Christian Right Research Articles

Division on the Christian right: Republican pastors and the use of force

Abstract Polarization in American politics has not produced unity among conservative Christians. Drawing from original survey and interview data on Republican pastors in North Carolina, this paper seeks to understand why these pastors are divided on the legitimacy of force defending the “traditional American way of life.” We find (1) that theological fundamentalism has a positive, though weak, influence; (2) Christian nationalism and White grievance are powerful in increasing support for the use of force; and (3) distrust of elections intensifies the effect of these attitudes.

How #Trad Catholics Challenge Current Constructions of Christian Nationalism: Counterknowledge, Masculinity, and Elite Aesthetics on Instagram

ABSTRACT I analyze traditionalist Catholic (or Trad) content on Instagram to add digital hyperconnectivity to current conversations about Christian nationalism in the United States. Building on studies of both epistemological and affective shifts in the age of digital hyperconnectivity, I argue that some pockets of right-wing Christian content are not anti-intellectual, but rather construct alternative knowledge bases to challenge mainstream authorities. This populist strategy of counterknowledge is mediatized in Trad Instagram, creating an epistemic community to counter those of the mainstream. The affordances of Instagram as a platform, characterized by its emphasis on visual content, brevity, and rapid consumption, have resulted in the decontextualized presentation of fragmented elements of Catholic philosophy and social teaching. This reconfiguration not only reshapes the public perception of Catholic thought but also fundamentally alters the grammar of public discourse. I draw on studies of affective polarization to argue that counterknowledge is not primarily about building a substantive alternative knowledge base, but rather about constructing an identity around the media image of an epistemic community under threat. The Trad aesthetic representation of intellectualism is distinctly gendered, presenting intellectual pursuit and reason as masculine virtues. I conclude by explaining how Trad Instagram contributes to and challenges current discourses on Christian nationalism by centering digital hyperconnectivity instead of a rationalist analysis of motivating beliefs, providing insights not only about shifts in authority and populism, but also moving beyond ideology to highlight aesthetic, affect, and the algorithmic curation of knowledge.

Neighbourhood sociodemographic factors and COVID-19 vaccine uptake in the Netherlands: an ecological analysis

BackgroundWhile overall COVID-19 vaccine uptake is high in the Netherlands, it lags behind in certain subpopulations.AimWe aimed to explore the characteristics of groups with lower COVID-19 vaccine uptake at neighbourhood level to inform the strategy to improve uptake and guide research into barriers for vaccination.MethodsWe performed an ecological study using national vaccination register and socio-demographic data at neighbourhood level. Using univariate and multivariable generalized additive models we examined the (potentially non-linear) effect of each determinant on uptake. We focused on those aged 50 years and older, since they are at highest risk of severe disease.ResultsIn those over 50 years of age, a higher proportion of individuals with a non-Western migration background and higher voting proportions for right-wing Christian and conservative political parties were at neighbourhood level univariately associated with lower COVID-19 vaccine uptake. In contrast, higher socioeconomic status and higher voting proportions for right-wing liberal, progressive liberal and Christian middle political parties were associated with higher uptake. Multivariable results differed from univariate results in that a higher voting proportion for progressive left-wing political parties was also associated with higher uptake. In addition, with regard to migration background only a Turkish background remained significant.ConclusionWe identified determinants associated with COVID-19 vaccine uptake at neighbourhood level and observed heterogeneity in uptake between different subpopulations. Since the goal of vaccination is not only to reduce suffering and death by improving the average uptake, but also to reduce health inequity, it is important to focus on subpopulations with lower uptake.

