Naval Rivalry Research Articles

Chapter Eleven: Naval competition and security in East Asia

Strategic links between Japan and Europe during the Cold War were limited. During this period the IISS helped bridge the gap between the two, exposing its membership base to the international affairs of Asia and Japan and providing Japanses scholars, strategists and diplomats with a platform from which to amplify their voices in the West. Analyses by these experts often appeared in IISS publications, but the Institute also gained key insights through its well-established conferences and lecture series. These initiatives illuminated Japanese strategic thinking and perspectives on contemporary critical issues in Japan’s and Asia’s foreign, security and defence policy.This Adelphi book, through its collection of earlier analysis, helps the reader to understand the evolution of Japanese strategic thought from the 1960s until today, and shines a light on the continuities and changes in this thinking. New, original analysis of the material seeks to identify areas where such thinking was prescient and remains relevant to the contemporary strategic environment, and other areas where predictions failed or assumptions were proved wrong. These new essays were also informed by interviews of Japanese senior scholars and diplomats who spent time with the IISS. This book seeks to frame, educate and guide strategic thinking on the most pressing issues of today, both in and outside Japan and Asia, and will be of great interest to analysts, practitioners and students of international affairs.

Redes empresariales y administración estatal: La provisión de materiales estratégicos en el mundo hispánico durante el largo siglo XVIII

Redes empresariales y administración estatal: La provisión de materiales estratégicos en el mundo hispánico durante el largo siglo XVIII

Strategic Posturing of China in IOR

China has been working on a modernization plan for its military. Particularly, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has been the focus of modernization due to China’s seaward economic growth and development for protecting its maritime economic interests. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of strategic envisioning which has multiple facades besides dividends. Since China has a massive trade volume transiting Indian Ocean Region, PLAN has increased engagement in this region. Its modernization including its naval capabilities, surface and underwater vessels, unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs), acoustic systems for information, and other technological advancements has made China’s strategic posture in IOR dynamic and is threatening India’s intrinsic naval supremacy in the region with certain implications over regional peace and stability. This is exploratory research conducted to determine the nature of naval competition and the resulting balance of power to identify implications for regional peace and stability.

David Lloyd George and the American Naval Challenge: Great Britain and the Washington Conference

ABSTRACT The First World War spurred the United States to acquire – in the words of Woodrow Wilson – ‘incomparably the greatest navy in the world’, and amongst the many problems confronting Britain after 1919 was how to avoid an Anglo-American naval arms race. David Lloyd George was determined not to sleepwalk into another struggle for naval mastery. He rejected the expert opinion of his top naval advisers that building capital ships would enhance Britain’s security. Instead, he showed restraint in responding to the American naval build-up, while doggedly pursuing arms control talks with Washington. He thus prevented an escalation of the naval arms competition that emerged after the war, and so created the favourable conditions for a negotiated settlement of the naval rivalry with the United States and provided for Britain’s security at sea.

‘An Empire Dock’: Place Promotion and the Local Acculturation of Imperial Discourse in ‘Britain’s Third Port’

This article explores the employment and adaptation of imperial ideas and imagery in the civic performance and presentation of Hull, the East Yorkshire port city, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Focusing, in particular, on the opening ceremony of a new dock in June 1914 - organised around the procession of King George V and the Queen-consort Mary - the article contests that imperial discourses were adapted for use in the local context during this period. At a time when the British empire was widely seen to require renewal, following military mistakes in South Africa and growing economic and naval competition with Germany and North America, civic performances such as dock openings provided a means for the presentation of the provincial city to a national and, potentially, international audience. They were also an opportunity to present an image of a still robust and powerful empire. Opening ceremonies provided local political and business elites with a stage for situating the city within the broader structures of empire, conferring, in concert with the approval of the Crown, an association with imperial grandeur and socioeconomic innovation.

The Hegemonic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region and the Making of South Korea as a Middle Sea Power

A realist perspective is prevalent in relation to the newly emerging naval rivalry between the United States and China and its consequences for their neighbors. China’s drive to construct artificial islands in the South China Sea has drawn global attention, while its Belt and Road Initiative has induced the United States and Japan to counter-propose the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. The shifting attention beyond the China Seas has everyone scrambling to protect their commercial interests and national security, which are heavily dependent on the sea lines of communication. This study examines the rivalry between the United States, China and Japan, and draws its implications for South Korea from a ‘point-line-plane’ perspective. In the face of thorny challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, South Korea needs to rejuvenate its long-lost identity as a sea power and its navy should work closely with the Vietnam People’s Navy. In particular, establishing a strategic point at one of the naval bases in southern Vietnam such as Danang, Cam Ranh or Nhơn Trạch will have significant consequences not just for their bilateral ties but also for the South China Sea region and beyond.

