Negotiation Of International Agreements Research Articles

Quiet early bird or loud late riser? Parliamentary activities and types of European Parliament involvement during the negotiation of international agreements

ABSTRACT This paper inductively distinguishes six types of European Parliament (EP) involvement in the negotiation of international agreements. Since 2009, the EP has veto power on international agreements and has leveraged it through various activities such as resolutions. However, there exists no cross-case characterization of the EP’s involvement. Therefore, this paper asks: what are the types of EP involvement during the negotiation of international agreements? To systematically compare the nature, frequency and timing of EP activities, sequence analysis is applied to a dataset of EP activities relative to the 344 agreements concluded since 2009. For a majority of agreements, the EP acts as a ‘bystander’ and does not conduct any activities. When it does conduct activities, the EP most frequently acts as a ‘loud late riser’ and is active only during the ratification stage. For other agreements, EP involvement is very diverse regarding the timing and frequency of activities.

Criminalising the Non-return of Cultural and Historical Goods under Temporary Exportation for Combating Illegal Trafficking in Cultural Property

The author examines the policies pursued by Belarus on the prevention of international illegal trafficking in antiquities and cultural goods. Clarifications of Article 230 of the Criminal Code of Belarus are proposed. The findings and recommendations could inform the ongoing work on amendments to the Code on Culture, negotiation of international agreements, and strengthening of the safeguards for the repatriation of cultural property under temporary exportation.

The procedural law of international agreements: A thematic journey through Article 218 TFEU

The study gives a thematic analysis of the ECJ case law on the procedural law under Article 218 TFEU. Article 218 lays down a single procedure of general application for the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international agreements by the EU. The study addresses questions on the scope of application of Article 218, the relationship between Article 218 and so-called “hybrid” acts of the Union and the Member States; the respective powers of the institutions in relating to the negotiation of international agreements by the Union; implementation of the EU’s international agreements and the European Parliament’s right to information. It is shown that the ECJ gives Article 218 TFEU a central position in defining the respective powers of the institutions compared to more general Treaty provisions – viz. Articles 13(2), 14(1), 16(1) and 17(1) TEU. The Court’s description of Article 218 TFEU as a provision of general application as well as its constitutional nature is also reflected in the case law. As for the powers of the Council, the Parliament and the Commission in respect of negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international agreements, the Court succeeds in striking a balance, so that each of the institutions has its own role to play.

Closed Oversight: European Parliament's Access to Official Secrets

This paper examines the role of the European Parliament to provide oversight in the context of EU executive secrecy. Behind closed doors meetings of EU executive actors are still commonplace for crucial policy issues, such as the euro crisis, or negotiations of international agreements with tremendous impact, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the US. Perhaps paradoxically, parliamentary oversight of executive power in the EU is also increasingly taking place behind closed doors. This paper examines how the European Parliament asserts its role in oversight and its challenges in access to official secrets. The paper argues that current parliamentary practice of access to official secrets does not meet the standard of democratic oversight facilitating public deliberation.

Democratizing EU External Relations: The European Parliament’s Informal Role in SWIFT, ACTA, and TTIP

Since 1958, the European Parliament (EP) has come a long way from being a talking shop to being a powerful legislative organ. In the European Union’s external relations, the EP’s role was initially very weak, when it was sometimes not even consulted on international agreements. The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the parliamentary role in external relations covering policies where the ordinary legislative procedure applies by ascribing the EP the right to ratification of international agreements. Formally limited to voting on final agreements, the EP has widely expanded its informal role in external relations since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force in December 2009. Now, its role goes beyond the provisions as laid out in the Lisbon Treaty and even the role of national parliaments in international agreements. Since the negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EP has been active at all stages of negotiations – negotiation directives, negotiation rounds, ratification of agreement, and implementation of agreement – which activities reach as far as influencing the agreements’ substance. Analysing with what strategies the EP has achieved this involvement – by providing original data from fifteen semi-structured interviews with EU officials – this article assesses the EP’s informal role in the negotiation of international agreements since the Lisbon Treaty in three in-depth case studies: the SWIFT agreement, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), and the ongoing TTIP negotiations.

Lessons from the Implementation of MDGs in Kenya: Options for a Post-2015 Framework

Kenya is playing a significant role in the development of post‐2015 MDG and SDG frameworks. This is compatible with the desire of the new leadership to be more proactive in the negotiation of international agreements. However, the synergies between various leadership roles remain under‐exploited, ultimately reducing Kenyan influence. In Kenya, the MDG period saw a fairly unsuccessful struggle to move away from the notion that the framework was an externally driven means to guide development assistance. While the present consultations around MDGs and SDGs might mean that governments will identify themselves more closely with the new framework, it does not mean that the framework will adequately reflect the views of the poor. Furthermore, there is a risk that a strong post‐2015 framework will dilute the imperative of human rights. The human rights framework offers the prospect of more transformative change, and there is a risk that it will be undermined if it does not form the core of the post‐2015 agreement.

