Neuroscience Of Empathy Research Articles

The lifespan development and developmental neural basis of empathy

Empathy is the affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of other’s emotional state or condition. In the current era, it is urgent to explore the underlying cognitive mechanism of empathy, grasp the development trajectory of empathy, and improve the ability of individual empathy by combing the neuroimaging methods from a neuroscience perspective. There are different stages in the development of empathy. It begins to sprout in infancy and preschool, and becomes flexible and controllable in adolescence, showing a mature development from adolescence to early adulthood. When entering middle and late adulthood, the affective empathy rebounded, and cognitive empathy declined. So far, the research of the neural basis of empathy focuses on the childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood, emphasizing the brain region and brain network related to empathy, and the relationship between the individual’s empathy level, characteristics and brain structure or function. Based on the previous research about the development and neuroscience of empathy, this paper focused on the future research direction from the aspects of measurement, technical route, research entry point and transformation of research results, and made a certain plan for the development route of domestic research in this field.

Graded Empathy: A Neuro-Phenomenological Hypothesis.

The neuroscience of empathy has enormously expanded in the past two decades, thereby making instrumental progress for the understanding of neural substrates involved in affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. Yet, these conclusions have relied on ultrasimplified tasks resulting in the affective/cognitive dichotomy that was often modeled and overemphasized in pathological, developmental, and genetic studies of empathy. As such, the affective/cognitive model of empathy could not straightforwardly accommodate and explain the recent surge of neuroscientific data obtained from studies employing naturalistic approaches and intergroup conditions. Inspired by phenomenological philosophy, this article paves the way for a new scientific perspective on empathy that breaks thorough the affective/cognitive dichotomy. This neuro-phenomenological account leans on phenomenological analyses and can straightforwardly explain recent neuroscience data. It emphasizes the dynamic, subjective, and piecemeal features of empathic experiences and unpicks the graded nature of empathy. The graded empathy hypothesis postulates that attending to others' expressions always facilitates empathy, but the parametric modulation in the levels of the empathic experience varies as a function of one's social interest (e.g., via intergroup or inter-personal cues) in the observed other. Drawing on multiple resources that integrate neuroscience with phenomenology, we describe the potential of this graded framework in an era of real-life experimentation. By wearing lenses of neuro-phenomenology, this original perspective can change the way empathy is considered.

Synchronous Interactions Foster Empathy.

Despite growing interest in the neuroscience of empathy, very little is known about the developmental processes that foster the neural maturation of an empathic response. Here, we suggest that the synchronous interaction shapes and fosters the ability to empathize with others. We argue that this intriguing relationship between synchrony and empathy expands beyond the mother-child relationship to social relationships in general. It will be important to further explore this relationship in more social settings and to probe the biological mechanisms, which may underlie it. Advancing research on the relationship between these two social processes may support the work of practitioners, psychologists, and educators in moderating the devastating outcomes of mental disorders and promoting social maturity and growth.

Expanding Empathy in Our Clinical Work: A Response to Wickramasekera II’s (2015) “Mysteries of Hypnosis and the Self Are Revealed by the Psychology and Neuroscience of Empathy.”

Empathy is a central tenet of psychotherapeutic process. This article builds upon Wickramasekera II’s (2015) “Mysteries of Hypnosis and the Self are Revealed by the Psychology and Neuroscience of Empathy,” with particular focus on “empathetic involvement theory.” A brief transtheoretical and research review of empathy is provided. A couple’s therapy case illustration is provided to elucidate how one can expand “empathetic involvement theory” into clinical practice. Emphasis is placed upon the dimensions of sensation and body/mind connectedness.

