A New Right to Property: Civil War Confiscation in the Reconstruction Supreme Court DANIEL W. HAMILTON* During the Civil War, both the Union Congress and the Confederate Congress put in place sweeping confiscation programs designed to seize the private property of enemy citizens on a massive scale. Meeting in special session in August 1861, the U.S. Congress passed the First Confiscation Act, authorizing the federal government to seize the property ofthose participating directly in the rebellion.1 The Confederate Congress retaliated on August 30, 1861, passing the Sequestration Act.2 This law authorized the Confederate government to forever seize the real and personal property of “alien enemies,” a term that included every U.S. citizen and all those living in the Confederacy who remained loyal to the Union. Ten months later, in July 1862, the U.S. Congress passed the much broader Second Confiscation Act.3 This expansive law per mitted the Union government to seize all the real and personal property ofanyone taking up arms against the government, anyone aiding the rebellion directly, or anyone offering aid or comfortto the rebellion. This effectivelymeant the U.S could legally seize all the property of all those who recognized and supported the le gitimacy of the Confederacy. The Civil War represented the second great American experiment with broad leg islative confiscation during wartime, after the American Revolution.4 The Civil War isjustly described as America’s second revolution.5 Yet the nineteenth-century experience with con fiscation reveals the extent to which, when it came to the relationship of property and the state, the country had changed from the first revolution to the second. The outcomes of these two wartime experiments with con fiscation were nearly opposite. Revolutionary confiscation was marked by the quick, deci sive, vigorous pursuit of disloyal property. A great deal ofLoyalist property was seized for ever, without compensation or recourse to the courts. Eighty years later, confiscation met quite a different fate. During the Civil War, the A NEW RIGHT TO PROPERTY 255 Revolutionary conception of sovereignty found its fullest expression only in the los ing section. The Confederacy quickly put in place an effective confiscation program, de signed to seize U.S. property, that was every bit as zealous as any pursued during the Rev olution. Yet in the wake of Confederate de feat, this broad assertion of legislative power was quickly reversed. After the war, the Con federate confiscation program was completely dismantled. Soon after victory, the Union nul lified almost all the public laws ofthe Confed eracy, including sequestration. From the point of view of American law after the Civil War, it was quite literally as ifthe Confederate Se questration Act had never existed. The seizure of millions of dollars of U.S. property by the Confederacy was meaningless and had never, in the eyes ofthe law, taken place. If Confederate sequestration was marked by vigor, Union confiscation was marked by an agonized, intractable, ideological impasse. Union confiscation defied legislative consen sus andmostly failed inpractice as a result. The language ofthe Acts containedconfusing, even contradictory instructions, which made their enforcement immensely difficult, if not virtu ally impossible. Relatively little property was actually confiscated, and the Second Confisca tion Act was more or less ignored by Lincoln and the executive branch during the war before languishing in the federal courts for decades afterwards. Once confiscation ceased to be politi cally viable, it did not simply vanish. Instead, it remained a fixture in American property law for fifty years. Even as the executive branch ceased to confiscate property, the fed eral courts were beginning to considerthe vital legal and constitutional issues raised by con fiscation. These questions included many that the Supreme Court had not faced in seventyfive years, or had never faced. Was permanent, uncompensated property confiscation for dis loyalty a legitimate power of Congress? Did a presidential pardon mandate the return of already-confiscated property? Who had title to confiscated land, and how should it be treated in the marketplace? What was the le gal and constitutional status of the Confeder ate Sequestration Act and property seized un der the Act? The Supreme Court had never been asked these fundamental legal questions. Its...