Sanctions applied against Sierra Leone and Liberia by the UN security council are phased and have fared differently. UN sanctions were first imposed on Sierra Leone in 1997 and on Liberia in 1992 and were mostly symbolic in nature. This changed in 2000 through proactive monitoring by expert panels - individuals hired by the UN as consultants for a limited time to provide advice and counsel to the appropriate sanctions committee. Experts dedicated to the Sierra Leone and Liberian sanctions regimes played an important role in improving the implementation of the sanctions, and, in the case of the panel for Sierra Leone, provoked a new sanctions regime against Liberia. Indeed, the Liberia sanctions regime represented the first time the council applied sanctions against a state for interference and support of rebels in another. Arguably, had it not been for the compelling information provided by the Sierra Leonean panel of experts, sanctions against Liberia for interference in Sierra Leone would not have been changed as dramatically as they were - from an arms embargo only to a series of targeted measures aimed at disrupting the funding and travel of the president of Liberia and his supporters.This article outlines the events that led to the application of sanctions by the security council, assesses the contribution of panel experts to the stabilization of the conflicts, and outlines the reasons for their diminished utility over the life of the sanctions regimes. The article also highlights that sanctions regimes have different phases and that their impact can vary over time. This is influenced by politics but also by the priorities and professionalism of the individuals appointed to UN expert groups and the support provided by the relevant UN peacekeeping operation.SIERRA LEONEIn 1996, under heavy domestic and international pressure, democratic elections took place for the first time since 1967 in Sierra Leone, leading to the election of a former UN official and leader ofthe Sierra Leone People's Party, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. On 30 November 1996, Kabbah signed the Abidjan peace agreement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had been attempting to overthrow successive governments since March 1991. The Sierra Leone army was increasingly resentful of the power it had lost, however. Led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was awaiting trial for a coup attempt in 1996, military members - many from the Republic of Sierra Leone military forces - loyal to him and backed by members of the RUF, joined forces. On 25 May 1997 a coup attempt was successful, placing Koroma and his new government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), at the helm. The economic community of west African states' (ECOWAS) military arm - ECOMOG (mainly Nigerian soldiers) - had been on the ground since the early 1990s trying to keep the peace, but, in essence, had been fighting for the now-exiled Kabbah government. It was from this point that international and regional sanctions played a role in the conflict.1THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN THE 1997 COUP AND AFTERMATHIn response to the May 1997 coup, ECOWAS imposed a general and total arms embargo against Sierra Leone, as well as a prohibition on the supply of petroleum products and a travel ban on members of the military junta.2 ECOWAS appealed to the security council throughout June, July, and August of 1997 to apply sanctions as well.3 The council agreed and adopted its first resolution on the situation, 1132, in October 1997. Because of the continuing violence and growing humanitarian crisis, the council declared that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region and invoked chapter VII. The initial objectives ofthe council were for the military junta to relinquish power and restore democracy to Sierra Leone. To this end, targeted travel and petroleum sanctions were imposed, along with an arms embargo. The targeted travel sanctions applied to members of the military junta and adult members of their family, unless the travel was for verified humanitarian reasons. …
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