Non-fuel Exports Research Articles

The Repercussions of Oil Price Fluctuations on Iraqs Gross Domestic Product Analytical Study for the Period between 2000-2019

From the results obtained with regard to the fluctuations in oil prices, there is a significant impact of oil prices on the overall economy, expressed in gross domestic product, as in a case like Iraq, the rise in oil prices leads to an increase in export earnings, and thus an increase in the volume of foreign trade, and when oil prices rise, the This leads to an increase in the flow of foreign currency represented in the US dollar to the national economy, and this causes a high rate of inflation on the one hand and an increase in the demand for imports on the other hand, which leads to an expansion in government spending, and high oil prices encourage investment (especially in the sector). Based on the statistical results and the conclusions reached, it is noted that the price of oil has a significant impact on the gross domestic product as the most important overall indicator of the Iraqi economy, which makes the latter hostage to its behavior in the global oil market. Finally, it should be noted that the uncertainty surrounding the oil market, which made it difficult to predict oil prices, has become necessary for the economic authorities in Iraq to: We take the issue of searching for new financial resources outside the oil sector seriously, so the study recommends the need to expedite the adoption of a policy aimed at reducing dependence on oil revenues in the national economy, and strive to diversify non-fuel exports, and support the pillars of the national economy to mitigate the effects of the external shock.

Foreign Trade in 2016: Stabilization of Exports and Imports

Generally, according to the 2016 results fuel exports dramatically fell, non-fuel exports decreased somewhat, while imports stopped falling. However, H2 2016 (as compared to the similar period of 2015) showed slightly different results. Exports virtually stopped falling, while imports even began to grow. In 2016, in the geographic pattern of trade turnover the dynamics of the previous years prevailed: the share of the EU countries and Ukraine was diminishing, while that of the Eurasian Economic Union, China and the US was growing.

АНТИДЕМПИНГОВЫЕ МЕРЫ ПРОТИВ РОССИЙСКИХ ЭКСПОРТЕРОВ: ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ УСТРАНЕНИЯ

Anti-dumping policy is the instrument of protection of domestic producers from dumped imports causing injury to the domestic industry. Russian exporters are facing significant barriers to trade in foreign markets in the form of anti-dumping measures, in particular in the case of non-fuel exports. While Russia is striving to a higher degree of export diversification, this goal cannot be achieved given the current magnitude of the existing anti-dumping measures against Russian exporters that mostly affect two major export oriented industries, namely steel and fertilizers. This paper estimates losses of Russian exports resulting from the anti-dumping measures imposed by third countries. We use partial equilibrium model incorporated into the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) software that allows performing tariff cuts simulations to estimate the effects of removal of the anti-dumping on trade. While this estimation is problematic due to the lack of firm-level data, our results show that the total loss of exports is around 3 Billion US$ where the major share is attributed to the anti-dumping measures imposed by the USA. We also give an overview of the instruments that could be used by Russian exporters to defend their interests in the context of the Russian membership to the WTO. While there is no absolute remedy to counteract discrimination resulting from anti-dumping, we believe that each legal instrument may be successfully used on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the specific circumstances of each case must be taken into account. In this regard, we also identify and compare the determinants of litigation of anti-dumping measures in the WTO and under domestic judicial review procedures, namely in the US Court of International Trade (USCIT) and the EU General Court. Authors emphasise alternative solutions, namely the importance of cooperation of the exporter with the investigating authority or the additional rule in the regional trade agreements. Although the WTO dispute settlement is costly and time-consuming and does not normally lead to restoration of the market access, it may bring huge benefits for the exporter. These benefits stem from the legal interpretations, rulings and recommendations of the DSB on systemic issues that clarify the Anti-Dumping Agreement and directly affect the ways the anti-dumping investigations will be conducted in the future.

Mining and corruption

This study examines the links between mineral dependency and corruption. Specifically, it develops a cross-section econometric model that estimates the effects of per capita income, fuel exports, non-fuel exports, and average per unit value of mineral exports on corruption. The results indicate that fuel and non-fuel mineral exports affect corruption differently. Corruption increases with fuel exports in an unambiguous manner. Non-fuel mineral exports tend to increase corruption only in poor countries, particularly affecting those exporting high value mineral commodities such as diamonds and gold. In richer countries, non-fuel mineral exports actually reduce corruption. In addition, while economic development reflected by rising per capita income ultimately reduces corruption, the evidence indicates that at early stages of development, advances in per capita income are associated with greater corruption. These findings suggest that the links between corruption on the one hand and mineral dependency and per capita income on the other are far more complex than widely recognized.

Assessing Russia's Non-fuel Trade Elasticities: Does the Russian Economy React ‘Normally’ to Exchange Rate Movements?

This article attempts to assess the impact of exchange rate movements on Russian import and non-fuel export performance, using an error correction model. The estimation of trade equations shows that long-run price elasticities for imports and non-fuel exports are close to 0.6 and 0.7 respectively, hence relatively similar to those obtained for OECD countries. The Marshall–Lerner condition clearly holds. More precisely, we find that a 10% real appreciation (depreciation) of the currency leads on average to a non-fuel current account deterioration (improvement) of around 1% of GDP. Moreover, the short-term dynamics of the error correction model indicate that the response of the trade balance to exchange rate shocks is rapid, the adjustment being almost complete after one quarter. Finally, the evolution of import prices and non-fuel export prices of Russia, relative to its competitors on domestic and third markets, suggests that by 2004 the Russian economy had already lost the price competitiveness advantage it had gained after the 1998 crisis.

