Negative Risk-return Relationship Research Articles

An aspirational perspective on the negative risk-return relationship

The existence of a negative risk-return relationship challenges the conventional wisdom of finance, which typically assumes a positive correlation between risk and return. Reference-dependent preferences, motivated by prospect theory, offer a possible explanation for this negative risk-return relation. However, as we demonstrate in this paper prospect theory does not provide a general explanation for this puzzle. We show that the expected utility theory with an aspiration level can effectively account for this phenomenon.

Corporate Diversification, Economies of Scope, and the Risk–Return Relationship

The negative relationship between corporate risk and corporate returns, also known as the “Bowman paradox,” has been an important puzzle in strategy research that has motivated dozens of empirical studies. Theoretically, the paradox was explained with an appeal to contingent managerial preferences for risk or to heterogeneous managerial capabilities. A popular alternative view has been that the paradox is merely an empirical artifact and, thus, does not need to be explained with management theories. Furthermore, the view that the negative risk-return relationship does not need to be explained theoretically translated into a bottom line for nearly five decades of research on diversified firms—that the paradox cannot be explained theoretically based on the context of corporate diversification. This study counters that pessimistic view and develops a formal model to explain theoretically how the negative risk-return relationship exists in diversified firms due to the interplay of two types of economies of scope. Thus, the Bowman paradox is explained in this study parsimoniously, with the fundamental features of the context of corporate diversification that exist regardless of the variation in managerial preferences for risk or in managerial capabilities.

Does the low-risk anomaly exist in the Indian equity market? A test using alternative risk measures

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the risk-return trade-off in the Indian equity market at both the aggregate equity market level and in the cross-sections of stock return using alternative risk measures.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses weekly and monthly data of 3,085 Bombay Stock Exchange-listed stocks spanning over 20 years from January 2000 to December 2019. The study evaluates the risk-return trade-off at the aggregate equity market level using the value-weighted and the equal-weighted broader portfolios. Eight different risk proxies belonging to the conventional, downside and extreme risk categories are considered to analyse the cross-sectional risk-return relationship.FindingsThe results show a positive equity premium on the value-weighted portfolio; however, the equal-weighted portfolio of these stocks shows an average return lower than the return on the 91-day Treasury Bills. The inverted size premium mainly causes this anomaly in the Indian equity market as the small stocks have lower returns than big stocks. The study presents a strong negative risk-return relationship across different risk proxies. However, under the subsample of more liquid stocks, the low-risk anomaly regarding other risk proxies becomes moderate except the beta-anomaly. This anomalous relationship seems to be caused by small and less liquid stocks having low institutional ownership and higher short-selling constraints.Practical implicationsThe findings have important implications for investors, managers and practitioners. Investors can incorporate the effects of different highlighted anomalies in their investment strategies to fetch higher returns. Managers can also use these findings in their capital budgeting decisions, resource allocations and other diverse range of direct and indirect decisions, particularly in emerging markets such as India. The findings provide insights to practitioners while valuing the firms.Originality/valueThe study is among the earlier attempts to examine the risk-return trade-off in an emerging equity market at both the aggregate equity market level and in the cross-sections of stock returns using alternative measures of risk and expected returns.

Corporate diversification, economies of scope, and the risk-return relationship

Corporate diversification was believed to enhance returns and reduce risk. Empirical research was split between supporting and rejecting speculations about the resulting favorable combination of high returns and low risk. The lack of theory in this regard and the empirical controversy made researchers conclude that the favorable risk-return performance is impossible. This study uses a formal model to develop the missing theory of the risk-return relationship in corporate diversification. The model involves two types of economies of scope, intra-temporal economies from resource sharing and inter-temporal economies from resource redeployment. The model demonstrates that, when both economies are present, firms sustain the negative risk-return relationship and can achieve the favorable combination of high returns and low risk. The model carefully explains mechanisms underlying these results.

Bowman’s Risk-Return Paradox: Evidence From Eastern Countries

Abstract While conventional wisdom has stated that greater risks typically bring greater rewards, many studies have shown that this is not generally true for the financial state of firms. This paradox, known as Bowman’s paradox has motivated studies to examine this relationship across different industries, periods, and nations. However, most of these studies have focused on Western countries such as Belgium and the United States of America. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by investigating the generalizability of Bowman’s paradox and prospect theory across three distinct Eastern countries. Data is collected from 10,623 firms located in China, Japan, and Vietnam. Cross- sectional and longitudinal associations between risk and return provided general support for Bowman’s paradox and prospect theory for the three Eastern countries. The results indicate that there is a general negative risk-return relationship for firms in these countries. Further analyses show that this relationship is stronger for firms performing below the industry median. This might suggest that firms that are in trouble usually take more risks. This relationship is strongest for firms in Japan, followed by firms in China and Vietnam, respectively.