Can China Change the International System? The Role of Moral Leadership

Abstract Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion. This essay evaluates the feasibility of China’s attainment of humane authority, which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China’s growth will lead to a bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent. Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a ‘new Cold War’, which would hamper China’s efforts to widen its circle of followers. To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security dilemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of labour, by accepting the other’s pre-eminence in different areas through social cooperation.

Perspectives on The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War

Perspectives on <i>The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War</i>

Lloyd George and the American Naval Challenge: “The Naval Battle of Paris”

ABSTRACTIn the immediate aftermath of the First World War, naval competition loomed between Great Britain and the United States. This American naval challenge frustrated Britain’s leaders, who were determined to hold onto their country’s hard-won standing as the world’s leading sea Power. Britain’s Prime Minister David Lloyd George chose the setting of the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference to force a showdown with American leaders in an attempt to curtail their naval shipbuilding. Much to Lloyd George’s chagrin, the Americans proved obdurate in negotiations. President Woodrow Wilson and his naval advisors refused to stop the American buildup of large and powerful capital ships that called into question Britain’s naval mastery. The deadlocked talks between American and British naval leaders threatened to wreck the peace negotiations and the establishment of the League of Nations. To prevent a breakdown in Anglo-American relations at Paris, Sir Robert Cecil and Colonel Edward House negotiated an agreement that pledged both countries to work towards a settlement of their naval competition. This analysis examines Lloyd George’s motivations and actions in provoking this confrontation to defeat America’s naval challenge in what would later become known as the naval battle of Paris.

Introduction: Of War and Peace: Aspects of British Policy and the Treaty of Versailles

ABSTRACTThe Treaty of Versailles is one of the twentieth century’s most controversial international agreements; and British policy towards the settlement with defeated Germany equally so. British policy at the Peace Conference stemmed from war aims developed after 1914 – desultory because of unexpected total war. In this process after December 1916, Prime Minister David Lloyd George controlled policy-making and, by late 1918, had general aims involving German territorial losses, disarmament, and paying for the war. Despite distrusting Foreign Office professionals, Lloyd George and his Downing Street advisors at Paris relied on non-professional experts through informal networks below them. One was James Headlam-Morley about the future of Danzig; and several pre-war historians also contributed in a profound way, their experiences stimulating the establishment of diplomatic history as a field of academic research and the emergence of the nascent discipline of international relations. On bigger issues, like Anglo-American naval rivalry that emerged at the Conference, Lloyd George sparred with President Woodrow Wilson. And as only Lloyd George of the Big Four survived politically after the Conference, development of his ideas and policies during the war and after played a major role in post-war international politics. Some issues at Paris have not received needed attention like the restitution of cultural objects in German possession: the Koran of Caliph Othman and the Skull of Sultan Mkwawa. Finally, after the war, the Treaty’s impact on both Britain’s enemy, Germany, and its ally, France profoundly affected the European balance of power.

Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage

Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.