Reshaping Goals and Values in Times of Penal Transition: The Dynamics of Penal Change in the Collateral Consequences Reform Space

Over the past decade, reform efforts in the area of collateral consequences of conviction have succeeded in emancipating themselves from standard discourses and dynamics in the US criminal legal reform space. This article draws on concepts and insights from the literature on penal transformation to explore the unique interplay of goals and values that have led to recent collateral consequences reforms. It identifies three major drivers of change that have had a significant impact, particularly, on softening occupational licensing restrictions for individuals with a criminal history and passing criminal record clearance legislation. First, advocates of the economic libertarian agenda joined forces with civil libertarian groups to reduce occupational licensing hurdles for criminal record holders. Second, an attitude promoting redemption and second chances through criminal record clearance reform has been championed, in particular, by the Christian right. Third, economic concerns by employers seeking to hire individuals with a criminal record have become more pronounced in tight labor markets, both pre- and post-pandemic. The analysis concludes that, although much remains to be done, ongoing reforms represent a significant reshaping of the collateral consequences landscape. A logic of unworthiness toward individuals with criminal records, however, remains hard to eradicate and can easily resurface in the current unstable phase of penal transition.

The Land of (Almost) No Central Government Arts Spending? Cultural Policy, Protestant Denominations, and the Cultural Policy Singularity of Unites States of America

Cultural policy in USA has usually been considered an exception at the international level, not only because it constitutes a unique model due to its liberal orientation and its lack of central coordination, but also because it stands out for the limitations it places on federal action. The explanation for this has traditionally focused on external factors such as the rejection of totalitarianism or the strength of the private cultural market. However, this emphasis on factors external to the cultural system is exaggerated and above all, underestimates internal factors of a religious nature. For this reason, we propose that one of the explanatory factors for this singularity is Protestantism in its most fundamentalist variants, which promotes an anti-intellectual and puritanical political culture. Consequently, a part of the population and especially the political elite linked to the Christian right has limited the consolidation and empowerment of cultural policy since the 1960s.

American Exceptionalism as Religion: Postmodern Discontent by Jordan Carson

Reviewed by: American Exceptionalism as Religion: Postmodern Discontent by Jordan Carson Christopher Douglas Jordan Carson. American Exceptionalism as Religion: Postmodern Discontent. Ohio State UP, 2020. xxi + 222 pp. Jordan Carson's American Exceptionalism as Religion: Postmodern Discontent is an engaging new entry in contemporary literature and religion studies. Focusing on Thomas Pynchon and Don DeLillo—two postsecular standbys—in refreshing conversation with Ana Castillo and George Saunders, as well as with Marilynne Robinson, perhaps the greatest living American Christian writer, Carson aims to show how each "portrays American exceptionalism as a compelling but corrupted religion that comprises both an object of belief and a set of disciplines" (23). The book focuses on the ideology qua religion of American exceptionalism, which Carson defines as "the myth of election" (3), "America as a chosen nation" (4) of God's chosen [End Page 577] people on the promised land, distinguishing it from American civil religion. These contemporary writers "aim to divest 'America' of its claim to transcendence and reveal America for what it is: a place and a way of government, a set of nontranscendent but worthy ideals, a place of freedom but also of oppression, not wholly evil but also not a chosen nation" (23). Carson examines the "specific religious practices" depicted by these writers, both good and bad, and "how these practices shape individuals morally, spiritually, emotionally, and aesthetically." Thus, for Carson DeLillo's work is a study in "the damage wrought by misplaced faith" (26), in which characters yearn for transcendence and sometimes come close but only through the apophatic tradition, the attempt to imagine via language a transcendent that lies beyond language. His discussion of DeLillo's use of the apophatic tradition is illuminating and engages with previous discussions (notably John McLure's and Amy Hungerford's) on DeLillo and mystery, even if that mystery "does not offer a coherent theological or spiritual vision" (56). Placing Castillo within the larger frame of Chicano fiction and "liberation theology" (76), Carson's smart analysis of hybrid religion and trickster ethics is alert to nuance. Insofar as American exceptionalism is a form of religion, it ends up being an obstacle to pluralist, hybrid, and mestiza spirituality. Similarly, hybrid pluralism marks the kind of religious engagement Carson finds most evident in Pynchon's fiction, where "spiritual disciplines . . . those depicted unironically and in earnest—translate into greater investment in the world: works of compassion, care for the earth, and opposition to all forms of domination" (131). Spiritual pilgrims, in this sense, stand against the religion of American exceptionalism as "the myth of [American] election" (99). Carson's analysis of empathy and compassion in the fiction of Saunders, perhaps the least-studied among his five authors, is rewarding and smart. Carson shows how Saunders's work repeatedly questions a cluster of negative "spiritual disciplines" (131) associated with American exceptionalism: notions of self-improvement and self-sufficiency, economic gain as moral progress, and the power of positive thinking, which ignores the social world and other people. Carson's reading of Robinson, meanwhile, focuses on her non-fiction essays. In these, "Robinson castigates the resurgent Christian right for surrendering religion to ideology and confusing religious devotion with cultural identity" (171). His critique of Robinson's dismissal of the Christian Right as engaging in "ideology" rather than (true) religion is insightful and refreshing because he treats the ideology [End Page 578] with the same judicious expansion of the term "religion" that he's given to American exceptionalism. Noting that "the semantic slippage in Christian also makes Robinson's own views hard to pin down" (174), Carson persuasively concludes that "Robinson wants her two primary arguments—the essence of Christianity and the essence of democracy—to be heard by two audiences: a narrower Christian audience, and a larger audience of the general American populace." Thus, his interpretation of Robinson's democratic individualism as "a theopoetics that allows for pluralism and diversity to become a source of aesthetic fullness" (199) in Whitman's tradition is likewise convincing and well-articulated. Intriguingly, Carson expands his discussion of American exceptionalism to include related discourses such as the American dream. In DeLillo's and Castillo's works, the dream's ideology of success...

