Net Asset Position Research Articles

Net external position, financial development, and banking crisis

Does the external position of a country that is conditioned on financial development impact the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis? We address this question using data from 149 developing and advanced countries from 1970 to 2011, as well as a variety of statistical tools. Our findings are twofold. First, we find that the net external position of a country significantly affects its likelihood of a systemic crisis depending on the level of financial development. Conditional on low to moderate financial development, countries can lower the risk of banking crises significantly by maintaining a net foreign creditor status. Second, we find that the level of financial development raises a countryi?½s crisis risk significantly while its impact depends on the net asset position. This indicates a potential amplification effect in which countries with more developed and complex financial systems that are also debtor countries have a higher potential of incurring a systemic banking crisis.

Changes in Debt

Mainstream macroeconomists have a tendency to see debt as a flow variable, whereas heterodox economists emphasizes that debt should be understood as a stock-flow component in the economy. In this way changes in debt has to do with adjustments in assets and liabilities as well as in the servicing of interests. To bridge the interests a stock-flow model of debt changes is proposed. A sectoral approach is taken to debt changes underlining that debt is first of all a sectoral problem before becoming a total economy issue. The model is derived from the policy relevant indicator for debt, the nominal debt to nominal GDP. The resulting model show that debt changes are directly linked to changes in the real rate of interest and the real economic growth rate, and to the indirect effects of these changes on the net income and net asset positions of the economy’s sectors. The results are used to explain the recent surge in world debt levels and possible linkages to monetary policy.

Universal Baby Bonds Reduce Black-White Wealth Inequality, Progressively Raise Net Worth of All Young Adults

The distribution of wealth has grown increasingly unequal, especially along racial lines. Lawmakers and researchers propose to address the issue with universal “baby bonds,” paid to every newborn and preserved until young adulthood. Bond values are tied inversely to wealth up to a $50,000 maximum investment. This study uses longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on the assets of young adults to simulate contemporary racial inequalities under a counterfactual policy environment in which the United States had administered baby bonds when the current cohort of young adults were newborns. Initial bond values are defined categorically by quintiles of household wealth observed in 1989 and 1994, smoothed across the inverse hyperbolic sine of household wealth, and then assumed to grow at 2% per year through 2015. Without baby bonds, young White Americans hold approximately 16 times the wealth of young Black Americans at the median ($46,000 vs. $2,900). Baby bonds reduce the disparity to a factor of 1.4 ($79,143 vs. $57,845), in the absence of intervening behavioral responses to the policy. The share held by the top decile decreases from 72% to 65%, marginally approaching the more egalitarian societies. Baby bonds considerably narrow wealth inequalities while simultaneously improving the net asset position of young adults and alleviating asset concentration.

What’s wealth got to do with it? Global balance sheets and US geo-economic power

Does the ever-increasing stock of cross-border asset holdings pose a threat to macro-economic stability and to US geo-economic power? Recent analyses suggest that exchange rate changes might drive massive changes in net asset positions that in turn create equally large wealth effects. These wealth effects might compromise US macro-economic policy. In contrast, this manuscript argues that these fears are misplaced. Income flows are the dog that wags the asset tail. Those income flows in turn derive from differences in national growth rates and in the ability of firms to capture profit from global value chains. Expectations around these flows validate asset values. Attention should therefore focus on the source of flows and control over flows, particularly profits, rather than on asset stocks, which are a dependent variable. Although wealth effects driven by exchange rate changes are large, other routine changes in flows and expectations have similar or larger effects on the stock of wealth.

The distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model

Abstract This paper compares the distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing (QE) within an estimated open-economy DSGE model of the euro area. The model includes two groups of households: (i) wealthier households, who own financial assets and are able to smooth consumption over time, and (ii) poorer households, who only receive labor and transfer income and live `hand to mouth'. We use the model to compare the impact of policy shocks on constructed measures of income and wealth inequality (net disposable income, net asset position, and relative per-capita income). Except for the short term, expansionary conventional policy and QE shocks tend to mitigate income and wealth inequality between the two population groups. In light of the coarse dichotomy of households that abstracts from richer income and wealth dynamics at the individual level, the analysis emphasizes the functional distribution of income.

