Non-identity Problem Research Articles

The Unthinkable Conclusion: Derek Parfit's Budding Antinatalism.

Derek Parfit famously opined that causing a person to exist with a life barely worth living can be wrong, although it is not wrong for that person. This conundrum is known as the nonidentity problem. Parfit also held that persons can, in a morally relevant sense, be caused to exist in the distant future by actions that make the agent a necessary condition for a person's existence. When these views are combined, which he did, and applied explicitly to persons with a life not worth living, which he did not, an interesting conditional conclusion can be drawn. If every family line eventually produces a person with a life not worth living, and if causing that person to exist cannot be justified by the benefits befalling others in the family line, it is always wrong to have children. Parfit did not draw this antinatalist conclusion, but an analysis of his introduction of the nonidentity problem shows that he could have. Since Parfit's other views on population ethics continue to be discussed with relative respect, it stands to reason that the antinatalist position should be no exception. Right or wrong, it has its legitimate place in considerations concerning the future of reproduction.

Intergenerational Domination

AbstractThe political and ethical status of future generations is commonly discussed within conceptual frameworks like intergenerational justice, rights, or welfare. In this article, I argue that the concept of domination can provide a novel perspective on the philosophy of intergenerational relations. To that end, I first advance and defend a (slightly) revised conception of domination, drawing on Philip Pettit’s neorepublican view. Second, I establish a prima facie case for the existence of intergenerational domination and address four major objections to the claim that the present generation dominates future generations: the non-concurrency challenge, a modified version of the non-identity problem, the inescapability objection, and the problem of historical domination. Finally, I explore some implications and conceptual advantages of the framework of intergenerational domination. As a theoretical foundation of a comprehensive analysis of structures of domination, the proposed framework may contribute to identifying and reducing domination within and across generations.

Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem

Reparative justice, historical injustice, and the nonidentity problem

The Varieties of Prudence

We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored recently by Das and Paul, and although, as this paper argues, their analysis fails—there is no intrapersonal analogue for the non-identity problem—it functions to highlight a persistent and perplexing puzzle for prudential rationality. This paper offers its own explanation: namely, that the phenomena that motivate the purported intrapersonal problem are better accounted for by conceiving prudence as disjunctive. To this end, I sketch a theory of two varieties of prudence.

Risk, Non-Identity, and Extinction

Abstract This paper examines a recent argument in favour of strong precautionary action—possibly including working to hasten human extinction—on the basis of a decision-theoretic view that accommodates the risk-attitudes of all affected while giving more weight to the more risk-averse attitudes. First, we dispute the need to take into account other people’s attitudes towards risk at all. Second, we argue that a version of the non-identity problem undermines the case for doing so in the context of future people. Lastly, we suggest that we should not work to hasten human extinction, even if significant risk aversion is warranted.

Dissecting the Non-Identity Problem

The non-identity problem is the problem of explaining why some “existence-inducing acts” are morally wrong. Many philosophers have tried to find a solution to this problem. In this article, I explore a different approach. My aim is not to offer a novel solution to the non-identity problem, but rather a different method for addressing it. The non-identity problem looks intractable when we assume that there is a single problem and a single solution to it. Thus, I dissect this problem into three different problems: the “non-comparative harm problem”, the “non-deprivation problem”, and the “creator harm problem”. I discuss these problems separately and explore possible solutions.

Rights and Future Persons

This paper examines the ways the two fundamental problems regarding the rights of future persons/generations (the non-existence problem and the non-identity problem) are usually tackled in scholarship. It is argued that while rights cannot be properly attributed to future people, rights in respect to future generations can be based on present persons’ identity.

Anti-natalism is incompatible with Theory X.

The anti-natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less-discussed claim that his anti-natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non-Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Since the publication of his Better Never to Have Been, Benatar has continued to claim that its provision of such solutions strengthens his defense of anti-natalism. Although Benatar's view has received much criticism, this argument has not been discussed at length. I undertake a thorough examination of the argument and identify reasons to reject it. The central point of my critique is that the implications of Benatar's views in determining ranges of wrong and not-wrong cases of procreation are extensionally inadequate when applied to the problems of population ethics.

A Less Bad Theory of the Procreation Asymmetry and the Non-Identity Problem

AbstractThis paper offers a unified explanation for the procreation asymmetry and the non-identity thesis – two of the most intractable puzzles in population ethics. According to the procreation asymmetry, there are moral reasons not to create lives that are not worth living but no moral reasons to create lives that are worth living. I explain the procreation asymmetry by arguing that there are moral reasons to prevent the bad, but no moral reasons to promote the good. Various explanations for the procreation asymmetry have failed to explain the non-identity thesis: if one could create a person with a good life or a different person with a better life, one has a moral reason to create the better life. I argue that reflections on the misfortune of unfulfilled potential allow us to circumvent the non-identity problem.

Defending the de dicto approach to the non-identity problem

Is it wrong to create a blind child, for example by in vitro fertilization, if you could create a sighted child instead? Intuitively many people believe it is wrong, but this belief is difficult to justify. When there is a possibility to create and select either ‘blind’ or ‘sighted’ embryos choosing a set of ‘blind’ embryos seems to harm no-one since choosing ‘sighted’ embryos would create a different child altogether. So when the parents choose ‘blind’ embryos, they give some specific individual a life that is the only option for her. Because her life is worth living (as blind peoples’ lives are), the parents have not wronged the child by creating her. This is the reasoning behind the famous non-identity problem. I suggest that the non-identity problem is based on a misunderstanding. I claim that when choosing a ‘blind’ embryo, prospective parents harm ‘their child’, whoever she or he will be. Put another way: parents harm their child in the de dicto sense and that is morally wrong.

The Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare: Its Merits and Flaws

According to the person-affecting view, the ethics of welfare should be cashed out in terms of how the individuals are affected. While the narrow version fails to solve the non-identity problem, the wide version is subject to the repugnant conclusion. A middle view promises to do better – the Interpersonal Comparative View of Welfare (ICV). It modifies the narrow view by abstracting away from individuals’ identities to account for interpersonal gains and losses. The paper assesses ICV’s merits and flaws. ICV solves the non-identity problem, avoids the repugnant conclusion, and seems to accommodate the person-affecting intuition. But it cuts too many things along the way: ICV obstructs the advantage of the wide view to account for all future individuals’ welfare, abandons the intuitions that underlie the narrow view, and even violates its own presuppositions by turning out to be merely pseudo person-affecting.

Contingent Existence, Worthwhile Lives, and Humane Animal Slaughter

Humanely raised farm animals have lives worth living, and their existence is contingent upon human actions. Do these facts render the act of humanely slaughtering such animals permissible? I identify two ethical principles that may seem to connect these facts to the permissibility of humane animal slaughter. The first principle, inspired by the non-identity problem, exonerates some actions that maximize an individual’s well-being, but it is often inapplicable to animal slaughter. The second principle, which exonerates actions that are part of a practice that makes the animal better off, does apply to animal slaughter; but this principle is false.

The Ethical Aspects of Choosing a Nuclear Fuel Cycle

In this paper, we addressed the problem of choosing a nuclear fuel cycle. Ethical problems related to the choice of a nuclear fuel cycle, such as the depletion of natural uranium reserves, the accumulation of nuclear waste, and the connection with the problems of nonidentity and distributive justice are considered. We examined cultural differences in attitudes toward nuclear safety and the associated ambiguities in the choice of a nuclear fuel cycle. We suggested that the reduction in consumption of natural uranium does not seem to be a feasible way of reducing nuclear waste because of the nonidentity problem.

The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem

AbstractDavid Boonin argues that in a choice between creating a person whose life would be well worth living and creating a different person whose life would be significantly worse, but still worth living, each option is morally permissible. I show that Boonin's argument for this view problematically implies that in a choice between creating a person whose life would be well worth living and creating another person whose life would not be worth living, each option is also morally permissible.

Enforcing Constitutional Sustainability Clauses in the Age of the Climate Crisis: Insights from Social Contract Theory on How to Take Account of Future Generations

Abstract Climate change is one of the most alarming events today, which will very likely have devastating effects on a lot of people worldwide. This paper addresses the question as to how constitutional sustainability clauses can be enforced in the age of the climate crisis. It does so by looking into some difficulties of making the notion of future generations operable. First, the paper will briefly analyze two decisions by the Austrian Constitutional Court and the Norwegian Supreme Court, which have both rejected claims based on constitutional sustainability clauses referring to future generations. This is juxtaposed with a recent decision by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany which invigorated Article 20a of the German Basic Law and thereby also future generations. Second, this paper aims at shedding light on the notion of future generations by looking into philosophical debates on the so-called non-identity problem. The question as to how to include future generations in the social contract and selected philosophical strategies to address it are discussed and introduced to the legal discourse. This seems to be a worthwhile goal as by now several scholars from various disciplines such as geography, political science, and applied ecology have opened up a debate on the role of social contracts concerning climate change. This paper seeks to further the debate by aiming to suggest a connection between philosophical social contract reasoning and constitutional sustainability clauses taking the example of Austria, Norway, and Germany.

Circumventing the Non-identity Problem

This article provides an account of moral obligations that we have towards present generations, which require us to produce outcomes that are similar to those we would be required to produce if we had moral obligations to future generations. Discharging these duties enables us to secure the kinds of goods for future generations that we intuitively think we ought to provide in the absence of an answer to the non-identity problem. In this sense, the non- identity problem is avoided rather than solved. Nevertheless, a significant upshot of this account is that it provides a basis for practical action in the face of theoretical uncertainty.

Escaping the Shadow

Escaping the Shadow

기후 변화의 비동일성 문제와 세대 간 정의

The issue of climate change is one of the most serious problems facing mankind at the moment. Climate change can be considered as a kind of injustice because future generations will have to suffer unilateral damage from climate change. The most problematic thing of establishing the theory of justice between generations of climate change is the nonidentity problem. Therefore, justice between generations for climate change must first be able to solve the nonidentity problem. This study examines several ethical theories that can be a solution to the nonidentity problem, and examines if they can act as an justice between generations of climate change. As a result, I concluded that the theory of justice based on John Rolls' just savings principle is the most valid.

“IF WE DIDN’T EAT THEM, THEY WOULDN’T EXIST” The Nonidentity Problem’s Implications for Animals (Including Humans)

“IF WE DIDN’T EAT THEM, THEY WOULDN’T EXIST” The Nonidentity Problem’s Implications for Animals (Including Humans)

Conventionalism about Persons and the Nonidentity Problem

ABSTRACT I motivate ‘Origin Conventionalism’—the view that which facts about one’s origins are essential to one’s existence depends partly on our person-directed attitudes. One important upshot is that the view offers a novel and attractive solution to the Nonidentity Problem. That problem typically assumes that the sperm-egg pair from which a person originates is essential to that person’s existence; in which case, for many future persons that come into existence under adverse conditions, had those conditions not been realized, the individuals wouldn’t have existed. This is problematic because it delivers the counter-intuitive conclusion that it’s not wrong to bring about such adverse conditions since they don’t harm anyone. Origin Conventionalism, in contrast, holds that whether a person’s sperm-egg origin is essential to their existence depends on their person-directed attitudes. I argue that this provides a unique and attractive way of preserving the intuition that the actions in the ‘nonidentity cases’ are morally wrong because of the potential harm done to the individuals in question.