Net Welfare Effects Research Articles

Economic Integration between Refugee Settlements and Host Communities

With 1.5 million refugees and a refugee policy that promotes long-term settlement and self-sufficiency, understanding the impact of refugees on host communities in Uganda is a critical issue. Of particular concern – not only in Uganda, but all refugee-hosting countries – is the economic impact of refugees; while refugees attract aid money into the local economy, the mass distribution of in-kind goods can drive local prices and wages down. Moreover, little is known about the role of economic integration between refugees and hosts, especially in situations of protracted displacement. Using a mixed methods approach with panel survey data and semi-structured interviews, we show significant integration between refugees and hosts that is widely perceived as positive. Results indicate that refugees provide goods and services at lower costs to hosts and often of higher quality than found elsewhere. Yet, these interactions, especially through markets, create competition and may lower prices and wages since proximity to refugees is associated with lower host labor participation and earnings from crop production. The net welfare effect for hosts of being close to refugees are found to be ambiguous.

The effects of food export restrictions on the domestic economy of exporting countries: A review

This review summarizes empirical evidence for the effects of food export restrictions on domestic food prices and the welfare of food system actors in the local economy of exporting countries. Evidence suggests that food export restrictions offer, in some cases, a temporary respite from price surges by boosting short-term domestic supply but have unintended negative consequences for food producers in most cases. The net welfare effect of food price stabilization through export restrictions depends on the net food buyers' share relative to the net food sellers' share in the economy, the relative change in producers' versus consumers' prices and the contribution of the restricted food item to household income and expenditure. In the absence of a generous producer price support program, the short-term welfare effect generated by export bans is minimal and, in some instances, negative particularly for rural residents. Food export restrictions also prevent domestic producers from taking advantage of the high international prices for agricultural commodities, stimulating the agricultural sector and boosting food production. Finally, food export restrictions lead to high economic costs in terms of lost producer revenue, forgone agricultural investments, high enforcement costs, and high fiscal costs for procuring and maintaining larger than normal food reserves.

The global minimum tax

This paper studies how the global minimum tax shapes national tax policies and welfare in a formal model of international tax competition with heterogeneous countries. The net welfare effect is generally ambiguous from the perspective of non-havens. On the one hand, the global minimum tax raises their welfare by curbing profit shifting, which boosts government revenue. One the other hand, it lowers their welfare by increasing equilibrium tax rates in havens, which transfers resources from non-haven firms to haven governments. The net welfare effect is unambiguously positive when the global minimum rate is so high that profit shifting ends.

Net Neutrality and Welfare Effects of Discrimination on Either or Both the Content Side and the User Side

Net Neutrality and Welfare Effects of Discrimination on Either or Both the Content Side and the User Side

The long-term impact of trade with firm heterogeneity

This paper explores the welfare effects of openness in a setting with firm heterogeneity and country asymmetry and presents results in terms of the well-known formula from Arkolakis et al. (Am Econ Rev 102(1):94–130, 2012). By allowing agents to save and the economy to grow, new channels for the welfare effects of openness appear, since firm selection affects the value of accumulated savings and the average efficiency of the economy, and therefore its future growth rate. Country asymmetry yields differentiated, and in some cases opposite, results between countries. In line with the empirical literature, net welfare effects in each region depend on countries’ specific conditions and losses may occur. A numerical exercise fits the model to the UK and EU economies to show the magnitude and direction that each effect can take if trade barriers increase between them. It is shown that welfare losses for UK consumers can be greatly underestimated if asymmetries and dynamics are removed from the analysis.

Inequality and Trade Policy: The Pro‐Poor Bias of Contemporary Trade Restrictions

This paper studies the pro‐poor bias of trade policy in India by estimating the household welfare effects of removing the current protection structure. The elimination of a pro‐poor trade policy is expected to have a negative differential welfare effect at the low end of the distribution. The paper first constructs trade restrictiveness indexes for household consumption items and industries using both tariffs and non‐tariff barriers. The results indicate that Indian trade policy is regressive through the expenditure channel as it disproportionately raises the cost of consumption for poorer households, while it is progressive through the earnings channel. Based on the net welfare effects, the elimination of the current trade protection structure is estimated to reduce inequality. These results indicate that a trade policy that is progressive through the earnings channel may induce a price effect that is regressive through the expenditure channel.

