Nazi Economic Research Articles

Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War by Pierpaolo Barbieri, and: Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three by Paul Dukes, and: The Third Reich in History and Memory by Richard J. Evans, and: An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler by Peter Fritzsche, and: Implacable Foes. War in the

Reviewed by: Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War by Pierpaolo Barbieri, and: Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three by Paul Dukes, and: The Third Reich in History and Memory by Richard J. Evans, and: An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler by Peter Fritzsche, and: Implacable Foes. War in the Pacific, 1944–1945 by Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, and: The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture by Benjamin G. Martin, and: World War II at Sea: A Global History by Craig L. Symonds Jeremy Black Hitler's Shadow Empire. Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War. By pierpaolo barbieri. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 368 pp. $22.50 (paper). Great Men in the Second World War: The Rise and Fall of the Big Three. By paul dukes. New York: Bloomsbury, 2017. 216 pp. $88.00 (hardcover). The Third Reich in History and Memory. By richard j. evans. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 496 pp. $18.95 (paper). An Iron Wind. Europe Under Hitler. By peter fritzsche. New York: Basic Books, 2016. 384 pp. $29.99 (hardcover). Implacable Foes. War in the Pacific, 1944–1945. By waldo heinrichs and marc gallicchio. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 728 pp. $34.95 (hardcover). The Nazi-Fascist New Order for European Culture. By benjamin g. martin. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. 370 pp. $39.95 (hardcover). World War II at Sea: A Global History. By craig l. symonds. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 792 pp. $34.95 (hardcover). The Second World War, Again All of these books are interesting, but this is the Journal of World History, and I shall review them accordingly, and not with the space or approach that would be relevant were I reviewing for a journal of national or European history. It is, for example, very much the case that the excellent work that continues to come out on German history, on Fascist history, and on aspects of alliance, collaboration and occupation in German-occupied Europe generally fails to draw on parallels elsewhere in the world during this period, and notably so as far as Japanese policy and practice are concerned. Archival issues preclude direct comparisons, but there is much material available in English-language secondary literature and the situation is therefore disappointing. So also for the military aspect of the war and of the pre-war crises. There is some insightful comparative work, commonly on the part of multi-author collections. However, such work pales considerably in scale when compared to the mass of material that looks simply at one of the conflicts that composed the world war. That choice reflects the experience that many individuals had, but not the reality of the strategic dilemmas facing the major powers. Indeed, the war took on strategic weight in terms of a series of time-space equations, and there were very different levels of skill in the handling of these equations. The greatest success, with all the consequences in terms of the staging of operations and, therefore, taking advantage of the pressures and opportunities allowed by simultaneity and sequencing, was achieved by the United States. It and Britain had to confront the issues posed by war with a number of combatants across the world. Germany and Japan each had a number of combatants, but not across such a range. By not fighting Japan until August 1945, the Soviet Union was able to restrict its combatants, and that provided it with major opportunities. These differences were important to the situation discussed by Craig Symonds in his World War II at Sea, although he does not bring out the broader, let alone theoretical, implications of his subject. Moreover, Symonds devotes most of his attention to a customary chronology and a conventional cast. The United States dominates his account. In contrast, insufficient attention is devoted to the Soviet Union and to France. That is a major problem with much of the literature on naval history, but a focus on the leading power is not necessarily helpful. An awareness of the oceanic dimension is an aspect of the key element of geopolitics. This emerges in...

Hitler's Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War by Pierpaolo Barbieri

<i>Hitler's Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War</i> by Pierpaolo Barbieri

Hitler’s Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War, by Pierpaolo Barbieri

Hitler’s Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War, by Pierpaolo Barbieri

Hitler's shadow empire: Nazi economics and the Spanish Civil War

Pitting fascists and communists in a showdown for supremacy, the Spanish Civil War has long been seen as a grim dress rehearsal for World War II. Francisco Franco s Nationalists prevailed with German and Italian military assistance a clear instance, it seemed, of like-minded regimes joining forces in the fight against global Bolshevism. In Hitler s Shadow Pierpaolo Barbieri revises this standard account of Axis intervention in the Spanish Civil War, arguing that economic ambitions not ideology drove Hitler s Iberian intervention. The Nazis hoped to establish an economic empire in Europe, and in Spain they tested the tactics intended for future subject territories.The Nazis provided Franco s Nationalists with planes, armaments, and tanks, but behind this largesse was a Faustian bargain. Through weapons and material support, Germany gradually absorbed Spain into an informal empire, extending control over key Spanish resources in order to fuel its own burgeoning war industries. This plan was only possible and profitable because of Hitler s economic czar, Hjalmar Schacht, a wizard of international finance. His policies fostered the interwar German recovery and consolidated Hitler s dictatorship. Though Schacht s economic strategy was eventually abandoned in favor of a very different conception of racial empire, Barbieri argues it was in many ways a more effective strategic option for the Third Reich.Deepening our understanding of the Spanish Civil War by placing it in the context of Nazi imperial ambitions, Hitler s Shadow Empire illuminates a fratricidal tragedy that still reverberates in Spanish life as well as the world war it heralded.

