Non-market Regulation Research Articles

ЦІНОУТВОРЕННЯ ЛОГІСТИЧНИХ ПОСЛУГ

The purpose of the article is to consider the mechanism of pricing in logistics systems and identify features of pricing for logistics services. Features of formation of prices for logistic services are considered. Significant importance is attached to the composition of costs for logistics services as a basis for price formation in the logistics system and the basic parameters of equilibrium. The types of costs in the context of their impact on the price are considered. Logistics costs are characterized by: distribution by different groups of costs, classified by traditional aspects (species and quantity); high and often increasing share of total costs of the enterprise; - variability of costs in different periods of time; division of responsibility for their occurrence between the many organizational units and jobs that make up the logistics system; the complexity of measures related to determining their total volume and performing a large number of settlement operations. The influence of costs on the pricing of services is determined. Types of logistics services and features of pricing depending on the type of services are defined. Depending on the degree of non-market regulation, services are divided into: services, the tariffs for which are regulated by the state; services, tariffs for which are formally regulated by market participants themselves; services, tariffs for which are formed by market mechanisms. The types of factors of formation of logistic expenses depending on the degree of their detailing are investigated. The factors that must be taken into account in the process of developing a pricing strategy in logistics systems. It is determined that the pricing strategy is chosen depending on the company's mission and is aimed at taking a competitive position in the market, is consumer-oriented and takes into account the resource potential of the enterprise and is aimed at increasing profits. The article determines that the price of the service takes into account: the time of service; the total time of the contractor to perform the service; order waiting time; rates of tariffs for services when calculating wages; direct and other costs.

Agricultural Extension Services and Market Regulation: Learning from a Comparison of Six EU Countries

If farmers are to meet the new challenges facing agriculture (environment, rural development, etc.), appropriate knowledge has to be produced. But observations in six EU countries (France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK) show that unexpected problems arise when technical support for agriculture is linked to market regulation, as recommended since the late 1980s. The source of these problems can be understood better by applying concepts from the service economy: i) The production of new knowledge requires strong interaction between service providers (technical support bodies) and beneficiaries (farmers). The weakening of non-market regulation procedures, which partly guaranteed these possibilities of interaction, makes the conception of an advisory service difficult. ii) As soon as consultancy becomes a paying service, some beneficiaries reduce technical interaction with their colleagues in order to benefit from a productive advantage, and the ‘multipliable’ nature of new knowledge is reduced. iii) An increasing number of farmers are excluded from the benefits of technical support even though they help to provide services that society expects from agriculture (management of the land, maintenance of activities in low-density areas). iv) The responsibility for combining contradictory requirements (competitiveness, environment, rural development) is most often put on the shoulders of individual farmers who are unequipped to deal with such complex issues. Observed trends attest to the fact that effects often run counter to the stated agricultural and rural development objectives of policies.

Capitalism: In search of alternatives

In the post-Soviet phase, the question of path of development and alternatives to capitalism is wide open. This article seeks to examine the Marxian theory regarding abolition of classes. It examines the conditions under which abolition of classes and rule of the working class becomes possible in Marxian theory. The analysis shows that abolition of classes is possible only under conditions of abundance and if abundance is not plausible, then in the Marxian framework working class rule is also not plausible. An attempt has also been made to sketch an alternative to capitalism. A tentative list of objectives that could form the strategic goal is discussed and it is argued that economic structure has to have a mix of market and non-market regulation, regulated private property and state/community ownership, etc. While this thesis has wide acceptance as the pragmatic goal for many critics of capitalism, usually the theoretical goal continues to be abolition of private property and rule of the working class. The thrust of this paper is to make a case for change in the ‘theoretical’ goal.

The Development of Non-market Regulation : Labor and Welfare in the 20th Century France(Session 2 Labor in the Welfare Capitalism,The Twentieth Century Capitalism : Reexamination of its History and Review of Methodologies,Special Issue of Commemoration : Papers Read at the Fiftieth Anniversary Conference of the Political Economy and Economic History Society of November 1998)

The Development of Non-market Regulation : Labor and Welfare in the 20th Century France(Session 2 Labor in the Welfare Capitalism,The Twentieth Century Capitalism : Reexamination of its History and Review of Methodologies,Special Issue of Commemoration : Papers Read at the Fiftieth Anniversary Conference of the Political Economy and Economic History Society of November 1998)

Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas

This article examines a thesis of interest to social epistemology and some articulations of First Amendment legal theory: that a free market in speech is an optimal institution for promoting true belief. Under our interpretation, the market-for-speech thesis claims that more total truth possession will be achieved if speech is regulatedonlyby free market mechanisms; that is, both government regulation and private sector nonmarket regulation are held to have information-fostering properties that are inferior to the free market. After discussing possible counterexamples to the thesis, the article explores the actual implications of economic theory for the emergence of truth in a free market for speech. When confusions are removed about what is maximized by perfectly competitive markets, and when adequate attention is paid to market imperfections, the failure of the market-for-speech thesis becomes clear. The article closes by comparing the properties of a free market in speech with an adversarial system of discourse.