Housing, the Great Income Tax Experimentt, and the Intergenerational Consequences of the Lease

This paper provides an analysis of how the New Zealand tax system may be affecting residential property markets. Like most OECD countries, New Zealand does not tax the imputed rent or capital gains from owner-occupied housing. Unlike most OECD countries, since 1989 New Zealand has taxed income placed in retirement savings funds on an income basis, rather than an expenditure basis. The result is likely to be the most distortionary tax policy towards housing in the OECD. Since 1989, these tax distortions have provided incentives that should have lead to significant increases in house prices and the average size of new dwellings, should have reduced owner-occupier rates, and should have led to a worsening of the overseas net asset position. The tax settings are likely to be regressive, and are not intergenerationally neutral, as they impose significant costs on current and future generations of young New Zealanders (and new migrants). Since it does not appear to be politically palatable to tax capital gains or imputed rent, to reduce the distortionary consequences of the tax system on housing markets New Zealand may wish to reconsider how it taxes retirement savings accounts by adopting the standard OECD approach.

How would Capital Account Liberalization Affect China's Capital Flows and the Renminbi Real Exchange Rates?

AbstractIn this paper we study the determinants of gross capital flows, project the size of China's international investment position in 2020, and analyze the implications for the renminbi real exchange rate if China liberalizes the capital account. We assume in this exercise that the renminbi will have largely achieved capital account convertibility by the end of the current decade, a timetable consistent with recent proposals by the People's Bank of China. Our analysis shows that if the capital account were liberalized, China's gross international investment position would grow significantly, and inflows and outflows would become much more balanced. The private sector would turn its net liability position into a balanced position, and the official sector would reduce its net asset position significantly, relative to the country's GDP. Because of the increasing importance of private sector foreign claims and the decreasing importance of official foreign reserves, China would be able to earn higher net investment income from abroad. Overall, China would continue to be a net creditor, with the net foreign asset position as a share of GDP remaining largely stable through this decade. These findings suggest that the renminbi real exchange rate would not be particularly sensitive to capital account liberalization as capital flows are expected to be two‐sided. The renminbi real exchange rate would likely be on a path of moderate appreciation as China is expected to maintain a sizeable growth differential with its trading partners.

Official forecasts and management of oil windfalls

Official forecasts for oil revenues and the burden of pensioners are used to estimate forward-looking fiscal policy rules for Norway and compared with permanent-income and bird-in-hand rules. The results suggest that fiscal reactions have been partial forward-looking with respect to the rising pension bill, but backward-looking with respect to oil and gas revenues. Solvency of the government finances might be an issue with the fiscal rules estimated from historical data. Simulation suggests that declining oil and gas revenue and the costs of a rapidly graying population will substantially deteriorate the net government asset position by 2060 unless fiscal policy becomes more prudent or current pension and fiscal reforms are successful.

How Would Capital Account Liberalisation Affect China’s Capital Flows and the Renminbi Real Exchange Rates?

In this paper we study the determinants of gross capital flows, project the size of China’s international investment positions in 2020 and analyse the implications for the renminbi real exchange rates. We assume in this exercise that the renminbi will have largely achieved capital account convertibility by the end of this decade, a timetable consistent with recent proposals by the People’s Bank of China. Our analysis shows that China’s gross international investment positions would grow significantly, and inflows and outflows would become much more balanced. The private sector would turn its net liability position into a balanced position, and the official sector would reduce its net asset position significantly, relative to the country’s GDP. Because of the increasing importance of private sector foreign claims and the decreasing importance of official foreign reserves, China would be able to earn higher net investment incomes from abroad. Overall, China would continue to be a net creditor, with the net foreign asset position as a share of GDP remaining largely stable through this decade. These findings suggest that the renminbi real exchange rate would not be particularly sensitive to capital account liberalisation as capital flows are expected to be two-sided. The renminbi real exchange rate would likely be on a path of moderate appreciation as China is expected to maintain a sizeable growth differential with its trading partners.