Why Are Firms with Lower Performance More Volatile and Unpredictable? A Vulnerability Explanation of the Bowman Paradox

This study investigates the negative relationship between firm risk and accounting performance known in the strategy field as the Bowman paradox, which has been generally attributed to differences across firms in their willingness to take risk. Most research to date relies on the behavioral theory of the firm to suggest that underperformers take greater risks to increase their performance to their reference point. As an alternative explanation, we suggest that the Bowman paradox may result from the inherent vulnerability of low performers to negative external shocks. Our panel analysis of 2,681 U.S. firms from 1980 to 2010 confirms that firms with lower performance within their industry are more affected by negative shocks to the economy. The asymmetric vulnerability of low performers to external events makes their overall accounting performance more volatile and difficult to predict by market analysts, even if all firms have a similar attitude toward risk taking and capabilities to manage change. Our vulnerability explanation is also supported by our empirical analysis of the 2008 global financial crisis as a natural experiment. Furthermore, we find strong evidence of a negative risk–return relationship using different methods to control for their endogeneity.

Macroeconomic Sensitivity, Risk-Return Trade-Off and Volatility Dynamics Evidence From Developed and Developing Markets

This study aims to examine the impact of macroeconomic factors on the stock return volatility along with the pricing of risk, and asymmetry and leverage effect on a comparative basis for the USA and UAE markets. Further, these three dimensions are also investigated with regard to various firm's features (such as firm's size and age). The daily data for the period 4th January 2010 to 29th December 2017 of firm stock returns from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADSE), and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) is considered and three time-series models were applied. The results from GARCH (1. 1) indicated that all the economic factors have significant impact on the stock return volatility in both the markets. Similarly, the study also found evidence of asymmetry & leverage effect using EGARCH in the NYSE (for all firms) and the UAE (partially). Finally, for a majority of the firms, a positive risk-return relationship is found in the UAE and a negative risk-return relationship is found in the NYSE using GARCH-in the mean. Interestingly, these results in context of both markets were different with respect to various firm features such as firm size and age. In light of these results, it is concluded that both the markets have different dynamics with regard to all three dimensions. Hence, the investors have a clear opportunity to diversify their risk and investments across developed and emerging markets.

Volatility in the Housing Market: Evidence on Risk and Return in theLondon Sub-market

The impact of volatility in housing market analysis is reconsidered via examinaton ofthe risk-return relationship in the London housing market is examined. In addition to providing thefirst empirical results for the relationship between risk (as measured by volatility) and returns forthis submarket, the analysis offers a more general message to empiricists via a detailed and explicitevaluation of the impact of empirical design decisions upon inferences. In particular, the negativerisk-return relationship discussed frequently in the housing market literature is examined and shown todepend upon typically overlooked decisions concerning components of the empirical framework fromwhich statistical inferences are drawn.

Does managerial myopia explain Bowman’s Paradox?

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate if Bowman’s Paradox (negative association between risk and return) is caused by managerial myopia. It also attempts to disentangle whether results are more consistent with one or more potential explanations.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses univariate statistics and OLS regressions. Empirically examines the relationship between four risk and return proxies, across a wide ranging time period and utilizing a number of model specifications. Results hold after using three-way clustered errors and using a more robust rolling five year, fixed regression methodology measure.FindingsConfirms the existence of the Paradox. Also documents that the association between risk and return is positive in “winner” firms and negative in “loser” firms. Upon further analysis, the earlier negative risk-return relationship is found to entirely be due to the volatility of the (short term) income statement component of the performance terms. Results imply that executives of winner (loser) firms are less (more) likely to manage earnings or engage in other value destroying activities.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is confined by the typical archival study limitations; including potential endogeneity, selection biases and generalizability of the results.Practical implicationsAnecdotal evidence indicates that the business community makes extensive use of these performance measures. These performance measures are also pervasive in academic research. Given the importance of controlling for both managerial and firm performance, a good performance proxy is quintessential.Originality/valueAlthough over 30 years have passed since Bowman (1980) first observed the negative correlation, to date, no consensus explanation exists. Findings suggest that Bowman’s Paradox, is potentially a manifestation of managerial myopia. Thus, this result contributes to several existing research streams.

Empirical Analysis of the Intertemporal Relationship between Downside Risk and Expected Returns: Evidence from Time‐varying Transition Probability Models

AbstractThis paper examines the intertemporal relationship between downside risks and expected stock returns for five advanced markets. Using Value‐at‐Risk (VaR) as a measure of downside risk, we find a positive and significant relationship between VaR and the expected return before the world financial crisis (September 2008). However, when we estimate the model using a sample after this date, the results show a negative risk–return relationship. Evidence from a two‐state Markov regime‐switching model indicates that as uncertainty rises, the sign of the risk–return relationship turns negative. Evidence suggests that the Markov regime‐switching model helps to resolve the conflicting signs in the risk–return relationship.

