non-GAAP Earnings Research Articles

Regional Social Capital and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure

We investigate whether regional social capital is associated with a company’s discretionary disclosures of non-GAAP earnings. The US county level social capital is used to capture the informal supervisory instrument of regional social capital. The two dimensions of social capital, dense networks and strong norms in regions with high social capital, cause reciprocity, integrity, and organizational citizenship. Using a panel of US companies, we find that companies located in regions with high social capital (1) are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, and (2) their non-GAAP earnings disclosures have higher quality. These findings are robust to controlling for demographic features, substitute proxies for regional social capital, and using two-stage least squares and propensity score matching approaches. Furthermore, we implement a mediator analysis and show that companies in high social capital regions have lower costs of equity capital because they are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, and their disclosures are of higher quality. Overall, the findings indicate that the informal institutional factor of regional social capital is associated with the crucial voluntary disclosure tool of managers’ non-GAAP earnings.

Economic Policy Uncertainty and Firms’ Non-GAAP Reporting

Using the US economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index developed by Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. [2016. Measuring economic policy uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593–1636. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw024], we examine the impact of policy uncertainty on firms’ non-GAAP reporting practices. We show that EPU increases both the likelihood and quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. These effects are more pronounced for firms with higher index ownership and for those with less informative GAAP earnings. Furthermore, we show that non-GAAP disclosures provide tangible economic benefit during periods of increasing EPU, including compensating for the reduced informativeness of GAAP earnings and reducing information asymmetry. Overall, our evidence suggests that non-GAAP reporting is a means by which managers communicate value-relevant information about their firms’ performance to investors during periods of high EPU.

Auditor tenure and non-GAAP earnings

PurposeThis study aims to examine whether the newly available auditor tenure information is associated with non-GAAP earnings, as the recent requirement to disclose the initial year of auditor-client relationship in audit reports may give the impression that longer auditor tenure may be related to lower audit quality.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of firm-quarters from 2017 to 2020, the authors conduct both univariate and regression analyses. We use hand-collected data for auditor tenure, SEC comment letters, and non-GAAP variables.FindingsFirst, the authors find that the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings monotonically increases with auditor tenure on a univariate basis. Second, auditor tenure is negatively associated with aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Third, the authors document evidence of aggressive reporting in general; that is, items excluded in calculating non-GAAP earnings are associated with future performance. However, the association declines with longer auditor tenure. Finally, the authors report evidence that the likelihood of receiving an SEC comment letter that contains non-GAAP comments decreases with longer auditor tenure.Practical implicationsThe results show that regulators need to consider both GAAP and non-GAAP disclosures’ costs and benefits when enacting auditor tenure regulation. Investors can benefit from the findings in evaluating the quality of non-GAAP earnings. The findings are also relevant to the SEC when allocating limited resources in monitoring non-GAAP reporting.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study showing that auditor tenure is associated with the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Given that financial reporting quality should be understood as a comprehensive system comprising both mandatory and voluntary disclosures, this study complements the literature that examines the effect of auditor tenure on financial reporting quality using GAAP reporting.

Non-GAAP Reporting and Investment

ABSTRACT The wide-spread reporting of non-GAAP earnings suggests efficiency gains from doing so. By estimating a dynamic investment model, we examine the real implications of investors using both GAAP and non-GAAP earnings to value firms. When investors use the firm’s GAAP earnings only, the firm’s manager—who cares about current stock prices—underinvests, and his investment is sensitive to transitory earnings. Non-GAAP earnings can improve investment efficiency by adjusting for these transitory earnings, but can also hide inefficient investment by introducing opportunistic bias. Although non-GAAP earnings induce overinvestment, they dominate GAAP-only reporting. Counterfactual analysis reveals supplementing GAAP earnings with biased non-GAAP earnings increases firm value by 3.4 percent relative to GAAP-only reporting. Precluding bias reduces overinvestment and further increases firm value by 1 percent. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: E22; G31; G34; M40.

Consequences of the Financial Markets Authority Guidelines on the Relevance of Non-GAAP Earnings

In this paper, we investigate the consequences of the FMA guidelines on the relevance of non-GAAP earnings (NGE). These guidelines require firms NGE to conform to a certain code of practice to improve transparency and comparability. From our sample of 441 NGEs disclosed over the period 2011-2017, we find a decrease in the relevance of NGE after the FMA guidelines were implemented. Nonetheless, we find that market participants reward NGE disclosed after 2015, when they are accompanied by “better quality” communication (i.e. compliance with the FMA guidelines). Also, we find a decrease in analysts’ forecasts dispersion after 2015, suggesting a reduction in information asymmetry following the application of FMA guidelines.