Introduction

Introduction Nadège Rolland (bio) In recent years the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as the "One Belt, One Road" strategy, has emerged as the cornerstone of China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping. Presented as a cooperative endeavor motivated by China's willingness to bring economic prosperity, growth, and stability to its wider periphery, BRI nevertheless has more than one purpose. As part of its New Silk Road project launched in 2015, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has been studying BRI in detail over the last several years. We have unpacked its drivers, ambitions, and strategic implications.1 We have analyzed its possible impact on the Eurasian continental and maritime energy environment,2 described and assessed regional responses,3 underlined the challenges and uncertainties it faces,4 and participated in policymaking assessments of the initiative.5 This Asia Policy roundtable follows in the footsteps of these groundbreaking research activities, this time with the intention to shed light on BRI's military and security implications in South Asia. The roundtable has been made possible by the generous support of the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security, which partnered with NBR on a new project launched in 2018 dedicated to examining how China's expanding interests along the belt and road affect its military and security calculations and shape its external security behavior. [End Page 2] As China's economic and political footprint expands along the continental Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, an increasing number of Chinese diplomats, businessmen, and workers are venturing into areas that were until now largely outside China's traditional reach. Along the belt and road, the security situation is often volatile due to insurgency and destabilizing spillovers from regional conflicts. How the Chinese military and security elite are trying to protect and secure China's interests along the new Silk Roads is one of the issues critical to BRI's sustainability and success. Nowhere is China's tentative response to BRI's security challenges more apparent than in South Asia. The significance of this geographic space is self-evident, as this subregion is where the continental "belt" meets the maritime "road" and connects three continents—Europe, Africa, and Asia—via land and the Indian Ocean, a crucial artery for international commerce and energy supplies. But it is also where BRI faces a whole gamut of serious security challenges, from traditional conflicts centered on territorial and border disputes, to potential naval competition with India, to nontraditional terrorist and religious insurgencies, to energy security challenges. Pakistan epitomizes most of the security challenges BRI faces. Using the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a test case to assess how China attempts to secure its assets, Filippo Boni finds that the responsibility to protect Chinese citizens and assets is delegated to the Pakistani military and police forces, who have benefited from increased cooperation with their Chinese counterparts. Pakistan is also the only example of a South Asian country where Chinese private security companies operate so far. Meia Nouwens notes that the lack of either international or domestic regulations, combined with these companies' relative inexperience with operating in hostile environments, increases risks of miscalculation. Widening the geographic focus to the entire Indian Ocean, Nilanthi Samaranayake looks at China's first attempts in securing the Maritime Silk Road. Although Beijing's efforts still seem limited in scope and constricted by local and regional counterbalancing, the situation could change in the long run. It is precisely against the possibility of losing their strategic edge in the Indian Ocean to an expanded Chinese naval presence that both India and the United States should strengthen their countervailing response, argue Gurpreet Khurana and Arzan Tarapore. Considering the national security risks posed by China's expanded influence on its traditional periphery, India should promote military and geoeconomic [End Page 3] solutions, argues Khurana. Viewing BRI as an essential element of China's grand strategy, Tarapore advocates enhanced U.S. partnerships with regional states, with India at the core, and a comprehensive U.S. strategy that blurs the traditional economic and security fault lines (not unlike BRI itself). Taken together, the essays presented in this roundtable offer a...

Freedom of Navigation in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Case Study of Japan's Maritime Jurisdictional Claims

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) formalizes many rules about the extent and type of jurisdiction that states are entitled to claim over the navigation of vessels at sea. Disagreement over the interpretations of those rules have been a growing source of contention, particularly among Asian states embroiled in disputes over “freedom of navigation.” Despite the significance of maritime legal claims in contemporary naval competition, however, international relations scholars have not sought to explain patterns in the maritime jurisdictional claims and enforcement behaviors of states. This paper proposes a theory for predicting states’ approach to freedom of navigation (FON). I hypothesize that states with military power projection capability and/or economic dependence on trade and imported energy will be more likely to advocate maximal freedom of navigation, while states with a historical memory of naval assault or invasion and/or a perception of threat from naval powers will be more likely to impose restrictions on FON near their coasts. Based upon combinations of these variables, I develop sixteen ideal state types that can be used to categorize states and predict the positions they will adopt on FON. After developing this theory, I conduct an initial case study of Japan, which my theory predicts would espouse a mixed position on FON. Drawing upon both primary and secondary research, including interviews conducted in fall 2017 with six American and 25 Japanese maritime legal experts and officials, I find that Japan’s positions toward FON are indeed mixed. Although the motivations for Japan’s positions largely accord with the predictions of my theory, my findings also highlight the singular importance of Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States in shaping the contours of its maritime jurisdictional claims.