Rent, State and the Market: The Political Economy of the Transition to Self-sustained Capitalism (Distinguishedl Lecture)

In opposition to the now generalised critique of rent-seeking the following contribution establishes the inevitable character of the emergence of a rent problem in nearly any transition to capitalism from pre-capitalist relations of production. The only possibility of avoiding this possibility would be a rapid demographic decline or an equally rapid increase in availability of productive land. This rent problem in underdeveloped countries is aggravated by the existence of technically more advanced economies. Integration into the world economy can contribute to the management of this rent problem, but does not abolish it. The topic of development economics is, therefore, the combination of market regulation with non-market regulation in order to move the respective underdeveloped economy to a state where.rent can be abolished by the extension of the market mechanism. In contrast to the recommendations of the Bretton Woods Institution, the mere reinforcement of market regulation and the withdrawal of the state from economic regulation cannot be considered as sufficient for moving underdeveloped economies to self-sustained growth which allows market regulation.

Self-regulating industry behavior: Antitrust limitations and trade association codes of conduct

Self-regulation exists at the firm-level, the industry-level, and the business-level of economic organization. Industry self-regulation has faced economic (“free rider”) and legal (antitrust) impediments to widespread implementation, although there exist examples of effective industry self-regulation, e.g., securities industry and the SEC, advertising and the FTC. By instituting industry codes of conduct, national trade associations have shown to be natural vehicles for self-regulation. While there has been long-standing general encouragement for establishing industry codes, adopting and enforcing conduct codes has been seriously circumscribed by restrictive Supreme Court decisions and FTC advisory opinions. One approach to clearing legal confusion is to petition the FTC to issue an industry guide on promulgating and enforcing trade association codes of conduct. Another strategy is to utilize a stakeholder approach to association ethics committee appointments that subsequently influence code creation and enforcement. Finally, a new concept of an industry code of conduct will consist of three subcodes: an economic code; an environmental code; and a socio-political code. Combined, these strategic approaches will offer new opportunities for effective nonmarket regulation.

Distribution in a Centrally Planned and Market-Oriented Economy

Distribution in market-oriented economies is shaped on the basis of market regulation while in socialist economies the main role is played by various types of nonmarket regulation. The seller's market is a structural characteristic of the socialist economy. Its consequences for various economic and social phenomena are entirely different from the buyer's market. The adaptive process of economic units proceeds differently. Characteristics of the market distribution and the administrative distribution playing a significant role in Poland differ as well. The distribution is characterized by its low adaptability, and it constitutes a bottleneck in the economy contributing with its high social costs to the deepening of the economic disequilibrium. The article discusses various characteristics of the centralized and administrative distribution. In the socialist economy, there exist parallely different systems of product allocation, which aggravates a negative impact of the distribution on the entire economy. It...

Industry Self-Regulation: An Economic, Organizational, and Political Analysis

Researchers generally have viewed nonmarket regulation of firm behavior as synonymous with direct regulation by the government. This paper highlights industry self-regulation as an alternative form of nonmarket regulation that, depending on the context, may supplement or complement direct regulation by the government. Further, on the basis of exploratory economic, organizational, and political analysis, it advances, for possible future research, propositions relating to the existence, operation, and outcome of industry self-regulation.

The Economics of the Baby Shortage

Although economists have studied extensively the efforts of government to regulate the economy, public regulation of social and personal life has largely escaped economic attention. With the rapid development of the economic analysis of nonmarket behavior, the conceptual tools necessary for the economic study of social (as distinct from narrowly economic) regulation are now at hand.1 Nor is there any basis for a presumption that government does a good job of regulating nonmarket behavior; if anything, the negative presumption created by numerous studies of economic regulation2 should carry over to the nonmarket sphere. An example of nonmarket regulation that may be no less perverse than the widely criticized governmental efforts to regulate imports, transportation, new drugs, bank entry, and other market activities is the regulation of child adoptions-the subject of this paper. Sometimes natural parents do not want to raise their child; the typical case is where the birth is illegitimate. And in some cases where the natural parents do raise the child initially, their custody is later terminated for one reason or another--death or other incapacity, abuse, or extreme indigence. In either case-the unwanted infant or the abused, neglected, or abandoned child-there are potential gains from trade from transferring the custody of the child to a new set of parents. Where the new parents assume full parental rights and obligations over the child, one speaks of adoption; where they obtain simply a temporary custody (usually being partially compensated for their custodial services by the state), one speaks of foster care. An alternative to foster care in a home is foster care in an institution.

A note on the decision rules of public regulatory agencies

In recent years economists have investigated the use of market mechanisms to deal with external diseconomies [Coase; Castle]. They have also recognized that many external diseconomies cannot be compensated by internalization. When this occurs the relevant problem becomes the specification of legal parameters for non-market regulation [Haveman; Galbraith; Castle]. This note examines an important component of the process of specifying the legal parameters the decision rules of public agencies. The analysis is presented in somewhat more formal terms than has appeared previously in the literature by using the analogy of statistical decision rules. This approach provides considerable insight on how a change in political decisions (policy assumptions) can reverse a regulatory agency's decisions without changing its technical evaluation procedures.1 Regulatory agencies are charged with establishing standards for such diverse items as drugs, industrial pollution and nuclear energy. They are also responsible for determining if the standards are being met and for enforcing compliance with them. Technical expertise in these areas constitutes the raison d'etre of the agencies, while policy assumptions are thought to belong in the sphere of the legislative bodies which establish guidelines and vote funds for the agencies. A point which is generally ignored, however, is that the daily decision rules of the agencies themselves are derived from the hypotheses they establish. The