Nietzsche's Perspectivism Research Articles

Nietzsche's Pragmatism: A Study on Perspectival Thought

Nietzsche's Pragmatism: A Study on Perspectival Thought

A Criticism of Liberal Education Based on Nietzsche's Perspectivism

A Criticism of Liberal Education Based on Nietzsche's Perspectivism

Perspectivism and Falsification Revisited: Nietzsche, Nehamas, and Me

Abstract In this article, I offer the beginning of a new interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism, one that restricts the scope of the knowledge to which it applies. I do so by presenting a new reading of one of Nietzsche's most important passages on perspectivism, Genealogy III:12. I arrive at this reading by revisiting Alexander Nehamas's 1985 interpretation of perspectivism, my 1990 alternative to it, and Nehamas's recent criticism of that alternative in the Journal of Nietzsche Studies. I argue that, despite some errors that I made, my developmental approach to interpreting Nietzsche's commitment to the falsification thesis still holds up against Nehamas's recent criticism. I then argue against his 2017 account of falsification in The Gay Science and his 1990 and 2017 accounts of perspectivism. In the end, I argue that we both made the same mistake of thinking that Nietzsche's perspectivism applies to all knowledge.

Il pragmatismo di Nietzsche. Saggi sul pensiero prospettivistico

Il pragmatismo di Nietzsche. Saggi sul pensiero prospettivistico

Nietzsche nella Rivoluzione conservatrice

Nietzsche nella Rivoluzione conservatrice

Open Letter to Bret Davis: Letter on Egoism: Will to Power as Interpretation

Open Letter to Bret Davis: Letter on Egoism: Will to Power as Interpretation

“Der Faule Fleck des Kantischen Kriticismus”: Erscheinung und Ding an sich bei Nietzsche

“Der Faule Fleck des Kantischen Kriticismus”: Erscheinung und Ding an sich bei Nietzsche

Die Funken des freien Geistes: Neuere Aufsätze zu Nietzsches Philosophie der Zukunft

Die Funken des freien Geistes: Neuere Aufsätze zu Nietzsches Philosophie der Zukunft

Nietzsche, die Orchestikologie und das dissipative Denken

Nietzsche, die Orchestikologie und das dissipative Denken

Relendo a perspectividade: algumas notas sobre "o perspectivismo de Nietzsche"

Este texto contrasta o entendimento comum do "perspectivismo de Nietzsche" com o seu uso da palavra "Perspektive" e termos semelhantes. As primeiras seções proporcionam uma breve pesquisa do desenvolvimento dos diversos significados através da carreira de Nietzsche e a influência de Gustav Teichmüller. As seções subsequentes revelam alguns problemas de leituras comuns do perspectivismo, como a teoria do conhecimento de Nietzsche. Discutindo os assuntos de falsificação, objetividade e autorreferência, as seções remanescentes levam à conclusão que o perspectivismo não deve ser entendido como a doutrina epistemológica de Nietzsche, mas como algo que não o deixa criar tal doutrina.

Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Education

Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Education

Nietzsche and the Perspective of Life

This paper is an extended version of Valuing from life's In this paper, with the aim of explaining Nietzsche's view, I illustrate one way of making sense of a theoretical entity (called Life), which has values and a perspective. Then I turn to Nietzsche's perspectivism, with the hope of explaining why Life's perspective should be in any way privileged. Finally, I explain how trying to live from Life's perspective would force us to change our values - and, in particular, disown the values we have placed in truth (at least for its own sake) and traditional morality.

Ilse/Lies: Nietzsche and/in Pynchon

Nietzsche and Pynchon have, as has been said recently of Nietzsche and Emerson, an elective (Stack). This affinity is especially close on questions of truth and knowledge, and closest in Nietzsche's later philosophy and Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow (hereafter GR ). While Nietzsche's early theories of truth and knowledge have won most attention recently, his later writings – from On the Genealogy of Morals (hereafter GM ) onward – reject these theories as being indebted to a Schopenhauerian representationalism and pursue the claim that knowledge is perspectival. In this essay I argue for an affinity between Nietzsche's later philosophy and GR on questions of truth and knowledge. In particular, I focus on the ways GR rejects theories of truth and knowledge based on objectivity and coherence, and offers instead a theory of truth and knowledge similar to Nietzsche's perspectivism.