Variable Geometry and International Relations Within the Matrix of the AFSJ: A Practice-Based Case Study of Opting-In and Out in EU-US Relations

The extensive legal flexibility accorded to the UK and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice in the Treaty of Lisbon was considered to threaten the legal coherence of the Union considerably. The flexibility was unique in many respects, not least for its broad application, its two-way “opt out and opt in” character, and its relationship to the Transitional Provisions, providing for further constitutional conditionality. One of the manifestations of flexibility is in the area of the external Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) in transatlantic relations. While flexibility has functionally formed part of several agreements between the EU and US to date, it has not impacted ostensibly upon legal coherence of EU external action in transatlantic relations. Flexibility does not appear to have complicated the negotiation of transatlantic agreements, and does not appear to have stalled evolution of the EU’s global objectives, or the deepening proximity between the EU and US legal orders.The account assesses the practical effects so far of the British, Irish, and to a much lesser extent, the Danish Protocols; whereby variable geometry in the AFSJ is examined on the basis of the practice that has developed in the last years since the Treaty of Lisbon. The paper also considers in detail their impact upon the international relations agreements of the EU, particularly their operation in the specific case of EU-US relations. The paper examines firstly the key legal provisions shaping variable geometry in the AFSJ; followed secondly by an analysis of the provisions for parliamentary scrutiny of these provisions in a domestic context in the UK and Ireland. Third, the operation of scrutiny provisions in the area of Transatlantic Relations is considered in Ireland and the UK; followed fourthly by an assessment of the external implications of variable geometry for the negotiation of international agreements; and fifthly by the practical consequences for pre-Lisbon Agreements of a UK “mass” opt-out.

Climate change regional review: Poland

AbstractPoland is a country where a climate change warming signal can be detected in temperature, but observed changes in other variables, and especially in precipitation, are complex. Temperature projections indicate further warming, but models do not agree as to seasonal distribution of changes in precipitation. This article reviews evidence for climate change and its impacts in Poland, in the context of observations and projections. It also reviews various aspects of climate change mitigation policy in the country whose energy supply is more coal‐dominated than any other country. This is one reason why climate change mitigation efforts are modest and climate policy largely passive. The dramatic decline of industrial production involving a rapid decline in CO2 emissions during 1989–1992 was the crucial element of the Poland's position in the negotiations of international agreements. The European Union (EU) accession in 2004 tied Poland to EU climate policy. This cautious approach is largely in harmony with public attitudes. Poles are aware of climate change, but it is not considered as a priority issue and public opinion is divided about the issues of mitigation. Adaptation to climate change impacts in Poland is driven by the fact that observed impacts are not very large and there is no persuasive attribution of these impacts to greenhouse gas emissions. Reactive adaptation to climate change is preferred over anticipatory adaptation. There are several ‘special care’ areas in Poland in terms of adaptation: the mountains; the coastal zone of the Baltic Sea; and the river valleys. WIREs Clim Change 2012 doi: 10.1002/wcc.175This article is categorized under: Trans‐Disciplinary Perspectives > National Reviews

Security of Energy Supply in the New Europe: A Role for the European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy?

External energy relations are essential components of both the European Union’s search for an overall energy strategy, an Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) and the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In this article questions are posed about the role for the use of nuclear technology as the means of meeting some of the objectives of both areas of policy. As both the EPE and the ENP are dependent on the negotiation of international agreements with third parties for their effectiveness the focus of analysis presented will be on the EU’s legal and constitutional framework for action and in particular the EURATOM Treaty which established the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957.

Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements

If the terms of a potential international agreement are interpreted as sharing surpluses generated by cooperation, they can be viewed, on an item by item basis, as giving an advantage to one or the other party. By interpreting bargaining outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to the status quo, we modify Rubinstein's full information bilateral alternative offers bargaining model, and find that this opens up new bargaining tactics in equilibrium. The Rubinstein solution no longer provides unique resolution to the bargaining problem. Instead, negotiators can choose from a continuum of strategies that involve holding tough positions and waiting for the other to concede. The tactic is visible in negotiations as diverse as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or North American Foreign Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This occurs although our negotiators are assumed to be fully informed about each other's priorities. Given the other's offer, a negotiator can choose optimally from a whole range of counteroffers in our model. But all of these leave her with the same ex ante expected utility. By focusing on the possible outcomes of a given strategy choice, we define an expected ex post evaluation of strategy that discriminates between strategies that were equivalent ex ante. Negotiators who seek to maximize this ex post valuation choose a tough bargaining position, offering less than the Rubinstein share, and wait, hoping that the other side will concede before they do.