Christian Religiosity, Religious Nostalgia, and Attitudes Toward Muslims in 20 Western Countries

Radical ethnonationalism has drastically risen in Western politics, largely mobilized by nostalgia for the country's past with homogeneity and Christianity as a cultural symbol against non‐Western immigrants, especially Muslims. However, how nostalgia for Christianity's past significance can invoke anti‐Muslim sentiments is unknown, especially given that Christianity is increasingly losing its previous status under secularization, resulting in radical backlash from the Christian right. In the current study, I examine whether nostalgia related to religion and the religious–secular gap in the perceived status of religion can induce anti‐Muslim attitudes among Christians from 20 Western countries using International Social Survey Programme data and mixed‐effect multilevel modeling. Contrary to expectations, anti‐Muslim attitudes are stronger for people with higher levels of Christian religiosity and doctrinal belief, and exclusivist view on religion, when they have less religious nostalgia by perceiving a stronger status of religion. Moreover, in countries with a larger religious–secular gap in the perceived status of religion, people holding exclusivist views on religion are more hostile to Muslims. Yet, the findings can still be consistent with theoretical expectations, since anti‐Muslim attitudes are likely promoted through backlash from the Christian community against religious diversity, expressed in demands for a larger salience of religion rather than nostalgia.

Music for Counting Votes

Music for Counting Votes

A Pantheology of Pandemic: Sex, Race, Nature, and the Virus

A Pantheology of Pandemic: Sex, Race, Nature, and the Virus

ENTANGLED AUTONOMY ON AUTOMATED AIRWAVES: THE CASE OF RIVENDELL

Rivendell, a free and open source software suite for automated radio broadcasting, has brought several groups with clashing stances on technology, communication, and cultural politics into cooperation. This paper treats Rivendell as an opening onto the politics at play when the liberal ethos propelling free and open source software (Coleman, 2013) meets the autonomy-prizing traditions of independent broadcasting within an automation system. Complicating this already tense juncture, Rivendell has drawn users and code contributors from drastically opposed political groups within American broadcastings—right-wing Christian talk radio networks and progressive community stations—and has sustained a difficult terrain of working compromise that the activist push for low-power FM broadcasting inaugurated (Dunbar-Hester, 2014). In this paper, analysis of Rivendell's open source code base sheds light on its development and helps connect it to longer histories of media automation and its attendant social frictions. Interviews with lead Rivendell developers complete the picture of the project's trajectory, of its relation to the religious right context where the project began, and of the negotiations that have played out among its developers and its community of users in terrestrial and internet radio. The ongoing compromises and tensions threaded through Rivendell can offer insight into an issue that becomes larger and more pressing as media become increasingly complex and networked: how artists, activists, and media technologists who prioritize independence have reckoned with their reliance on socio-technical infrastructures whose connections may strike them as far less than savory.