Providing the Spark: Impact of financial incentives on battery electric vehicle adoption

To overcome adoption barriers and promote battery electric vehicles (BEVs) as an energy efficient consumer transportation option, a number of states offer subsidies to consumers for BEVs. We use a national data set of vehicle registrations and state-level financial incentives to assess the impact of vehicle purchase subsidies on adoption using both difference-in-differences and synthetic controls methods. We find that incentives offered as direct purchase rebates generate increased levels of new BEV registrations at a rate of approximately 8 percent per thousand dollars of incentive offered. Between 2011 and 2015, vehicle rebate incentives are associated with an increase in overall BEV registrations of approximately 11 percent. Our findings indicate incentives offered as state income tax credits do not have a statistically significant effect on BEV adoptions, though we caution this may be a result of limited temporal variation in BEV incentives across our sample. Responses to rebate incentives do not differ significantly by the make of the vehicle purchased (i.e., Tesla and non-Tesla vehicles). We combine our results with recent assessments of marginal environmental costs of electric vehicle charging and measure net welfare effects of BEV subsidy programs. Our analysis indicates these programs are not welfare-improving if only considering benefits associated with avoided emissions. Additional benefits associated with long-term market growth, production cost savings, network externalities, or accelerated innovation could substantially impact the net welfare outcomes.

There Is No Free House

This paper estimates the effect of a housing relocation program on the labor supply and living conditions of low-income households across major cities in South Africa. Using panel microdata collected between 2008 and 2014, it exploits the arbitrary eligibility rules of the policy with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to obtain reduced form estimates. There are three main findings. First, in the short-term of 2 to 4 years following relocation, the labor supply of recipient households decreases, driven mostly by a reduction of female hours. Second, the large increase in distance (km) to economic opportunities seems to be an important factor behind the decline, directly or indirectly through family shifts in earning strategies. Finally, evidence is limited regarding improvements in housing and neighborhood quality. Overall, there is no clear indication that the net welfare effect of relocation is positive.

Trade between mass- and rate-based regulatory regimes: Bad for emissions?

If one jurisdiction regulates power plant emissions with a cap-and-trade (mass) program and another with an intensity (rate) standard, is it a good idea for them to link? Specifically, what effects does introducing electricity and rate-mass allowance trade between differently-regulated regions have on emissions and ultimately welfare? We explore these questions first with a simple theoretical model and then with a sophisticated numerical model of the electricity sector. The theoretical model isolates the policy effects by assuming that two otherwise identical regions are regulated differently. With fixed demand, their autarky marginal abatement costs are identical, but electricity prices are lower in the rate-limited region. Adding electricity trade shifts generation to the rate-limited region, expanding its allowance allocation, while emissions remain capped in the mass-capped region. Adding rate-mass allowance trade exacerbates this shift in generation and expansion of emissions. The increase of emission damage could make the net welfare effects negative. However, if the mass cap is sufficiently more stringent than the rate limit, allowing rate-mass allowance trade in the presence of electricity trade can lower emissions. The numerical model of the eastern US illustrates the effects predicted in the theoretical model, and projects their magnitudes. In our simulation that is loosely based on the US Clean Power Plan, the estimated CO2 damage makes the estimated net benefits of allowing rate-mass trading negative. Our results also illustrate that linking can shift the geographic distribution of SO2 and NOX emissions, which can counteract the effect of the CO2 damage on estimated total welfare.

The costs of free: commoditization, bundling and concentration

AbstractDigital markets offer abundant free content but exhibit extreme concentration among content aggregation intermediaries. These characteristics are linked. Weak copyright environments select against stand-alone content-delivery structures and select for bundled aggregation structures in which free content for users promotes positively priced advertising and data-collection services for firms. Dominant intermediaries promote commoditization, and the reallocation of market rents from content producers to content aggregators, through litigation and free content distribution that weaken copyright protections. The potential net welfare effects raise concern. Network effects, compounded by weak inventory constraints, scale economies, and learning effects, promote winner-takes-all outcomes in the intermediary services market while weak copyright may generate output distortions in the content production market.