Leadership Matters: International Treaty Ratification in Canada and the United States

The ratification process for international treaties has become increasingly politicized in many democratic states. While scholars have devoted attention to the negotiation of international agreements, few have studied ratification struggles that define the ultimate success or failure of international commitments. Fewer still have examined the dynamics of this process in comparative perspective. In this article, I address this gap in the literature by exploring the politics of contemporary international treaty ratification processes in Canada and the United States. Drawing on two-level game theory, I posit that the likelihood of ratification success in these two different systems is often a function of similar dynamics in elite strategies for treaty ratification. Democratic leaders who sign international agreements must consider a range of factors, from the characteristics of the treaty itself to legislative pressures, interest groups, and public opinion in both parliamentary democracies and presidential systems. A structured, focused comparison of Canadian and U.S. case studies shows that the likelihood of successful treaty ratification depends primarily upon executive strategies within certain scope conditions. Given the challenges of minority government in Canada and deep political divisions in the U.S., this study also directs attention to the importance of coalition-building to ratify international agreements. Recent political developments in Canada and the United States suggest a trend toward politicization of international treaty ratification processes. In the United States alone, there have been more than five hundred instances of presidential endorsement that did not lead to congressional ratification. (2) Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was nearly defeated in a federal election in 1988 when he linked his political fate to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA), and President Bill Clinton won a narrow victory for North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ratification in 1993. The Kyoto Protocol prompted serious resistance from provincial leaders in Canada, and President Bush actually withdrew U.S. support for the treaty soon after taking office. Recent struggles over treaties offer important lessons about the relationship between executive leadership and international cooperation in many democratic systems. The outcomes of contested national elections in both countries in 2004 also raised the stakes in building political coalitions for controversial treaties. Minority government in Canada and deep political divisions in the United States mean that executives bear an even heavier share of responsibility in debates about treaties, international commitments, and sovereignty. Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the negotiation of international agreements, but few have focused on ratification struggles that truly define the success or failure of international commitments. (3) Fewer still have studied the dynamics of ratification struggles in comparative perspective. Yet breakdowns, and near-breakdowns, of international cooperation are surprisingly common in the ratification phase. This study investigates the role that executive strategies play in four case studies of U.S. and Canadian struggles over international cooperation. Research questions include: What are the legal and political requirements for ratification of an international agreement across democratic systems? How similar or different are ratification processes? What conditions influence the likelihood of ratification success? What conditions lead to failure? And, why would treaty ratification processes ever fail if the chief negotiators are fully aware of domestic political constraints? This study employs the comparative case study method for the purpose of exploring four episodes of treaty ratification struggles: 1. United States' ratification of NAFTA (1991-1993); 2. Canadian ratification of CUFTA and NAFTA (1988-1993); 3. …

Infinity within the Brackets

The ethnographic subjects of this article are UN‐sponsored international conferences and their legal documents. Drawing upon fieldwork among Fiji delegates at these conferences, in this article I demonstrate the centrality of matters of form, as distinct from questions of “meaning,” in the negotiation of international agreements. A parallel usage of documents and of mats among Fijian negotiators provides a heuristic device for exploring questions of pattern and scale in the aesthetics of negotiation, [documents, institutions, knowledge, aesthetics, law, transnationalism]

The U.S. Global Change Research Program: History and organization

The U.S. government has been proactively seeking solutions to the growing concern with issues relating to global change through several initiatives. A major global change initiative in 1993 supported by both President Clinton and Vice President Gore was announced with the release of the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan. The objective is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. At that time, President Clinton also committed his administration to begin actively working on negotiations of international agreements on desertification and forestry. President Clinton's Earth Day announcement on 21 April 1993 stated,

U.S.-USSR Nuclear Arms Negotiations: The Process and the Lawyer

The bilateral negotiating process that has been developed to address the central problems of nuclear arms control has evolved to the point that it can be characterized as a proven mechanism for the negotiation of international agreements on these subjects. Even though the process was recently interrupted, and although it by no means represents the only vehicle available for the purpose, history demonstrates that employment of the methodical bilateral process can lead the way, under favorable political conditions, to the resolution of many of the difficult political and technical questions common to the field of nuclear arms control.

Negotiation of International Agreements in the Field of Commerce and Investment—Problems of Relevance to Newly-Independent States

Negotiation of International Agreements in the Field of Commerce and Investment—Problems of Relevance to Newly-Independent States