Australian Secularism, the Sexual Revolution and the Making of the New Christian Right

This article seeks to explain the origins and continued rise of the New Christian Right (NCR) in Australia since the sexual revolution. Australia is an increasingly secular country, yet conservative religion continues to strongly influence sexual discourse in Australia. The success of the NCR in Australia thus requires explanation. Proportional representation in the Australian parliamentary system explains the unique role that the NCR political parties have played in the Australian sexual polity. The article suggests that Australia’s pragmatic and pluralistic secularism was a necessary condition for the making of the NCR. It argues, following Janice Irvine, that the rise of the Right did not simply trigger bitter conflicts over sexuality; it was accomplished through them. They produced a new, conservative, ecumenical, and politically engaged Christian movement that was defined by sexual politics.

Bells of Mindfulness: Bonhoeffer, COVID-19, and the Climate Crisis

Bells of Mindfulness:Bonhoeffer, COVID-19, and the Climate Crisis Lisa E. Dahill (bio) This is a reflection on collective awakening. In October 1941, the Nazi regime was spewing war, terrorism, and genocide in all directions from Germany. Living in Berlin that fall, the country's human toll mounting as Allied bombing pressed into Germany and began to reach the capital, and witnessing the German army's suicidal push into Russia, Dietrich Bonhoeffer perceived his country facing the collective consequences of nearly ten years of national complicity with Hitler's lies and delusional hatred. Reflecting on Jeremiah 16:21,1 he wrote, "There is a last resort by which God leads [the] people (Israel), who have repeatedly misused and resisted God's grace and have toyed with it, to lead them to the recognition of God's authority: namely, the powerful angry strike of God's hand."2 A little over two years later he was back in Berlin, now imprisoned in the Nazis' Tegel Prison near the epicenter of Allied bombing campaigns on the city. Having survived an intense middle-of-the-night bomb along with his fellow prisoners and guards, he wrote to his close friend Eberhard Bethge (November 27, 1943), Our intensive experiences in the most harrowing aspects of war will, if we survive them, presumably provide the necessary experience for a rebuilding of the life of the peoples, internally and externally…. For this reason we must really preserve our experience, come to terms with it, let it become fruitful, and not push it away. We have never before been given such a palpable sense of the wrathful God, and that too is grace. "Today, if you hear [God's] voice, do not harden your hearts" [citing Psalm 95:7b-8a].3 The wrath of God is an unpopular theological topic, for understandable reasons. At least in the United States, a fringe element of the Christian right is quick to label any natural disaster proof of God's wrath against a given place for political and social policies seen as too liberal. More significantly, far too many children and adults—indeed, entire societies—have been terrorized over the centuries by images of divine fury; and colonial policies of the early-modern European powers translated that internalized sense of divine judgment on what is condemned in oneself out into global campaigns of racist, often genocidal terror that shaped and still inform the modern world.4 Contemporary [End Page 80] analyses show the persisting linkages between theologies of divine wrath and the violence and trauma upholding human structures of injustice.5 Such theological critique of the ways human rage projected onto God deform our capacity for true perception of the divine began centuries earlier, however, at least with Julian of Norwich, whose conviction that "there is no wrath in God" informed a radiant spirituality able to challenge the terrors of her day.6 We thrive when we lead toward others and toward ourselves with God's primal Yes, the very-good-ness of our existence and all life on Earth (Genesis 1:31). Psychologically, Julian and Martin Luther were correct: we are indeed healed by the experience (in his terms, "faith") of being loved utterly unconditionally ("grace"). But Bonhoeffer, the Lutheran, reminds us of the necessity of heeding as well the divine "No," echoing not only through the wreckage of Nazi Germany but also through our contemporary catastrophes of COVID-19, human injustice, greed, and ecological assault on the planet and future generations. In that 1941 biblical reflection, he ponders how the goodness of God, misused and exploited, shifts into a more ominous divine register, one to which most of us may be unaccustomed: "Once the friendly and admonishing word no longer does any good . . . comes the terrifying new teaching of the angry hand and might of God. War, crises, imprisonment, distress of all kinds—this is the 'alien' teaching of God, the 'alien' proclamation and self-revelation of God."7 This warning reads as a heightening of Bonhoeffer's earlier denunciations of cheap grace in his 1937 work, Discipleship. There, in the midst of Hitler's domestic terrorism and bellicosity, his co-opting of Christian symbols and allegiance...