Distributional and Environmental Effects of an Emissions-Differentiated Car Sales Tax

European countries introduced a combination of demand-side fiscal policies and mandatory supply-side emissions standards to reduce CO2 emissions rates of new cars. I quantify the equilibrium response to one of the most drastic demand-side policies, the Finnish CO2 differentiation of automobile sales tax rates. Despite having a drastic market impact, this environmental tax reform did not drive the observed decline of new-car CO2 emissions rates, given the concurrent introduction of mandatory EUCO2 emissions standards for manufacturers. The CO2 tax-rate differentiation however led to increased local pollution by promoting the sale of diesel-powered cars. The tax reform had a positive net welfare effect as it lowered tax rates on average. It was nonetheless also a regressive policy with large tax revenue losses and a disproportional benefit to high-income consumers. Optimal fiscal policy aiming to balance environmental and public finance goals needs to consider both the market structure as well as other concurrent policies on different levels of government.

THE UNCERTAIN WELFARE EFFECTS OF RAILROAD COMPETITION AND RAILROAD REGULATION, 1870–1900

This essay, written for a memorial contribution on the works of Paul W. MacAvoy, discusses MacAvoy's first book, The Economic Effects of Regulation (1965), which addresses eastern railroad cartels in the United States between 1870 and 1900. The essay describes the many achievements of this book in terms of detecting and measuring cheating on cartel prices and its discussion of cartel practices of greater or lesser success. The essay also compares railroad practices for chiefly the transport of grain from Chicago to New York to practices over the same period for the transport of refined oil from Pittsburgh and Cleveland to various locations on the east coast. The principal difference as between grain and oil transport was the existence of competitive markets for grain shipment versus the monopsony of the Standard Oil Company over the shipment of refined oil. The net welfare effects of the grain cartels versus the oil monopsony remain unclear.

Undervaluation through foreign reserve accumulation: Static losses, dynamic gains,

This paper analyzes foreign reserve accumulation as a second-best policy in economies with learning-by-investing externalities that arise disproportionately from the tradable sector. Under closed capital accounts, reserve accumulation requires an increase in net exports, which reduces the domestic supply of tradable goods, raises their relative price in terms of non-tradable goods – i.e. undervalues the real exchange rate – and stimulates the production of tradable goods. The cost of such a policy is to reduce domestic tradable absorption. However, since the tradable sector generates learning-by-investing externalities, it leads to dynamic gains. Reserve accumulation always increases growth in our framework, but the net welfare effects depend on the balance between the static losses from lower tradable absorption and the dynamic gains from higher growth. We capture this trade-off in a simple analytic formula and depict it in an intuitive graph. We also discuss alternative policy options to reserve accumulation that serve to internalize learning-by-investing externalities.

PLEASE DON'T REGULATE MY INTERNALITIES.

PLEASE DON'T REGULATE MY INTERNALITIES.