Does assurance improve the quality and value relevance of non-GAAP earnings?

Does assurance improve the quality and value relevance of non-GAAP earnings?

Audits of Non-GAAP Earnings: Evidence from Adjusted EBITDA in Segment Disclosures

Audits of Non-GAAP Earnings: Evidence from Adjusted EBITDA in Segment Disclosures

Macroeconomic uncertainty and non-GAAP disclosure

This study examines the relation between macroeconomic uncertainty and firms’ non-GAAP disclosure. Using the dispersion of GDP forecasts and the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) VIX Index to proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty, this study finds that non-GAAP reporting likelihood decreases during periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty. However, for firms that choose to disclose non-GAAP earnings, their non-GAAP exclusions become more transitory, indicating an increase in non-GAAP reporting quality. Further evidence suggests that the increase in non-GAAP reporting quality is driven by the decrease in the persistence of excluded special items. Overall, the findings of this study advance the knowledge of how non-GAAP disclosure changes as macroeconomic uncertainty varies.

The impact of top management team incentive dispersion on Non-GAAP reporting

We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.

Non-GAAP Earnings and Definite-Lived Intangible Asset Allocations in Mergers and Acquisitions

ABSTRACT We test whether firms that exclude the effects of amortization from non-GAAP earnings allocate more of an acquisition’s purchase price to definite-lived intangible assets (DLIA). This strategy can yield two potential benefits: it can (1) increase non-GAAP earnings by shifting depreciation of tangible assets, which is often included in non-GAAP earnings, to amortization of DLIA, which non-GAAP earnings exclude, and (2) decrease the likelihood of future impairments by shifting allocations from goodwill to DLIA. Consistent with expectations, we find that non-GAAP-reporting firms that exclude amortization from non-GAAP earnings allocate more of the purchase price to DLIA. We also find that these firms allocate less of the purchase price to depreciable assets and goodwill. Finally, we document earnings surprise and valuation benefits related to these allocation choices. Overall, our results provide new evidence about non-GAAP reporting and purchase price allocations and suggest that non-GAAP reporting can influence management’s GAAP accounting choices. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources described in the paper. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M45.

A Penny Here, a Penny There: A Case of Managing Non-GAAP Earnings at PPG Industries

ABSTRACT This real-world case demonstrates attempts by PPG’s controller to manage non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat the consensus analyst estimates. The case provides information regarding improper accounting adjustments made by PPG. In completing the case requirements, students decipher whether PPG used non-GAAP earnings to inform or obfuscate, determine whether certain accounting adjustments violated generally accepted accounting principles, compute the effect of accounting adjustments on non-GAAP and GAAP earnings, examine its materiality, and understand the likely motivations of the controller for recording accounting adjustments. The case also demonstrates the effect of classification shifting as a tool for managing non-GAAP earnings and exposes students to the importance of meeting or beating analyst estimates. It is appropriate for intermediate accounting and professional accounting research courses. JEL Classifications: M41.

Experience with Non-GAAP Earnings and Investors’ Pricing of Exclusions

ABSTRACT Although the increase in non-GAAP earnings metrics has drawn unfavorable attention from regulators and standard setters, it can provide valuable experience for investors. We investigate whether experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics influences investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. We measure experience as the frequency with which managers or analysts provide non-GAAP earnings over the prior eight quarters and find that experience aids in the pricing of non-GAAP exclusions. Absent prior experience with non-GAAP earnings metrics, investors appear to overestimate the persistence of exclusions at the earnings announcement, which corrects in the following months. Cross-sectional tests suggest that experience facilitates investors’ pricing of non-GAAP exclusions by reducing their information processing costs. JEL Classifications: M40.

Accounting Reporting Complexity and Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure

ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.

Conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings and the implications for the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings

We examine whether and how the degree of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings influences managers' decisions to disclose non-GAAP earnings. Conditional conservatism imposes a downward bias and may negatively affect the information content of GAAP earnings. However, prior research documents that non-GAAP earnings exhibit higher persistence, predictive ability, and information content than GAAP earnings. Consequently, we argue that companies may disclose non-GAAP earnings to circumvent the constraints imposed by conditional conservatism. Our evidence is consistent with the existence of a positive association between the degree of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings and the decision by firms to disclose non-GAAP earnings. We also document a positive association between the extent of conditional conservatism in GAAP earnings and both the magnitude of non-GAAP exclusions and frequency of non-GAAP disclosures.

Non-GAAP Disclosure Following Going Concern Opinions

This paper examines whether firms change their non-GAAP reporting behavior after receiving a first-time going concern opinion (GCO). I find that the likelihood of disclosing non-GAAP earnings decreases while the quality of disclosed non-GAAP earnings increases following the receipt of a first-time GCO. The results are consistent with the notion that managers change their non-GAAP reporting behavior during the period of heightened investor scrutiny. Further analyses indicate that such changes in non-GAAP disclosure are more pronounced in firms with weaker corporate governance.

Happy 20-year anniversary non-GAAP earnings: a systematic review of the literature

PurposeIt has been two decades since the first academic paper shone a spotlight on non-GAAP earnings. The past 20 years of research investigates concerns over the misuse of these disclosures and resulted in some significant changes to accounting and reporting standards across the globe. This paper aims to document the history of non-GAAP reporting and outline the emerging themes of the now matured practice of non-GAAP reporting.Design/methodology/approachThis systematic literature review searches two popular databases to identify the academic publications relating to non-GAAP reporting between 2002 and 2022. The paper uses bibliographic mapping to present the key statistics of the non-GAAP reporting field of research.FindingsThe non-GAAP reporting environment started out as the “wild West’ but, through regulation and public awareness, emerged as an important supplement to the traditional outputs of financial reporting. Current consensus is recent non-GAAP earnings are informative to users but there is lack of research into qualitative non-GAAP disclosures and the vast body of archival research needs triangulating with more experimental studies.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the literature by documenting the past 20 years of non-GAAP reporting and identifying the important existing and emerging research areas concerning non-GAAP earnings disclosures.

Board political connections and tradeoff between market and nonmarket advantages: Evidence from corporate financial information disclosure

We explore the extent to which board political connections shape the firm’s disclosure behavior. We focus on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures and argue that board political connections reduce the firm’s propensity to report non-GAAP earnings through two mechanisms: the reduction in capital market pressure (insulating effect) and the concerns about public scrutiny (constraining effect). Our theory is tested and supported by an analysis of U.S.-listed firms in the period 2003-2019. We further exploit the variation in firms’ media exposure to identify the primary mechanism underlying this disclosure strategy and find that the constraining effect plays a more important role than the insulating effect in driving the financial reporting behavior of politically connected firms.

The information content of mandatory and discretionary non-GAAP earnings

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the pricing of discretionary earnings in South Africa. This is a unique setting, as South African listed firms also report mandatory non-GAAP earnings (“headline earnings”).Design/methodology/approachResults are based on multivariate regression analyses for South African firms that report from 2010 to 2019.FindingsFindings show that the value-relevance of discretionary earnings exceeds that of both GAAP earnings and headline earnings. In addition, placement of discretionary earnings reconciliations communicates information about the decision-usefulness of earnings.Originality/valueDiscretionary earnings remain the most value-relevant earnings measure, despite the divergent decision-useful characteristics offered by headline earnings and GAAP earnings. Therefore, the most decision-useful earnings reflect unique industry or firm characteristics rather than the assurance arising from regulation.

Correction to: The risk-relevance of non-GAAP earnings

Correction to: The risk-relevance of non-GAAP earnings

Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation and Non-GAAP Income Statements

ABSTRACTWe study firms’ decisions to provide non-GAAP income statements and the information environment consequences of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters directing them to stop disclosing such statements. We find firms voluntarily disclose non-GAAP income statements when firm and disclosure complexity, analyst following, and institutional ownership are higher. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, after firms stop disclosing full non-GAAP income statements at the direction of the SEC, the informativeness of non-GAAP earnings and overall earnings announcements decreases, information asymmetry increases, and analyst forecasts become less accurate and more disperse. We also find that firms not receiving a comment letter are more likely to stop providing non-GAAP income statements after an industry peer receives a non-GAAP income statement comment letter. Overall, our evidence suggests SEC comment letters about non-GAAP income statements appear to worsen the information environment for firms previously providing those statements.Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.