John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Faith by Patrick Lacroix

Reviewed by: John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Faith by Patrick Lacroix Mark Massa S.J. John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Faith. By Patrick Lacroix. [Studies in US Religion, Politics, and Law] (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2021. Pp. 272. Hardback $34.95. ISBN 978-0-7006-3049-3.) Patrick Lacroix has written an important work of revisionist scholarship. Indeed, he argues—for the most part quite convincingly—that scholars of American religion (and of U.S. Catholicism in particular) have largely gotten the "secular sixties" completely wrong. As Lacroix argues the case, most previous scholars studying the contours of twentieth century American religious history have taken it as axiomatic that the famous "religious revival" of the 1950s ended with Dwight Eisenhower, and that the election of JFK in 1960 ushered in both the end of anti-Catholicism as a mainstream American pastime and the beginning of the era of waning religiosity during the 1960s and 1970s. But according to Lacroix, there was no "secular sixties." And Lacroix points to the person Kennedy himself and his presidency for understanding the quite important intersection of religion and politics at the beginning of the 1960s. He argues that scholars studying American [End Page 636] religion have tended to echo (far too uncritically) the Christian right's own assertion that the "secular sixties" were a decade of waning religiosity in which faith-based groups largely eschewed political engagement. In this quite mistaken periodization, the naked public square that Kennedy's presidency ostensibly ushered in itself helped the forces of conservative religion to build up steam to emerge in the 1980s as the "New Religious Right." But from Lacroix's vantage, "the Kennedy years represent an important moment in the arc of U.S. religious history, connecting the religious revival of the 1950s to the conservative religious activism of the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2). As Lacroix shapes the story, both Kennedy himself and his presidency were key factors in a decade when "progressive religion"—far from staging a retreat—played a key role in politics and the public square. Indeed, the author constructs a narrative that seeks to displace most previous histories of U.S. religion that have largely ignored Kennedy's impact on faith-based activism. The creation of the Peace Corps, as well as his growing appreciation for the social vision of Pope John XXIII (documented in papal encyclicals like Pacem in terris) illustrate Kennedy's growing commitment to utilizing inter-denominational faith-based groups in realizing his social vision in civil rights and economic aid initiatives, both in the United States and abroad. And the author is at pains to document how Kennedy's own commitment to the causes of civil rights and the work of young people in the Global South were rooted in his own "progressive" Catholic values and moral sense, values seemingly given official church approbation by the "other John." Lacroix argues that religion was "repurposed" during the Kennedy presidency: religion certainly had been instrumentalized at the beginning of the Cold War in the late 940s in the U.S. battle against "godless communism." But both the tone and location of that marshaled faith was relocated after 1960: the religious faith of the American mainstream was utilized under JFK to promote liberal reform both domestically and abroad, specifically around the issues of racial justice, arms control, and U.S. contributions to developing countries in organizations like the Peace Corps. And the author argues that it was Kennedy himself who functioned as the center of gravity for this new ("progressive") religious activism, all the while espousing a firm commitment to a high wall of separation between church and state, the latter rising more from Kennedy's own deeply-held understanding of constitutional principles and from his "realist" recognition of anti-Catholic impulses on the Protestant right, rather than from his ostensibly secular values. [End Page 637] Lacroix's study is rife with historical ironies, not the least of which was that it was the Catholic candidate in 1960 who played a key role in uncovering and deepening the rift between the "Seven Sister" mainstream Protestant groups affiliated with the National Council of...