An Intersubjective View of Empathy and Hypnotic Trance: Response to Wickramasekera II

In response to Wickramasekera II’s description of his empathic involvement theory of hypnosis in “Mysteries of hypnosis and the self are revealed by the psychology and neuroscience of empathy” (Wickramasekera II, 2015), Henning offers further reflections on what empathy might be and what it allows therapists to do, particularly in conditions of hypnotic trance. She defines her intersubjective view of hypnotic trance as an experience in which client and therapist mutually engage in a shared state of consciousness, and a mutual bidirectional or multidirectional exchange of verbal and nonverbal, as well as conscious and unconscious, material occurs, and which may include shared taking on of roles and expectations in each party, as suggested by the other, particularly when both client and therapist are highly hypnotizable. Research on the concept of “mutual hypnosis,” or co-trance, is reviewed, and barriers to scholarly discussions about intersubjectivity in therapy relationships are described. Concepts from other disciplines and traditions, including quantum physics, transpersonal psychology, contemplative Christianity, and shamanistic practices and trance in other cultures are then offered to clarify the processes of intersubjectivity, and perspectives about empathy and hypnotic co-trance are offered from the context of the author’s own clinical work as a trauma therapist. Finally, suggestions are provided for future research approaches and methods to further explore and understand these phenomena.

Empathy Examined From Perspectives of Neuroscience and Artistic Imagination

This response to Ian E. Wickramasekera II’s article, Mysteries of Hypnosis and the Self Are Revealed by the Psychology and Neuroscience of Empathy, is addressed from a joint perspective on consciousness comprising two related orientations: neuroscience and artistic imagination. We find that the central importance of empathy to empathic involvement theory (Wickramasekera II, 2015) reflects the pivotal nature of empathy in the brain and in the relational exchange implicit in the psychotherapeutic process, particularly when using art in therapy. We offer a preliminary unpacking of the roles related to key psychological processes, such as imagination, that are implicated in clinical uses of verbal and visual empathic resonance.

Mysteries of Hypnosis and the Self Are Revealed by the Psychology and Neuroscience of Empathy

This article reviews a growing body of research and theory in hypnosis and neuroscience that supports the empathic involvement theory (EIT) of hypnosis (Wickramasekera II, 2001; Wickramasekera II & Szlyk, 2003; Wickramasekera II, 2007c). The EIT is a unified transpersonal theory of hypnosis and the self, which weaves together empathic elements of Dzogchen, neodissociative, neuroscience, psychoanalytic, sociocognitive, and other theories by proposing that hypnotic phenomena are inherently characterized by their deep involvement with processes of empathy and the self. The EIT proposes that the experience of hypnosis is embodied in a system of neural networks in the brain that utilizes empathy-related processes, adaptive resonance between perceptual input and top-down expectancies, and connectionist learning algorithms to (a) empathically enact the affect, cognition, body language, response expectancies, social roles, sensations, etc. that are presented to them during hypnosis in accordance with socio-cognitive theories of hypnosis; (b) engage in a convergent psychophysiological relationship with another person in accordance with psychoanalytic, Ericksonian, and polyvagal/social engagement system theories; (c) alter the empathic self/other (theory of mind) coding of phenomenological experiences during hypnosis in accordance with aspects of the neo-dissociative and socio-cognitive traditions; and (d) develop an experiential understanding of the illusion of self that may lead, in some people, to its transcendence in accordance with Bon-Buddhist, Dzogchen, and transpersonal scholars. A unified definition of hypnosis is proposed based on findings in the empathic neuroscience of hypnosis as well as a working model of the neuromatrix of the self.

A Biosemiotic Body of Law: The Neurobiology of Justice

We offer a theory regarding the symbolism of the human body in legal discourse. The theory blends legal theory, the neuroscience of empathy, and biosemiotics, a branch of semiotics that combines semiotics with theoretical biology. Our theory posits that this symbolism of the body is not solely a metaphor or semiotic sign of how law is cognitively structured in the mind. We propose that it also signifies neurobiological mechanisms of social emotion in the brain that are involved in the social and moral decision-making and behavior that law generally seeks to govern. Specifically, we hypothesize that the symbol of a collective human body in the language of law signifies neural mechanisms of pain empathy which generate a virtual, neurally simulated, emotional sense of sharing the feelings or pain of others and of thereby being one-in-body with or virtually equal to them. We speculate that this may be the neural basis of what is signified in legal and political theory as the “body politic” or “sense of equality,” because neuroscience and psychiatry further suggest that such pain empathy may provide the natural, emotional motivation to think and act in a rights-based manner. We conclude that misunderstanding of these neural mechanisms of pain empathy and related misinterpretation of this corporeal symbolism for the same may have long resulted in legal discourse that misinterprets the function of “pain” in the law and misinterprets the associated positive law, specifically the law regarding individual, equality-based rights and criminal justice, in particular, punishment theory.