Finding Truth in ‘Lies’: Nietzsche's Perspectivism and its Relation to Education

In his 2001 article ‘Teaching to Lie and Obey: Nietzsche on Education’, Stefan Ramaekers defends Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism against the charge that it is relativistic. He argues that perspectivism is not relativistic because it denies the dichotomy between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world, a dichotomy central to claims to relativism. While Ramaekers' article is correct in denying relativistic interpretations of perspectivism it does not go far enough in this direction. In fact, the way Ramaekers makes his case may actually encourage the charge of relativism, especially when it comes to his appropriation of perspectivism for education. This article proposes to pick up where Ramaekers left off. It will argue that Nietzsche's denial of the opposition between the ‘true’ world and the ‘seeming’ world opens up the possibility for the reestablishment of truth, albeit in a modified form. After examining Nietzsche's modified ‘realist’ epistemology, the paper will explore the implications of it for his philosophy of education. It will be argued that Nietzsche's educational philosophy is founded on his concept of perspectivism in so far as he demands that students be rigorously inculcated into a pedagogical framework that teaches students to discriminate between ‘true’ and ‘false’ perspectives. This framework is essential for the development of an intellectually robust and life-affirming culture.

Shaping the Future: Nietzsche's New Regime of the Soul and Its Ascetic Practices (review)

Reviewed by: Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul and Its Ascetic Practices Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg Horst Hutter . Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul and Its Ascetic Practices. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006. ISBN 0-7391-1359-3. $26.95. Scarcely a week goes by without the publication of a new volume devoted to the interpretation of Nietzsche's thinking. Indeed, even those passionately devoted to the study of Nietzsche will be hard-pressed to keep up with this literature. It seems to us that Horst Hutter's volume stands out from this legion because the complex strands of his reading of Nietzsche converge around the project of self-fashioning, predicated on a series of ascetic practices or techniques of the self. Hutter forcefully demonstrates how these practices are themselves linked to a particular reading of Nietzsche's writings which as such compels a performative intervention in his texts. Readings become creative rewritings of the texts guided by an impulse to self-shaping that is awakened by the aural-musical potential of Nietzsche's language for persuasion. Persuasion works subliminally, "infectiously," by using the "doctrines" conveyed as sign-functions that provoke the destruction of inherited personal "identities" and enable the construction of new ones. (201) Nietzsche's "doctrines" are not viewed as propositional truths about the "real" world but as "'attempts' and 'temptations' that aim to provoke his free-spirited readers into changing themselves . . ." (2). They are challenges and provocations. If we accept Hutter's claim, then the way in which we read Nietzsche is dramatically transformed: his purported doctrines become tropes of persuasion, not an account of how things really are. If we read Hutter as he reads Nietzsche, then his own account of Nietzsche's thinking is an assay, an attempt, rather than a hermeneutic claim that he has gotten Nietzsche "right." For Hutter, then, Nietzsche's philosophy is an art of living, in the sense that it has recently been given by Pierre Hadot, Michel Foucault, or Alexander Nehamas, rather than "a set of 'true' propositions about the world" or "a set of keys to the solving of logical puzzles . . ." (9).1 According to Hutter, for Nietzsche, truths are conceived not "as something to be found, but as something to be created and willed" (125). The question of truth arises for Hutter in two very different senses than it does for Anglo-American linguistic philosophy. First, it presents in the form of the quest "to answer the questions of what one should do and how one should live if one believes Nietzsche's interpretation of the world to be 'true' and valid" (9). Second, inasmuch as becoming what Hutter terms "artists of living" (128), we "demonstrate" Nietzsche's "truths" by the way in which we shape our own futures and become our own lawgivers. As Nietzsche puts it in his Zarathustra: "Can you give yourself your own evil and your own good and hang your own will over yourself as a law?" (Z 175). As we shall see, for Hutter, this entails first unmaking ourselves, overcoming the identities that our culture has stamped upon us, and then actually fashioning a self, or what he terms "'individual' self-creation" (3). Indeed, Hutter claims that "[w]e cannot begin to understand Nietzsche if we do not see his writings as expressions of a personal quest for autonomy and wisdom that call upon readers to engage in a similar struggle. We need to achieve personal sovereignty for ourselves and must imitate Nietzsche by engaging in our personal quest" (xiii). Before we proceed to a discussion of that complex of issues, however, something more needs to be said about how Hutter sees any interpretation of Nietzsche, including his own. On the one hand, [End Page 83] Hutter points out that "Nietzsche's opus is a veritable labyrinth that permits many interpretations. . . . My focus on ascetic techniques is my particular Ariadne thread out of the Nietzschean labyrinth . . ." (4). Moreover, adapting Nietzsche's perspectivism to his own reading, Hutter acknowledges that his exposition of Nietzsche is but one possible interpretation. Yet there are moments when that very mode of reading Nietzsche seems to be...

Nietzsche’s Perspectivism and Problems of Self-Refutation

Nietzsche's perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine's apparent self-refuting character. If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself? Nietzsche's perspectivism must be construed either as a facts or as one further interpretation - but in the former case the doctine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one's perspective are rendered both impotent and superflouos. The unpalatable consequencs of Nietzsche's perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche's treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Nietzsche's perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense. There is every reason, i conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche's perspectivism.