Why did it take so long? Trump-Bannonism in a global conjunctural frame

ABSTRACT This is a revised and extended version of my keynote lecture to the Vega Symposium on Resurgent Nationalisms and Populist Politics in the Neoliberal Age, held at the Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, in April 2018. It is part of a Special Issue of Geografiska Annaler, Series B that also includes my Introduction, and articles by Manu Goswami, Tova Höjdestrand and Kanishka Goonewardena, based on their contributions to the Symposium. In this essay I bring South Africa, India and the United States into the same global frame to comprehend the rise of exclusionary nationalisms and right-wing populist politics in relation to neoliberal forms of capitalism and modalities of rule. Rather than pre-given bounded national units or separate ‘cases', I regard them as related yet historically specific nodes in globally interconnected historical geographies, and focus as well on new forms of U.S. imperialism since the 1980s. This global frame enables new and different questions. Instead of asking what explains Trumpism (or Trump-Bannonism), the question rather is why did it take so long for a demagogic figure like Trump to ascend to power, given the long histories of racism and right-wing Christian nationalism in the United States; the ravages of neoliberal forms of capitalism; and abandonment of the working class by the Democratic Party? To engage this question, I combine my earlier work on relational comparison with Antonio Gramsci’s method of conjunctural analysis.

Is the Religious Left Resurgent?

Abstract Journalistic sources seem to suggest that there has been a resurgence of the American Religious Left (i.e., politically liberal Christians who support progressive agendas) in the wake of the strong support from the conservative Christian right in the 2016 presidential election of Donald J. Trump. Using quantitative analysis, we draw on survey data from the General Social Survey, the Public Religion Research Institute, and the National Congregations Study to assess the possibility of a resurgence among the Religious Left. In comparison with a speculated rise, our analysis indicates a notable decline in both the prevalence and engagement of Americans who self-identify as both religious and politically liberal. Not only is the constituency of the Religious Left shrinking, they have also been steadily disengaging from political activity in the last decade. Especially when looking at more recent elections, it has been those among the Secular Left who have been the most politically engaged. We summarize these empirical patterns in relation to the Religious Right and consider the potential for influence among the Religious Left aside from electoral politics. We also briefly consider other possibilities for their political impact and reflect on the inadequacy of the label “Religious Left” for capturing important dynamics. In the end, we urge greater attention to politics among sociologists of religion, providing a set of research questions to consider in light of the upcoming American 2020 national election.

Waving Israeli Flags at Right-Wing Christian Rallies in South Korea

ABSTRACT The impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and the ensuing shift to a liberal administration triggered massive far-right rallies in South Korea. The rally participants waved the South Korean flag to invoke their patriotism and the US flag to show their support for the Korean–USA alliance; however, a group of Protestant Christians at the front of pro-Park rallies waved Israeli flags, which was perplexing to non-participants. To explore why the Israeli flag was waved at the rallies, the study reported in this article examined video recordings of the Christian participants carrying Israeli flags. An analysis of the attendees’ spoken language, signs and edited captions reveals that the Israeli flag first symbolises ancient Israel in the Bible, from which stories and metaphors legitimise the Christians’ participation in the right-wing rallies. Second, the Israeli flag symbolises the modern State of Israel that was restored in 1948 together with the Republic of Korea, which supports right-wing ideology regarding the establishment of the first South Korean government. Finally, by waving the Israeli flag with the other two national flags, the flag wavers were attempting to make their Christian group identity salient without harming the right-wing identity of the rallies.