The neuroscience of empathy: progress, pitfalls and promise

The last decade has witnessed enormous growth in the neuroscience of empathy. Here, we survey research in this domain with an eye toward evaluating its strengths and weaknesses. First, we take stock of the notable progress made by early research in characterizing the neural systems supporting two empathic sub-processes: sharing others' internal states and explicitly considering those states. Second, we describe methodological and conceptual pitfalls into which this work has sometimes fallen, which can limit its validity. These include the use of relatively artificial stimuli that differ qualitatively from the social cues people typically encounter and a lack of focus on the relationship between brain activity and social behavior. Finally, we describe current research trends that are overcoming these pitfalls through simple but important adjustments in focus, and the future promise of empathy research if these trends continue and expand.

Manipulation of Intergroup Relationships does not reduce Racial Bias in Empathetic Neural Responses

Event Abstract Back to Event Manipulation of Intergroup Relationships does not reduce Racial Bias in Empathetic Neural Responses Emily R. Hielscher1*, Luis S. Contreras1 and Ross Cunnington1 1 Queensland Brain Institute, Australia When we observe someone in pain, it activates neural structures that are involved in the direct experience of pain. Recent ERP studies (Sheng & Han, 2012) have investigated the racial bias of empathy in response to perceived pain amongst a Chinese population. Findings have demonstrated an automatic, empathetic neural response to observed pain experienced by same-race subjects. There is uncertainty as to whether this is due to racial effects or just a general in-group bias. The present study aimed to further elucidate this by investigating the time-course of empathetic neural responses when intergroup relationships were manipulated. Using the minimal group paradigm, a sample of Caucasian Australians were assigned to one of two mixed race (Asian, Caucasian) groups. Participants were asked to judge in-group and out-group faces as either painful or not; faces were exposed to a painful (syringe) or non-painful (q-tip) stimuli. The results identified a significant racial bias at early ERP components including N1, where painful stimuli elicited a negative shift relative to non-painful stimuli in response to Caucasian faces only. Additionally, strong racial effects were found at N170 and VPP. A long latency empathic response was found at P3 where there was significant differentiation between painful and non-painful stimuli, regardless of race or group. There was no evidence that empathy-related brain activity was modulated by intergroup manipulation. The results support a model of empathy for pain which consists of early, automatic identification for same race and a late top-down cognitive evaluation. The neuroscience of empathy is important for furthering our understanding of the ‘hidden brain’, that our unconscious mind may be more biased than we would like to believe. References Sheng, F., & Han, S. (2012). Manipulations of cognitive strategies and intergroup relationships reduce the racial bias in empathic neural responses. NeuroImage, 61, 786-797. Keywords: Empathy, ERP, Pain, Racial Bias, Intergroup Manipulation Conference: ACNS-2012 Australasian Cognitive Neuroscience Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 29 Nov - 2 Dec, 2012. Presentation Type: Poster Presentation Topic: Emotion and Social Citation: Hielscher ER, Contreras LS and Cunnington R (2012). Manipulation of Intergroup Relationships does not reduce Racial Bias in Empathetic Neural Responses. Conference Abstract: ACNS-2012 Australasian Cognitive Neuroscience Conference. doi: 10.3389/conf.fnhum.2012.208.00044 Copyright: The abstracts in this collection have not been subject to any Frontiers peer review or checks, and are not endorsed by Frontiers. They are made available through the Frontiers publishing platform as a service to conference organizers and presenters. The copyright in the individual abstracts is owned by the author of each abstract or his/her employer unless otherwise stated. Each abstract, as well as the collection of abstracts, are published under a Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 (attribution) licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) and may thus be reproduced, translated, adapted and be the subject of derivative works provided the authors and Frontiers are attributed. For Frontiers’ terms and conditions please see https://www.frontiersin.org/legal/terms-and-conditions. Received: 14 Oct 2012; Published Online: 07 Nov 2012. * Correspondence: Ms. Emily R Hielscher, Queensland Brain Institute, Brisbane, Australia, e.hielscher@qcmhr.uq.edu.au Login Required This action requires you to be registered with Frontiers and logged in. To register or login click here. Abstract Info Abstract The Authors in Frontiers Emily R Hielscher Luis S Contreras Ross Cunnington Google Emily R Hielscher Luis S Contreras Ross Cunnington Google Scholar Emily R Hielscher Luis S Contreras Ross Cunnington PubMed Emily R Hielscher Luis S Contreras Ross Cunnington Related Article in Frontiers Google Scholar PubMed Abstract Close Back to top Javascript is disabled. Please enable Javascript in your browser settings in order to see all the content on this page.