Hitler’s Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War

Hitler’s Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War

Nazi Economic Thought and Rhetoric During the Weimar Republic: Capitalism and its Discontents

At the heart of Nazism was a radical economic vision and rhetoric that provided the Nazis with an authenticity and legitimacy in their struggle to succeed the free-market capitalist economic system – this was crucial to their successful mass mobilisation and to becoming an acceptable party of government. While many of these views had deep historical and ideological roots in German society, they only became mainstream during the world economic depression. By then the Nazis' uncompromising political-economic demand that Germany could only prosper when overthrowing the Versailles peace order, looking after its national interests and doing things the German way had transformed from fringe view to mainstream consensus. At a time when capitalism's future and Germany's place in it looked bleak, many regarded the Nazis' economic vision entailing state control, autarky coupled with Grossraumwirtschaft and withdrawal from international cooperation in favour of nationalist policies as the most promising economic programme. Meanwhile Nazi rhetoric had become an integral part of a powerful anti-capitalist Zeitgeist, an ‘anti-system’ rallying cry that questioned the core principles of capitalism. Its proponents condemned its selfishness, materialism and unfairness, and instead demanded that the common good had to be protected from individual greed.

The Malthusian physiognomy of Nazi economics

The Nazi economic recovery, achieved between 1933 and 1938, displayed striking features of brilliant economic overhauling of a capitalist machine that had been plagued by a prolonged crisis. The means employed to effect the recovery appear to follow a Malthusian exercise in the rehabilitation of the function of effective demand: the Nazis, prompted by expediency and necessity, took remedial action that was very much in consonance with the canons of classical political economy. The succinct analysis of such an exercise in the context of the strong governmental regimentation of the Third Reich may provide insight into the nature and future of the capitalist regime, in the light of the fact that its principles, business and philosophical, and its implications for the world at large, so far, have not shown a marked departure from the way in which they were understood by the spirit of the 1930s, in Germany, as well as abroad.

Holocaust Controversies in the 1990s: The Revenge of History or the History of Revenge?

During the 1990s it was often remarked that controversies about the persecution and mass murderof the Jews between 1933 and 1945 had acquired an unprecedented volume and vehemence. Indeed, the esca...

Book Review: The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews

Book Review: The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews, by Harold James

<i>The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War Against the Jews</i>, by Harold James

Reviews of Books:The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property Harold James

Reviews of Books:The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property Harold James

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property

1University of Connecticut The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish‐Owned Property HaroldJames CambridgeCambridge University Press 2001280$25.00

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property

The Deutsche Bank and the Nazi Economic War against the Jews: The Expropriation of Jewish-Owned Property

Hitler's economy: Nazi work creation programs, 1933-1936

Preface Introduction National Socialist Labor Market Statistics: Fact or Fiction? Financing Germany's Economic Recovery National Socialist Creation from Theory to Practice Creation in Action: The Conquest of Unemployment Race Policy, Agricultural Policy, and Creation: The Hellmuth Plan for the Rhon Local and Regional Efforts in the Battle for Work Road Building: Motorization, Creation, and Preparation for War The Voluntary Labor Service under National Socialism From Creating Jobs to Allocating Labor The Nazi Economic Achievement: A Comparative Evaluation Appendix Notes Sources Index

Weimar Economic Decline, Nazi Economic Recovery, and the Stabilization of Political Dictatorship

A politicoeconomic model of the relationship between economic and structural variables and government popularity is developed and applied to the Weimar Republic. We obtained data from decentralized election results in the 1924 to 1933 period, using a weighted panel estimation method. Parameter estimates show a strong relationship between the development of economic variables and the decline in electoral support that confronted every government in this period. We link this finding to existing historiographie theories and extrapolate from it to estimate the effects of the economic recovery in the first years of the Nazi regime.

Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory and Policy.

Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory and Policy.

Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy

Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy

Soviet and Nazi Economic Planning in the 1930s

This paper argues that economic planning under Stalin and Hitler in the 1930s was essentially similar, both in process and outcome. Both economies had fixed prices and used coercion as part of a rather chaotic process of resource allocation; consumption in both countries was sacrificed to investment in heavy industry. Both economies can be thought of as socialist, and socialism in the 1930s was hardly more than military mobilization. The economy of the Soviet Union is distinguished from that of capitalist economies by having both public ownership of property and centralized economic planning. This two-dimensional classification gives rise to questions about intermediate cases, particularly now that the Soviet economy is in the process of change. Economies with public ownership of property but not planning have been analyzed under the label of market socialism. Economies with private ownership and central planning have suffered neglect by comparison. The Nazi and wartime economies are mentioned occasionally as examples, but little attention has been paid to them in this context. (For example, Pryor, 1985, p. 24, ) This paper compares the process of economic planning in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the 1930s. I argue that there were many similarities between planning in the two economies. The commonalities derived in large part from the use of fixed prices and economic coercion. Planning in the Soviet Union was less well organized and planning in Nazi Germany was more organized than might be thought. Two implications follow from this finding. First, actual socialist planning in the 1930s was closer to military mobilization than the market socialism of Western theorists or postwar Yugoslavia. Although not a new view, this conclusion has dropped out of recent discussions of the Soviet economy and needs reemphasis (Gregory and Stuart, 1990) . Second, the Nazi economy shared many characteristics with the dominant socialist economy of the time. The National Socialists were socialist in practice as well as name. The investigation will proceed in three steps. I will look first at the inputs to planning: bureaucracy, fixed prices, economic incentives. Then I will examine the major outputs of planning: the growth of output, its composition, and the standard of living. Finally I will attempt to infer the planners* aims from their activities as well as their statements. A concluding section reiterates some important differences between the Nazi and Soviet economies.

Nazi economics: ideology, theory, and policy

The Nazis' economic principles and projects before 1933 nationalist Etatism in German economic thought ideology and the economy - the institutional framework ideology and the economy - implemented policies, 1933-1936 the economy of war and conquest, 1937-1945.