Eleições presidenciais na América Latina em 2018 e ativismo político de evangélicos conservadores

Outrora interpretado como baluarte da modernidade cultural e econômica, o protestantismo, no início do século XX, formou cismas fundamentalistas e pentecostais que, posteriormente, sobrepujaram as vertentes liberais, difundiram-se pelo mundo e desaguaram na nova direita cristã. Na América Latina, onde já alcançam um quinto da população, grupos evangélicos transformaram o campo religioso, formaram bancadas parlamentares e partidos. Este artigo trata, de forma sumária, do ativismo político evangélico conservador nas eleições presidenciais em 2018 de Costa Rica, Colômbia, Venezuela, México e Brasil. Em defesa da “família” e da “vida”, lutam para conformar o ordenamento jurídico aos valores morais da “maioria cristã”, empreendendo cruzadas contra aborto, políticas igualitárias e anti-homofóbicas, educação sexual e a suposta doutrinação ideológica e de “gênero” nas escolas.

“The Moral Equivalent of Rosa Parks?” The New Christian Right’s Framing Strategy in the Latest Chapter of the Culture Wars

In evaluating recent developments in the New Christian Right (NCR), this paper uses the social movement theory approach of framing. Social movement organizations try to gain advantages with authorities and the public by framing their demands in ways intended to persuade people that their cause is valid. The most effective way of doing this is to align their specific issues rhetorically with larger cultural themes and values, which makes the frame accessible to larger audiences. After debating as to whether a conservative religious crusade can be considered a social movement, this paper examines the NCR as a collective movement whose influence on society and capacity to mobilize are heightened by resorting to the ‘discriminated minority’ framing strategy. I argue that viewing the NCR as a social movement allows us to deepen our understanding of both religious conservatism and of the culture wars.

Thank God for the greatest country on earth: white supremacy, vigilantes, and survivalists in the struggle to define the American nation

ABSTRACTThe election of Donald Trump in 2016 has been identified by observers as the outcome of a wave of nationalist populism in the U.S.A. This article interrogates the meaning of nationalist populism in contemporary American culture with respect to far-right extremism. White supremacists, border vigilantes, and survivalists are forms of far-right extremism that illuminate the nationalist populism of mainstream right-wing American politics. In particular, the politics of religion of the far-right are examined as a microcosm of the Christian right. Using ethnographic data collected over a period of four years in northern Arizona, the politics of religion of one particular family renders anthropological nuance to broad categorisations of the ‘white working class’ and its importance in the election of Donald Trump. How this family variously constructs ‘God’ as a central value of the American nation indicates the ongoing and potentially dangerous struggles of nationalism in the current political climate.

“A remarkably dense historical and political juncture”: Anita Bryant, The Body Politic, and the Canadian Gay and Lesbian Community in January 1978

In 1977, Anita Bryant — the American Southern Baptist, singer, and spokesperson for the Florida Citrus Commission — founded the right-wing Christian Save Our Children campaign in order to overturn a Florida county ordinance that legislated the protection of civil rights for Dade County gays. Six months later, Bryant was invited to visit Toronto, Canada, by Christian minister Ken Campbell of Renaissance International — the homegrown Canadian version of the Christian Evangelical movement. Bryant's visit took place at a complicated historical and political juncture for the Canadian gay and lesbian community: the gay liberation paper of record, The Body Politic, had published an article about adult-child sexual relationships and was subsequently raided by the police; a young boy had been killed in a reported “homosexual orgy”; and the Ontario Human Rights Commission had recently recommended that “sexual orientation” be included in the Human Rights Code — but whether the recommendation would be included remained to be seen. This essay will analyze how Bryant's defeat of the Dade county ordinance and visits to Canada, the controversial article in The Body Politic, and the subsequent police raid on the newspaper provoked mass organizing, protests, and laid the basis for future anti-right organizing in the Canadian gay and lesbian liberation movement — but also exposed the limits of solidarity between gays and lesbians. The tumultuous context that shaped the Canadian gays' and lesbians' responses, analyses, and engagements as well as conflicts with each other will bring to light the unities, dis-unities, and differences within.