Jean Decety and William Ickes (eds): The Social Neuroscience of Empathy

Jean Decety and William Ickes (eds): The Social Neuroscience of Empathy

Empathy: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach

AbstractThere has been recent widespread interest in the neural underpinnings of the experience of empathy. In this review, we take a social cognitive neuroscience approach to understanding the existing literature on the neuroscience of empathy. A growing body of work suggests that we come to understand and share in the experiences of others by commonly recruiting the same neural structures both during our own experience and while observing others undergoing the same experience. This literature supports a simulation theory of empathy, which proposes that we understand the thoughts and feelings of others by using our own mind as a model. In contrast, theory of mind research suggests that medial prefrontal regions are critical for understanding the minds of others. In this review, we offer ideas about how to integrate these two perspectives, point out unresolved issues in the literature, and suggest avenues for future research.

Toward a Neuroscience of Empathy: Integrating Affective and Cognitive Perspectives

Empathy is a process essential for mitigation of human suffering and for the creation and long-term stability of social bonds. Although it has recently become the focus of intensive study after decades of neglect, models of empathy emerging from cognitive neuroscience, affective neuroscience, and functional imaging studies show considerable confusion about defining empathy and widespread differences of opinion about the cognitive vs. affective dimensions to empathy. Human empathy probably reflects variable admixtures of more primitive affective resonance mechanisms, melded with developmentally later-arriving theory of mind and perspective taking. This integration of primitive with more cognitive mechanisms occurs under the “supervision” of a motivated valuing of another sentient creature, a supervision that underlines intrinsic ties between empathy and attachment processes. We know little, however, about how more primitive resonance-induction mechanisms centrally involved in attachment connect developmentally to more later arriving cognitive theory of mind components. From these considerations, a basic model of affective empathy is generated as a gated resonance induction of the internal distress of another creature, with an intrinsic motivation to relieve the distress. It is “gated” in that at least four classes of poorly mapped variables determine the intensity of an empathic response to the suffering of another. Potential classes of variables affecting empathic inductions are: (1) genotypic and (2) phenotypic effects; (3) state-dependent influences (on the affective state of the empathizer); and finally (4) the perceived qualities of the suffering party. Most current models have failed to conceptualize this critical “gating” process, subsequently losing any naturalistic predictive efficacy in modeling real-world social phenomena. Contagion has been generally neglected in affective neuroscience, but it may point to poorly understood receptive processing capabilities, embedded in the distributed paralimbic and subcortical architectures for primary emotion. Thus, contagion may be a developmentally primitive emotion-induction mechanism that cognitive development largely (but not totally) supplants. Detailed differential predictions of this model are proposed.

Assessments of the Emotional States of Others: Conscious Judgments Versus Emotional Contagion

Clinicians have identified two techniques for gaining information about clients' emotional states: (1) they can consciously try to assess clients'emotional states and/or (2) they can monitor their own emotional reactions during the therapeutic hour, hoping to «feel themselves into» their clients' emotions. Usually, clients'emotional self-reports are in synchrony with their facial, vocal, and postural expressions of emotion. But, what happens when they are not?