposes a set of policy options for the design of export controls on digital technologies, so that they can serve as an effective vehicle for promoting the protection of human rights.

Россия в ООН: императивы векторов разоружения

The main purpose of this article is to study the efforts of the United Nations as a legitimate platform at the global level, which has tools of an international legal nature to maintain peace, stability and security in arms control issues, in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The article examines the history of long-term activities of Soviet and Russian diplomacy in this area, offers solutions and scenarios for building new approaches in Russian foreign policy in this area. When preparing the article, a set of different methods was used: the main technique was the complex application of different methods – system, historical and problem analysis, along with the principles of logical interpretation. The article highlights the role and importance of the most important international UN documents in the field of disarmament, adopted with the active participation of Soviet and Russian diplomacy, develops the concept of inadmissibility of diluting the main elements and powers of the UN system, and also gives specific recommendations for their prevention. The authors conclude that the end of the cold war did not lead to a stable and equal system, safe for its participants, and the new rivalry of the leading powers returned. In this regard, the perspective importance of the "nuclear five" format in the issues of arms control and disarmament processes is highlighted. The theoretical and, especially, practical significance of the work is determined by the high degree of relevance of this issue – at present, the architecture of security and control over nuclear weapons created over the past half century is disintegrating, which, according to the authors, requires a rethinking of the role of the UN in global processes.

The United Nations’ Reso Lution 2325 “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” and Its Role in Preventing Terrestrial-Based WMD Utilization Toward Orbiting Space Objects

Abstract The 2016 United Nations’ Resolution 2325 “Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” manifests one of the greatest challenges for humankind in relation to preventing a global catastrophe, where it reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. However, regarding the continuous technological developments of terrestrial-based WMD aimed at orbiting space objects in near-Earth orbit, it is crucial to analyze whether, and if so, how 2325 prevents their proliferation and utilization. Another relevant argument addresses the terminological factuality that, while treaty and customary law do provide some guidance on the legality of weaponization, the concept of a “space weapon” is still not clearly defined. Moreover, even though the Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and WMD in near-Earth orbit, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space, it simultaneously excludes terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons, thus creating a legal loophole. National representatives of superpowers, particularly of space-faring nations, are aware of the existing issue and often express their concerns toward comprehensive ASAT development and utilization. Nevertheless, the potential weaponization of outer space will not be actively recognized and accepted as an official occurrence within the international community until our current space systems are eventually utilized in order to destroy or damage another State’s space object.

In search of the elusive conflict: The (in-)compatibility of the Treaties on the Non-Proliferation and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

In search of the elusive conflict: The (in-)compatibility of the Treaties on the Non-Proliferation and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Implementation Against the Apartheid Regime in South Africa

The article covers history and practice of the development of economic sanctions as a mechanism of influence on countries that do not comply with the norms of international law. The objectives of the sanctions may include preventing wars, promoting freedom and democracy, combating environmental pollution, protecting human and labor rights, ensuring non-proliferation of weapons, releasing captured citizens, and countering land grab. Everything connected with sanctions (e.g. size, form, etc.) is determined by their acceptability by the community, and they are influenced by technology and the existing relations of power between social groups within countries. However, unlike well-defined rules concerning declared war and blockade of wartime, international law doesn’t establish any legal or formal restrictions on coercive measures with the exception of war. The first written economic sanctions were imposed in 432 BC by the Athens Maritime Union on the city of Megara. Sanctions were aimed at stopping the Megara’s practice of accepting runaway Athenian slaves and plowing sacred border territories. Sanctions were ineffective, due to which the Peloponnesian War began. Athens suffered a crushing defeat, and the Athenian union was destroyed. In the 19th century sanctions generally took the form of sea blockades. The question of the international legitimacy of sea blockades did not arise until the formation of the League of Nations in the 20th century. Article 16 of the Charter of the League of Nations allowed collective economic and military action against a state that turned to war in disregard of the League Agreement, which required states to settle disputes peacefully. In the Charter of the United Nations, the right to apply sanctions is enshrined in Articles 2 (4), 39, 41, 42, 43 and 46 of the Charter of this organization and in the “Unification for Peace resolution” 1950. In the period between 1946 and 1990 the UN imposed sanctions on North Korea, South Africa, Portugal, Rhodesia and Iraq. In the subsequent period, the UN began to apply sanctions more actively, especially against African states. Effectiveness of the implemented economic sanctions in most cases was dubious, since the desired results were not achieved or at least deviated from the initial purpose. After the massacre in Sharpeville, where civilians who protested against the apartheid became victims of inhuman police crimes, the problem of South African racist politics became a hot topic on the world agenda. Some countries led by India in the following years began to actively raise this issue with the UN Security Council. Western countries did their best to prevent the use of sanctions against South Africa, because of the country’s important role for NATO in advancing its strategic goals. After the Soweto Uprising, on November 4, 1977, when the photographs of young people killed by the police appeared in major newspapers worldwide, the UN Security Council finally adopted mandatory sanction measures. Nevertheless, governments of some of the Western powers sought to maintain their traditional tolerance for the apartheid regime, counting on South Africa to counter the Soviet-Cuban intervention in the civil wars of Angola and Mozambique. Since 1977 till 1994 The UN Security Council had repeatedly demanded that all states comply with the sanctions restrictions, which throughout this time gradually tightened and comprehensively affected all spheres of life of the South African society.