Bank Internationalisation During the Global Financial Crisis: An Asia Pacific Perspective

Bank internationalisation traditionally takes the form of lending to non-residents, but increasingly non-resident securities are purchased. These assets are funded mostly by international loans and deposits, rather than the issuance of securities. Within the Asia Pacific region, the largest net beneficiaries of international bank funding to developing economies are China, India and South Korea. Importantly, apart from the financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore, which show significant outward as well as inward banking flows, Chinese Taipei is an important international lender. Australia and New Zealand remain significant net international borrowers. The Global Financial Crisis reversed earlier developments with China and Japan now becoming net international borrowers, while both Hong Kong and Singapore have reduced their net asset positions.

Bank internationalisation during the Global Financial Crisis: an Asia Pacific perspective

Bank internationalisation traditionally takes the form of lending to non-residents, but increasingly non-resident securities are purchased. These assets are funded mostly by international loans and deposits, rather than the issuance of securities. Within the Asia Pacific region, the largest net beneficiaries of international bank funding to developing economies are China, India and South Korea. Importantly, apart from the financial centres of Hong Kong and Singapore, which show significant outward as well as inward banking flows, Chinese Taipei is an important international lender. Australia and New Zealand remain significant net international borrowers. The Global Financial Crisis reversed earlier developments with China and Japan now becoming net international borrowers, while both Hong Kong and Singapore have reduced their net asset positions.

Foreign Direct Investment in Canada

This article analyzes foreign direct investment in Canada. In 2009, Canadian direct investment in the United States was down sharply, generating a net liability position. Direct investment in other countries also declined, but the overall net asset position was sustained. The value of Canada’s direct investment abroad was declined by 7.5 percent in 2009.

The UK's international investment position

This paper describes the path of the UK's net asset position with the rest of the world. Notwithstanding that the UK has run a substantial current account deficit for over a quarter of a century, at the beginning of 2009 the net asset position was not far off balance. The paper begins by detailing recent developments in both the UK's overseas balance sheet, known as the international investment position (IIP), and the current account deficit. It examines the link between the IIP and the cumulative current account deficit over the past forty years and explains that the divergence between the two is due to other changes. The paper then introduces a model which enables a decomposition of these other changes into currency, price and other volume effects. The results are reported in terms of annual and quarterly changes before conclusions are drawn.

China’s Fiscal Sustainability: A Comment

China has become a major in the global economy: there is fear of its competitive pressure on global markets and on demand for resources, and there is fear of the consequences for global growth if its economy hits a serious speed bump. China is usually given pretty good marks for macroeconomic policy management, with moderate budget deficits and manageable on-balance sheet debt. Its fiscal challenges are usually seen as one of debt sustainability, with the main fear factor for the medium term being contingent liabilities arising from non-performing loans in the banking system and, for the longer term, unfunded pensions. Sustainability of government debt is perhaps the ultimate test the viability of an economic framework. If growth is underwritten by an accumulation of debt, whether on the public accounts as the result of open subsidies or as contingent government liabilities in the banks and social insurance funds, the usual consequences are a currency and/or banking sector crisis coupled with a surge in inflation that writes down the value of existing financial assets and liabilities. Is China facing such a future fiscal threat? The conclusion reached here is that concern with contingent liabilities stemming from non-performing loans in the banking sector is overblown and China may actually have a favourable net asset position. Nonetheless, China's public sector faces looming medium-term spending pressures that will put great pressure on it to raise taxes. And, as is well known, tax reform is hard, especially in a setting such as China's with a low trust society and a decentralized administrative structure with responsibility for social risks concentrated at the provincial level, which necessitates the establishment of an effective fiscal framework for sharing revenue while maintaining overall fiscal discipline. In addition, China approaches the next global downturn with much less flexibility to address macroeconomic stabilization through SOE expenditures financed by state-owned banks. The pressure on open deficit financing will be much greater; moreover, China has no experience in managing its rapidly changing economy by standard macro tools alone. Successful fiscal reform is thus a key to China’s ability to sustain its economic success.