The Rise of the Chinese Navy: A Tirpitzian Perspective of Sea Power and International Relations

Western commentators often view the emergence of a modernizing Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) through the theoretical lens of Alfred Thayer Mahan, an influential 19th century American naval theorist who advocated an imperialistic brand of sea power modeled on the British example. This approach, however, risks painting a misleading picture of China's naval ambitions because it is based on a hegemonic theory of naval power that most regional powers cannot realistically follow. Instead, this article turns to the writings of Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the short‐lived German battle fleet that unsuccessfully challenged British naval dominance during World War I. Applying his ideas about naval power and hegemony to East Asia's strategic context is a useful heuristic device for revealing key logics behind three facets of US–Chinese naval rivalry: (i) China's anxieties over access to markets; (ii) the importance of alliance value; and (iii) the fiscal, operational, and technological dynamics that shape naval arms races between a hegemon and its weaker regional contender. In all three cases, the application of non‐hegemonic naval theory raises important questions about the sustainability and justice of current US naval strategy in the Western Pacific while simultaneously laying bare the major pitfalls of China's current trajectory.

Maritime Component of China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): India–China Competition in the Arabian Sea

ABSTRACTThe China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) provides a great platform for China and Pakistan to promote regional trade activity. The massive infrastructure project to improve maritime and road connectivity is viewed as being a “game-changer” for Pakistan’s economy. However, the CPEC project at its core is envisaged as the link between China’s ambitious “One Belt and One Road” project and the “Maritime Silk Route” project. There is plausibility in the argument that connectivity projects, naval cooperation and the deepening bilateral relationship with the littorals of the Indian Ocean, particularly Pakistan, would certainly increase China’s maritime influence in the region. In view of the above, the paper will analyse how the China–Pakistan naval cooperation will upset the regional balance and intensify the naval competition between India and China in the Arabian Sea.

COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPROACHES TO THE STUDY BRITAIN AND GERMAN NAVAL ANTAGONISM IN WORKS OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE GERMAN HISTORIANS IN 20-30s. IN XX CENTURY

In article the author researches the liberal and conservative German historians devoted to questions of the British-German sea rivalry before World War I, published in the period of the 20th - the 30th of the XX century. The special attention is paid to A. Tirpitz, E. Kehr, G. Halgarten, G. Hertsfeld, H. Fenris, B. Mikhalik and G. Erdbryuger analytical works to whom authors presented the original judgments regarding a perspective of a military marinism of the beginning of last century. The importance of scientific activity above the specified historians is, first of all, that it proceeded in the period of rough shocks of post-war German society. This circumstance very promoted emergence of cardinally opposite historiographic schools, with "set" of belief which occupied one of the leading provisions in the German historiography of naval rivalry for the next decades. Relevance of the researches presented in works of authors is determined not only original statement of questions, generalization of the saved-up material by the studied problem, but also input in a scientific turn of new archival materials. The contribution of each of scientists to the developed subject is estimated, and also the factors promoting formation of the developed theses and providing them success in work are represented.

Visions of Empire: Patriotism, Popular Culture and the City, 1870–1939 by Brad Beaven, and: Britain’s Imperial Muse: The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian Empire, 1784–1914 by Christopher Hagerman, and: Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914 by Jon K. Hendrickson, and: Mapping the End of Empire: American and British Strategic Visions in the Postwar World by

Visions of Empire: Patriotism, Popular Culture and the City, 1870–1939 by Brad Beaven, and: Britain’s Imperial Muse: The Classics, Imperialism, and the Indian Empire, 1784–1914 by Christopher Hagerman, and: Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914 by Jon K. Hendrickson, and: Mapping the End of Empire: American and British Strategic Visions in the Postwar World by

Jon K. Hendrickson. Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914.

Jon K. Hendrickson. Crisis in the Mediterranean: Naval Competition and Great Power Politics, 1904–1914.

RIGHTING THE SCHOLARSHIP: THE BATTLE-CRUISER IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

ABSTRACTThe provenance of the dreadnought battle-cruiser and its significance with respect to the Anglo-German naval rivalry has generated sharp scholarly disagreement. This article reviews the work of four historians who have wrestled with the battle-cruiser issue in order to evaluate their different approaches to the evidence and conflicting conclusions. It then identifies hitherto unnoticed connections between the battle cruiser, a redefinition of the two-Power standard, and the financing of the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act.

On forecasting the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States

The article discusses the prospects of relations between China and the United States compared to the relations that have taken place between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. A comparison of relations between the two pairs of superpowers is made in the article based on the following parameters: the interaction of the superpowers in economic and financial sectors, the struggle for the world’s mineral resources, relations in the strategic nuclear sphere, naval rivalry, relationship in the land theaters, and conflicts in cyberspace.