Perspectivism, Criticism and Freedom of Spirit

The paper examines the view that Nietzsche's perspectivism about practical judgments, understood as a form of internalism about practical reasons, implies that any legitimate criticism of judgments emanating from a foreign perspective must be in terms that are internal to this perspective. Insofar as it is thought to be motivated by certain general theoretical strictures of perspectivism, this view is incoherent. The paper argues that, on the contrary Nietzsche's recourse to a strategy of internal criticism is motivated by his own particular commitment to preserving the freedom of spirit of his interlocutors. The paper concludes with a discussion of how freedom of spirit is preserved by internal criticism, and how the nature of freedom of spirit affects the particular form such criticism will assume.

Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism

I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.

The "Subject" of Nietzsche's Perspectivism

The "Subject" of Nietzsche's Perspectivism CHRISTOPH COX FORMERLY TAKEN TO ENDORSE a profound skepticism and relativism, Nietzsche 's "doctrine of perspectivism" recently has been seen to fit within traditional conceptions of epistemology and ontology? In the most recent and influential study of the matter, Maudemarie Clark maintains that, properly understood, perspectivism is "an obvious and nonproblematic doctrine. ''~ In a similar vein, Brian Leiter has recently argued that "perspectivism turns out to be much less radical than is usually supposed," that, with this doctrine, "Nietzsche .., is merely rehashing familiar Kantian themes, minus the rigor of Kant's exposition."~ According to both Clark and Leiter, perspectivism simply ' With occasional alterations, Nietzsche's texts willbe quoted from the Kaufmann/Hollingdale translations and cited in the text according to standard abbreviations of their English titles followed by the section and/or paragraph number(s). The exception is "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," which is cited by page number from Philosophy and Truth: Selectionsfrom Nietzsche 'sNotebooks of the Early x87os, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (NewJersey: Humanities Press International, 1979), 79-9x. Abbreviations are as follows:A: The Antichrist; BGE:Beyond Good and Evil; BT/SC: Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism"; D: Daybreak; GM: On the Genealogy of Morals; GS: The Gay Science; TI: Twilight of the Idols; TL: "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense"; UM: Untimely Meditations; WP: The Will to Power; Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Where these translations have been modified, I have consulted the Werke: Kritische Studienansgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (New York/Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967-t988), cited as KSA,followed by the volume, page, and fragment numbers. 2Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199o), 135. 3Brian Leiter, "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's GenealogyofMorals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy,Morality :Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy ofMorals, ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, ~994), 351. Leiter borrows this second phrase from Ken Gemes, "Nietzsche's Critique of Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 49, who, in fact, disagrees with the claim. Yet Leiter finds the characterization appropriate, adding that "this is not a problem, particularly since Nietzsche's primary concerns lie elsewhere," namely, "with philosophical theories of agency and value" (351-52). [269] 270 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:2 APRIL 1997 presents an analogy between certain obvious features of human vision and less immediately obvious features of human knowledge.4 I will argue that Nietzsche's perspectivism is less obvious, more problematic , and more interesting than these recent accounts take it to be. Moreover, the perspectivism I attribute to Nietzsche undermines a central presupposition of these accounts: namely, that there exists a simple, stable subject who has perspectives. Before turning to the notion of subjectivity affirmed by Nietzsche's perspectivism, a word must be said about the "doctrine of perspectivism" itself. 1. PERSPECTIVE AND AFFECTIVE INTERPRETATION AS the name of a doctrine, "perspectivism" is a critical construct. The term is found only once in Nietzsche's published work5 and only twice in The Will to Power, the well-known collection of his unpublished notes. 6 Moreover, the term is misleading, since it suggests that a visual metaphor provides the key to Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. But this is not the case. Indeed, in the passage on perspectivity that both Clark and Leiter take to be decisive,7 Nietzsche intimately associates the notion of "perspective" with a very different, nonvisual notion: that of "affective interpretation." Nietzsche writes: "[O]bjectivity" [ought to be] understood not as "contemplation without interest" (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to have one's For and Against under control and to engage and disengage them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations [Perspectiven und Affect-lnterpretationen] in the service of knowledge. Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an...

Reading DeMan Reading Rhetoric

Paul de Man's conception of rhetoric is misguided. Based on his reading of Nietzsche, de Man argues that the historical and philosophical articulations of rhetoric suggest that persuasion exists as a derivative of trope. In this essay, I provide a rereading of Nietzsche's early conceptions of rhetoric that critiques de Man's separation of trope and persuasion. Through this rereading, I argue that Nietzsche's understanding of rhetoric parallels earlier historical articulations of rhetoric, which rely on a fusion of trope and persuasion as a means of the social production of knowledge. The essay concludes by arguing that Nietzsche's sense of perspectivism coincides with this social sense of rhetoric, and that de Man's separation of trope and persuasion becomes untenable when rhetoric is reconsidered within the thematic of Nietzsche's perspectivism.