Trade Liberalization and Trade Balance

The paper estimates the impact of import tariffs on Russia's trade balance. Empirical model analyzes Russian trade by industries and partner countries, taking into account import tariffs on both industrial output and intermediate goods. It is shown that the aggregate impact of import duties on trade balance is negative in all industries outside the fuel and energy sector. Decrease in import tariffs is likely to improve market positions of Russian non-fuel exports, especially in such industries as machine building and metal works, agriculture and forestry, chemistry and light industry.

Iran's Economic Policy Dilemma

IN 1979, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (IRI) inherited an economy that was heavily dependent on oil with a small and inefficient manufacturing sector. An eight-year war with Iraq, an influx of refugees, rapid population growth, US economic sanctions and politically expedient policies have resulted in the economic conditions of today, conditions under which the IRI has little room for manoeuvre. The medium- and long-term policies that are called for are obvious yet politically difficult to implement.This article provides a brief overview of the Islamic Republic's economic performance since the revolution of 1979, describes its policy record, and addresses the economic policy dilemma at hand.ECONOMIC PERFORMANCEIn 1988, Iran's real gross domestic product (GDP) was about what it was in 1977, and given population growth of about 60 percent, per capita real incomes had fallen by roughly 40 percent. Recently, GDP growth has been more satisfactory, at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent for 1990-1995 (although unbalanced and with heavy external financing); 3.8 percent for 1995-2000; and more recently, after adopting some reforms, a more balanced 5.8 percent on average for 2000-2003. During 2002-2003, overall growth reached 6.8 percent even though the oil sector contracted, and 6.5 percent growth is projected for 2003-2004. Yet even after these recent successes, real per capita GDP in 2000 was some 30 percent below the levels of the mid-1970s(1) and 20 percent below those levels in 2003. These figures suggest subpar economic performance and rapid population growth over the long haul, although with significant improvement in recent years.Iran's overall export growth has also been less than stellar since the revolution. Total exports in current dollars declined at an annual rate of 2.5 percent, with fuel oil exports--on which Iran depends heavily--declining at an annual rate of 4.3 percent. (Non-fuel exports increased at an annual rate of 10.9 percent.) Petroleum exports declined for most major oil exporters over the same period. But in the case of Iran, two internal developments further exacerbated the decline in oil export revenues: a decline in oil output (and capacity) and a rapid increase in domestic petroleum consumption. The decline in production capacity was due largely to investment shortfalls in the oil sector. The increase in domestic consumption was due to high population growth and one of the world's highest petroleum product price subsidies.Although the economy underperformed and total exports did not fare well, Iran did not resort to significant external borrowing until 1988, after the Iran-Iraq war. Between 1988 and 1993, Iran's external debt exploded from $5.8 billion to $28.5 billion (all figures in US dollars) because of the rapid increase in imports (to meet pent-up demand in the aftermath of the war) and resulted in large current account deficits. Unfortunately, the increased external borrowing did not finance productive investments and Iran received little long-term benefit from the external debt it incurred. This period was followed by several years of current account surpluses because of lower imports. These current account surpluses reduced the stock of external debt to around $7.2 billion 2002.(2) At the same time, gross official reserves increased from $5.3 billion in 1997 to an estimated $21.8 billion in 2002. Iran's debt/GDP ratio stood at 6.3 percent in 2001; its ratio of debt to exports was 30.4 percent; and its debt (excluding short-term debt) service ratio was 6.3 percent.(3) These are low figures by any standard and represent a significant accomplishment relative to most other developing countries.In the social arena, Iran has enjoyed much more success since the revolution: the average Iranian's life expectancy has risen steadily; infant mortality rates have fallen; access to safe water, sanitation and health care have shown significant improvement; the number of physicians, dentists and nurses per person have increased; and immunization rates have risen. …

Manufactured exports of developing countries and their terms of trade since 1965

During the last 40 years since the Prebisch-Singer terms of trade deterioration hypothesis was first proposed, the commodity composition of exports of developing countries has undergone a major change in the direction of dominance of manufactures in their nonfuel exports, with strong growth in the volume of their manufactured exports. But this did not allow developing countries to escape unequal exchange relations with the industrial countries. Their barter terms of trade in manufactures showed signs of weakness rather than improvement, and clearly failed to reflect the respective productivity trends, leading to deterioration in factoral terms of trade.

Exchange Rates and the Management of the External Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa

The performance of Africa's external sector during the 1970s has been described in a number of important publications. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the continent's share of world exports declined from 3·9 per cent in 1970 to 3·4 per cent in 1979. The performance of the region's export sector had been sluggish throughout this period, growing at an annual rate of only 0·6 per cent in volume compared to 6 per cent during the last five years of the previous decade. The World Bank report on sub-Saharan Africa described the 1970s as having been characterised by growing balance-of-payments deficits, attributable partly to external factors — notably the two large oil-price shocks, the slow growth in world trade in primary commodities, and the persistently rising price of imported manufactured goods — but partly caused also by domestic factors. Even within the group of developing countries, Africa's share of non-fuel exports is estimated to have declined from over 18 per cent in 1970 to about 9 per cent in 1978. During this decade the volume of imports expanded by an estimated 58 per cent annually — although for the sub-Saharan region the growth rate was only 3 per cent — while the terms of trade worsened significantly. Official development assistance rose substantially as a whole, but offset only a part of the growing deficit.