The missing dark matter in the wealth of nations and its implications for global imbalances

Current account statistics may not be good indicators of the evolution of a country's net foreign assets and of its external position's sustainability. The value of existing assets may vary independently of current account flows, so-called ‘return privileges’ may allow some countries to obtain abnormal returns, and mismeasurement of FDI, unreported trade of insurance or liquidity services, and debt relief may also play a role. We analyse the relevant evidence in a large set of countries and periods, and examine measures of net foreign assets obtained by capitalizing the net investment income and then estimating the current account from the changes in this stock of foreign assets. We call dark matter the difference between our measure of net foreign assets and that measured by official statistics. We find it to be important for many countries, analyse its relationship with theoretically relevant factors, and note that the resulting perspective tends to make global net asset positions appear relatively stable. — Ricardo Hausmann and Federico Sturzenegger

International Recycling Channels of Petrodollars

The continued rise in oil prices since 2002 has resulted in a significant increase in export revenue for oil exporting countries. This increase in the price of oil and other commodities means that OPEC countries and Russia have received, between 2003 and 2006, a windfall of 1.3 trillion dollars with respect to their export level in 2002. This paper analyzes, using the limited data available, the recycling of these resources back to the world economy through the trade channel, via higher imports, or the financial channel, via an increase in the net external asset position of these countries. Our results show that around 50% of the windfall revenue has been used to increase imports, while the rest has been directed towards international reserve accumulation and other improvements in the net asset position of these countries. Comparing the current oil price increase with previous ones, such as those resulting from the tightening of oil supply in the 70's, we find that the trade channel has been more important in the current episode than in previous ones. This can be attributed to (i) the perception of a more permanent increase in the price of oil in the context of rising demand, and (ii) the gradualism of the current oil price increase, which has allowed a stronger response from imports.

Capital Flows to Central and Eastern Europe

We examine the evolution of the net external asset positions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) countries over the past decade, with a strong emphasis on the composition of their international balance sheets. We assess the extent of their international financial integration, compared with the advanced economies and other emerging markets, and highlight the salient features of their external capital structure in terms of the relative importance of FDI, portfolio equity, and external debt. In addition, we briefly describe the country and currency composition of their external liabilities. Finally, we explore the implications of the accumulated stock of external liabilities for future trade and current account balances.

Global Imbalances or Bad Accounting? The Missing Dark Matter in the Wealth of Nations

This paper argues that current account statistics may provide a poor indication for the real evolution of a country’s net foreign assets. This may be due to a series of factors including the mismeasurement of FDI, unreported trade of insurance or liquidity services and debt relief. Because of these problems we suggest estimating net foreign assets by capitalizing the net investment income and then estimating the current account from the changes in this stock of foreign assets. We call dark matter the difference between our measure of net foreign assets and that portrayed by official statistics. We find dark matter to be important for many countries and that it relates to FDI flows, domestic volatility, and debt relief. We also find that, once dark matter is taken into account, global net asset positions appear to be relatively stable. In particular, the exports of dark matter of the US appear to be fairly steady and large enough to keep the US net asset position stable, casting doubts on the need for a major adjustment of the dollar or a large rebalancing of the global economy. [Jointly published as Center for International Development Working Paper No. 124 and KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP06-003.]

Capital Flows to Central and Eastern Europe

We examine the evolution of the net external asset positions of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) countries over the past decade, with a strong emphasis on the composition of their international balance sheets. We assess the extent of their international financial integration, compared with the advanced economies and other emerging markets, and highlight the salient features of their external capital structure in terms of the relative importance of FDI, portfolio equity, and external debt. In addition, we briefly describe the country and currency composition of their external liabilities. Finally, we explore the implications of the accumulated stock of external liabilities for future trade and current account balances.

On the Determinants of External Imbalances and Net International Portfolio Flows: A Global Perspective

In a panel covering a large number of countries from 1970 to 2003, we show that net portfolio flows play an important role in correcting external imbalances, since they are driven by common determinants represented by countries’ demographic profiles, the quality of institutions, monetary aggregates and initial net financial asset positions. Population ageing causes current account deficits, net equity inflows and net outflows in debt instruments. A higher money to GDP ratio – associated with lower interest rates – favours international investments in domestic stocks to the detriment of the less attractive domestic bonds. Additionally, current account balances are driven negatively by real GDP growth, losses in competitiveness and increases in the quality of the institutions; net equity flows are driven positively by the quality of the institutions and negatively by per capita income; while net flows in debt instruments are driven by long-term interest rate differentials and deviations from the UIP. JEL Classification: F21, F32, F41, O16