A Tale of Two Investors: Estimating Optimism and Overconfidence

We estimate investors’ sentiment from option and stock prices by anchoring objective beliefs to a neoclassical pricing kernel. Our estimates of sentiment correlate well with other sentiment measures such as the Baker–Wurgler index, the Yale/Shiller crash confidence index and the Duke/CFO survey responses, and yet contain additional information. Our analysis points out three significant issues related to overconfidence. First, the Baker–Wurgler index strongly reflects excessive optimism but not overconfidence. Second, overconfidence drives the pricing kernel puzzle. Third, the dynamics of optimism and overconfidence generate a perceived negative risk-return relationship, while objectively the relationship is positive. Optimism and overconfidence about market returns co-move together, inflating asset prices in good times and exacerbating market crashes in bad times.

A Tale of Two Investors: Estimating Risk Aversion, Optimism, and Overconfidence

We estimate aggregate preferences, beliefs, and sentiment from option prices and historical returns. Our market-based estimates correlate well with independent survey-based estimates, and yet provide a number of novel insights. Our analysis points out two significant issues related to overconfidence. First, the Baker--Wurgler index strongly reflects excessive optimism but not overconfidence. Second, optimism and overconfidence comove over time and generate a perceived negative risk-return relationship, while objectively the relationship is positive.The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2295896

Risk-return relationship in a complex adaptive system.

For survival and development, autonomous agents in complex adaptive systems involving the human society must compete against or collaborate with others for sharing limited resources or wealth, by using different methods. One method is to invest, in order to obtain payoffs with risk. It is a common belief that investments with a positive risk-return relationship (namely, high risk high return and vice versa) are dominant over those with a negative risk-return relationship (i.e., high risk low return and vice versa) in the human society; the belief has a notable impact on daily investing activities of investors. Here we investigate the risk-return relationship in a model complex adaptive system, in order to study the effect of both market efficiency and closeness that exist in the human society and play an important role in helping to establish traditional finance/economics theories. We conduct a series of computer-aided human experiments, and also perform agent-based simulations and theoretical analysis to confirm the experimental observations and reveal the underlying mechanism. We report that investments with a negative risk-return relationship have dominance over those with a positive risk-return relationship instead in such a complex adaptive systems. We formulate the dynamical process for the system's evolution, which helps to discover the different role of identical and heterogeneous preferences. This work might be valuable not only to complexity science, but also to finance and economics, to management and social science, and to physics.

A Contingent Relationship Between Risk and Return: Toward A Behavioral Model of Decision Making

Different researchers have conceptualized the risk-return relationship as being positive, negative, or curvilinear. This paper proposes a framework where different theoretical approaches can be mapped onto a two-dimensional risk-return space in order to reconcile them. Rather than a single and fixed reference point, we propose that there are two additional reference points. Furthermore, we present a polynomial risk-return relationship that suggests a negative risk-return relationship below and above the failure and success reference points, and a positive relationship in between the two points. Practitioner as well as research implications are discussed.

Does conditional market skewness resolve the puzzling market risk-return relationship?

In this paper, we employ instrumental variables methods that allow time-varying risk and reward-to-risk to test various conditional asset pricing models. We find a negative partial relation between the market excess return and conditional market variance. In contrast with recent findings, we show that this negative relationship is not due to the omission of the hedge term associated with the ICAPM. However, conditional market skewness seems to partly account for this negative risk-return relationship.

The Fear and Exuberance from Implied Volatility of S&P 100 Index Options

This paper studies the relationship between option traders' risk perception, as proxied by the implied Market Volatility Index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and contemporaneous market conditions. The key discovery is that this metric of risk perception tends to increase when downside volatility increases more than upside volatility. The risk-return relationship is asymmetric and nonlinear, best described as a reclined S-curve. Extreme price decreases correlate strongly with rapid upward spikes in risk while extreme price increases correlate with relatively subdued falls in risk. This asymmetry points to another form of loss aversion. By further conditioning the downside and upside partitions of contemporaneous returns on the signs of lagged returns, it is revealed that consecutively falling prices are associated with increasing fear of risk while consecutive price run-ups have relatively weaker effect on reducing risk. Financial leverage (but not operating leverage) is found to be a plausible explanation for the general negative risk-return relationship. Moreover, high financial leverage helps to sharpen the curvature of the reclined S-curve. These results suggest that the true financial risk does not come in simple symmetry as conveniently assumed in mainstream financial research. This paper's primary contribution is to raise awareness of the semidimensional nature of risk.