불완전한 환경세 사용에 따른 잠재적 후생 손실

지난 30년간 환경세나 배출권과 같은 경제적 정책도구들이 환경정책의 영역에서 꾸준 히 각광을 받아왔다. 경제적 환경정책도구들은 저마다 특성이 다르고, 각국 정책당국이 직면한 환경문제의 구조적 제도적 배경이 상이하기 때문에, 교과서적인 의미에서의 피구세(배출세)와 같은 정책도구는 널리 사용되지 못하는 상황이다. 오히려 산출물이나 소비 등에 부과하는 환경 관련 조세를 부과함으로써 피구세 사용에 수반되는 한계와 어려움을 회피하려는 경향이 강하다. 즉, 피구세(배출세)를 사용하지 못함으로써 이미 상당한 후생손실을 감내할 수밖에 없는 것이다. 특히 개발도상국들에서는 구조적 제도적 제약들이 선진국에 비해서 더 많고 크기 때문에, 제대로 된 피구세(배출세)를 사용하지 못함에 따라 입는 후생손실이 훨씬 커질 수 있다. 본 논문에서는 이 점을 보여주기 위해서, 이론적인 일반균형모형을 통해 노동에 대한 과세가 존재하는 차선의 상황에서, 피구세 및 산출세 수준을 최선과 차선의 경우에 계산하고, 각종 구조적 제도적 제약을 모형 내의 파라미터로 표현한 사회후생 수식을 통해 도출해낸다. 그리고 피구세에 대한 불완전하지만 현실적인 대안으로 산출세를 이용하여 환경문제를 해결하려 하는 경우, 후생증진의 차이가 얼마나 벌어지는지 살펴본다. 또한 미국과 중국의 예를 들어, 환경 차원에서 불완전한 산출세를 사용함으로써 겪는 후생손실이 개도국의 경우 산업국가에 비해서 무려 6배나 벌어질 수 있음을 시뮬레이션을 통해 보여준다. In environmental policy areas, a greater use of economic instruments (EIs) has recently been observed in many countries. However, EIs are heterogeneous policy tools. The textbook case of a Pigouvian tax is far from widely used, mainly due to the information requirements and other structural and institutional constraints. The successful implementation of EIs might heavily depend on pre-existing structural and institutional conditions. Moreover, these institutional conditions are particularly unfavorable in developing countries. Using a simple analytical general equilibrium model, this paper examines how these constraints affect the welfare gain from the introduction of environmental taxes in developing countries. First, this paper solves for the second-best optimal Pigouvian tax and output tax in the presence of a distortionary tax on market use of labor. The result confirms that an environmental output tax achieves a socially-efficient level of emissions in the least-cost manner only if the nature of the linkage between the tax base and the environmental damage is fixed. Second, incorporating structural and institutional constraints into the model through a set of parameter values from China and the US, this paper calculates the net welfare effects of either using the ideal Pigouvian tax or instead using an output tax. The numerical simulation results show that the net welfare gain from the use of an ideal Pigouvian tax could be more than six times larger than that of an output tax in developing countries. On the other hand, the welfare gain is only 50 percent in developed countries. This means that the potential welfare disadvantage from using output taxes instead emissions tax for environmental purposes could be much greater in the case of developing countries.

Human capital accumulation in a federation

More than half of the variation across U.S. school districts in real K-12 education expenditures per student is due to differences between, rather than within, states. I study the welfare implications of redistribution of education expenditures by the Federal government, using an analytically tractable model of human capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents and endogenous state policies. The net welfare effect of Federal redistribution depends on a trade-off between the positive effect of redistributing resources toward poorer states and the negative effect resulting from misallocation of population across states. Federal redistribution increases welfare in a calibrated version of the model.

Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.

Cross market price support and agricultural development

Purpose – This paper aims to develop a market-driven mechanism for commodity price insurance in developing countries lacking access to futures markets or other forms of hedging products. Design/methodology/approach – The model incorporates futures, exchange rate and local basis risk under the Black-Scholes framework to develop quanto (quantity adjusting option). When the domestic price of a commodity in a developing country is strongly correlated to the price in a futures market, price support premiums can be estimated. The authors use daily corn futures prices, exchange rate MXP/USD, and prices of corn and sorghum at several locations in Mexico. Findings – The authors calculated the price insurance premium at various local markets in Mexico for corn and sorghum. The results are consistent with those for the USA, showing that relative price premiums are similar. Research limitations/implications – The results provide a benchmark to estimate the net welfare effects of government programs for agricultural price support. Practical implications – The model shows that privately provided agricultural price insurance is feasible under certain conditions for developing countries without an established futures market. Originality/value – This paper provides market-based agricultural options in Mexico which contributes to the existing government price support program.

Banking Unions: Distorted Incentives and Efficient Bank Resolution

A banking union limits international bank default contagion, eliminating inefficient liquidations. For particularly low short term returns, it also stimulates interbank flows. Both effects improve welfare. An undesirable effect arises for moderate moral hazard, as the banking union encourages risk taking by systemic institutions. If banks hold opaque assets, the net welfare effect of a banking union can be negative. Restricting the banking union mandate restores incentives, improving welfare. The optimal mandate depends on moral hazard intensity and expected returns. Net creditor countries should contribute most to the joint resolution fund, less so if a banking union distorts incentives.

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.